Eusebius, Preparation of the Gospels

§ 11.13.2 [PLATO]'Have we then been right in speaking of one heaven, or was it more correct to say that there are many and infinite? One, if indeed it is to have been created according to the pattern. For that which includes the ideals of all living creatures whatsoever cannot possibly be second to another.'

§ 11.13.3 But that he has a knowledge of one God, even though in accordance with the custom of the Greeks he commonly speaks of them as many, is evident from the Epistle to Dionysius, in which, giving marks to distinguish his letters written in earnest from those thrown off at random, he said that he would put the name of'The gods' as a sign at the head of those which contained nothing serious, but the name of'God' at the head of those which were thoughtfully composed by him. Accordingly he thus speaks word for word:

§ 11.13.4 [PS.-PLATO]'With regard then to the distinctive mark concerning the letters which I may write seriously, and which not, though I suppose you remember it. nevertheless bear it in mind and give great attention to it. For there are many who bid me to write, whom it is not easy for me openly to refuse. So then the serious letter begins with “God,” and the less serious with “gods.”'

§ 11.13.5 And the same author expressly acknowledges that he has learned the doctrine of the one'God' from men of old, as he says in the Laws:'God then, as the old tradition says, holding the beginning and end and middle of all things that exist, passes straight through while travelling round in nature's course. Justice is ever His companion, taking vengeance on those who depart from the divine law: and the man who is to be happy holds fast to her and follows on humbly in orderly array. But if any man lifted up by arrogance, or elated by riches or honours, or personal beauty, has his soul inflamed with youthfulness and folly combined with insolence, as feeling no need of a ruler or guide, but being competent even to guide others, he is left forsaken of God: and when he is thus forsaken, and has also taken to himself others of like mind, he prances about and throws all things into confusion, and to many he seems to be somebody, but after no long time pays to justice no contemptible penalty, and brings utter destruction upon himself as well as on his family and city.'

§ 11.13.6 Thus Plato writes. And now beside the description,'God holding the beginning and end and middle of all things that exist,' set thou this from Hebrew prophecy,'I God am first and I am with the last':56 and beside the sentence,'passes straight through while travelling on in nature's course,' set this,'His countenance doth behold uprightness.'

§ 11.13.7 Also with the phrase,' Justice is ever His companion, taking vengeance on those who depart from the divine law,' compare this,'Righteous is the LORD, and He loveth righteousness';58 and this,'Vengeance is Mine, I will repay, saith the LORD';59 and this,'For the Lord is an avenger, and repayeth them that work exceeding proudly';60 and with this,'the man who is to be happy holds fast to her and follows on humbly in orderly array,' there agrees,'Thou shalt walk after the LORD thy God.' And with this,'But he that is lifted up by pride is left forsaken of God,' agrees,'God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the humble';62 and,'But the joy of the ungodly is a sudden fall.' These then are a few out of countless passages concerning Him who is God over all. But observe also the passages concerning the Second Cause.

§ 11.14.1 IN regard then to the First Cause of all things let this be our admitted form of agreement. But now consider what is said concerning the Second Cause, whom the Hebrew oracles teach to be the Word of God, and God of God, even as we Christians also have ourselves been taught to speak of the Deity.

§ 11.14.2 First then Moses expressly speaks of two divine Lords in the passage where he says,'Then the LORD rained from the LORD fire and brimstone upon the city of the ungodly': where he applied to both the like combination of Hebrew letters in the usual way; and this combination is the mention of God expressed in the four letters, which is with them unutterable.

§ 11.14.3 In accordance with him David also, another Prophet as well as king of the Hebrews, says,'The LORD said unto my Lord, sit Thou on My right hand,' indicating the Most High God by the first LORD, and the second to Him by the second title. For to what other is it right to suppose that the right hand of the Unbegotten God is conceded, than to Him alone of whom we are speaking?

§ 11.14.4 This is He whom the same prophet in other places more clearly distinguishes as the Word of the Father, supposing Him whose deity we are considering to be the Creator of the universe, in the passage where he says,'By the Word of the LORD were the heavens made firm.'

§ 11.14.5 He introduces the same Person also as a Saviour of those who need His care, saying,'He sent His Word and healed them.'

§ 11.14.6 And Solomon, David's son and successor, presenting the same thought by a different name, instead of the'Word' called Him Wisdom, making the following statement as in her person:'I Wisdom made prudence my dwelling, and called to my aid knowledge and understanding.' Then afterwards he adds,'The LORD formed me as the beginning of His ways with a view to His works: from everlasting He established me, in the beginning before He made the earth,... before the mountains were settled, and before all hills He begat me.... When He was preparing the heaven, I was beside Him.'

§ 11.14.7 And there is this again of the same author,'God by Wisdom founded the earth, and by understanding He prepared the heavens.' The following also is said to be the same author's:'And all things that are either secret or manifest I learned: for Wisdom, the artificer of all things, taught me.'

§ 11.14.8 Then he adds,'But what wisdom is, and how she came into being, I will declare, and will not hide mysteries from you, but will trace her out from the beginning of creation.'

§ 11.14.9 And afterwards he gives such explanations as the following:'For she is a spirit quick of understanding, holy, alone in kind, manifold, subtil, freely moving, clear in utterance, unpolluted,... all-powerful, all-surveying, and penetrating through all spirits, that are quick of understanding, pure, most subtil. For wisdom is more mobile than any motion; yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness. For she is a breath of the power of God, and a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty. Therefore can nothing defiled find entrance into her. For she is an effulgence from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the operation of God, and an image of His goodness.... And she reacheth from end to end with full strength, and ordereth all things graciously.'.' Thus the Scripture speaks: but Philo the Hebrew, explaining the meaning of the doctrine more clearly, represents it in the manner following:

§ 11.15.1 [PHILO]'FOR it becomes those who have made companionship with knowledge to desire to behold the true Being, but should they be unable, then at least to behold His image, the most holy Word.'

