Eusebius, Preparation of the Gospels

§ 10.14.11 And a pupil of Anaximander was Anaximenes son of Eurystratus of Miletus; and his pupil was Anaxagoras, son of Hegesibulus, of Clazomenae. He was the first who clearly defined the subject of first principles. For he not only published his opinions concerning the essence of all things, like his predecessors, but also concerning the moving cause thereof.'For in the beginning,' he says,'all things were confused together. But mind entered and brought them out of disorder into order.'

§ 10.14.12 Anaxagoras had three pupils, Pericles, Archelaus, and Euripides. Pericles became the first man of Athens, and excelled his contemporaries both in wealth and birth: Euripides turned to poetry, and was called by some'the philosopher of the stage':59 and Archelaus succeeded to the school of Anaxagoras in Lampsacus, but migrated to Athens and lectured there, and had many Athenians as pupils, and among them especially Socrates.

§ 10.14.13 At the same time with Anaxagoras there flourished the physical philosophers Xenophanes and Pythagoras. Pythagoras was succeeded by his wife Theano, and his sons Telauges and Mnesarchus.

§ 10.14.14 A pupil of Telauges was Empedocles, in whose time Heracleitus'the obscure' became famous. Xenophanes is said to have been succeeded by Parmenides, and Parmenides by Melissus, and Melissus by Zeno the Eleatic, who, they say, concocted a plot against the tyrant of that time, and was caught, and when tortured by the tyrant that so he might give a list of those who were his accomplices, paid no regard to the tyrant's punishments, but bit through his tongue, and spat it at him, and died in this obstinate endurance of the tortures.

§ 10.14.15 He had for his pupil Leucippus, and Leucippus Democritus, and he Protagoras, in whose time Socrates flourished. One may also find scattered here and there other physical philosophers who lived before Socrates: all, however, beginning with Thales appear to have flourished later than Cyrus king of Persia: and it is manifest that Cyrus lived long after the carrying away of the Jewish nation into captivity at Babylon, when the Hebrew prophets had already ceased, and their holy city had been besieged. So you must admit that Greek philosophy was much later than Moses and the Prophets who came after him; and especially the philosophy of Plato, who having been at first a hearer of Socrates, afterwards associated with the Pythagoreans, and shot far beyond all his predecessors both in eloquence and wisdom and in his philosophical doctrines.

§ 10.14.16 Now Plato lived about the end of the Persian monarchy, a little earlier than Alexander of Macedon, and not much more than four hundred years before the Emperor Augustus.

§ 10.14.17 If therefore it should be shown to you that Plato and his successors have agreed in their philosophy with the Hebrews, it is time to examine the date at which he lived, and to compare the antiquity of the Hebrew theologians and prophets with the age of all the philosophers of Greece.

§ 10.14.18 But since this has been already proved, it is now the proper time to turn back and observe that the wise men of the Greeks have been zealous imitators of the Hebrew doctrines, so that our calumniators can no longer reasonably find fault with us, if we ourselves, admiring the like doctrines with their philosophers, have determined to hold the Hebrew oracles in honour.

§ 11.1 PREFACE CONCERNING THE ARGUMENT: THE preceding Book, which is the tenth of the Evangelical Preparation, was intended to prove by no statements of my own, but by external testimonies, that as the Greeks had contributed no additional wisdom from their own resources, but only their force and elegance of language, and had borrowed all their philosophy from Barbarians, it was not improbable that they were also not unacquainted with the Hebrew Oracles, but had in part seized upon them also; seeing that they did not keep their hands clean from theft even of the literary efforts of their own countrymen. For, as I said, it was not my statement but their own that proved them to be thieves.

§ 11.2 Moreover in the same Book we learned by the comparison of dates that they were very young in age as well as in wisdom, and fell very far short of the ancient literature of the Hebrews.

§ 11.3 Such were the contents of the preceding Book: but in this present one we hasten on at once to pay as it were a debt, I mean the promise which was given, and to exhibit the agreement of the Greek philosophers with the Hebrew Oracles in some if not in all their doctrinal theories. Dismissing therefore those of whom it is superfluous to speak, we call up the leader of the whole band, deeming it right to adopt as umpire of the question Plato alone as equivalent to all: since it is likely that as he surpassed all in reputation he will be sufficient by himself for the settlement of our question.

§ 11.4 But if at any point it should be necessary, for the sake of giving clearness to his thought, I shall also make use of the testimony of those who have studied his philosophy, and shall set forth their own words for the settlement of the question before us.

§ 11.5 Let me, however, make this reservation, that not every matter has been successfully stated by the master, although he has expressed most things in accordance with truth. And this very point also we shall prove at the proper season, not in order to disparage him, but in defence of the reason for which we confess that we have welcomed the Barbarian philosophy in preference to the Greek.

§ 11.1.1 WHEREAS Plato divided the whole subject of philosophy into three branches, Physics, Ethics, Logic, and then again divided his Physics into the examination of sensibles, and the contemplation of incorporeals, you will find this tripartite form of teaching among the Hebrews also, seeing that they had dealt with the like matters of philosophy before Plato was born.

