History of the Peloponnesian War

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1.29.1.1
The Corinthians did not listen to any of these proposals; but when their ships were manned, and their confederates had come, having first sent a herald to declare war upon the Corcyraeans, they weighed anchor with seventy-five ships and two thousand heavy-armed, and set sail for Epidamnus to wage war against the Corcyraeans.
1.29.2.1
Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus.
1.29.3.1
After they were come to Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where is the temple of Apollo, at the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyraeans sent forward a herald to them to forbid their sailing against them; and at the same time were manning their ships, having both undergirded the old ones, so as to make them sea-worthy, and equipped the rest.
1.29.4.1
When the herald brought back from the Corinthians no peaceable answer, and their ships were manned, to the number of eighty sail, (for forty were besieging Epidamnus,) they put out against them, and formed their line, and engaged them:
1.29.5.1
and the Corcyraeans won a decided victory, and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. It happened likewise the same day, that those too who were besieging Epidamnus reduced it to surrender, on condition that they should sell the strangers, and keep the Corinthians in bonds, till something else should be determined.
1.30.1.1
After the battle, the Corcyraeans having set up a trophy on Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew the other prisoners they had taken, but kept the Corinthians in bonds.
1.30.2.1
Subsequently, when the Corinthians and their allies, after being vanquished at sea, were gone home, the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea in those parts, and sailed to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and wasted part of the territory; and burnt Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished both money and shipping to the Corinthians.
1.30.3.1
And most of the time after the battle they were masters of the sea, and continued sailing against and ravaging the allies of the Corinthians; until, on the return of summer, the Corinthians sent ships and an army, in consequence of the distress of their allies, and formed an encampment on Actium, and about Chimerium in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and such other states as were friendly to them.
1.30.4.1
The Corcyraeans also formed an encampment in opposition to them, on Leucimna, both for their ships and land-forces. And neither party sailed against the other; but remaining in opposite stations this summer, at the approach of winter they then each retired homeward.
1.31.1.1
Now the whole of the year after the sea-fight, and the succeeding one, the Corinthians, being indignant about the war with the Corcyraeans, were building ships, and preparing with all their might a naval armament, drawing together rowers both from the Peloponnese itself and the rest of Greece, by the inducement of the pay they gave.
1.31.2.1
And the Corcyraeans, on hearing of their preparations, were alarmed; and being in alliance with none of the Greeks, and not having enrolled themselves in the league either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, they determined to go to the Athenians, and make alliance with them, and endeavour to obtain some assistance from them.
1.31.3.1
And the Corinthians, on hearing this, went themselves also to Athens on an embassy, to prevent the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyraeans being an impediment to their concluding the war as they wished.
1.31.4.1
And an assembly having been convened, they came to controversy; and the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:-
1.32.1.1
"It is but just, Athenians, that those who without any previous obligation, either of great benefit or alliance, come to their neighbours, as we now do, to beg their assistance, should convince them in the first place, if possible, that they ask what is even expedient but if not that, at any rate what is not injurious; and in the second place, that they will also retain a lasting sense of the favour: and if they establish none of these points clearly, they should not be angry if they do not succeed.
1.32.2.1
Bat the Corcyraeans have sent us with a conviction that, together with their request for alliance, they will show that these points may be relied on by you.
1.32.3.1
Now the same policy has happened to prove inconsistent in your eyes, with regard to our request, and inexpedient, with regard to our own interest at the present time.
1.32.4.1
For having never yet in time past voluntarily become the allies of any party, we are now come to beg this of others; and at the same time we have, owing to it, been left destitute with regard to the present war with the Corinthians; and what before seemed our prudence, viz. not to join in the peril of our neighbour's views by being in alliance with others, has turned out now to be evident folly and weakness.
1.32.5.1
In the late sea-fight, indeed, by ourselves and single-handed we repulsed the Corinthians. But since they have set out against us with a larger force from the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, and we see ourselves unable to escape by our own power alone; and at the same time our peril is great, if we are subjugated by them; we must beg assistance both from you and every one else : and it is pardonable, if we venture on a course contrary to our former non-interference, [which was practised,] not from any evil intention, but rather from an error of judgment.
1.33.1.1
"Now if you are persuaded by us, the occurrence of our request will be honourable to you in many respects: first, because you will be granting the assistance to men who are injured, and not injuring others: in the next place, by receiving men who have their highest interests at stake, you would bestow the obligation with testimony [to the fact] that would, as far as possible, be always remembered;
1.33.2.1
and, [lastly,] we are in possession of a navy the largest except yours. And consider what good fortune is more rare, or what more annoying to the enemy, than if that power, the addition of which to yours you would have valued above much money and favour, come of its own accord, offering itself without dangers and expense; and moreover affording, in the eyes of the world at large, a character for goodness, and to those whom you will assist, obligation; and to yourselves, strength; all of which advantages together have fallen to the lot of few indeed in the whole course of time: and few are there who, when begging alliance, go conferring safety and honour on the men whose aid they invoke, no less than to receive them.