§ 11.15.2 Also in the same treatise he says this:'But even if one be not as yet worthy to be called the son of God, let him strive earnestly to be adorned after the likeness of His first-begotten Word, who is the eldest of the Angels, and as an Archangel has many names.'For He is called the Beginning, and the Name of God, and the Word, and the Man after God's image, and He who seeth Israel. For which cause I was induced a short time ago to praise the virtues of those who assert that we are all sons of one Man.'For even if we have not yet become fit to be deemed children of God, yet surely we may be children of His eternal Image, the most holy Word: for His eldest Word is the Image of God.'

§ 11.15.3 And again he adds:'I have, however, heard also one of the companions of Moses utter an oracle of this kind: Behold I the man whose name is the East. A very strange appellation, if you suppose the man who is composed of body and soul to be meant: but if you mean that incorporeal Being who wears the divine form, you will fully acknowledge that the'East' was happily given to Him as a most appropriate name: for the Universal Father made Him rise as His eldest Son, whom elsewhere He named “First-begotten.” And indeed He that was begotten, imitating the ways of His Father, looked to His archetypal patterns in giving form to the various species.'

§ 11.15.4 Let it suffice at this point to have made these quotations from, the Hebrew Philo, taken from the treatise inscribed with the title, On the worse plotting against the better. But already in an earlier part of The Preparation for the Gospel, in setting forth the doctrines of the religion of the ancient Hebrews, I have also sufficiently discussed those which relate to the Second Cause, and to those passages I will now refer the earnest student. Since therefore these have been the theological opinions held among the Hebrews in the way that I have described concerning the Second Cause of the Universe, it is now time to listen to Plato speaking as follows in the Epinomis:

§ 11.16.2 [PLATO]'AND let us not, in assigning offices to them, give to this one a year, and to that a month, and to others appoint no portion, nor any time in which to perform his course, and help to complete the order, which Reason (λόγος), of all things most divine, appointed; Reason, which the happy man at first admires, and then gets a desire to understand, as much as is possible for mortal nature.'

§ 11.16. Also in the Epistle to Hermeias, and Erastus, and Coriscus, he has laid down the doctrine with excellent caution, writing as follows word for word:'This letter you three must all read, together if possible; but if not, by two and two together, as you can, as often as possible: and must make an agreement and valid law, adding an oath as is right, and with earnestness not unworthy of the Muses, and with culture the sister of earnestness, invoking the God who is the Ruler of all things that are and that shall be, and Father and Lord of Him who is the Ruler and the Cause: Whom, if we rightly study philosophy, we all shall know clearly as far as is possible for favoured mortals.'

§ 11.16.3 Does it not seem to you that in speaking thus Plato has followed the doctrines of the Hebrews? Or from what other source did it occur to him to name another God who is mightier than the cause of all things, whom also he calls Father of the All-ruler? And whence came his idea of setting the name of Lord on the Father of the Demiurge, though never before him had any one brought this to the ears of the Greeks, nor even set it down in. his own mind.

§ 11.16.4 And if we yet want other witnesses for an indisputable confirmation of the philosopher's meaning, and of the construction of our argument, hear what explanations Plotinus gives in the treatise which he composed Concerning the three Primary Hypostases, writing as follows:

§ 11.17.1 [PLOTINUS]'IF any one admires this world of sense, beholding at once its greatness and beauty and the order of its eternal course, and the gods that are therein, some visible, and some invisible, the daemons, and animals and all kinds of plants, let him mount up to its original pattern and to the more real world, and there let him see all intelligible things, and things which are of themselves eternal in their own understanding and life, see also the pure intelligence and the infinite wisdom that presides over them.'

§ 11.17.2 Then afterwards in addition to this he says:'Who then is He that begat Him? He who is simple, and prior to a plurality of this kind, who is the cause both of His being, and of His plurality. For number came not first: since before the duad is the one; and the duad is second, and produced from the one.'

§ 11.17.3 And again he goes on and adds:'How then and what must we conceive concerning that abiding substance? A light shining around and proceeding from it, while it remains itself unchanged, as from the sun proceeds the bright surrounding light that runs around it, ever produced out of it, while it remains unchanged itself.'And all existing things, so long as they remain, give forth necessarily from their own essence and from the power present in the substance which surrounds them externally and is dependent upon them, being as it were an image of the archetypes from which it sprang.'Thus fire gives forth the heat which proceeds from it, and snow does not merely retain its cold within itself. And especially all fragrant things bear witness to this fact: for as long as they exist, a something from them goes forth around them, which is enjoyed by whatever is near.'Moreover all things as soon as they are perfect begin to generate: so that which is always perfect is always generating a something eternal, and what it generates is less than itself.'What then must we say concerning the Most Perfect? That He either generates nothing from Himself, or the things which are the greatest next to Himself. But after Him mind is the greatest and the second. For the mind beholds Him and has need of Him alone, but He has no need of it: and that which is begotten from a superior mind, must be mind; and mind is superior to all things, because all the rest come after it.'

§ 11.17.4 After this he says further:'Now everything desires and loves that which begat it, and especially when that which begat and that which is begotten exist alone. And when that which begat is also the very best, the begotten is necessarily so joined with it, as to be separated only by its otherness. But, since it is necessary to speak more plainly, I mean that mind is His image.'

§ 11.17.5 And to this again he adds:'This is the reason also of Plato's trinities: for he says that around the King of all are all the primaries, and around the second the secondaries, and around the third the tertiaries. He says also that the Cause has a Father, meaning that Mind is the Cause, for with Plato Mind is the Creator.'And Mind, he says, makes the Soul in that cup of his. And the Cause which is Mind has for its Father, he says, the Good, and that which transcends both Mind and essence. But in many places he speaks of Being and of Mind as the Idea. So that Plato recognizes Mind as proceeding from the Good, and the Soul from Mind: and these are no new doctrines, nor now first stated, but long since, though not publicly divulged: and the doctrines of the present time have been interpretations of the former, which by the testimony of Plato's own writings have confirmed the antiquity of these opinions.'