§ 11.1.2 It will be right then to hear Plato first, and so afterwards to examine the doctrines of the Hebrews. And I shall quote the opinions of Plato from those who give the highest honour to his system; of whom Atticus, a man of distinction among the Platonic philosophers, in the work wherein he withstands those who profess to support the doctrines of Plato by those of Aristotle, recounts the opinions of his master in the following manner:

§ 11.2.1 [ATTICUS]'SINCE therefore the entire system of philosophy is divided into three parts, the so-called Ethical topic, and the Physical, and also the Logical; and whereas the aim of the first is to make each one of us honourable and virtuous, and to bring entire households to the highest state of improvement, and finally to furnish the whole commonalty with the most excellent civil polity and the most exact laws; while the second pertains to the knowledge of things divine, and the actual first principles and causes, and all the other things that result from them, which part Plato has named Natural Science; the third is adopted to help in determining and discovering what concerns both the former. Now that Plato before and beyond all others collected into one body all the parts of philosophy, which had till then been scattered and dispersed, like the limbs of Pentheus, as some one said, and exhibited philosophy as an organized body and a living thing complete in all its members, is manifestly asserted by every one.'For it is not unknown that Thales, and Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras, and as many as were contemporary with them spent their time solely on the inquiry concerning the nature of existing things. Nor moreover is any one unaware that Pittacus, and Periander, and Solon, and Lycurgus, and those like them, applied their philosophy to statemanship. Zeno too, and all this Eleatic School, are also well known to have studied especially the dialectic art. But after these came Plato, a man newly initiated in the mysteries of nature and of surpassing excellence, as one verily sent down from heaven in order that the philosophy taught by him might be seen in its full proportions; for he omitted nothing, and perfected everything, neither falling short in regard to what was necessary, nor carried away to what was useless.'Since therefore we asserted that the Platonist partakes of all three, as studying Nature, and discussing Morals, and practising Dialectic, let us now examine each point separately.'

§ 11.2.1 So speaks Atticus, And the Peripatetic Aristocles also adds his testimony to the same effect, in the seventh Book of the treatise which he composed Of Philosophy, speaking thus word for word:

§ 11.3.1 [ARISTOCLES]'IF any man ever yet taught a genuine and complete system of philosophy, it was Plato. For the followers of Thales were constantly engaged in the study of Nature: and the school of Pythagoras wrapped all things in mystery: and Xenophanes and his followers, by stirring contentious discussions, caused the philosophers much dizziness, but yet gave them no help.'And not least did Socrates, exactly according to the proverb, add fire to fire, as Plato himself said. For being a man of great genius, and clever in raising questions upon any and every matter, he brought moral and political speculations into philosophy, and moreover was the first who attempted to define the theory of the Ideas: but while still stirring up every kind of discussion, and inquiring about all subjects, he died too early a death.'Others took certain separate parts and spent their time upon these, some on Medicine, others on the Mathematical Sciences, and some on the poets and Music. Most of them, however, were charmed with the powers of language, and of these some called themselves rhetoricians and others dialecticians.'In fact the successors of Socrates were of all different kinds, and opposed to each other in their opinions. For some sang the praises of cynical habits, and humility, and insensibility; but others, on the contrary, of pleasures. And some used to boast of knowing all things, and others of knowing absolutely nothing.'Further some used to roll themselves about in public and in the sight of all men, associating with the common people, while others on the contrary could never be approached nor accosted.' Plato however, though he perceived that the science of things divine and human was one and the same, was the first to make a distinction, asserting that there was one kind of study concerned with the nature of the universe, and another concerned with human affairs, and a third with dialectic.'But he maintained that we could not take a clear view of human affairs, unless the divine were previously discerned: for just as physicians, when treating any parts of the body, attend first to the state of the whole, so the man who is to take a clear view of things here on earth must first know the nature of the universe; and man, he said, was a part of the world; and good was of two kinds, our own good and that of the whole, and the good of the whole was the more important, because the other was for its sake.'Now Aristoxenus the Musician says that this argument comes from the Indians: for a certain man of that nation fell in with Socrates at Athens, and presently asked him, what he was doing in philosophy: and when he said, that he was studying human life, the Indian laughed at him, and said that no one could comprehend things human, if he were ignorant of things divine.'Whether this, however, is true no one could assert positively: but Plato at all events distinguished the philosophy of the universe, and that of civil polity, and also that of dialectic.'

§ 11.3.2 Such being the philosophy of Plato, it is time to examine also that of the Hebrews, who had studied philosophy in the like manner long before Plato was born. Accordingly you will find among them also this corresponding tripartite division of Ethical, and Dialectical, and Physical studies, by setting yourself to observe in the following manner:

§ 11.4.1 As to Ethics then, if you thoroughly examine what the Hebrews taught, you will find that this subject before all others was zealously studied among them in deeds much earlier than in words. Since as the end of all good, and the final term of a happy life, they both admired and pursued religion and that friendship with God which is secured by the right direction of moral habits; but not bodily pleasure, like Epicurus; nor again the threefold kinds of good, according to Aristotle, who esteems the good of the body, and external good on an equality with the good of the soul; no, nor yet the utter void of knowledge and instruction, which some have announced by a more respectable name as'suspension of judgement'; nay, nor even the virtue of the soul; for how much is there of this in men, and what can it contribute by itself without God to the life that knows no sorrow?

§ 11.4.2 For the sake of that life they fastened their all on hope in God, as a cable that could not break, and declared that the friend of God was the only happy man: because God the dispenser of all good, the purveyor of life and fountain of virtue itself, being the provider of all good things for the body, and of outward fortune, must be alone sufficient for the happy life to the man who by thoroughly true religion has secured His friendship.

§ 11.4.3 Hence Moses, the wisest of men and the first of all to commit to writing the life of the godly Hebrews before his time, has described in an historical narrative their mode of life both political and practical. In beginning that narrative he drew his teaching from universal principles, assuming God as the cause of the universe, and describing the creation of the world and of man.