1.33.3.1
And as for the war in which we should be useful, if any of you do not think that it will arise, he is deceived in his opinion; and does not observe that the Lacedaemonians, through their fear of you, are longing for war and that the Corinthians have power with them, and are hostile to you, and are now first subduing us with a view to attacking you, that we may not stand with each other in common hostility to them; and that they may not fail to gain one of two advantages, either to injure us, or to strengthen themselves.
1.33.4.1
But it is our business, on the contrary, to be beforehand with them, by our offering and your accepting the alliance; and to plot against them first, rather than to meet their plots against us.
1.34.1.1
"But should they say that it is not just for you to receive their colonists, let them learn that every colony, if well treated, honours its mother-country; but if wronged, is estranged from it; for they are not sent out to be slaves, but to be on the same footing with those who are left at home.
1.34.2.1
And that they wronged us, is evident; for when challenged to a judicial decision respecting Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute the charges by war rather than by equity.
1.34.3.1
And let what they are doing to us, their kinsmen, be a warning to you, that you may both avoid being seduced by them, through any false pretence; and may refuse to assist them, if they ask you in a straightforward manner: for he who incurs the fewest regrets from gratifying his enemies would continue in the greatest safety.
1.35.1.1
"But neither will you break the treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party.
1.35.2.1
For it is mentioned in it, that whichever of the Grecian states is in alliance with no other, it has permission to go to whichever side it may please.
1.35.3.1
And it is hard if these shall be allowed to man their ships both from the confederates, and moreover from the rest of Greece also, and especially from your subjects, while they will exclude us both from our proposed alliance, and from assistance from any other quarter; and then consider it an injustice if you are persuaded to what we request. But much greater fault shall we find with you, if we do not persuade you.
1.35.4.1
For us who are in peril, and not actuated by any hostile feeling, you will reject; while these men who are thus actuated, and have made the attack, you will be so far from restraining, that you will even overlook their gaining additional power from your dominions; which you should not do; but should either stop their mercenaries drawn from your country, or send succour to us also, in what ever way you may be persuaded; but it were best of all to receive us openly, and assist us.
1.35.5.1
And many, as we hinted at the beginning, are the advantages we hold forth to you; bat the greatest of them is, that we both have the same enemies, (which is the surest bond,) and those not weak, but able to harm such as have stood aloof from them. And as it is a naval, and not a land alliance that is offered you, the loss of it is not the same; but it were best, if possible, to allow no one else to possess ships; but if not, whoever is strongest in them, to have him for your friend.
1.36.1.1
And whoever thinks that these things which we have urged are indeed expedient, but is afraid that through being persuaded by them he would break the treaty; let him know that his fear, being attended by strength, will cause greater alarm to his enemies; but that his confidence in not having received us, being powerless will be less formidable to his foes who are strong; and also, that it is not about Corcyra more than about Athens too that he is deliberating; and that he is not providing the best for her, when for the war that is coming, and all but here, he hesitates, from present considerations, to receive a country which is made either a friend or a foe, with the greatest opportunities [for good or evil].
1.36.2.1
For it lies well for the voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily, so as both to prevent a navy from coming thence to the Peloponnesians, and to help on its way a fleet from these parts to those;
1.36.3.1
and in other respects it is most advantageous. But the shortest summary, both for general and particular statements, from which you may learn not to give us up, is the following: There being but three navies worth mentioning amongst the Greeks, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians. if you allow two of these to come together, and the Corinthians bring us under their power first, you will have to fight at sea with both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians; but if you receive us you will be able to contend against them with the greater number of ships on your side.
1.36.4.1
Thus spoke the Corcyraeans; and the Corinthians after them as follows.
1.37.1.1
"Since these Corcyraeans have made their harangue, not only about receiving them. but also to show that we are acting unjustly, and they are unfairly attacked; it is necessary that we too should first touch on both these points, and so proceed to the rest of our speech; that you may know more certainly beforehand the grounds of our request, and may with good reason reject their petition. Now they say that it was from regard to prudence that hitherto they accepted the alliance of no party:
1.37.2.1
whereas they adopted this practice for villany, and not for virtue; but from wishing to have no ally or witness in their unjust deeds, nor to be put to the blush by calling him to their aid.