§ 11.17.6 This is what Plotinus says. And Numenius highly commending Plato's doctrines in his treatise Of the Good gives his own interpretation of the Second Cause, as follows:

§ 11.18.1 [NUMENIUS]'THE man who is to understand about the First and Second God must previously distinguish the several questions by some orderly arrangement: and after this seems to be set right, he must then endeavour also to discuss the matter in a becoming manner, or otherwise not at all. Else he who handles it prematurely, before the first steps have been taken, will find his treasure become dust, as the saying is.'Let us then not suffer the same; but after invoking God to be the guide of our discussion concerning Himself, and to show us the treasure of His thoughts, so let us commence. At once we must offer our prayer, and then make our distinction.'The First God, being in Himself, is simple, because, being united throughout with Himself, He can never be divided. God however the Second and Third is one: but by being associated with matter which is duality, He makes it one, but is Himself divided by it, because it has a tendency to concupiscence, and is always in flux.'Therefore by not adhering to the intelligible (for so He would have been adhering to Himself), because He regards matter and gives attention to it, He becomes regardless of Himself.'And He lays hold of the sensible and busies Himself with it, and moreover from setting His desire upon matter He takes it tip into His own moral nature.'

§ 11.18.2 And after other statements he says:'For it is not at all becoming that the First God should be the Creator; also the First God must be regarded as the father of the God who is Creator of the world.'If then we were inquiring about the creative principle, and asserting that He who was pre-existent would thereby be preeminently fit for the work, this would have been a suitable commencement of our argument.'But if we are not discussing the creative principle, but inquiring about the First Cause, I renounce what I said, and wish that to be withdrawn, but will pass on in pursuit of my argument, and hunt it out from another source.'Before capturing our argument, however, let us make an agreement between ourselves such as no one who hears it'can doubt, that the First God is free from all kinds of work and reigns as king, but the Creative God governs, and travels through the heaven.'And by Him comes also our equipment for the chase, mind being sent down in transmission to all who have been appointed to partake of it..'So when God is looking at and turned towards each of us, the result is that our bodies then live and revive, while God cherishes them with His radiations. But when He turns away to the contemplation of Himself, these bodies become extinguished, but the mind is alive and enjoying a life of blessedness.'

§ 11.18.3 This is what Numenius writes. And now do you set beside it the passages from David's prophecy, sung of old among the Hebrews in the following fashion:'How mighty are Thy works, O Lord: in wisdom hast Thou made them all. The earth is filled with Thy creation.... All things wait upon Thee, to give them their meat in due season. When Thou givest it them, they will gather it; and when Thou openest Thine hand, they all will be satisfied with goodness. But when Thou turnest away Thy face, they will be troubled: if Thou takest away their breath, they will die, and turn again to their dust. Thou wilt send forth Thy Spirit, and they will be created, and Thou wilt renew the face of the earth.'

§ 11.18.4 For in what would this differ from the thought of the philosopher, which declares, as we saw, that'When God is looking at and turned towards each of us, the result is that our bodies then live and revive, while God cherishes them with His radiations; but when God turns to the contemplation of Himself, these become extinguished.'

§ 11.18.5 And again, whereas with us the Word of Salvation says,'I am the vine,... My Father is the husbandman,... ye are the branches,',' hear what Numenius says concerning the deity of the Second Cause.

§ 11.18.6 [NUMENIUS]'And as again there is a relation between the husbandman and him that planteth, exactly in the same way is the First God related to the Demiurge. The former being the seed of all soul sows it in all things that partake of Himself. But the Lawgiver plants, and distributes, and transplants into each of us the germs which have been previously deposited from that higher source.'

§ 11.18.7 And afterwards again he speaks as follows of the mode in which the Second Cause arose out of the First.'Now all things which, when given, pass to the receiver, and have left the giver, such as are attendance, property, silver unstamped or coined, — these things, I say, are mortal and human: but divine things are such as, when they are distributed and have come from one to another, have not forsaken the former, and have brought with them benefit to the latter, without hurting the other; nay, have brought him a further benefit by recalling to memory what he understood before.'Now this excellent thing is that good knowledge which brings profit to the receiver and is not lost to the giver. Just as you may see a lamp lit from another lamp shining with a light of which it did not deprive the former, but had its own material kindled at the other's flame.'Such a thing is knowledge, which when given and received remains the same with the giver, and is communicated to the receiver.'And the cause of this, my friend, is not anything human; but that the state and essence which possesses knowledge is the same both in God who has given, and in you and me who have received it.'Wherefore also Plato said that wisdom was brought to mankind “with a brilliant flame of fire by Prometheus.”'

§ 11.18.8 And again afterwards lower down he says:'Now the modes of life of the First God and of the Second are these: evidently the First God will be at rest, while the Second on the contrary is in motion. So then the First is engaged with intelligibles, and the Second with both intelligibles and sensibles.'And be not surprised at my saying this, for you are going to hear something far more surprising. For instead of that motion which belongs to the Second I assert that the rest which belongs to the First is His natural motion, from which both the order of the world, and its eternal continuance, and its safety is diffused throughout the universe.'

§ 11.18.9 After this in the sixth Book also he adds the following:'Since Plato knew that the Creator alone was known among men, but that the First Mind, which is called Absolute Being, is altogether unknown among them, therefore he spoke in this way, just as if one were to say; The First Mind, my good sirs, is not that which you imagine, but another mind before it, more ancient and more divine.'

§ 11.18.10 And after other passages he adds:'A pilot when driven along in mid ocean, sits high above the helm, and steers the ship by the tillers, but his eyes and mind are strained directly at the sky, looking at things aloft, as his course passes across the heaven above, while he sails upon the sea below. So also the Creator having bound matter together in harmony that it may neither break out nor slip away, is Himself seated above matter, as above a ship on the sea: and in directing the harmony He steers by the ideas, while instead of the sky He looks to the High God who attracts His eyes, and takes His judgement from that contemplation, and His energy from that impulse.'