§ 11.4.4 Thus from universal principles he next advanced in his argument to particulars, and by the memory of the men of old urged his disciples on to emulation of their virtue and piety; and moreover being himself declared the author of the holy laws enacted by him, it must be manifest that on all points he was careful to promote the love of God by his attention to moral habits, a point which in fact our argument anticipated and made clear in what has gone before.

§ 11.4.5 It would be too long to set down in this place the prophets who came in succession after Moses, and their arguments to encourage virtue, and dissuade from all kinds of vice. But what if I were to bring before you the moral precepts of the all-wise Solomon, to which he devoted a special treatise and called it a book of Proverbs, including in one subject many concise judgements of the nature of apophthegms?

§ 11.4.1 And in this way from old times, before the Greeks had learned even the first letters, the Hebrews were both themselves instructed in the ethical branch, and freely imparted of the same instruction to those who came to them.

§ 11.5.2 ALSO the dialectic branch of Hebrew philosophy they thought it right to pursue not, as the Greeks were wont, with clever sophistries, and arguments cunningly framed to deceive, but by the conception of actual truth, which with souls illumined by divine light their religious philosophers discovered, and were by it enlightened.

§ 11.5.3 And to make those who were being instructed in the learning of their country more keen in pursuit of this truth, they used even from the age of infancy to deliver to them recitations of holy words, and tales from sacred histories, and metrical compositions of psalms and canticles, problems also and riddles, and certain wise and allegorical theories, combined with beauty of language, and eloquent recitation in their own tongue.

§ 11.5.4 Moreover they had certain expositors (δευτερωταί) of primary instruction (for so it pleases them to name the interpreters of their scriptures), who by translation and explanation made clear what was obscurely taught in riddles, if not to all, at least to those who were fitted to hear these things.

§ 11.5.5 Thus again Solomon the wisest among them started from this principle in the beginning of his book of Proverbs, teaching us that this was mainly the cause of his writing, by stating in express terms that every man ought to know wisdom, and instruction, and to discern the words of understanding, and to perceive the turns of language, and understand true righteousness, and give right judgement.'That I may give,' he says,'subtilty to the simple, and to the young man perception and thoughtfulness. For the wise man will hear these things and be wiser, and the man of understanding will obtain guidance: he will understand a proverb and a dark saying, the words of the wise, and riddles.'

§ 11.5.6 Suet were the terms of the promise of the said book: and the particular Questions proposed and their solutions, and the dialectic treatment carried through all their prophetic scriptures in a manner proper to the wisdom and language of the authors, any one who wishes may learn by taking in hand and studying at leisure the books of their discourse. And if any one were also to study the language itself with critical taste, he would see that, for Barbarians, the writers are excellent dialecticians, not at all inferior to sophists or orators in his own language.

§ 11.5.7 There would also be found among them poems in metre, like the great Song of Moses and David's 118th Psalm, composed in what the Greeks call heroic metre. At least it is said that these are hexameters, consisting of sixteen syllables: also their other compositions in verse are said to consist of trimeter and tetrameter lines, according to the sound of their own language.

§ 11.5.8 While such is the relation of their diction to its logical sense, the thoughts must not be brought into comparison with those of men. For they comprise the oracles of God and of absolute truth to which they have given utterance, prophecies, and predictions, and religious lessons, and doctrines relating to the knowledge of the universe.

§ 11.5.9 And of the authors' accuracy in reasoning you may find indications from their correctness in the application of names, concerning which it will be evident that Plato also bears witness to the opinion of the Hebrews, and is on this very point in agreement with the philosophy of their authors, as indeed it is easy to discern from what follows.

§ 11.6.1 LONG before the name of philosophy was known to the Greeks, Moses had been the first throughout all his writing to treat in numberless instances of the giving of names, and sometimes had arranged the names of all things about him in exact accordance with their nature, and at other times referred to God the decision of the new name given to devout men, and had taught that names are given to things by nature and not conventionally; Plato in following him assents to the same opinions, and does not omit to mention Barbarians, and affirm that this custom is maintained among them, hinting probably at the Hebrews, since it is not easy to observe a theory of this kind among other Barbarians.

§ 11.6.2 He says, at all events, in the Cratylus:

§ 11.6.3 [ Plato ]'The name of anything is not whatever men agree to call it, pronouncing over it some small portion of their own language, but there is a kind of natural correctness in names, the same for all both Greeks and Barbarians.'

§ 11.6.4 And then farther on he says:'So then as long as the legislator, whether here or among the Barbarians, assigns to each thing the form of name that properly belongs to it, whatever syllables he may use, you will not deem him to be a worse legislator, whether in this country or anywhere else.'

§ 11.6.5 Then again after asserting that the man who understands the correctness of names is a dialectician and a legislator, he next speaks thus:'A carpenter's work then is to make a rudder under the superintendence of a pilot, if the rudder is to be a good one.'Evidently.'And a legislator's work, as it seems, is to give a name, having a dialectician to direct him, if the name is to be rightly given.'That is true.'The giving of names then, Hermogenes, is likely to be no light matter, as you suppose, nor a work for light persons, nor for chance comers: and Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that things have their names by nature, and that not every one is an artist in names, but only that man who looking to the name which by nature belongs to each thing is able to impose its form upon both the letters and the syllables.'