1.37.3.1
And their city also, lying in a self-sufficient position, makes them judges of the injuries they inflict on any one, rather than that there should be judges appointed by agreement; because, while they very seldom sail from home to their neighbours, they very frequently receive others, who of necessity touch there. And herein consists the specious shunning of confederacies, which they have put forward;
1.37.4.1
not that they may avoid committing injustice with other, but that they may commit them by themselves; and that wherever they have the power, they may act with violence; and where they escape observation, they may take unfair advantage; and if in any case they have seized on something, they may not be put to the blush.
1.37.5.1
And yet, if they were, as they say, honest men, the more impregnable they were to their neighbours, the more manifestly might they have shown their virtue, by giving and taking what was just.
1.38.1.1
"But neither to others nor to us are they of such a character; but although our colonists, they have all along revolted from us, and are now making war upon us; saying that they were not sent out to be ill-treated.
1.38.2.1
But we say that neither did we settle them there to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders, and to be properly respected by them.
1.38.3.1
Our other colonies, at least, honour us, and we are very much beloved by our colonists;
1.38.4.1
and it is evident, that if we are pleasing to the greater part, we should not, on a right view of the case, be displeasing to these alone; nor do we attack them unbecomingly, without being also signally injured by them.
1.38.5.1
Even if we were in the wrong, it had been honourable for them to have yielded to our humour; but disgraceful for us to have done violence to their moderation: but through pride, and power of wealth, they have both acted wrongly towards us in many other things, and with regard to Epidamnus, which belonged to us, when it was ill-treated they did not claim it; but when we went to its assistance, they took it by force, and keep it.
1.39.1.1
"And they say, forsooth, that they were before willing to have it judicially decided : but with regard to this, it is not the man who proposes it with superiority, and in safety, that should be considered to say any thing; but that man, who puts alike his actions and words on the same footing, before he enters on the struggle.
1.39.2.1
But as for these men, it was not before they besieged the place, but when they thought that we should not put up with it, that they also advanced the specious plea of a judicial decision. And they are come hither, not only having themselves done wrong there, but now requesting you also to join them, not in alliance, but in injury; and to receive them, when they are at variance with us. But then ought they to have applied to you, when they were most secure;
1.39.3.1
and not at a time when we have been injured, and they are in peril; nor at a time when you, though you did not share their power then, will now give them a share of your aid; and though you stood aloof from their misdeeds, will incur equal blame from us; but they ought long ago to have communicated their power to you, and so to have the results also in common. [As, however, you have had no share only in the accusations brought against them, so you should not participate in the consequences of their actions.]
1.40.1.1
"That we ourselves, then, come with accusations on proper grounds, and that these are violent and rapacious, has been proved: and that you could not with justice receive them, you must now learn.
1.40.2.1
For if it is said in the treaty, that any of the states not registered in it may go to whichever side it please, the agreement was not meant for those who go to the detriment of others; but to any one who, without withdrawing himself from another, is in need of protection; and who will not cause war instead of peace to those who receive him, ([as they will not do ] if they are wise;) which would now be your case, if not persuaded by us.
1.40.3.1
For you would not only become auxiliaries to these, but also enemies to us, instead of being connected by treaty; for if you come with them, we must defend ourselves against them without excepting you.
1.40.4.1
And yet you ought, if possible, to stand aloof from both parties; or if not that, on the contrary, to go with us against them; (with the Corinthians, at any rate, you are connected by treaty; while with the Corcyraeans you were never yet so much as in truce;) and not to establish the law, that we should receive those who are revolting from others.
1.40.5.1
For neither did we, when the Samnians had revolted, give our vote against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesians were divided in their votes, as to whether they should assist them; but we openly maintained the contrary, that each one should punish his own allies.
1.40.6.1
For if you receive and assist those who are doing wrong, there will be found no fewer of your allies also who will come over to us; and you will make the law against yourselves, rather than against us.
1.41.1.1
"These, then, are the pleas of right which we have to urge to you, sufficiently strong according to the laws of the Greeks; and we have the following advice, and claim on you for favour, which, being not enemies so as to hurt you, nor, on the other hand, suck friends as to be very intimate with you, we say ought to be repaid to us at the present time.
1.41.2.1
For once, when you were in want of long ships for the war with the aeginetans, before that with the Medes, you received from the Corinthians twenty ships. And this service, and that with regard to the Samians, namely, that it was through us that the Peloponnesians did not assist them, gave you the mastery of the aeginetans, and the chastisement of the Samians: and it took place in those critical times in which men, when proceeding against their enemies, are most regardless of every thing besides victory.