§ 11.18.11 Also the Word of our Salvation says,'The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing.' Enough, however, has been said by Numenius on this subject: and there is no need to add anything to his own words to show that he was explaining not his own opinions but Plato's. And that Plato is not the first who has made these attempts, but has been anticipated by the Hebrew sages, has been proved by the examples already set forth. Naturally therefore Amelius also, who was distinguished among recent philosophers, and above all others an admirer of Plato's philosophy, who moreover called the Hebrew theologian a Barbarian, even though he did not deign to mention John the Evangelist by name, nevertheless bears witness to his statements, writing exactly what follows word for word:

§ 11.19.1 [AMELIUS]'AND this then was the Word, on whom as being eternal depended the existence of the things that were made, as Heracleitus also would maintain, and the same forsooth of whom, as set in the rank and dignity of the beginning, the Barbarian maintains that He was with God and was God: through whom absolutely all things were made; in whom the living creature, and life, and being had their birth: and that He came down into bodies, and clothed Himself in flesh, and appeared as man, yet showing withal even then the majesty of His nature; aye, indeed, even after dissolution He was restored to deity, and is a God, such as He was before He came down to dwell in the body, and the flesh, and Man.'

§ 11.19.2 This, it must be evident, is paraphrased from the Barbarian's theology, no longer under any veil, but openly at last and'with forehead bold and bare.' And who was this Barbarian of his but our Saviour's Evangelist John, a Hebrew of the Hebrews? Who in the beginning of his own Scripture states the doctrine of the deity thus,'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that hath been made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men.... And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father.'

§ 11.19.3 Hear also what another Hebrew theologian says concerning the same Person:'Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation: for in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, whether visible or invisible,... and by Him all things consist, and in Him were they all created.'

§ 11.19.4 But since we have found such agreement between the philosophers of the Greeks and the doctrines of the Hebrews concerning the constitution and substantiation of the Second Cause, let us then pass on to other matters.

§ 11.20.1 WHEREAS next to the doctrine of Father and Son the Hebrew oracles class the Holy Spirit in the third place, and conceive the Holy and Blessed Trinity in such a manner as that the third Power surpasses every created nature, and that it is the first of the intellectual essences constituted through the Son, and third from the First Cause, observe how Plato also intimated some such thoughts, speaking thus in his Epistle to Dionysus:

§ 11.20.2 [ Plato ]'I must explain it to you then in riddles, that if the tablet suffer any harm in the remote parts of sea or land, the reader may learn nothing. For the matter is thus: Around the King of the Universe are all things, and all are for His sake, and that is the cause of all things beautiful: and around the Second are the secondary things, and around the Third the tertiary. The soul of man therefore strains after them to learn what sort of things they are, looking upon the things akin to its own nature.'

§ 11.20.3 These statements are referred, by those who attempt to explain Plato, to the First God, and to the Second Cause, and thirdly to the Soul of the Universe, defining it also as a third God. But the sacred Scriptures regard the Holy and Blessed Trinity o'f Father and Son and Holy Ghost as the beginning, according to the passages already set forth.

§ 11.20.4 The next point to this is to examine the nature of the Good.

§ 11.21.1 THE Sacred Scripture of the Hebrews explains the nature of the Good in various ways, and teaches that the Good itself is nothing else than God, both in the statement,'The LORD is good to all them that wait for Him, to the soul that will seek Him,' and in this,'O give thanks unto the LORD; for He is good: for His mercy endureth for ever';105 and also by what the Word of our Salvation declared to the man who asked Him concerning this, saying,'Why askest thou Me concerning that which is good? None is good save one, even God.'

§ 11.21.2 Now then listen to what Plato says in the Timaeus:'Let me then tell you for what cause the Creator formed a creation, and made this universe. He was good. And in one who is good no jealousy of anything ever finds place: and being free from jealousy He desired that all things should be made as like to Himself as possible.'

§ 11.21.3 In the Republic also he speaks thus:'Is it not true then that the sun though not itself sight, is yet the cause of sight, and is itself discerned by this very sight? It is so, said he. Well then, said I, you may say that this is he whom I call the offspring of the good, whom the good begat as analogous to itself, that this should be in the visible world in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind.'

§ 11.21.4 And afterwards he adds:'Well then, this which imparts truth to the things which are known, and bestows on the knower his faculty of knowledge, this you may call the idea of the good.'

§ 11.21.5 And again he says:'You would say, I suppose, that the sun imparts to visible things not only their power of being seen, but also their generation, growth, and nourishment, though he is not himself generation. How could it be otherwise? You would also say then that things which become known receive from the good not only the property of being known, but also their existence and their essence, though the good is not an essence, but far transcends essence in dignity and power.'

§ 11.21.6 Herein Plato says most distinctly that the intellectual essences receive from'the good,' meaning of course from God, not merely the property of being known, but also their existence and essence; and that'the good' is'not an essence, but far transcends essence in dignity and power.' So that he does not regard the ideas as co-essential, nor yet suppose that they are unbegotten, because they have received their existence and their essence from Him who is not an essence, but far transcends essence in dignity and power, whom alone the Hebrew oracles with good reason proclaim as God, as being the cause of all things.

§ 11.21.7 So then things which have neither their existence nor their essence from themselves, nor yet are of the nature of the good, cannot reasonably be regarded as gods, since the good does not belong to them by nature: for to One only and to no other can this be ascribed, to the Only Good, which Plato admirably proclaimed as'far transcending all essence both in dignity and power.' Again Numenius also in his treatise Of the Good, in explaining Plato's meaning, discourses in the following manner:

§ 11.22.1 [NUMENIUS]'BODIES, therefore, we may conceive by inferences drawn from observing similar bodies, and from the tokens existing in the bodies before us: but there is no possibility of conceiving the good from anything that lies before us, nor yet from anything simil'ar that can be perceived by the senses. For example, a man sitting on a watch-tower, having caught a quick glimpse of a small fishing-boat, one of those solitary skiffs, left alone by itself, and caught in the troughs of the waves, sees the vessel at one glance. Just so, then, must a man withdraw far from the things of sense, and commune in solitude with the good alone, where there is neither man nor any other living thing, nor body great or small, but a certain immense, indescribable, and absolutely divine solitude, where already the occupations, and splendours of the good exist, and the good itself, in peace and benevolence, that gentle, gracious, guiding power, sits high above all being.'But if any one, obstinately clinging to the things of sense, fancies that he sees the good hovering over them, and then in luxurious living should suppose that he has found the good, he is altogether mistaken. For in fact no easy pursuit is needed for it, but a godlike effort: and the best plan is to neglect the things of sense, and with vigorous devotion to mathematical learning to study the properties of numbers, and so to meditate carefully on the question, What is being?'