§ 11.6.6 After these statements, and many more, he again brings up the mention of the Barbarians, and then expressly acknowledges that most of the names have come to the Greeks from the Barbarians, saying in exact words:'I have an idea that the Greeks, and especially those who live under the Barbarians, have taken many names from them.'Well, what then?'If any one should try to find how these names are fitly given according to the Greek language, and not according to that language from which each name happens to be derived, you know that he would be in difficulty.'Naturally.'

§ 11.6.7 So says Plato. He is anticipated, however, by Moses; for hear what he says, as being a wise legislator and withal a dialectician.'And out of the ground God formed all the beasts of the field and all the fowls of the heaven, and brought them to Adam, to see what he would call them. And whatsoever Adam called a living being, that was the name thereof.'

§ 11.6.8 For by saying'that was the name thereof does he not show that the appellations were given in accordance with nature? For the name just now given, he says, was long before contained in the nature, and that in each of the things named there existed from the beginning this name which the said man inspired by a superior power has given it.

§ 11.6.9 Moreover the very name Adam, being originally a Hebrew noun, would become with Moses an appellation of the earth-born man, because among the Hebrews the earth is called Adam, wherefore also the first man made out of the earth is with true etymology called by Moses Adam.

§ 11.6.10 But the name may also have another meaning, being otherwise taken for'red,' and representing the natural colour of the body. However, by the appellation' Adam' he signified the earthlike, and earthly, and earthborn, or the man of body and of flesh.

§ 11.6.11 But the Hebrews also call man otherwise, giving him the name' Enos,' which they say is the rational man within us, different in nature from the earthlike' Adam.' Enos also has a meaning of its own, being in the Greek language interpreted'forgetful.'

§ 11.6.12 And such the rational part within us is by nature apt to be, on account of its combination with the mortal and irrational part. For the one being altogether pure, and incorporeal, and divine, and rational, comprehends not only the memory of the things that are past, but also the knowledge of the things that are to come, through the supreme excellence of its vision. While the other close-packed in flesh, pierced through with bones and nerves, and laden with the great and heavy burden of the body, was seen by the Hebrew Scripture to be full of forgetfulness and ignorance, and called by an apt designation' Enos,' which means'the forgetful.'

§ 11.6.13 It is written at least in a certain Prophet'What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? Or the son of man, that Thou visitest him?' For which the Hebrew, in the first naming of'man,' contains the word' Enos': as if he said more plainly, What is this forgetful one, that Thou, O God, rememberest him, forgetful though he is? And the other clause,'Or the son of man that Thou visitest him? is read among the Hebrews,'Or the son of Adam': so that the same man is both Adam and Enos; the fleshly nature being represented by Adam, and the rational by Enos.

§ 11.6.14 In this way do the Hebrew oracles distinguish the etymology of the two words. But Plato asserts that man is called ἄνθρωπος in the Greek language from looking upward, saying:'But man no sooner sees, that is the meaning of ὄπωπε, than he both looks up (ἀναθρεῖ), and considers that which he has seen, that he may be one who looks up at what he sees (ἀναθρῶν ἂ ὄπωπε).'

§ 11.6.15 Again the Hebrews call the man'Ish' (Εἷς): and the name is derived by them from Ἔς, by which they signify fire, that the man may be so named because of the hot and fiery temper of the masculine nature.

§ 11.6.16 But the woman, since she is said to have been taken out of man, also shares the name in common with the man: for the woman is called among them'Issha,' as the man is'Ish.' But Plato says that the man (ἀνήρ) is so named because of the upward flux (τὴν ἄνω ῥοήν); and he adds —'And γυνή (woman) seems to me to be the same as γονή (birth).'

§ 11.6.17 Again Moses calls the heaven in the Hebrew tongue the firmament etymologically, because the first thing after the incorporeal and intellectual essence is the firm and sensible body of this world. But Plato says that the name οὐρανός is rightly given to the heaven, because it makes us look upward (ὁραν ἄνω).

§ 11.6.18 Again the Hebrews say that the highest and proper name of God may not be spoken or uttered, nor even conceived in the imagination of the mind: but this actual name by which they speak of God, they call Elohim, from El, as it seems: and this they interpret as'strength,' and'power'; so that among them the name of God has been derived by reasoning from His power and strength, by which He is conceived as Allpowerful and Almighty, as having established all things. But Plato says that the names θεός and θεοί (god and gods) were given because the luminaries in heaven are always running (θέειν).

§ 11.6.19 Of some such kind, to speak generally, are the investigations of the Hebrews and those of Plato on the correctness of names. The names also among men, Plato says, have been given with some meaning, and he tries to render the reason of them: for he says that Hector somehow or other is named from having and ruling (ἔχειν καὶ κρατεῖν) because he was king of the Trojans;15 and Agamemnon because he was very persistent (ἄγαν μένειν), and persevered vigorously and constantly in his determinations about the Trojans;16 Orestes because of the mountainous (ὀρεινόν) and fierce and savage quality of his disposition; and Atreus, because of his having been a mischievous (ἀτηρόν) sort of person in character; and Pelops as one who saw nothing at a distance, but only the things that were close and near (πέλας).19 Tantalus, he says, means a most miserable man (ταλάντατον) because of the misfortunes which beset him.

§ 11.6.20 These examples and countless others such as these you will find stated by Plato, in endeavouring to teach that the first men had their names given to them by nature and not by convention.

