History of the Peloponnesian War

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1.77.5.1
At least they endured much harder treatment than this at the hand of the Medes; whereas our rule is thought to be severe; and naturally so;
1.77.6.1
for their present condition is always irksome to subjects. You, at any rate, should you subdue us and possess an empire, would quickly lose the good-will which you have enjoyed through their fear of us; if you have the same views now as you gave symptoms of then, when you led then against the Mede for a short time. For you have institutions by yourselves, distinct from the rest of the world; and moreover, each individual of you, on going abroad., neither acts according to these, nor to those which the rest of Greece recognises.
1.78.1.1
Deliberate therefore slowly, as on no trifling matters; and do not, through being influenced by other people's views and accusations, bring on yourselves trouble of your own: but consider before on previously to your being engaged in it, how for when long protracted, it generally comes in the end to depend on chances;
1.78.2.1
from which we are equally removed, and run the risk in uncertainty as to which way it will turn out.
1.78.3.1
And in going to war men generally turn to deeds first, which they ought to do afterwards; and when they are in distress, then they have recourse to words.
1.78.4.1
We however, being neither ourselves yet involved in such an error, nor seeing you in it, charge you, while good counsel is still eligible to both sides, not to break treaty nor offend against your oaths, but to let our differences be judicially settled according to agreement. Else we will call to witness the gods who received cur oaths, and endeavour to requite you for commencing hostilities, in such a way as you may set the example.
1.79.1.1
Thus spoke the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard from the allies their charges against the Athenians, and from the Athenians what they had to say, they made them all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them.
1.79.2.1
And the opinions of the majority went the same way; viz. that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they ought to go to war with all speed. But Archidamus their king, a man who was considered both intelligent and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows.
1.80.1.1
"I have both myself already had experience in many wars, Lacedaemonians, and see that those of you who are of the same age [have had it also]; so that one would neither desire the business from inexperience, as might be the case with most men, nor from thinking it a good and safe one.
1.80.2.1
But this war, about which you are now consulting, you would find likely to be none of the least, if any one should soberly consider it.
1.80.3.1
For against the Peloponnesians and our neighbours our strength is of the same description, and we can quickly reach our destination in each case. But against men who live in a country far away, and besides are most skilful by sea, and most excellently provided with every thing else, with riches, both private and public, and ships, and horses, and heavy-armed, and a crowd of irregulars, such as there is not in any one Grecian town beside, and moreover, have many allies under payment of tribute; how can it be right to declare war rashly against these men? and in what do we trust, that we should hurry on to it unprepared? Is it in our ships? Nay, we are inferior to them:
1.80.4.1
but if we shall practise and prepare against them, time will pass in the interval. Well then, is it in our money? Nay, but we are still more deficient in this, and neither have it in the public treasury, nor readily contribute it from our private funds.
1.81.1.1
"Perhaps some one might feel confident because we excel them in heavy-armed troops, and in numbers, so that we might invade and ravage their land.
1.81.2.1
But they have other land in abundance, over which they rule, and will import what they want by sea.
1.81.3.1
If, again, we shall attempt to make their allies revolt from them, we shall have to assist these also with ships, as they are generally islanders.
1.81.4.1
What then will be the character of our war? For if we do not either conquer them by sea, or take away the revenues with which they maintain their fleet, we shall receive the greater damage;
1.81.5.1
and at such a time it will no longer even be honourable to make peace; especially if we are thought to have begun the quarrel more than they.
1.81.6.1
For let us now not be buoyed up with this hope, at any rate, that the war will soon be ended, if we ravage their land. Rather it even to our children: so probable is it that the Athenians would neither be enslaved in spirit to their land, nor, like inexperienced men, be panic-stricken by the war.
1.82.1.1
"I do not however, on the other hand, tell you to permit them, without noticing it, to harm our allies, and not to detect them in plotting against us; but I tell you not to take up arms at present, but to send and remonstrate; neither showing too violent signs of war, nor yet that we will put up with their conduct; and in the mean time to complete our own preparations also, both by bringing over allies whether Greeks or barbarians, from whatever source we shall receive additional strength, either in ships or in money; (for all who. like us are plotted against by the Athenians. may without (odium save themselves by accepting the aid not only of Greeks, but of barbarians also;) and at the same time let us bring out our own resources.
1.82.2.1
And if they listen at all to our ambassadors. that is the best conclusion; but if not. after an interval of two or three years, we shall then go against them, if we think tit, in a better state of defence.
1.82.3.1
And perhaps when they then saw our preparation, and our language speaking in accordance with it, they might be more disposed to yield, while they had their land as yet unravaged, and were deliberating about good things still enjoyed by them, and not yet sacrificed.