§ 11.22.2 This is in the first Book. And in the fifth he speaks as follows:'Now if essence and the idea is discerned by the mind, and if it was agreed that the mind is earlier than this and the cause of it, then mind itself is alone found to be the good. For if God the Creator is the beginning of generation, the good is the beginning of essence. And God the Creator is related to the good, of which He is an imitator, as generation is to essence, of which it is a likeness and an imitation.'For if the Creator who is the author of generation is good, the Creator also of essence will doubtless be absolute good, innate in essence. For the second god, being twofold, is the self-maker of the idea of Himself, and makes the world as its Creator: afterwards He is wholly given to contemplation.'Now as we have by our reasoning gathered names for four things, let them be these four. The first, God, absolute good; His imitator, a good Creator: then essence, one kind of the first God, another of the Second; and the imitation of this essence, the beautiful world, adorned by participation in the beautiful.'

§ 11.22.3 Also in the sixth Book he adds:'But the things which partake of Him participate in nothing, else, but only in wisdom: in this way then, but in no other, they may enjoy the communion of the good. And certainly this wisdom has been found to belong to the First alone. If then this belongs exclusively to Him alone, from whom all other things receive their colouring and their goodness, none but a stupid soul could doubt any longer.'For if the second God is good, not of Himself but from the First, how is it possible that He, by communion with whom this Second is good, should not Himself be good, especially if the Second has partaken of Him as being good?'It is in this way that Plato has shown by syllogistic reasoning to any one who is clear-sighted that the good is one.'

§ 11.22.4 And again afterwards he says:'But Plato represented these things as true differently in different places; for in the Timaeus peculiarly he wrote the common inscription on the Creator, saying, “He was good.” But in the Republic he called the good the idea of good: meaning that the idea of the Creator was the good, because to us He is manifested as good by participation in the First and only Good.'For as men are said to have been fashioned by the idea of man, and oxen by that of an ox, and horses by the idea of a horse; so also naturally if the Creator is good by participation in the First Good, the first Mind would be an idea, as being absolute good.'

§ 11.23.1 [ Plato ]'AND having been created in this way' (evidently the world is meant)'it has been framed with a view to that which is apprehended by reason and thought and which is unchangeable. And if this be so, it necessarily follows that this world is an image of something.... For that contains in itself all intelligible beings, just as this world contains us.'

§ 11.23.2 So Plato speaks in the Timaeus. And the meaning of his statements I will set forth from the collections of Didymus Concerning the Opinions of Plato: and this is how he writes:

§ 11.23.3 [DIDYMUS]'He says that the Ideas are certain patterns arranged class by class of the things which are by nature sensible, and that these are the sources of the different sciences and definitions. For besides all individual men there is a certain conception of man: and besides all horses, of a horse; and generally, besides the animals, a conception of an animal uncreated and imperishable.'And in the same way as many impressions are made of one seal, and many images of one man, so from each single idea of the objects of sense a multitude of individual natures are formed, from the idea of man all men, and in like manner in the case of all other things in nature.'Also the idea is an eternal essence, cause, and principle, making each thing to be of a character such as its own.'As, therefore, the particular archetypes, so to say, precede the bodies which are perceived by sense, so the Idea which includes in itself all Ideas, being most beautiful and most perfect, exists originally as the pattern of this present world; for that has been made by its Creator like this Idea, and wrought according to the providence of God out of the universal essence.'

§ 11.23.4 These are extracts from the aforesaid author. Moses, however, the all-wise, anticipates even these doctrines, teaching us that before the visible sun and stars and before the heaven that we behold, which he calls the firmament, and before this our dry land, and before our day and night, another light besides the light of the sun, and day and night, and the rest, had been made by God the universal Ruler and Cause of all.

§ 11.23.5 Moreover the Hebrews who came after Moses declare that there is a certain incorporeal sun not visible to all, nor subjected to mortal eyes, as says the Prophet speaking in the person of God,'And to them that fear Me shall the Sun of righteousness arise.'

§ 11.23.6 Also righteousness itself, not that of a certain kind among men, but the Idea of that, is known to another Hebrew Prophet, who said concerning God,'Who raised up righteousness from the East? He called it before His face, and it shall go forth as it were before the nations.'

§ 11.23.7 Also a divine Word, incorporeal and essential, was just lately shown to us by our ordinary word in the previous quotations from the Hebrew Scriptures: concerning which Word there is also the following statement among the same people:'Who was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption.'

§ 11.23.8 He is called also Life, He is called Wisdom, and Truth. Also the Scriptures of the Hebrews (since the Apostles also and disciples of our Saviour are Hebrews ) make known to us all things which have essential being and subsistence, nay more, they show us myriads of other incorporeal powers beyond both heaven and all material and fleeting essence; and the images of these powers, they say, He expressed in things sensible, after which they have now received the name each of its image.

§ 11.23.9 Man, for instance, they have expressly stated to be the image of an ideal pattern, and the whole life of men passeth on in an image. Moses in fact says,'And God created man, in the image of God created He him.' And again another Hebrew writer, following the philosophy of his forefathers, says,'Surely man walketh in an image.' And now hear how the interpreters of the sacred laws explain the thought contained in the writings of Moses. The Hebrew Philo, in fact, speaks thus word for word in interpreting the doctrines of his forefathers.

§ 11.24.1 [PHILO]'Now if any one should wish to use names in a plainer way, he would not call the intelligible world anything else than the Word (or, Reason) of God already engaged in the creation of a world. For neither is the intelligible city anything else than the reasoning of the architect, when already designing to build the visible city [by help of the intelligible].'But this is Moses' doctrine, not mine. For instance, in recording the creation of man he expressly avows, in what follows, that he was fashioned after the image of God.'Now if the part (man) is an image of an image, evidently also the whole species, I mean the whole of this visible world, which is greater than the human image, is a copy of a divine image; and the archetypal seal, as we call the intelligible world, must itself evidently be the archetypal pattern, the Idea of the Ideas, the Word (Reason) of God.'He says too that “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth”;124 taking the beginning to be not, as some suppose, the beginning in time; for time was not before the world, but either has begun with it, or after it.'For since time is the interval of the motion of the universe, and motion could not begin before that which was to be moved, but must necessarily be established either after it or with it, so time also must necessarily either have been of the same age as the universe or younger than it, and to venture to represent it as older is unphilosophical.'But if in the present passage the beginning is not taken to be the beginning in time, then the beginning according to number would naturally be signified, so that in the beginning God created would be equivalent to “first He created the heaven.”'