§ 11.6.21 But you would not say that the explanations found also in Moses are forced, nor framed according to any sophistical invention of words, when you have learnt that the Hebrew'Cain' is translated among the Greeks as'jealousy'; and the person in question was judged deserving of this appellation because he was jealous of his brother Abel.' Abel' also is interpreted'sorrow,' because he too became the cause of such suffering to his parents, who by some diviner foresight gave these names to their children at birth.

§ 11.6.22 But what if I should quote Abraham to you? He was a kind of meteorologist, and formerly, while he was acquiring the wisdom of the Chaldees, he had become learned in the contemplation of the stars and in the knowledge of the heavens, and was called Abram; and this in the Greek language means'high father.'

§ 11.6.23 But God leading him on from things of this world to things invisible and lying beyond the things that are seen, employs an appropriate change of name, saying,'Thy name shall no more be called Abram, but Abraham shall be thy name; for a father of many nations have I made thee.'

§ 11.6.24 Now it would be long to tell with what thought this is connected: but it is sufficient in this matter also to adopt Plato as a witness to my statement, when he says that some names have been given by a more divine power.

§ 11.6.25 He says indeed in express words:'For here most of all ought care to have been taken in the giving of names: and perhaps some of them may even have been given by a higher power than that of men.'

§ 11.6.26 This very point is also certified by many examples in the sacred Scriptures of the Hebrews; and first of all by Moses, who taught that Abraham, and his son Isaac, and also Israel, received their names from a diviner power.' Isaac' is interpreted'laughter,' bringing with it the token of the virtuous joy, which God has promised to give as a special reward to the friends of God.

§ 11.6.27 His son Israel had formerly borne the name of' Jacob,' but instead of' Jacob' God bestows upon him the name' Israel,' transforming the active and practical man into the contemplative.

§ 11.6.28 For' Jacob' is interpreted'supplanter,' as one who strives in the contest of virtue: but' Israel' is interpreted'seeing God,' a description which would suit the mind in man that is capable of knowledge and contemplation.

§ 11.6.29 Why need I now refer to the perfect wisdom of Moses, or to the sacred oracles of the Hebrews, to explain, by countless other examples, the correctness of their imposition of proper names, when the details of the subject require longer leisure?

§ 11.6.30 To go no farther, the Greeks would be unable to state the etymologies even of the letters of the alphabet, nor could Plato himself tell the meaning or the reason of the vowels or the consonants.

§ 11.6.31 But the Hebrews would tell us the reason of'Alpha,' which with them is called'Al'ph,' and this signifies'learning':27 and of'Beta,' which it is their custom to call'Beth,' which name they give to a house; so as to show the meaning,'learning of a house,' or as it might be more plainly expressed,'a kind of teaching and learning of household economy.''Gamma' also is with them called'Gimel': and this is their name for'fullness.' Then since they call tablets' Delth,' they gave this name to the fourth letter, signifying therewith by the two letters, that'written learning is a filling of the tablets.'

§ 11.6.32 And any one going over the remaining letters of the alphabet, would find that they have been named among the Hebrews each with some cause and reason. For they say also that the combination of the seven vowels contains the enunciation of one forbidden name, which the Hebrews indicate by four letters and apply to the supreme power of God, having received the tradition from father to son that this is something unutterable and forbidden to the multitude.

§ 11.6.33 And one of the wise Greeks having learned this, I know not whence, hinted it obscurely in verse, saying as follows:'Seven vowels tell My Name, — the Mighty God, The everlasting Father of mankind: The immortal lyre am I, that guides the world, And leads the music of the circling spheres.'

§ 11.6.34 You would find also the meanings of the remaining Hebrew letters, by fixing your attention on each; but this we have already established by our former statements, when we were showing that the Greeks have received help in everything from the Barbarians.

§ 11.6.35 And any one diligently studying the Hebrew language would discover great correctness of names current among that people: since the very name which is the appellation of the whole race has been derived from Heber; and this means the man that'passes over,' since both a passage and the one who passes over are called in the Hebrew language'heber.'

§ 11.6.36 For the term teaches us to cross over and pass from the things in this world to things divine, and by no means to stay lingering over the sight of the things that are seen, but to pass from these to the unseen and invisible things of divine knowledge concerning the Maker and Artificer of the world. Thus the first people who were devoted to the one All-ruler and Cause of the Universe, and adhered to Him with a pure and true worship, they called Hebrews, naming men of this character as travellers who had in mind passed over from earthly things.

§ 11.6.37 But why should I spend more time in collecting all the instances of the propriety and correctness of the Hebrew names, when the subject requires a special treatise of its own. However, speaking generally, I think that even by what has been said I have supplied the evidence of the art of reasoning among the Hebrews: if indeed, as Plato said, it is a task for no mean or ordinary men, but for a wise lawgiver and dialectician, to discover the kind of names naturally belonging to things, — a man such as Moses who has made known to us the Hebrew oracles. So then what follows next after the subject of Dialectics, but to examine what was the condition of the Hebrew people in regard to Physics?

§ 11.7.1 THIS third branch also of Hebrew philosophy which, we said, is Physics, was divided among them also into the contemplation of things incorporeal and discerned only by the mind, and the Natural Science of things sensible. This too their all-accomplished Prophets knew, and mingled in their own discourses, when the occasion required; for they had not learned it by conjectures and by application of human thought, nor did they boast of men as their teachers, but ascribed their knowledge to the inspiration of a Higher Power, and the afflatus of a divine Spirit.

§ 11.7.2 From this source came their countless prophecies concerning future events, and countless physical explanations of the constitution of the world, and descriptions likewise countless of the nature of animals, and very many things concerning plants which each set down in his own prophecies.

