History of the Peloponnesian War

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1.52.2.1
But they, having put out with their ships from the land, and formed them in line at sea, remained quiet; not intending voluntarily to begin a battle, since they saw that fresh ships from Athens had joined them; and that they themselves were involved in many difficulties, with regard to the safe keeping of the prisoners they had on board, and because there were no means of refitting their ships in so deserted a place.
1.52.3.1
Nay, they were thinking of their voyage home, how they should return; being afraid that the Athenians might consider the treaty to have been broken, because they had come to blows, and not allow them to sail away.
1.53.1.1
They determined therefore to put some men on board a skiff and send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, and make an experiment.
1.53.2.1
And having sent them, they spoke as follows: You do wrong, Athenians, in beginning war, and breaking treaty: for while we are avenging ourselves on our enemies, you stand in our way, and raise arms against us. Now if your purpose is to stop our sailing to Corcyra, or wherever else we wish, and if you mean to break the treaty, then seize us here in the first place, and treat us as enemies.
1.53.3.1
They spoke to this effect, and all the army of the Corcyraeans that heard them immediately cried out, Seize them and put them to death! But the Athenians answered as follows:
1.53.4.1
We are neither commencing war, Peloponnesians, nor breaking the treaty; but we have come to assist the Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If therefore you wish to sail any where else, we do not stop you; but if you sail against Corcyra, or to any of the places belonging to them, we shall, to the best of our power, not permit it.
1.54.1.1
The Athenians having made this reply, the Corinthians began to prepare for their voyage homewards, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent: while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which had been carried to them by the current and the wind, which had risen in the night, and scattered them in all directions; and erected a counter-trophy at Sybota on the island, considering that they had been victorious.
1.54.2.1
It was on the following view of the case that each side claimed the victory.—The Corinthians erected a trophy, as having had the advantage in the battle until night, so that they got possession of most wrecks and dead bodies; as having no less than a thousand prisoners; and as having sunk more than seventy ships. The Corcyraeans erected a trophy for these reasons;—because they had destroyed about thirty ships; and after the Athenians were come, had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side; and because the Corinthians the day before had rowed sternwards and retreated from them, on seeing the Athenian ships; and after they were come, did not sail out from Sybota to oppose them. Thus each side claimed to be victorious.
1.55.1.1
As the Corinthians were sailing away homeward, they took by treachery Anactorium, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was possessed in common by the Corcyraeans and them; and after establishing in it a Corinthian population [only], they retired homewards; and of the Corcyraeans, eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody, and treated with great attention, that on their return they might win over Corcyra to them. For most of them happened to be the first men of the city in power.
1.55.2.1
Corcyra then in this way outlived the war with the Corinthians; and the ships of the Athenians returned from it. This was the first ground the Corinthians had for their war against the Athenians, namely, that in time of peace they had fought with them by sea in conjunction with the Corcyraeans.
1.56.1.1
Immediately after this the following disagreements arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, to lead them to war.
1.56.2.1
While the Corinthians were contriving how to avenge themselves on them, the Athenians, suspecting their hostility, ordered the Potidaeans, who live on the isthmus of Pallene, being colonists of the Corinthians, but their own subjects and tributaries, to throw down the wall towards Pallene, and give hostages; and to dismiss, and not receive in future, the magistrates whom the Corinthians used to send every year; being afraid that they might revolt at the instigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and lead the rest of their allies Thrace-ward to revolt with them.
1.57.1.1
These precautionary measures with regard to the Potidaeans the Athenians began to adopt immediately after the sea-fight at Corcyra.
1.57.2.1
For the Corinthians were now openly at variance with then; and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had been made their enemy, though he was before an ally and a friend.
1.57.3.1
He became such, because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, when acting together against him.
1.57.4.1
And being alarmed, he both sent to Lacedaemon, and tried to contrive that they might be involved in war with the Peloponnesians, and endeavoured to win over the Corinthians, with a view to Potidaea's revolting;
1.57.5.1
and made proposals also to the Thrace-ward Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had in alliance with him these places on his borders, he should more easily carry on the war in conjunction with them.
1.57.6.1
The Athenians perceiving these things, and wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, as they happened to be sending out thirty ships and a thousand heavy-armed against his country, with Archestratus, the son of Lycomedes, as general with ten others, gave orders to the commanders of the fleet to take hostages of the Potidaeans, and throw down the wall, and keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities, to prevent their revolting.