§ 11.24.2 Then afterwards he says:'First, therefore, the Maker proceeded to make an immaterial heaven, and an invisible earth, and an ideal form of air and of empty space, the former of which He called darkness, because the air is by nature black, and the latter He called the deep, for the empty space is very deep and vast.'Then He made the incorporeal essence of water and of wind, and over all the essence of light, the seventh in order, which again was incorporeal, and then an intelligible model of the sun. and of all stars that were destined to be established as luminaries in the heaven.'And the wind and the light were honoured with special privilege: for the one he called the Spirit of God, because spirit is the most life-giving thing, and God is the author of life; and light, because it excels in beauty. For the intelligible is, I suppose, as much more brilliant and radiant than the sensible, as the sun is than darkness, and day than night, and the mind, which is the guide of the whole soul, than the criteria of sense, and the eyes than the body.'But that invisible and intelligible light is made an image of the Divine Word, which explained its origin; and it is a super-celestial star the source of the visible stars, which one would not be wrong in calling “universal light,” from which sun and moon and the other planets and fixed stars draw their appropriate splendours in proportion to the power of each, while that unmingled and pure light becomes obscured, whenever it begins to turn in direction of the change from intelligible to sensible; for of the things subject to sense none is pure.'

§ 11.24.3 Also after a few words he adds:'But when light came, and darkness yielded and retired, and bounds were set in the intervals between them, namely evening and morning, there was at once completed, according to the necessary measure of time, that which the Creator rightly called “day,” and not the first day but one day, which it is called because of the singleness of the intelligible world, which has the nature of unity.'So then the incorporeal world was now complete, being founded in the divine Reason (Word); and after the model thereof the sensible world was now to be produced in its perfection: so the Creator proceeded to make first that which was also the best of all its parts, namely the heaven, which He rightly named the firmament, as being corporeal. For body is by nature solid, because it is of three dimensions: and what other idea is there of a solid and a body, except extension in every direction? Naturally therefore He called this the firmament, as contrasting the sensible and corporeal world with the intelligible and incorporeal.'

§ 11.24.4 So writes Philo. And Clement also agrees with him, speaking as follows in the Fifth Miscellany.

§ 11.25.1 [CLEMENT]'AND again the Barbarian philosophy knows one world of thought, and another of sense, the one an archetype, and the other an image of the fair model. And the former it assigns to Unity, as being perceptible to thought only; but the sensible it assigns to the number six: for among the Pythagoreans six is called marriage, as a number that generates.'And in the Unity it establishes an invisible heaven, and a holy earth, and an intellectual light. For “In the beginning,” says Moses, “God created the heaven and the earth: and the earth was invisible.”128 Then he adds, “And God said, let there be light, and there was light.”129 But in the cosmogony of the sensible world He creates a solid heaven (and the solid is sensible), and a visible earth, and a light that is seen.'Does it not seem to you from this passage that Plato leaves the idsas of living creatures in the intelligible world, and creates the sensible species after their kinds in the intelligible world?'With good reason then Moses says that the body was fashioned out of earth, which Plato calls an “earthly tabernacle,”130 but that the reasonable soul was breathed by God from on high into man's face.'For in this part, they say, the ruling faculty is seated, interpreting thus the accessory entrance of the soul through the organs of sense in the case of the first-formed man; for which reason also man, they say, is made after the image and likeness of God. For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible Man; and an image of that image is the human mind.'

§ 11.25.2 But let us now listen to what remains to be said.

§ 11.26.1 FURTHER than this Plato follows the doctrines of the Hebrews, when he says that there are not only good incorporeal powers but also those of opposite nature, writing as follows in the tenth Book of the Laws:

§ 11.26.2 [ Plato ]'As then the soul directs and inhabits all things that move in any direction, must we not say that it also directs the heaven? Of course. One soul, or more? More, I will answer for you. Less than two surely we must not suppose, the one that does good, and the other that has power to work evil.'

§ 11.26.3 Then lower down he says:'For since we have agreed that the heaven is full of many good things and also of many evil things, and these the more numerous, a conflict of this kind, we say, is immortal, and requires marvellous watchfulness. But gods and daemons are our allies, and we are their possessions.'

§ 11.26.4 Whence these ideas came to Plato, I cannot explain: but what I can truly say is that thousands of years before Plato was born this doctrine also had been acknowledged by the Hebrews.

§ 11.26.5 Accordingly their Scripture says,'And there was, as it were, this day when the angels of God came to stand before God; and the devil came in the midst of them, after going round the earth and walking about in it'; where it calls the adverse power devil, and the good powers angels of God.

§ 11.26.6 And these good powers it also calls divine spirits, and God's ministers, where it says,'Who maketh His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire.'

§ 11.26.7 Moreover the conflict of the adverse powers is thus represented by him who said,'Our wrestling is not against Wood and flesh, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of the darkness of this age, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places.'

§ 11.26.8 Also the oracle of Moses which said,'When the Most High was dividing the nations, when He was separating the children of Adam, He set the bounds of the nations according to the number of the angels of God,' seems to be directly paraphrased by Plato in the words whereby he defined the whole human race to be'the possessions of gods and daemons.'

§ 11.27.1 IN the doctrine of the immortality of the soul Plato differs not at all in opinion from Moses. For Moses was the first to define the soul in man as being an immortal essence, when he said that it is originally an image of God, or rather has been made'after the image of God.' For his words were,'God said, Let us make man after our image, and after our likeness.... And God made man, in the image of God made He him.'

§ 11.27.2 And afterwards dividing the compound man in his description into the visible body and the man of the soul that is discerned only by the mind, he adds,'And God took dust from the earth and formed man, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.'

§ 11.27.3 Moreover he says that man was made fit to be ruler and king of all the creatures upon earth. So he says,'And God said, Let us make man after our image, and after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and over the fowls of the heaven, and over the cattle, and over all the earth.... And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him.'