§ 11.7.3 And Moses, understanding also the qualities of precious stones extremely well, exercises a very careful consideration of them in the case of the High Priest's dress. Again that Solomon, above all others, excelled in knowledge of the nature of such things is testified by the sacred Scripture in the following words:'And Solomon spake three thousand proverbs, and his songs were five thousand; and he spake of trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall: he spake also of beasts, and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes. And there came all peoples to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and from all the kings of the earth, as many as heard his wisdom.'

§ 11.7.4 Starting from this description the author who ascribed to his person the perfection of wisdom, spake also thus:'For Himself gave me an unerring knowledge of the things that are, to know the constitution of the world, and the operation of the elements; the beginning and end and middle of times, the alternations of the solstices and the changes of seasons, the circuits of the year and the positions of stars; the natures of living creatures and the ragings of wild beasts, the violences of winds and the thoughts of men, the diversities of plants, and the virtues of roots; and all things that are either secret or manifest I learned, for Wisdom the artificer of all things taught me.'

§ 11.7.5 And again the same Solomon, explaining the nature of the fleeting substance of bodies, says in Ecclesiastes:'Vanity of vanities, all is vanity. What profit hath man in all his labour, wherein he laboureth under the Sun.' And he adds:'What is that which hath been? The very thing that shall be. And what is that which hath been done? The very thing that shall be done. And there is nothing new under the sun.'

§ 11.7.6 For these and such as these were his physiological conclusions concerning corporeal substance. And you will find, if you go on, that the other wise Hebrews were not without a share of the like science. At all events, as I said before, there are numberless sayings of theirs about plants and animals, whether of the land or of the water, and moreover about the nature of birds.

§ 11.7.7 Nay further, about the constellations in the heaven also: since there is conveyed in the writings of the said authors especial mention of Arctos and Pleias, Orion and Arcturus, which the Greeks are wont to call Arctophylax and Bootes.

§ 11.7.8 Also concerning the constitution of the world, and the revolution and change of the universe, and concerning the essence of the soul, and the creation of the nature both visible and invisible, of all rational beings, and the universal Providence, and still earlier than these, the opinions concerning the First Cause of the universe, and the doctrine of the divinity of the Second Cause, and the arguments and speculations about the other things that can be perceived only by thought, they have comprehended accurately and well: so that one would not err in saying, that those among the Greeks who have afterwards investigated the nature of these things have been like younger men following the guidance of the old.

§ 11.7.9 This then is what we have to say of their Natural Science of the Universe. But as they divided this subject into two parts, the one which concerns things perceived by the senses they did not think it necessary to make known accurately to the multitude, nor to teach the common people the causes of the nature of existing things, except only so far as it was necessary for them to know that the universe has not been self-created, and has not been produced causelessly and by chance from an irrational impetus, but is led on by the Divine Reason as its guide, and governed by a power of ineffable Wisdom.

§ 11.7.10 With regard, however, to things seen only by the mind, that they exist, and what they are, and what their condition is in regard to arrangement, power, and diversity, has been already mentioned and is laid down in the Sacred Books, and has been audibly delivered to all men, so far as the knowledge was necessary for those who profess religion, with a view to the recovery of a pious and sober life.

§ 11.7.11 But the deep and occult reason of these things they left to be sought out and learned in secret communications by those who were capable of being initiated in matters of this kind. It will be well, however, to describe in a general way a few points in the contemplation of these matters, and to show that herein also Plato entertained the sentiments which were dear to the said people.

§ 11.8.1 BUT in fact it is manifest from his own words that the admirable Plato followed the all-wise Moses and the Hebrew Prophets in regard also to the teaching and speculation about things incorporeal and seen only by the mind; whether it were that he learned from hearsay which had reached him (since he is proved to have made his studies among the Egyptians at the very time when the Hebrews, having been driven the second time out of their own country, were in the habit of visiting Egypt during the Persian supremacy), or whether of himself he hit upon the true nature of the things, or, in whatever way, was deemed worthy of this knowledge by God.'For God,' says the Apostle,'manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived by means of the things that are made, even His eternal power and divinity, that they may be without excuse.' And you may learn what I have stated by examining the matter as follows:

§ 11.9.1 MOSES in his declarations of sacred truth uttered a response in the person of God:'I AM THAT I AM. Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you,' and so represented God as the sole absolute Being, and declared Him to have been properly and fitly honoured with this name.

§ 11.9.2 And Solomon again spake concerning the origin and the decay of things corporeal and sensible:'What is that which hath been? The very thing that shall be. And what is that which hath been done? The very thing that shall be done. And there is nothing new under the sun, whereof a man shall speak and say, See, this is new. It hath been already, in the ages which were before us.'

§ 11.9.3 In accordance with them we also divide the All into two parts, that which can be perceived only by the mind, and that which can be perceived by the senses: and the former we define as incorporeal and rational in its nature, and imperishable and immortal; but the sensible as being always in flux and decay, and in change and conversion of its substance. And all things being summed up and referred to one beginning, we hold the doctrine that the uncreate, and that which has proper and true being, is One, which is the cause of all things incorporeal and corporeal.

§ 11.9.4 Now see in what manner Plato, having imitated not only the thought, but also the very expressions and words of the Hebrew Scripture, appropriates the doctrine, explaining it more at large, as follows:'What is that which always is and has no becoming? And what is that which is always becoming and never is? The former is that which may be comprehended by intelligence combined with reason, being always in the same conditions. The latter is that which may be conjectured by opinion with the help of unreasoning sensation, becoming and perishing but never really being.'