1.41.3.1
For they esteem him a friend who assists them, even though he may before have been an enemy; and him a foe who opposes them, though he may have happened to be a friend; nay they even mismanage their own affairs for the sake of their animosity at the moment.
1.42.1.1
"Thinking then of these things, and each younger man having learned them from some one older, let him resolve to requite us with the like, and not deem that these things are justly urged, but that others are expedient in case of his going to war.
1.42.2.1
For expediency most attends that line of conduct in which one does least wrong. And as for the coming of the war, frightening you with which the Corcyrraeans bid you commit injustice, it lies as yet in uncertainty; and it is not worth while, through being excited by it, to incur a certain enmity with the Corinthians, immediate, and not coming; but rather it were prudent to remove somewhat of our before existing suspicion on account of the Megareans.
1.42.3.1
For the latest obligation, when well timed, even though it may be comparatively small, has power to wipe out a greater subject of complaint.
1.42.4.1
And be not induced by the fact that it is a great naval alliance that they offer you. For not to injure your equals is a power more to be relied on, than, through being buoyed up by momentary appearances, to gain an unfair advantage by a perilous course.
1.43.1.1
We then, having fallen under the rule which we propounded ourselves at Lacedaemon, that every one should punish his own allies, now claim to receive the same from you; and not that you, after being benefited by our vote, should harm us by yours. Make us then a fair return;
1.43.2.1
knowing that this is that very crisis, in which he that helps is most a friend, and he that opposes, a foe.
1.43.3.1
And for these Corcyraeans, neither receive them as allies in spite of us, nor help them in doing wrong.
1.43.4.1
By thus acting, you will both do what becomes you, and advise the best for yourselves. To this effect then did the Corinthians also speak.
1.44.1.1
Now the Athenians, after hearing both sides, when an assembly had been even twice held, in the former rather admitted the arguments of the Corinthians; but in the one held the next day they changed their minds, and determined, not indeed to make an alliance with the Corcyraeans, so as to have the same enemies and friends, (for if the Corcyraeans had desired them to sail against Corinth, the treaty with the Peloponnesians would have been broken by them;) but they made a defensive alliance, to succour each other's country, should any one go against Corcyra, or Athens, or their allies. For they thought that, even as it was, they should have the war with the Peloponnesians;
1.44.2.1
and they wished not to give up Corcyra to the Corinthians, with so large a navy as it had, but to wear them out as much as possible against each other, that both the Corinthians and the rest who had navies might be in a weaker condition when they went to war with them, if it should be necessary to do so.
1.44.3.1
And at the same time the island appeared to them to lie well in the line of voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily.
1.45.1.1
With such a view of the case the Athenians admitted the Corcyraeans into alliance; and when the Corinthians had departed, they sent ten ships to assist them.
1.45.2.1
Tile commanders of them were Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epiclees.
1.45.3.1
They charged them not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against Corcyra, and threaten to land, or against any of the places belonging to them; but in that case to prevent them to their utmost: and this charge they gave them with a view to not breaking the treaty. So the ships arrive at Corcyra.
1.46.1.1
But the Corinthians, when they had made their preparations, set sail against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. There were ten of the Eleans, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots seven and twenty, of the Anactorians one, and of the Corinthians themselves ninety.
1.46.2.1
In command of these there were different men for the different forces according to their states, and of the Corinthians, Xenoclides, the son of Euthycles, with four others.
1.46.3.1
And when, in their course from Leucas, they made land on the continent opposite Corcyra, they came to anchor at Chimerium in the territory of Thesprotis.
1.46.4.1
It is a harbour, and a city named Ephyre lies beyond it, away from the sea, in the Elean district of Thesprotis. By it the Acherusian lake empties itself into the sea; and into this lake the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis, empties itself; from which also it takes its name. The river Thyamis also flows there, bounding Thesprotis and Cestrine; and between these rivers the promontory of Chimerium rises.
1.46.5.1
The Corinthians then came to anchor at that part of the continent, and formed their encampment.
1.47.1.1
But the Corcyraeans, when they perceived them sailing up, manned a hundred and ten ships, which were commanded by Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybates; and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota; and the ten Athenian ships were with them.
1.47.2.1
And on the promontory of Leucimna was their land force, and a thousand heavy-armed of the Zacynthians, who had come to their assistance.
1.47.3.1
The Corinthians also had on the mainland many of the barbarians, who had joined them to give assistance; for the people in that part of the continent have always been friendly with them.