§ 11.27.4 Now in what other way could an image and likeness of God be conceived than in reference to the powers that are in God, and to the likeness of virtue? Hear then how, in the Alcibiades, Plato speaks on this point also as one who had been taught by Moses:

§ 11.27.5 [ Plato ]'Can we then mention any part of the soul that is more divine than that with which knowledge and wisdom have to do?'We cannot.'This then is the part of it like God; and any one who by looking upon this has learned all that is divine, both God and wisdom, will thus get to know himself also most perfectly.'It is evident.

§ 11.27.6 ['So then, just as there are mirrors clearer than the mirror in the eye, and purer and brighter, so God is something purer and brighter than the best that is in our soul.'It seems so, Socrates.'In looking then on God, we should be using that noblest mirror of man's nature also for looking into the virtue of the soul; and in this way should best see and learn to know ourselves. Certainly.']

§ 11.27.7 This is in the Alcibiades. But in the dialogue On the Soul observe how he explains these topics more at length.'May we then, said he, assume two kinds of existing things, one visible and the other invisible?'Let us assume it, said he.'And the invisible constant and immutable, but the visible never constant?'This also let us assume.'Well then, said he, is not the one part of ourselves body, and the other soul?'Exactly so, said he.'To which class then should we say that the body is more like and more akin?'Oh, that is manifest to every one, said he; to the visible.'And what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?'Not visible at any rate by men, Socrates.'But we surely were speaking of the things that are visible or not visible to the nature of man; or was it, think you, to some other nature?'To man's nature.'What do we say then about the soul? Is it visible or invisible?'Invisible.'Then it is unseen?'Yes.'Soul then is more like the unseen than body is, and body like the visible?'It must certainly be so, Socrates.'Well then, were we not also saying long ago, that whenever the soul uses the help of the body to examine anything, either by sight, or by hearing, or by any other sense (for this is what is meant by “the help of the body,” to examine a thing by the help of sense), that then she is dragged by the body into the midst of these ever-changing objects, and loses her own way, and becomes confused, and giddy as if drunken, from trying to lay hold of things of this same kind?'Quite so.'But whenever she is contemplating anything by herself alone, she passes at once into yonder world, to the pure, and eternal, and immortal, and unchangeable, and there and with that world she ever communes as one of kindred nature, whenever she can be alone, and have opportunity; and so she has rest from her wandering, and with that world she is constant and unchangeable, as trying to lay hold of things of this same kind. And this condition of the soul is called thoughtfulness.'Very nobly and truly spoken, Socrates, said he.'To which class then does it now seem to you, from both our former and our present arguments, that the soul is more like and more akin?'Every one, I think, Socrates, said he, even the most stupid, would from this method of inquiry agree that soul is in every way much more like to that which is ever constant than to that which is not.'And what of the body?'More like the other.'Look at it then again in this way; that, when soul and body are combined in one, nature orders the body to serve and to obey, and the soul to rule and to govern. Now in these respects again which of the two seems to you to be like the divine, and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the divine is naturally fitted to rule and to lead, and the mortal to be ruled and to serve?'I think so.'To which of the two then is the soul like?'Evidently, Socrates, the soul is like the divine, and the body like the mortal.'Consider then, Cebes, said he, whether from all that has been said we obtain these results: that soul is most like the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and ever unchangeable and self-consistent; and the body on the other hand most like the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, arid multiform, and dissoluble, and never consistent with itself.'Have we anything else to say against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?'We have not.'Well then? This being so, is it not a property of body to be quickly dissolved, but of soul on the other hand to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so?'Certainly.'Do you then observe, that after a man is dead, the body, the part of him which is visible and lies in the visible world, and is called a corpse, the property of which is to be dissolved, and decomposed, and scattered by the winds, does not at once suffer any change of this kind, but remains for a considerable time — if the man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous time of life, for a very considerable time indeed. For when the body has shrunk and been embalmed, like those who were embalmed in Egypt, it remains almost entire an incredible time. And even if the body be decayed, some parts of it, bones and sinews and all such parts, are nevertheless, so to say, immortal, are they not?'Yes.'But then the soul, the unseen, that has passed to another place like herself, noble, and pure, and unseen, the true Hades, to the presence of the good and wise God, whither, if it be God's will, my own soul is presently to go — is then, I say, this soul of ours, such as she is and so endowed by nature, on being released from the body, immediately scattered to the winds and lost, as most men say?'Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias; but the truth is much rather this. If the soul is pure when released, drawing nothing of the body after her, as she never during this life had any communication with it willingly, but shrank from it, and was gathered up into herself, as making this her constant study, and this is nothing else than practising true philosophy, and preparing in reality to die cheerfully, — Or would not this be a preparation for death?'Certainly.'In this condition then the soul departs to that world which is like herself, the unseen, the divine, and deathless, and wise: and on arriving there she finds ready for her a happy existence, released from error, and folly, and fears, and wild desires, and all other human ills, and, as they say of the initiated, she truly passes the rest of her time with the gods. Is it thus, Cebes, that we ought to speak, or otherwise?'Thus assuredly, said Cebes.'But, I suppose, if when she departs from the body she is polluted and impure, from being in constant communion with the body, and cherishing it, and loving it, and having been so bewitched by it, I mean by its desires and pleasures, as to think that nothing else is true except the corporeal, just what a man might touch, and see, and eat, and drink, and use for his lusts — but accustomed to hate and fear and shun what to the eyes is dark and invisible, but intelligible to thought and attainable by philosophy — in this condition then do you suppose that a soui will depart pure in herself and unalloyed?'By no means, said he.'