1.82.4.1
For in their land consider that you have nothing else but a hostage; and the more so, the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, and not, through having reduced them to desperation, find them the more difficult to subdue.
1.82.5.1
For if we are hurried on by the complaints of our allies, and ravage it while we are unprepared, see that we do not come off in a manner more disgraceful and perplexing to the Peloponnese [than we should wish ].
1.82.6.1
For complaints, both of states and individuals, it is possible to settle: but when all together have, for their own separate interests, undertaken a war, of which it is impossible to know how it will go on, it is not easy to effect a creditable arrangement.
1.83.1.1
"And let no one think it shows a want of courage for many not at once to advance against one state.
1.83.2.1
For they too have no fewer allies who pay them tribute; and war is not so much a thing of arms as of money, by means of which arms are of service; especially in the case of continental against maritime powers.
1.83.3.1
Let us first then provide ourselves with this, and not be excited beforehand by the speeches of the allies; but as we shall have the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences either way, so also let us quietly take a view of them beforehand.
1.84.1.1
"And as for the slowness and dilatoriness which they most blame in us, be not ashamed of them. For by hurrying [to begin the war] you would be the more slow in finishing it because you took it in hand when unprepared:
1.84.2.1
and at the same time we always enjoy a city that is free and most glorious; and it is a wise moderation that can best constitute this. For owing to it we alone do not grow insolent in success, and yield less than others to misfortunes. We are not excited by the pleasure afforded by those who with praise stimulate us to dangers contrary to our conviction; and if any one provoke us with accusation, we are not the more prevailed on through being thus annoyed.
1.84.3.1
We are both warlike and wise through our orderly temper: warlike, because shame partakes very largely of moderation, and courage of shame; and wise, because we are brought up with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them; and are not over-clever in useless things, so that while in word we might ably find fault with our enemies' resources, we should not go against them so well in deed;
1.84.4.1
but are taught to think that our neighbours' plans, and the chances which befall in war, are very similar as things not admitting of nice distinction in language. But we always provide in deed against our adversaries with the expectation of their planning well and must not rest our hopes on the probability of their blundering, but on the belief our own taking cautious forethought. Again, we should not think that one man differs much from another, but that he is the best who is educated in the most necessary things.
1.85.1.1
These practices then, which our fathers bequeathed to us, and which we have always retained with benefit, let us not give up, nor determine hurriedly, in the short space of a day, about many lives, and riches, and states, and honours, but let us do it calmly; as we may do more than others, on account of our power.
1.85.2.1
And send to the Athenians respecting Potidaea, and send respecting those things in which the allies say they are injured; especially as they are ready to submit to judicial decision; and against the party which offers that, it is not right to proceed as against a guilty one. But prepare for war at the same time. For in this you, will determine both what is best, and what is most formidable to your adversaries.
1.85.3.1
Archidamus spoke to this effect; but Sthenelaidas, who was one of the ephors at that time, came forward last, and spoke before the Lacedaemonians as follows.
1.86.1.1
As for the long speech of the Athenians, I do not understand it; for though they praised themselves a great deal, in no part did they deny than they are injuring our allies and the Peloponnese. And yet if they were good men then against the Medes, but are bad ones now against us, they deserve double punishment for having become bad instead of good. But we are the same both then and now;
1.86.2.1
and shall not, if we are wise, overlook our allies' being injured, nor delay to assist them; for there is no longer delay in their being ill-treated. Others have in abundance riches, and ships, and horses;
1.86.3.1
but we have good allies, whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor decide the question with suits and words, while it is not also in word that we are injured; but we must assist them with speed and with all our might. And let no one tell me that it is proper for us to deliberate who are being wronged.
1.86.4.1
It is for those who are about to commit the wrong that it is much more proper to deliberate for a long time.
1.86.5.1
Vote then, Lacedaemonians, for war, as is worthy of Sparta; and neither permit the Athenians to become greater, nor let us betray our allies; but with the help of the gods let us proceed against those who are wronging them.
1.87.1.1
Having spoken to this effect he himself, as ephor, put the question to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians.
1.87.2.1
As they decide by acclamation and not by vote, he said that he did not distinguish on which side the acclamation was greater; but wishing to instigate them the more to war by their openly expressing their views, he said, Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks the treaty to have been broken, and the Athenians to have been guilty, let him rise and go yonder (pointing out a certain place to them); and whoever does not think so, let him go to the other side.
1.87.3.1
They arose and divided, and there was a large majority who thought that the treaty had been broken.