1.48.1.1
When the preparations of the Corinthians were made, taking three days' provision, they put out from Chimerium by night, with the purpose of engaging;
1.48.2.1
and in the morning, while on their course, they observed the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea, and sailing against them.
1.48.3.1
And when they saw each other, they drew up in opposite lines of battle. On the right wing of the Corcyraeans were the Athenian ships, but the rest of the line they themselves occupied, having formed three squadrons of their ships, which were commanded each by one of the three generals.
1.48.4.1
In this way did the Corcyraeans form their line. On the side of the Corinthians, the Megarean and Ambraciot ships occupied the right wing; in the centre were the rest of the allies severally; while the left wing was occupied by the Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right of the Corcyraeans.
1.49.1.1
As soon as the signals on each side were raised, they closed, and fought; both sides having many heavy-armed on the decks, and many bowmen and dartmen; as they were still rudely equipped in the old fashion.
1.49.2.1
And the battle was well contested; not so much in point of skill, but more like a land fight.
1.49.3.1
For whenever they happened to run on board one another, they did not easily get clear again, owing to the numbers and confusion of the ships; and because they trusted for victory, in a greater measure, to the heavy-armed on deck, who set to and fought, while the ships remained stationary. There was no breaking through the line, but they fought with fierceness and strength, more than with science.
1.49.4.1
On all sides then there was much confusion, and the battle was a disorderly one; and during it the Athenian vessels coming up to the Corcyraeans, if they were pressed at any point, struck fear into the enemy, but did not begin fighting, as the commanders were afraid of the charge given by the Athenians.
1.49.5.1
It was the right wing of the Corinthians which was most distressed; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships having routed and pursued them in a scattered condition to the continent, sailed up to their encampment, and having made a descent upon them, burnt the deserted tents, and plundered their goods.
1.49.6.1
On that side then the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans were victorious: but where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they had a decided victory; as twenty ships of the Corcyraeans, from a number [originally] smaller, had not returned from the pursuit.
1.49.7.1
But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, assisted them now more unequivocally; though at first they refrained from charging any vessel; but when the rout had clearly taken place, and the Corinthians were lying close on them, then indeed every one at length set to work, and there was no longer any distinction, but it had come to such urgent necessity, that the Corinthians and Athenians attacked each other.
1.50.1.1
Now when the rout had taken place, the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the vessels which they might happen to have sunk, but turned their attention to the men, sailing throughout to butcher, rather than to make prisoners; and some of their own friends, not being aware that those in the right wing had been worsted, they unwittingly killed.
1.50.2.1
For as both fleets were numerous, and extended over a wide space of the sea; when they closed with each other, they did not easily distinguish, who were conquering, or being conquered; for this engagement, for one of Greeks against Greeks, was greater in the number of vessels than any of those before it.
1.50.3.1
After the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to land, they turned their attention to the wrecks, and their own dead, and got possession of most of them, so as to take them to Sybota, where their land force composed of the barbarians had come to their assistance. Now Sybota is a desert port of Thesprotis.
1.50.4.1
Having done this, they mustered again, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who with their seaworthy ships, and such as were left, in conjunction with those of the Athenians, on their side also sailed out to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land on their territory.
1.50.5.1
It was now late, and the Paean had been sung by them for the advance, when the Corinthians suddenly began to row sternwards, on observing twenty ships of the Athenians sailing up; which the Athenians had sent after the ten to help them fearing, (as was the case,) that the Corcyraeans might be conquered, and their own ten ships be too few to aid them.
1.51.1.1
These, then, the Corinthians having first seen, and suspecting that they were from Athens, [and were] not merely as many as they saw, but more, began to retreat.
1.51.2.1
But by the Corcyraeans they were not seen, (for they were advancing more out of their view,) and they wondered at the Corinthians rowing astern, till some saw them and said, There are slips yonder sailing towards us. Then they also withdrew;
1.51.3.1
for it was now growing dark, and the Corinthians by turning back had occasioned the suspension of hostilities.
1.51.4.1
In this way they parted from each other, and the battle ceased at night. And when the Corcyraeans were encamped on Leucimna, these twenty ships from Athens, which were commanded by Glauco, the son of Leager, and Andocides, the son of Leogoras, coming on through the dead bodies and the wrecks, sailed up to the camp not long after they had been descried.
1.51.5.1
Now the Corcyraeans (it being night) were afraid they might be enemies; but afterwards they recognised them, and they came to anchor.
1.52.1.1
The next day the thirty Athenian ships, and as many of the Corcyraean as were sea-worthy, put out and sailed to the harbour at Sybota, in which the Corinthians were anchored, wishing to know whether they would engage.

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