§ 11.27.8 This is what Plato says. And his meaning is explained by Porphyry in the first Book of his Answer to Boethus Concerning the Soul, where he writes in the following manner:

§ 11.28.1 [PORPHYRY]'FOR example, he said, the argument from similarity was thought by Plato to be forcible in proof of the immortality of the soul. For if she is like that which is divine, and immortal, and invisible, and inseparable, and indissoluble, and essential, and firmly established in incorruption, how can she fail to be of the corresponding class to the pattern?'For whenever there are two extremes manifestly contrary, as rational and irrational, and it is a question to which side some third thing belongs, this is one mode of proof, by showing to which of the opposites it is like. For thus, although the human race in the first stage of life is held down in an irrational condition, and although many even to old age are full of the errors of unreason, nevertheless, because it has many similarities to that which is purely rational, this race was believed to be from the beginning rational.'Since therefore there is a divine constitution manifestly incapable of admixture and of damage, namely that of the gods, and since there is evidently on the other hand the earthly, and soluble, subject to corruption, and since with some it is doubted to which side of the said opposition the soul is attached, Plato's opinion was that we should trace out the truth from similarity.'And since she is in no way like to the mortal and soluble and irrational and inanimate, which is therefore also tangible, and sensible, and becoming, and perishing, but like the divine, and immortal, and invisible, and intelligent, which partakes of life, and is akin to truth, and has all the properties which he enumerates as belonging to her, — since this is so, he thought it not right, while granting that she had the other points of likeness to God, to consent to deny her the similarity of essence, which is the cause of her having received these very properties.'For as the things which were in their operations unlike God were at once found to differ also in the constitution of their essence, so he thought it followed, that the things which partook in a measure of the same operations had previously possessed the similarity of essence. For because of the quality of the essence the operations also were of a certain quality, as flowing from it, and being offshoots of it.'

§ 11.28.2 Hear then what Boethus, in detracting from the force of this argument, has written in the very beginning of his treatise, as follows:

§ 11.28.3 [BOETHUS]'To show whether the soul is immortal, and is a nature too strong for any kind of destruction, a man must persistently travel round many arguments.'But one would not need much discussion to believe that nothing about us is more like God than the soul, and that, not only because of the continuous and incessant motion which she generates within us, but also because of the mind belonging to her.'In view of which fact the physical philosopher of Crotona said that the soul as being immortal naturally shrank from all quiescence, like the bodies that are divine.'But also to the man who had once discerned the idea of the soul, and especially how great purposes and what impulses the mind that rules within us often sets in motion, there would gradually appear a great likeness to God.'

§ 11.28.4 And afterwards he adds:'For if the soul is shown to be of all things most like to the divine, of what further use is it to require by way of preface all the other arguments in proof of her immortality, instead of reckoning this as one among the many, sufficient as it is to convince the fair-minded, that the soul would not have participated in the activities which are similar to those of the divine, if she were not also divine herself.'For if, although buried in the body which is mortal, and soluble, and unintelligent, and by itself dead, and constantly perishing and wasting away towards its change of final destruction, the soul both forms it and holds it together, and displays her own divine essence, although she is obstructed and impeded by the all-ruinous mould which lies around her, must she not, if by our hypothesis she were separated as gold from the clay plastered round it, at once display her own specific form as being like God alone, and moreover preserving through her participation in Him the similarities in her operations, and even in her most mortal condition (as she is when imprisoned in the mortal body) escaping dissolution for this reason, that she is, as we said, of the nature which has nothing in common with decay?'

§ 11.28.5 And lower down he says:'But naturally she appears to be both divine from her assimilation to the Indivisible, and mortal from her approaches to the mortal nature: and she descends and ascends, and is both akin to the mortal, and yet like the immortals.'For even he who stuffs himself full and hastes to be surfeited like the cattle is a man: and he too is a man, who by knowledge is able in perils by sea to save the ship, and he who can save life in diseases, and he who discovers truth, and has devised methods for the attainment of knowledge, and inventions for kindling fire, and observations of horoscopes, and manufactures imitations of the works of the Creator.'For it was a man who thought of fashioning upon earth the conjunctions of the seven planets together with their motions, imitating by mechanism the phenomena in heaven. And in fact what did not man devise, showing thereby the mind within him that is divine and on a par with God?'And though thereby he displayed the daring efforts of an Olympian and divine and altogether immortal being, yet because the multitude through the selfishness of their own downward inclination were not able to discern his character, he misled them into supposing from the outward appearances that he was like themselves of mortal nature: there being but this one mode of deriving consolation from their baseness, that because of external appearances they found satisfaction in seeing others share equally in their wretchedness, and persuaded themselves that as in external things so also in their inner nature all men are alike.'

§ 11.28.6 Of all these doctrines Moses has been seen to be the teacher, for in describing the first creation of man in the language already quoted, he by his assimilation to the divine confirmed the arguments concerning the immortality of the soul.

§ 11.28.7 But since the opinions of Moses and Plato were in full harmony and accord concerning the incorporeal and invisible essence, it is time to review the remaining portions of Plato's philosophy, and to show that he was friendly to the Hebrews on all points, except where perchance he was led astray and induced to speak more after the manner of man, than in accordance with the word of truth.

§ 11.28.8 For instance, all the philosopher's sayings which have been rightly expressed will be found to agree with the doctrines of Moses, but in whatever he assumed that did not agree with Moses and the prophets, his argument will not be well established. And this we shall prove at the proper season. But meanwhile, since his positions in the contemplation of the intelligible world have been discovered to be in perfect agreement and harmony, it is time to go back again to the physical theory of the sensible world, and briefly run over the philosopher's agreement with the doctrines of the Hebrews.

§ 11.29.1 MOSES declared that this universe had a beginning as having been made by God; he says at all events in the commencement of his own writing,'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,' and after the particulars he adds,'This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth, when they were created, in the day that God made the heaven and the earth.' And now listen to Plato, how close he keeps to the thought, when himself writing as follows:'And again all that comes into existence must of necessity proceed from some cause; for it is impossible for anything to have been generated without a cause.'

§ 11.29.2 And he adds:'The whole heaven then or world, or by whatever other name it would most acceptably be called, so let us call it — we have first to ask a question concerning it, which it is assumed that one must ask on every subject at the outset — did it always exist, without any beginning of generation, or has it been generated and had some beginning?'It has been generated: for it is visible, and tangible, and has a body; and all such things are sensible: and all sensible things were shown to be apprehensible by opinion and generated. But that which is generated must, we say, have been generated by some cause. It is a hard task, however, to discover the maker and artificer of this universe, and after discovering Him it is impossible to speak of Him to all men.'