1.58.1.1
Now the Potidaeans sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to try if by any means they might persuade them to adopt no new measures against them; and went also to Lacedaemon in company with the Corinthians, to provide themselves with assistance, should it be necessary; and when, after long negotiating, they obtained no favourable answer from the Athenians, but the ships commissioned against Macedonia were sailing just as much against them and when the authorities at Lacedaemon promised them, that should the Athenians go against Potidaea, they would make an incursion into Attica; then indeed, at that favourable moment, they revolted with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, having entered into a league together.
1.58.2.1
And Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and throw down their cities on the sea, and remove inland to Olynthus, and make that one city a place of strength for themselves. And to those who abandoned them he gave a part of his own territory in Mygdonia, round lake Bolbe, to enjoy as long as the war with the Athenians lasted. And so, throwing down their cities, they removed inland, and prepared for war.
1.59.1.1
The thirty ships of the Athenians arrived at the Thraceward towns, and found Potidaea and the rest in revolt:
1.59.2.1
and the generals thinking it impossible with their present force to carry on war both with Philip and the revolted towns, turned their attention to Macedonia, the object for which they were first sent out; and having established themselves there, carried on the war in conjunction with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country with an army from the interior.
1.60.1.1
And at this time, when Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian ships were cruising about Macedonia, the Corinthians, being alarmed for the place, and considering the danger to affect themselves, sent volunteers of their own people and mercenaries of the rest of the Peloponnesians, sixteen hundred heavy-armed in all and four hundred light-armed.
1.60.2.1
Their general was Aristeus, the son of Adimantus; and it was from friendship for him especially that most of the soldiers from Corinth joined the expedition as volunteers; for he was always favourably disposed towards the Potidaeans.
1.60.3.1
And they arrived in Thrace the fortieth day after Potidaea had revolted.
1.61.1.1
To the Athenians too came immediately the tidings of the cities having revolted; and when they found that the forces with Aristeus had gone there besides, they sent two thousand heavy-armed of their own men and forty slips to the revolted towns, with Callias, the son of Calliades, as general with four others;
1.61.2.1
who, on arriving in Macedonia first, found that the former thousand had just taken Therme, and were besieging Pydna.
1.61.3.1
So they also sat down before Pydna, and besieged it; but afterwards, having made terms and a compulsory alliance with Perdiccas, as they were hurried on by Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus there, they withdrew from Macedonia;
1.61.4.1
and having gone to Beroea, and thence turned again [to the coast], (after first attempting the place without taking it,) they continued their march by land to Potidaea, with three thousand heavy-armed of their own, and many of the allies besides, and six hundred horse of the Macedonians with Philip and Pausanias. At the same time seventy ships were sailing in a line with them.
1.61.5.1
And advancing by short marches, they arrived at Gigonus, and pitched their camp.
1.62.1.1
Now the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus, in expectation of the Athenians, were encamped towards Olynthus, on the isthmus, and had established their market outside the city.
1.62.2.1
As general of all the infantry the allies had chosen Aristeus; of the cavalry, Perdiccas; for he had broken terms again immediately with the Athenians, and was in alliance with the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus to represent him as commander.
1.62.3.1
The plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and watch the Athenians, in case of their coming against them; while the Chalcidians, and the allies beyond the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry with Perdiccas, should remain at Olynthus; and when the Athenians advanced against his force, they should come up in their rear to assist him, and enclose the enemy between them.
1.62.4.1
But on the other hand, Callias, the general of the Athenians and his fellow-commanders, despatch the cavalry of the Macedonians and a few of the allies towards Olynthus, to prevent the troops there from giving any assistance; while they themselves broke up their camp, and proceeded to Potidaea.
1.62.5.1
And when they were at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they also took an opposite position; and not long after they began the engagement.
1.62.6.1
And just the wing of Aristeus, and such picked troops of the Corinthians and the rest as were around him, routed the wing opposed to them, and advanced in pursuit a considerable distance; but the remaining force of the Potidaeans and Peloponnesians was beaten by the Athenians, and fled within the wall for refuge.