1.87.4.1
And having summoned the allies, they told them that their own opinion was that the Athenians were in the wrong; but that they wished to summon all the allies also, and to put it to the vote; that after general consultation they might declare war, if they thought fit.
1.87.5.1
They then, after having settled this, returned home; as did the ambassadors of the Athenians afterwards, when they had despatched the business they had gone on.
1.87.6.1
This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the continuance of the thirty years' truce, which had been concluded after the war with Euboea.
1.88.1.1
Now the Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they were convinced by the arguments of the allies, as because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that most parts of Greece were already under their hands.
1.89.1.1
For it was in the following manner that the Athenians were brought to those circumstances under which they increased their power.
1.89.2.1
When the Medes had retreated from Europe after being conquered both by sea and land by the Greeks, and those of them had been destroyed who had fled with their ships to Mycale; Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was the leader of the Greeks at Mycale, returned home with the allies that were from the Peloponnese; while the Athenians, and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, stayed behind, and laid siege to Sestos, of which the Medes were in possession. Having spent the winter before it, they took it, after the barbarians had evacuated it; and then sailed away from the Hellespont, each to his own city.
1.89.3.1
And the people of Athens, when they found the barbarians had departed from their country, proceeded immediately to carry over their children and wives, and the remnant of their furniture, from were they had put them out of the way; and were preparing to rebuild their city and their walls. For short spaces of the enclosure were standing; and though the majority of the houses had fallen, a few remained; in which the grandees of the Persians had themselves taken up their quarters.
1.90.1.1
The Lacedaemonians, perceiving what they were about to do, sent an embassy [to them]; partly because they themselves would have been more pleased to see neither them nor any one else in possession of a wall; but still more because the allies instigated them, and were afraid of their numerous fleet, which before they had not had, and of the bravery they had shown in the Median war.
1.90.2.1
And they begged them not to build their walls, but rather to join them in throwing down those of the cities out of the Peloponnese; not betraying their real wishes, and their suspicious feelings towards the Athenians; but representing that the barbarian, if he should again come against them, would not then be able to make his advances from any strong hold, as in the present instance he had done from Thebes; and the Peloponnese, they said, was sufficient for all, as a place to retreat into and sally forth from.
1.90.3.1
When the Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, answered that they would send ambassadors to them concerning what they spoke of; and immediately dismissed them. And Themistocles advised them to send himself as quickly as possible to Lacedaemon, and having chosen other ambassadors besides himself, not to despatch them immediately, but to wait till such time as they should have raised their wall to the height most absolutely necessary for fighting from; and that the whole population in the city, men, women, and children, should build it, sparing neither private nor public edifice, from which any assistance towards the work would be gained, but throwing down every thing.
1.90.4.1
After giving these instructions, and suggesting that he would himself manage all other matters there, he took his departure.
1.90.5.1
On his arrival at Lacedaemon he did not apply to the authorities, but kept putting off and making excuses. And whenever any of those who were in office asked him why he did not come before the assembly, he said that he was waiting for his colleagues; that owing to some engagement they had been left behind; he expected, however, that they would shortly come, and wondered that they were not already there.
1.91.1.1
When they heard this, they believed Themistocles through their friendship for him; but when every one else came and distinctly informed them that the walls were building, and already advancing to some height, they did not know how to discredit it.
1.91.2.1
When he found this, he told them not to be led away by tales, but ratter to send men of their own body who were of good character, and would bring back a credible report after inspection.
1.91.3.1
They despatched them therefore; and Themistocles secretly sent directions about them to the Athenians, to detain them, with as little appearance of it as possible, and not to let them go until they themselves had returned back; (for by this time his colleagues, Abronychus, the son of Lysicles, and Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, had also come to him with the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced;) for he was afraid that the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, might not then let them go.
1.91.4.1
So the Athenians detained the ambassadors, as was told them; and Themistocles, having come to an audience of the Lacedaemonians, then indeed told them plainly that their city was already walled, so as to be capable of defending its inhabitants; and if the Lacedaemonians or the allies wished to send any embassy to them, they should in future go as to men who could discern what were their own and the general interests.
1.91.5.1
For when they thought it better to abandon their city and to go on board their ships, they said that they had made up their minds, and had the courage to do it, without consulting them; and again, on whatever matters they had deliberated with them, they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment.
1.91.6.1
And so at the present time, likewise, they thought it was better that their city should have a wall, and that it would be more expedient for their citizens in particular, as well as for the allies in general;
1.91.7.1
for it was not possible for any one without equal resources to give any equal or fair advice for the common good. Either all therefore, he said, should join the confederacy without walls, or they should consider that the present case also was as it ought to be.
1.92.1.1
The Lacedaemonians, on hearing this, did not let their anger appear to the Athenians; (for they had not sent their embassy to obstruct their designs, but to offer counsel, they said, to their state; and besides, they were at that time on very friendly terms with them owing to their zeal against the (Mede;) in secret, however, they were annoyed at failing in their wish. So the ambassadors of each state returned home without any complaint being made.
1.93.1.1
In this way the Athenians walled their city in a short time.
1.93.2.1
And the building still slows even now that it was executed in haste; for the foundations are laid with stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought together, but as the several parties at any time brought them to the spot: and many columns from tombs, and wrought stones, were worked up in them. For the enclosure of the city was carried out to a greater extent on every side; and for this reason they hurried on the work, removing every tiling alike.
1.93.3.1
Themistocles also persuaded them to build the remaining walls of the Piraeus, (they had been begun by him before, at the time of his office as archon, which he had held for a year over the Athenians,) thinking that the site was a fine one, as it contained three natural harbours; and that by becoming a naval people they would make a great advance towards the acquisition of power.
1.93.4.1
For he was the first who ventured to tell them that they must apply closely to the sea;
1.93.5.1
and he began immediately to assist in paving the way for their empire. It was by his advice that they built the walls of that thickness which is still seen round the Piraeus; for two waggons meeting each other brought up the stones. And in the inside there was neither rubble nor mortar, but large and square-cut stones wrought together, cramped on the outside with iron and lead. But only about half of the height he intended was finished.
1.93.6.1
For he wished by their great dimensions and thickness to keep off the attacks of their enemies; and thought that the protection of a few, and those the least efficient troops, would be sufficient, while the rest would go on board their ships.
1.93.7.1
For to the navy he paid the greatest attention; seeing, I suppose, that the approach of the king's forces against them was easier by sea than by land: and he considered the Piraeus more serviceable than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians, in case of their ever being hard pressed by land, to go down into it, and defy the world with their navy.
1.93.8.1
Thus then the Athenians were enclosed with walls, and began to furnish themselves with other buildings immediately after the retreat of the Medes.
1.94.1.1
Now Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon as general of the Greeks with twenty ships from the Peloponnese; there sailed with him also the Athenians with thirty ships, and a large number of the other allies.
1.94.2.1
And they made an expedition against Cyprus, and subdued the greater part of it; and afterwards against Byzantium, of which the Medes were in possession, and reduced it during this period of his command.
1.95.1.1
But when he was now acting with violence, the rest of the Greeks were offended, and especially the Ionians, and such as had lately been liberated from the king; and going to the Athenians, they begged them to become their leaders, on the ground of their relationship; and not to overlook it in Pausanias, if in any case he should treat them with violence.
1.95.2.1
The Athenians received their proposals, and attended to them with a determination not to overlook it, and to settle all other matters as might seem best to them.
1.95.3.1
At this time the Lacedaemonians sent for Pausanias, to bring him to account for what they had heard of him; for many charges were brought against him by the Greeks who came to them; and it appeared to be an imitation of a tyranny, rather than the command of a general.
1.95.4.1
It happened that he was summoned at the very time the allies, through their hatred of him, went over and ranged themselves with the Athenians, except the soldiers from the Peloponnese.
1.95.5.1
So when he came to Lacedaemon, he was censured for the wrongs he had done to any one individually; but was acquitted, as not guilty, on the heaviest charges. (He was especially accused of medizing, and it appeared to be most clearly established.)
1.95.6.1
Him they sent out no more as commander, but Dorcis and some others with him, with no great number of troops; but the allies would no longer give up the command to them.
1.95.7.1
On finding this, they returned; and the Lacedaemonians sent out no others after them; fearing that they might find those who went abroad becoming corrupted, just as they saw in the case of Pausanias; and also because they wished to be rid of the Median war, and considered the Athenians competent to take the lead, and well disposed towards themselves at that time.
1.96.1.1
The Athenians having in this way succeeded to the command at the wish of the allies, owing to their hatred of Pausanias, arranged which of the states were to furnish money against the barbarian. and which of them ships: for their pretext was to avenge themselves for what they had suffered, by ravaging the king's country.
1.96.2.1
And the office of treasurers of Greece was then first established by the Athenians; who received the tribute, for so the contribution-money was called. The first tribute that was fixed was 460 talents. Their treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were held in the temple.
1.97.1.1
Now they led the allies at first as possessing independence, and deliberating in common councils; and executed, both in the field and in their administration of affairs, between this war and the Median, the following undertakings; which were achieved by them against the barbarian, and against their own innovating allies, and those of the Peloponnesians who from time to time came in contact with them in each matter.
1.97.2.1
I have written an account of these events, and made this digression from my history, because this subject was omitted by all before me; who either wrote the history of Greece before the Median war, or of that war itself: and Hellanicus, who did touch on them in his Attic history, mentioned them but briefly, and not accurately with regard to their chronology. Besides, they also afford an opportunity of showing in what manner the empire of the Athenians was established.
1.98.1.1
In the first place, Eion on the Strymon, of which the Medes were in possession, was taken by them after a siege, and reduced to slavery, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades.
1.98.2.1
In the next place, Scyros, the island in the Aegean Sea, which was inhabited by Dolopes, was reduced to slavery, and colonized by themselves.
1.98.3.1
They had a war also with the Carystians, without the rest of the Euboeans joining in it;
1.98.4.1
and in course of time they surrendered on conditions. With the Naxians, who had revolted, they afterwards waged war, and reduced them after a siege; and this was the first allied city that was subjugated contrary to the agreement; then the rest, as each happened.
1.99.1.1
Now there were other reasons for the revolts, but the principal were arrears of tribute and ships, and failing (if any did so) in military service: for the Athenians strictly exacted these things, and were offensive by usingcompulsion to men who were neither accustomed nor willing to do hard work.
1.99.2.1
In some other respects also they were no longer liked in their government, as they had been; and while they did not join in the service on an equal footing, at the same time it was easy for them to bring to subjection those who revolted.
1.99.3.1
And for this the allies themselves were to blame; for owing to this aversion to expeditions, the greater part of them, to avoid being away from home, agreed to contribute money instead of ships as their quota of the expense; and so the fleet of the Athenians was increased from the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, found themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war.
1.100.1.1
After this was fought the battle at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, both by land and sea, between the Athenians and their allies and the Medes; and the Athenians were victorious in both engagements on the same day, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades; and took and destroyed in all two hundred triremes of the Phoenicians.
1.100.2.1
Some time after it happened that the Thasians revolted from them, having quarrelled about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace and the mine of which they were in possession. And the Athenians, having sailed with their fleet to Thasos, gained the victory in a sea-fight, and made a descent on their land.
1.100.3.1
About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to the Strymon, to colonize what was then called the Nine Ways, but new Amphipolis; and they made themselves masters of the Nine Ways, which was held by the Edones; but having advanced into the interior of Thrace, were cut off at Drabescus, a town of the Edones, by the united Thracians, by whom the settlement of the town of Nine Ways was regarded with hostility.
1.101.1.1
The Thasians, having been conquered in some engagements, and being invested, called the Lacedaemonians to their aid, and desired that they would assist them by invading Attica.
1.101.2.1
They promised to do so, without letting the Athenians know, and intended it; but were prevented by the earthquake which took place; on which occasion also they saw the Helots, and the Thurians and oethieans amongst the Perioeci, establish themselves in revolt at Ithome. Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians who were enslaved at that time [with which all are acquainted ]:
1.101.3.1
and for this reason the whole body of them were called Messenians. A war then was commenced by the Lacedaemonians against those in Ithome: and the Thasians in the third year of the siege came to terms with the Athenians, throwing down their wall, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing both to pay immediately the sum of money required, and to pay tribute in future, and surrendering their mainland towns and the mine.
1.102.1.1
The Lacedaemonians, when they found the war against those in Ithome prolonged, called other allies to their aid, and the Athenians also; who went under the command of Cimon with no small force.
1.102.2.1
They asked their aid, because they were considered to be skilful in conducting sieges: whereas in themselves, from the siege having been so protracted, there seemed to be a deficiency of this skill; for else they would have taken the place by assault.
1.102.3.1
It was from this expedition that the first open quarrel arose between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians. For the Lacedaemonians, when the place was not taken by storm, fearing the boldness and innovating spirit of the Athenians—and moreover considering that they were of a different race from themselves—lest, if they remained, they might at the persuasion of those in Ithome attempt some revolution, dismissed them alone of all the allies; not letting their suspicion appear, but saying that they were no longer in any need of them.
1.102.4.1
The Athenians, however, knew that they were dismissed, not on the more creditable reason assigned, but from some suspicion having arisen: and considering it hard usage, and not thinking that they deserved to be so treated by the Lacedaemonians, immediately on their return they broke off the alliance which they had made with them against the Mede, and became allies of the Argives, their enemies. The same oaths also were taken, and the same alliance made by both with the Thessalians.

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