§ 11.9.5 Does it not plainly appear that the admirable philosopher has altered the oracle which in Moses declared'I AM THAT I AM' into'What is that which always is and has no becoming?' And this he has made still clearer when he says that true'being' is nothing else than that which is not seen by eyes of flesh, but is conceived by the mind. So having asked, What is'being'? he makes answer to himself, saying:'That which may be comprehended by intelligence combined with reason.'

§ 11.9.6 And as to Solomon's maxim which said,'What is that which hath been? The very thing that shall be. And what is that which hath been done? The very thing that shall be done,' it must be evident that he translated this almost in the very words, saying,'But that which may be conjectured by means of irrational sensation is becoming and perishing, but never really “being.”' To which he also adds:'For all these are parts of time, the “was” and “shall be”; which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence. For we say that “It was, and is, and shall be.” But to this essence the “is” alone is truly appropriate; and the “was” and the “will be” are proper to be spoken of the generation in time, for they are movements. But to that which is always immovably in the same conditions it belongs not to become either older or younger through time: nor that it ever became, nor has now become, nor will be hereafter at all, nor be subject to any of the conditions which becoming attaches to the things which pass to and fro in sensation: but these are forms of time, imitating eternity and moving by number in a circle. And besides these there are such expressions as the following; what has become is become, and what becomes is becoming, and what will become is about to become.'

§ 11.9.7 And lest any one should suppose that I am misinterpreting the philosopher's words, I will make use of commentaries which explain the meaning of these statements. There are indeed many who have set themselves to the consideration of these matters; but at present it is enough for me to quote the expressions of an illustrious man, Numenius the Pythagorean, which he uses in his second Book Concerning the Good, as follows:

§ 11.1.1 [NUMENIUS]'COME then, let us mount up as nearly as we possibly can to true “being,” and let us say that “being” neither at any time “was,” nor ever can “become,” but always “is” in a definite time, the present only.'If, however, any one wishes to rename this present time eternity, I too am willing. But the time past we ought to consider altogether gone, already so gone away and escaped as to exist no longer: and on the other hand the time to come as yet is not, but professes to be able at some future time to come into being.'It is not therefore reasonable to suppose “being,” at least in one and the same sense, either not to be or to be no longer, or not yet. Since when this is so stated, there arises in the statement one great impossibility, that the same thing at the same time should both be and not be.'For if this were so, scarcely would it be possible for anything else to be, if “being” itself in regard to its very “being” be not. For “being” is eternal and constant, ever in the same condition, nor has it been generated and destroyed, nor increased and diminished: nor did it ever yet become more or less: and certainly neither in other senses nor yet locally will it be moved.'For it is not right for it to be moved, either backward or forward: nor upward ever, nor downward: neither to the right hand nor to the left shall “being” ever pass: nor shall it ever be moved around its own centre; but rather it shall stand fast, and shall be fixed and set firm, ever in the same conditions and same mode.'

§ 11.1.2 And then, after other statements, he adds:'So much then for my introduction. But for my own part I will no longer make pretences, nor say that I do not know the name of the incorporeal; for now at length it seems likely to be pleasanter to speak than not to speak it. And so then I say that its name is that which we have so long been examining.'But let no one laugh, if I affirm that the name of the incorporeal is “essence” and “being.” And the cause of the name “being” is that it has not been generated nor will be destroyed, nor is it subject to any other motion at all, nor any change for better or for worse; but is simple and unchangeable, and in the same idea, and neither willingly departs from its sameness, nor is compelled by any other to depart.' Plato too said in the Cratylus that names are exactly adapted to a likeness of the things. Be it granted then and agreed that “being” is the incorporeal.'

§ 11.1.3 Then lower down he adds:'I said that “being” is incorporeal, and that this is that which can be perceived by the mind only. Their statements then, so far as I can remember, were certainly of this kind: but any one who feels the want of an explanation I am willing to encourage with just this suggestion, that if these statements do not agree with the doctrines of Plato, yet at least he must consider them to be those of some other great man of the highest ability, such as Pythagoras.' Plato at all events says — come, let me remember how he says it — What is that which, always is and has no becoming? And what that which is always becoming, and never is? The first that which may be comprehended by intelligence combined with reason, and the other that which may be conjectured by opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, becoming and perishing, but never really “being.”'For he was inquiring what is “being,” and saying that it is unquestionably without beginning. For he said that for “being” there is no becoming: for then it would be changed, but that which is liable to change is not eternal.'

§ 11.1.4 Then below he says:'If then “being” is altogether and in every way eternal and unchangeable, and by no means departs in any way from itself, but abides in the same conditions, and remains fixed in the same manner, this surely must be that which can be comprehended by intelligence combined with reason.'But if body is in flux and is carried off by the change of the moment, it passes away and no longer exists. Wherefore is it not utter folly to deny that this is something undefinable, and that can only be conjectured by opinion, and, as Plato says, becoming and perishing, but never really “being”?'

§ 11.1.5 Thus then speaks Numenius, explaining clearly both Plato's doctrines and the much earlier doctrines of Moses. With reason therefore is that saying currently attributed to him, in which it is recorded that he said,'For what else is Plato than Moses speaking Attic Greek?'