1.63.1.1
When Aristeus was returning from the pursuit, seeing the rest of the army conquered, he was at a loss which place he should risk going to, whether towards Olynthus, or to Potidaea. He determined, however, to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and at a running pace force his way into Potidaea: and he passed along the breakwater through the sea, annoyed by missiles [from the Athenian slips], and with difficulty; having lost a few men, but saved the rest.
1.63.2.1
Now the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans from Olynthus, (the town is about sixty stades off, and within sight,) when the battle was beginning, and the signals had been hoisted, advanced a short distance to give succour, and the Macedonian horse drew up against them to prevent it; but when the victory soon declared for the Athenians, and the signals had been taken down, they retired again within the wall, and the Macedonians to the Athenians. So neither side had any cavalry present [in the engagement].
1.63.3.1
After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidaeans under truce. There were killed of the Potidaeans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, and Callias their general.
1.64.1.1
Now against the wall on the side of the isthmus the Athenians immediately raised works, and manned them. But that towards Pallene had no works raised against it; for they did not think themselves strong enough both to keep a garrison on the isthmus, and to cross over to Pallene and raise works there; fearing that the Potidaeans and their allies might attack them when divided.
1.64.2.1
And the Athenians in the city, hearing that Pallene had no works on it, some time after send sixteen hundred heavy-armed of their own, and Phormio, the son of Asopius, as general; who reached Pallene, and setting out from Aphytis, led his army to Potidaea, advancing by short marches, and ravaging the country at the same time: and when no one came out to offer him battle, he threw up works against the wall on the side of Pallene.
1.64.3.1
And thus Potidaea was now besieged with all their power, on both sides, and from the sea at the same time by ships that were blockading it.
1.65.1.1
Now Aristeus, when it was surrounded with works, and he had no hope of its escape, unless some movement from the Peloponnese, or something else beyond their calculation, should occur, advised all, except five hundred, to watch for a wind and sail out of it, that their provisions might hold out the longer; and he was willing himself to be one of those who remained. But when he did not persuade them, from a wish to provide what was the next best thing to be done, and in order that affairs out of the place might proceed in the best way possible, he sailed out, without being observed by the guard-ships of the Athenians.
1.65.2.1
And remaining amongst the Chalcidians, he joined in the other measures of the war; and laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them; and sending to the Peloponnese, endeavoured to contrive a way in which some assistance might be brought. After the works round Potidaea were finished, Phormio with his sixteen hundred men proceeded to ravage Chalcidice and Bottice, and took some of the towns also.
1.66.1.1
The Athenians then and Peloponnesians had had these previous grounds of complaint against each other; the Corinthians, because Potidaea, which was a colony of their own, and men of Corinth and from the Peloponnese in it, were being besieged; the Athenians against the Peloponnesians, because they had caused the revolt of a city which was their ally and tributary, and had come and openly fought with them in conjunction with the Potidaeans. The war however had not yet positively broken out, but at present there was a suspension of hostilities; for the Corinthians had done these things on their own responsibility alone.
1.67.1.1
When, however, Potidaea was being besieged, they did not remain quiet, as they had men in it, and were alarmed for the place. And immediately they summoned the allies to Lacedaemon, and came and cried out against the Athenians, as having broken the treaty, and as injuring the Peloponnese.
1.67.2.1
And the aeginetans, though they did not openly send ambassadors, for fear of the Athenians, yet in secret most of all urged on the war in conjunction with them, saying that they were not independent according to the treaty.
1.67.3.1
So the Lacedaemonians, after summoning any one of the allies besides, who said that in any other respect he had been injured by the Athenians, held their ordinary assembly, and told them to speak.
1.67.4.1
And others came forward and severally made their complaints, and especially the Megareans, who urged no few other grounds of quarrel, but most of all their being excluded from the ports in the Athenian dominions, and from the Attic market, contrary to the treaty.
1.67.5.1
And the Corinthians came forward last, after permitting the others first to exasperate the Lacedaemonians; and they spoke after them as follows.
1.68.1.1
"The trustiness of your policy and intercourse amongst yourselves, Lacedaemonians, renders you the more distrustful with regard to others, if we say any thing [against them]; and from this you have a character for sober-mindedness, but betray too great ignorance with regard to foreign affairs.
1.68.2.1
For though we often forewarned you what injuries we were going to receive from the Athenians, you did not gain information respecting what we told you from time to time, but rather suspected the speakers of speaking for their own private interests. And for this reason it was not before we suffered, but when we are in the very act of suffering, that you have summoned the allies here; amongst whom we may speak with the greatest propriety, inasmuch as we have also the greatest complaints to make, being insulted by the Athenians, and neglected by you. And if they were an obscure people any where who were injuring Greece, you might have required additional warning, as not being acquainted with them;
1.68.3.1
but as it is, why need we speak at any great length, when you see that some of us are already enslaved, and that they are plotting against others, and especially against our allies, and have been for a long time prepared beforehand, in case they should ever go to war.
1.68.4.1
For they would not else have stolen Corcyra from us, and kept it in spite of us, and besieged Potidaea; of which places, the one is the most convenient for their deriving the full benefit from their possessions Thrace-ward, and the other would have supplied the largest navy to the Peloponnesians.
1.69.1.1
"And for these things it is you who are to blame, by having at first permitted them to fortify their city after the Median war, and subsequently to build the long walls; and by continually up to the present time depriving of liberty, not only those who had been enslaved by them, but your own allies also now. For it is not he who has enslaved them, but he who has the power to stop it, but overlooks it, that more truly does this; especially if he enjoys the reputation for virtue as being the liberator of Greece.
1.69.2.1
But with difficulty have we assembled now, and not even now for any clearly defined object. For we ought to be considering no longer whether we are injured, but in what way we shall defend ourselves. For the aggressors come with their plans already formed against us who have not made up our minds; at once, and not putting it off.
1.69.3.1
And we know in what way, and how gradually, the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours. And while they think that they are not observed through your want of perception, they feel less confident; but when they know that you are aware of their designs, but overlook them, they will press on you with all their power.
1.69.4.1
For you alone of the Greeks, Lacedaemonians, remain quiet, defending yourselves against any one, not by exertion of your power, but by mere demonstration of it;
1.69.5.1
and you alone put down the power of your enemies, not when beginning, but when growing twice as great as it was. And yet you used to have the name of cautious; but in your case the name, it seems, was more than the reality. For we ourselves know that the Mede came from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnese, before your forces went out to meet him as they should have done; and now the Athenians, who are not far removed, as he was, but close at hand, you overlook; and instead of attacking them, prefer to defend yourselves against their attack, and to reduce yourselves to mere chances in struggling with them when in a much more powerful condition: though you know that even the barbarian was chiefly wrecked upon himself; and that with regard to these very Athenians, we have often ere this escaped more by their errors than by assistance from you. For indeed hopes of you have before now in some instances even ruined some, while unprepared through trusting you.
1.69.6.1
And let none of you think that this is spoken for enmity, rather than for expostulation; for expostulation is due to friends who are in error, but accusation to enemies who have committed injustice.
1.70.1.1
"At the same time we consider that we, if any, have a right to administer rebuke to our neighbours; especially as the differences [between you and them] are great; of which you do not seem to us to have any perception, nor to have ever yet considered with what kind of people you will have to struggle in the Athenians, and how very, nay, how entirely different from yourselves.
1.70.2.1
They, for instance, are innovating, and quick to plan and accomplish by action what they have designed; while you are disposed to keep what you have, and form no new design, and by action not even to carry out what is necessary.
1.70.3.1
Again, they are bold even beyond their power, and adventurous beyond their judgment, and sanguine in dangers; while your character is to undertake things beneath your power, and not to trust even the sure grounds of your judgement, and to think that you will never escape from your dangers. Moreover, they are unhesitating, in opposition to you who are dilatory;
1.70.4.1
and fond of going from home, in opposition to you who are most fond of staying at home: for they think that by their absence they may acquire something; whereas you think that by attempting [more] you would do harm to what you have.
1.70.5.1
When they conquer their enemies, they carry out their advantage to the utmost; and when conquered, they fall back the least.
1.70.6.1
Further, they use their bodies as least belonging to them, for the good of their country; but their mind, as being most peculiarly their own, for achieving something on her account.
1.70.7.1
And what they have planned but not carried out, they think that in this they lose something already their own; what they have attempted and gained, that in this they have achieved but little in comparison with what they mean to do. Then, if they fail in an attempt at any thing, by forming fresh hopes in its stead, they supply the deficiency: for they are the only people that succeed to the full extent of their hope in what they have planned, because they quickly undertake what they have resolved.
1.70.8.1
And in this way they labour, with toils and dangers, all their life long; and least enjoy what they have, because they are always getting, and think a feast to be nothing else but to gain their ends, and inactive quiet to be no less a calamity than laborious occupation.
1.70.9.1
So that if any one should sum up their character, by saying, that they are made neither to be quiet themselves, nor let the rest of the world be so, he would speak correctly.
1.71.1.1
And yet when such is the character of this state that is opposed to you, Lacedaemonians, you go on delaying, and think that peace is not most lasting in the case of those men, who with their resources do what is right, while as regards their feelings, they are known to be determined not to put up with it, if they are injured: but you practise fair dealing on the principle of neither annoying others, nor being hurt yourselves in self-defence.
1.71.2.1
Scarcely, however, could you have succeeded in this, though you had lived by a state of congenial views: while as it is, your ways, as we just now showed you, are old-fashioned compared with them.
1.71.3.1
But, as in the case of art, improvements must ever prevail; and though for a state that enjoys quiet, unchanged institutions are best; yet, for those who are compelled to apply to many things, many a new device is also necessary. And for this reason the institutions of the Athenians, from their great experience, have been remodelled to a greater extent than yours.
1.71.4.1
At this point then let your dilatoriness cease: and now assist us, and especially the Potidaeans, as you undertook, by making with all speed an incursion into Attica; that you may not give up men who are your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and turn the rest of us in despair to some other alliance.
1.71.5.1
And in that we should do nothing unjust, in the sight either of the gods who received our oaths or of the men who witness [our conduct]: for the breakers of a treaty are not those who from destitution apply to others, but those who do not assist their confederates.
1.71.6.1
If, however, you will be zealous, we will stand by you; for neither should we act rightly in changing, nor should we find others more congenial.
1.71.7.1
Wherefore deliberate well, and endeavour to keep a supremacy in the Peloponnese no less than your fathers bequeathed to you.
1.72.1.1
To this effect spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, happening before this to have an embassy at Lacedaemon, and hearing what was said, thought that they ought to come before the Lacedaemonians, not to make any defence on the subject of' the charges which the states brought against them. but to prove, on a general view of the question, that they ought not to deliberate in a hurry, but take more time to consider it. They wished also to show how powerful their city was; and to remind the older men of what they knew, and to relate to the younger what they were unacquainted with; thinking that in consequence of what they said, they would be more disposed to remain quiet than to go to war.
1.72.2.1
So they came to the Lacedaemonians, and said that they also, [as the Corinthians had done,] wished to speak to their people, if nothing prevented. They told them to come forward; and the Athenians came forward, and spoke as follows.
1.73.1.1
"Our embassy was not sent for the purpose of controversy with your allies, but on the business on which the state sent us. Perceiving, however, that there is no small outcry against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the states, (for our words would not be addressed to you as judges, either of us or of them,) but to prevent your adopting bad counsel through being easily persuaded by the allies on matters of great importance; and at the same time with a wish to slow, on a view of the general argument as it affects us, that we do not improperly hold what we possess, and that our state is worthy of consideration. Now as to things of very ancient date why need we mention them? since hearsay must attest them, rather than the eyes of those who will be our auditors.
1.73.2.1
But the Median war, and the deeds with which you yourselves are acquainted, we must speak of; though it will be rather irksome to us to be for ever bringing them forward: for when we performed them, the danger was run for a benefit, of the reality of which you had your share; and let us not be deprived of the whole credit, if it is of any service to us.
1.73.3.1
Our words, however, will be spoken, not so much for the purpose of exculpation, as of testimony, and of showing with what kind of a state you will have to contend, if you do not take good counsel.
1.73.4.1
For we say that at Marathon we alone stood in the van of danger against the barbarian; and that when he came the second time, though we were not able to defend ourselves by land, we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis; which prevented his sailing against and ravaging the Peloponnese, city by city. while you would have been unable to assist one another against his numerous ships.
1.73.5.1
And he himself gave the greatest proof of this; for when conquered by sea, thinking that his power was no longer what it had been, retreated as quickly as he could with the greater part of his army.
1.74.1.1
"Such now having been the result, and it having been clearly shown that it was on the fleet of the Greeks that their cause depended, we contributed the three most useful things towards it; viz. the greatest number of ships, the most able man as a genera, and the most unshrinking zeal. Towards the four hundred ships we contributed not less than two parts; and Themistocles as commander, who was chiefly instrumental of their fighting in the Strait, which most clearly saved their cause; and you yourselves for this reason honoured him most, for a stranger, of all that have ever gone to you.
1.74.2.1
And a zeal by far the most daring we exhibited, inasmuch as when no one came to assist us by land, the rest as far as us being already enslaved, we determined, though we had left our city, and sacrificed our property, not even in those circumstances to abandon the common cause of the remaining allies, nor to become useless to them by dispersing; but to go on board our ships, and face the danger; and not to be angry because you had not previously assisted us.
1.74.3.1
So then we assert that we ourselves no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we obtained one. For you, setting out from cities that were inhabited, and with a view to enjoying them in future, came to our assistance, [only] after you were afraid for yourselves, and not so much for us; (at any rate, when we were still in safety, you did not come to us;) but we, setting out from a country which was no more, and running the risk for what existed only in scanty hope, bore our full share in the deliverance both of you and of ourselves.
1.74.4.1
But if we had before joined the Mede through fear for our country, like others, or had afterwards had no heart to go on board our ships, considering ourselves as ruined men; there would have been no longer any need of your fighting by sea without a sufficient number of ships, but things would have quietly progressed for him just as he wished.
1.75.1.1
"Do we not then deserve, Lacedaemonians, both for our zeal at that time, and the intelligence of our counsel, not to lie under such excessive odium with the Greeks, at least for the empire we possess?
1.75.2.1
For this very empire we gained, not by acting with violence, but through your having been unwilling to stand by them to finish the business with the barbarian, and through the allies having come to us, and of their own accord begged us to become their leaders:
1.75.3.1
and from this very fact we were compelled at first to advance it to its present height, principally from motives of fear, then of honour also, and afterwards of advantage too.
1.75.4.1
And it no longer appeared to be safe, when we were hated by the generality, and when some who had already revolted had been subdued, and you were no longer friends with us, as you had been, but suspicious of us, and at variance with us, to run the risk of giving it up; for those who revolted would have gone over to you.
1.75.5.1
And all may without odium secure their own interests with regard to the greatest perils.
1.76.1.1
"You, at least, Lacedaemonians, have settled to your own advantage the government of the states in the Peloponnese over which you have a supremacy; and if at that time you had remained through the whole business, and been disliked in your command, as we were, we know full well that you would have become no less severe to the allies, and would have been compelled either to rule with a strong hand, or yourselves be exposed to danger.
1.76.2.1
So neither have we done any thing marvellous, or contrary to the disposition of man, in having accepted an empire that was offered to us, and not giving it up, influenced as we are by the strongest motives honour, and fear, and profit; and when, again, we had not been the first to set such a precedent, but it had always been a settled rule that the weaker should be constrained by the stronger; and when at the same time we thought ourselves worthy of it, and were thought so by you, until, from calculations of expediency, you now avail yourselves of the appeal to justice; which no one ever yet brought forward when lie had a chance of gaining any thing by might, and abstained from taking the advantage.
1.76.3.1
Nay, all are worthy of praise, who, after acting according to human nature in ruling others, have been more just than their actual power enabled them to be.
1.76.4.1
At any rate we imagine, that if some others had possessed our means, they would have best shown whether we are at all moderate or not; though to us there has unfairly resulted from our good nature disrepute rather than commendation.
1.77.1.1
"For from putting up with less than we might have had in contract-suits with the allies, and from having made our decisions in our own courts on the footing of equal laws, we are thought to be litigious.
1.77.2.1
And none of them considers why this reproach is not brought against those who have empire in any other quarter also, and are less moderate towards their subjects than we have been: for those who can act with violence have no need besides to act with justice.
1.77.3.1
But they, from being accustomed to have intercourse with us on a fair footing, if contrary to their notions of right they have been worsted in any thing, either by a legal judgment or by the power of our empire, even in any degree whatever; they feel no gratitude for not being deprived of the greater part [of their possessions], but are more indignant for what is lost than if from the first we had laid aside law, and openly taken advantage of them.
1.77.4.1
In that case not even they themselves would have denied that it was right for the weaker to yield to the stronger. But when injured it seems men are more angry than when treated with violence: for the one case is regarded as an advantage taken by their compulsion by their superior.

Perseus Greek. CTS URN tlg0003.tlg001.1st1K-eng2. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Source.