§ 11.1.6 But see, besides this, whether Plutarch in further unfolding the same thought may not agree both with the statements of philosophers which have been brought forward, and the theological doctrines of the Hebrews set forth again in other places, whereby at one time the God who makes answer is introduced as saying:'For I am the LORD your God, and I am not changed': and at another time the Prophet directs his speech with a view to Him, saying that the things which are seen would all some time be changed and removed,'but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail.' Observe then whether — when He who spake in Moses, as if proposing a question, said,'I AM THAT I AM,' and,'I am the LORD your God, and I am not changed': and again,'But Thou art (εἶ) the same' — whether, I say. Plutarch would not seem to be interpreting the meaning of this in his treatise Concerning the Εἶ at Delphi, when he speaks word for word thus:

§ 11.11.1'NEITHER number therefore, nor order, nor conjunction, nor any other of the non-significant particles, does the letter seem to indicate. But it is an address and appellation of the god complete in itself, which as soon as the word is uttered sets the speaker thinking of the power of the god.'For the god, welcoming as it were each of us who approach him here, addresses to us the words “Know thyself,” which is nothing less than “Hail”: and we answering the god again say “Thou art” (Εἶ), rendering to him the appellation of “being” as his true and unerring and solely appropriate name.'For we have in reality no share in “being,” but every mortal nature is set in the midst between becoming and perishing, and presents a phantom and a faint and uncertain seeming of itself.'And if any one closely press the thought, from wishing to grasp it, then just as the violent grasping of water by pressing and squeezing it together causes what was enclosed to slip through and be lost, so when Reason seeks too much actuality in any thing passible and subject to change, it goes astray on this side to the part that is becoming, and on that to the part that is perishing, being unable to lay hold of anything permanent, or of any true “being.”'For it is not possible, according to Heracleitus, to step twice into the same river, nor to touch a mortal substance twice in the same condition, but by the swiftness and suddenness of its change it scatters and again collects, or rather we must not say “again” nor “afterwards,” but it is at the same time both combining and passing away, both coming on and going off.'Wherefore neither does the part that is becoming attain to being, because the becoming never ceases nor stands still; but from a seed by constant change it makes an embryo, then a babe, then a child, in due order a youth, a young man, a man, an elder, an old man, destroying the first becomings and ages by those which come after.'We, however, are ridiculously afraid of one death, although we have already died and are dying so many. For not only, as Heracleitus used to say, is “the death of fire the birth of air,” but still more manifestly in our own case the man in his prime perishes when the old man is coming, and the young man has passed away into the man in his prime, and the child into the young man, and the infant into the child, and the man of yesterday has died into the man of today, and the man of today (is dying) into the man of to-morrow; and not one abides nor is one, but we become many, while matter is circulating around some one phantom and common mould, and then slipping away.'Else how is it, if we remain the same, that we delight now in some things, formerly in others, that we love and hate the contrary things, and praise and blame, use different language, have different feelings, retain no more the same appearance, form, or thought?'For neither is it natural to have different feelings without a change, nor can one who changes be the same. But if he is not the same, he is not, but is changing from this, and becoming other from other: and our sense, through ignorance of true “being,” falsely declares the apparent to “be.”'What then is true “being”? The eternal and uncreate, and imperishable, to which no time brings change. For time is something moveable, and imagined in connexion with the movement of matter, and ever flowing and not holding water, as it were a vessel of perishing and becoming. And so when it is said of time “after” and “before,” and “will be” and “has been,” there is at once an acknowledgement of “not-being.”'For to say of that which has not yet come into being, or has already ceased from being, that it “is” is silly and absurd. But at the very moment when, trying to fix our perception of time, we say “it is present,” “it is here,” and “now,” our reason slips away again from this and loses it. For it is thrust aside into the future and into the past, just as a visual ray is distorted with those who try to see what is necessarily separated by distance.'And if the nature which is measured is subject to the same conditions as the time which measures it, this nature itself has no permanence, nor “being,” but is becoming and perishing according to its relation to time.'Hence nothing of this kind may be said of “being,” such as “was” or “will be”: for these are a kind of inflexions, and transitions, and alternations of that which is not fitted by nature to continue in “being.”'But we ought to say of God, HE is, and is in relation to no time, but in relation to eternity the motionless, and timeless, and changeless, in which is no “before” nor “after,” nor future, nor past, nor elder nor younger: but being One He has filled the “Ever” with the one “Now”; and is the sole self-dependent real “Being,” having neither past nor future, without beginning and without end.'Thus then ought we in worship to salute and address Him, or even indeed as some of the ancients did, THOU ART ONE, For the Deity is not many, as each of us is, a promiscuous assemblage of all kinds compounded of numberless differences arising in its conditions: but “being” must be One, just as One must be “being”: for otherness, as a differentia of “being,” inclines towards a becoming of “not-being.”'

§ 11.12.1 WHEREAS Moses and all the Hebrew Prophets teach that the Divine nature is ineffable, and indicate the symbol of the ineffable Name by the notation which may not be pronounced among them, hear how Plato also in agreement with them speaks in his great Epistle word for word.

§ 11.12.2 [Ps.-PLATO]'For it can by no means be defined in words as other branches of learning, but from long converse on the subject itself, and from living with it, on a sudden a light, as it were kindled from a spark leaping out of the fire, comes to the soul, and thenceforth is self-sustained.'

§ 11.12.3 This example also of'light' another Hebrew Prophet had previously set forth, saying,'The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, was shown upon us.' And again another,'In Thy light shall we see light.'

§ 11.13.1 As Moses declared concerning the God of all the world,'Hear, O Israel, the LORD our God is one LORD,' Plato again concurring with him teaches that there is one God as also one heaven, speaking thus in the Timaeus: