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Dio Cassius, Histories

ToposText · Dio Cassius · 4,210 sections

  1. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.17.3

    § 41.17.3 In the case of Caesar's other projects also, as I have often stated, he both brought them to vote and carried them out in the same fashion, under the name of democracy, inasmuch as the majority of them were introduced by Antony, but with the substance of despotism. Both Caesar and Pompey called their opponents enemies of their country and declared that they themselves were fighting for the public interests, whereas each alike was really ruining those interests and advancing merely his own private needs.

  2. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.18.1

    § 41.18.1 After taking these steps Caesar occupied Sardinia and Sicily without a contest, as the governors who were there at the time withdrew. Aristobulus he sent home to Palestine to accomplish something against Pompey. 2 He also allowed the sons of those who had been proscribed by Sulla to canvass for office, and arranged everything else both in the city and in the rest of Italy to his own best advantage, so far as circumstances permitted.

  3. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.18.3

    § 41.18.3 Affairs at home he now committed to Antony's care, while he himself set out for Spain, which was strongly favouring the side of Pompey and causing Caesar some fear that it might induce the Gauls also to revolt. 4 Meanwhile Cicero and other senators, without even appearing before Caesar, retired to join Pompey, since they believed he had more justice on his side and would conquer in the war.5 For not only the consuls, before they had set sail, but Pompey also, under the authority he had as proconsul, had ordered them all to accompany him to Thessalonica, on the ground that the capital was held by enemies and that they themselves were the senate and would maintain the form of the government wherever they should be. 6 For this reason most of the senators and the knights joined them, some of them at once, and others later, and likewise all the cities that were not coerced by Caesar's armed forces.

  4. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.19.1

    § 41.19.1 Now the Massaliots, alone of the peoples living in Gaul, did not cooperate with Caesar, and did not receive him into their city, but gave him a noteworthy answer. 2 They said that they were allies of the Roman people and felt friendly towards both sides, and that they were neither intermeddling at all nor in a position to decide which of the two was in the wrong; consequently, in case they were approached in a friendly manner, they would receive them both, they said, without their arms, but if it were a question of making war, neither of them.

  5. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.19.3

    § 41.19.3 On being subjected to a siege they not only repulsed Caesar himself but held out for a very long time against Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, who besieged them later. For Caesar had persisted in his attempt for some time, thinking to capture them easily, and regarding it as absurd that after vanquishing Rome without a battle he was not received by the Massaliots; 4 but when they continued to hold out, he left them to care of others and himself hastened into Spain.

  6. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.20.1

    § 41.20.1 He had sent Gaius Fabius thither, but fearing the other would fail while contending by himself, he, too, made a campaign. Afranius and Petreius at this time had charge of affairs in the vicinity of the Iberus and had even posted a guard over the pass in the mountains, but in the main they had gathered their forces at Ilerda and there awaited the invaders. 2 Fabius overcame the garrison upon the Pyrenees, but as he was crossing the river Sicoris the enemy fell upon him suddenly and killed many of his men who were cut off; for the bridge collapsed before all had crossed and thus proved of the greatest assistance to the foes.

  7. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.20.3

    § 41.20.3 When Caesar came up, not long afterward, he crossed the river by another bridge and challenged them to battle; but for a great many days they did not dare to try conclusions with him, but remained quietly encamped opposite him. 4 Encouraged thereby, he undertook to seize the ground between their entrenchments and the city, as it was a strong position, with the intention of shutting them off from the walls.

  8. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.20.5

    § 41.20.5 Afranius and his followers, on perceiving this, occupied the place first, repulsed their assailants, and pursued them when they fled. Then, when others came out against them from the camp, they at first withstood them, then yielded purposely, and so lured them into positions which were favourable to themselves, where they slew many more of them. In consequence of this they took courage, attacked their opponents' foraging parties and harassed those who were scattered. 6 And on one occasion when some soldiers had crossed to the other side of the river and meanwhile a great storm had come up and destroyed the bridge which they had used, they crossed over after them by the other bridge, which was near the city, and destroyed them all, since no one was able to come to their assistance.

  9. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.21.1

    § 41.21.1 Caesar, when things were taking this course, fell into desperate straits; for none of his allies rendered him assistance, since his opponents met and annihilated the separate forces as often as they heard that any were approaching, and it was with difficulty that he managed to obtain provisions, inasmuch as he was in a hostile territory and unsuccessful in his operations. 2 The Romans at home, when they learned of this, renounced all hope of him, believing that he could hold out but a short time longer, and began to fall away to Pompey; and some few senators and others set out to join the latter even then.

  10. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.21.3

    § 41.21.3 But just at this time the Massaliots were defeated in a naval battle by Brutus owing to the size of his ships and the strength of his marines, although they had Domitius as an ally and surpassed in their experience of naval affairs; and after this they were shut off completely. But for this nothing would have prevented Caesar's projects from being ruined. 4 As it was, however, the victory was announced to the Spaniards with so much intentional exaggeration that it led some of them to change and take the side of Caesar. When he had obtained these adherents, he secured plenty of food, constructed bridges, harassed his opponents, and on one occasion intercepted suddenly a large number of them who were wandering about the country and destroyed them.

  11. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.22.1

    § 41.22.1 Afranius was disheartened at these reverses, and seeing that affairs in Ilerda were not safe or satisfactory for a prolonged stay, he determined to retire to the Iberus and to the cities there. He set out on the journey by night, intending to elude the enemy's notice or at least get the start of them. 2 And though his departure did not remain undiscovered, yet he was not immediately pursued, for Caesar did not think it safe in the darkness and with men ignorant of the country to follow up an enemy that was well acquainted with it. When day dawned, however, he hastened forward, and, overtaking them in the middle of their journey, he suddenly surrounded them on all sides at a distance; for he was much superior in numbers and found the bowl-shaped character of the region a help.

  12. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.22.3

    § 41.22.3 For he did not wish to come to close quarters with the enemy, partly because he was afraid that they might become desperate and carry out some rash undertaking, and partly because he hoped to win them over anyway without a conflict. This actually happened. They first tried to break through at many points, but were unable to do so anywhere, and became exhausted from this attempt as well as from loss of sleep and from their march; furthermore, they had no food, 4 since, expecting to finish their journey the same day, they had brought none along, and they were also without sufficient water, inasmuch as that region is terribly dry. They accordingly surrendered, on condition that they should not be harshly treated nor compelled to join his expedition against Pompey.

  13. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.23.1

    § 41.23.1 Caesar kept each of his promises to them scrupulously. He did not put to death a single man captured in this war, in spite of the fact that his foes had once, during a truce, destroyed some of his own men who were caught off their guard; and he did not force them to fight against Pompey, but released the most prominent and employed the rest as allies who were willing to serve for the gains and honours in prospect. 2 By this course both his reputation and his cause profited not a little; for he won over all the cities in Spain and all the soldiers there, a considerable number of whom were with Marcus Terentius Varro, the lieutenant, besides others in Baetica.

  14. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.24.1

    § 41.24.1 So, taking charge of these and arranging their affairs, he advanced as far as Gades, injuring no one at all except in so far as the exacting of money was concerned; for of this he levied very large sums. Many of the natives he honoured both privately and publicly, and to all the people of Gades he granted citizenship, which the people of Rome later confirmed to them. 2 This kindness he did them in return for the dream he had seen at the time he was quaestor there, wherein he had seemed to have intercourse with his mother; it was this dream that had given him the hope of sole rulership, as I have stated. Having done this, he assigned that nation to Cassius Longinus, because the latter was familiar with the inhabitants from his quaestorship which he had served under Pompey; and he himself proceeded by ship to Tarraco.

  15. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.24.3

    § 41.24.3 Thence he advanced across the Pyrenees, but did not set up any trophy on their summits, because he understood that Pompey had gained no good name for so doing; but he erected a great altar constructed of polished stones not far from his rival's trophies.

  16. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.25.1

    § 41.25.1 While this was going on, the Massaliots hazarded another conflict after ships had again been sent them by Pompey. They were defeated on this occasion also, and yet held out, even though they learned that Caesar was already master of Spain. 2 They not only vigorously repulsed all attacks but also, after arranging a kind of armistice, on the plea that they were going over to Caesar, when he should come, sent Domitius out of the harbour secretly and caused such injuries to the soldiers who had attacked them by night in the midst of the truce, that these ventured to make no further attempts.

  17. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.25.3

    § 41.25.3 With Caesar himself, however, they made terms upon his arrival; and he at that time deprived them of their arms, ships, and money, and later of everything else except the name of freedom. To offset this misfortune Phocaea, their mother city, was made free by Pompey.

  18. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.26.1

    § 41.26.1 At Placentia some soldiers mutinied and refused to accompany Caesar longer, on the pretext that they were exhausted, but really because he did not allow them to plunder the country nor to do all the other things on which their minds were set; for their hope was to obtain from him anything and everything, inasmuch as he stood in so great need of them. 2 Yet he did not yield, but, with a view to being safe from them and in order that after listening to his words and seeing the guilty punished they should feel no desire to transgress the established rules, he called together both the mutinous men and the others, and spoke as follows:

  19. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.27.1

    § 41.27.1 “Soldiers, I desire to have your affection, and still I should not choose on that account to share in your errors. I am fond of you and could wish, as a father might for his children, that you may be safe, prosperous, and have a good reputation. 2 For do not suppose it is the duty of one who loves to acquiesce in things which ought not to be done and for which it is quite inevitable that dangers and ill-repute should fall to the lot of those who do them, but rather to teach them the better way and keep them from the worse, both by admonishing and by correcting them.

  20. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.27.3

    § 41.27.3 You will recognize that I speak the truth, if you will not estimate advantage with reference to the pleasure of the moment but rather with reference to what is permanently beneficial, and if you will avoid thinking that gratifying your desires is more noble than restraining them. For it is disgraceful to take a momentary gratification of which you must later repent, and it is absurd after conquering the enemy to be overcome yourselves by pleasures.

  21. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.28.1

    § 41.28.1 ”Why now do I say this? Because although you have provisions in abundance, — I am going to speak frankly and without disguise: you get your pay in full and in season and you are always and everywhere supplied with food in plenty, — and although you endure no inglorious toil nor useless danger, and furthermore reap many great rewards for your bravery and are rebuked little, if at all, for your errors, yet you do not see fit to be satisfied with these things. 2 I say this, now, not to all of you, for you are not all like this, but only to those who by their own greed are casting reproach on the rest. Most of you obey my orders very scrupulously and satisfactorily and abide by your ancestral customs, and in that way have acquired so much land as well as wealth and glory; but some few are bringing much disgrace and dishonour upon us.3 And yet, though I understood clearly before this that they were that sort of persons, — for there is none of your concerns that I fail to notice, — still I pretended not to know it, thinking that they would reform if they believed they would not be observed in some of their evil deeds, through the fear that if ever they presumed too far they might be punished also for the deeds which had been pardoned them. 4 Since, however, they themselves, assuming that they may do whatever they wish because they were not brought to book at the very outset, wax overbold, and are trying to make the rest of you, who are guilty of no irregularity, mutinous likewise, it becomes necessary for me to devote some care to them and to give them my attention.

  22. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.29.1

    § 41.29.1 For no society of men whatever can preserve its unity and continue to exist, if the criminal element is not punished, since, if the diseased member does not receive proper treatment, it causes all the rest, even as in our physical bodies, to share in its affliction. 2 And least of all in armies can discipline be relaxed, because when the wrong-doers have power they become more daring, and corrupt the excellent also by causing them to grow dejected and to believe that they will obtain no benefit from right behaviour. For wherever the insolent element has the advantage, there inevitably the decent element has the worst of it; and wherever wrong-doing is unpunished, there self-restraint also goes unrewarded. What merit, indeed, could you claim, if these men are doing no wrong? And how could you reasonably desire to be honoured, if these men do not meet with their just punishment? Or are you not aware that if the one class is freed from the fear of retribution and the other is deprived of the hope of reward, no good is accomplished, but only countless ills? Hence, if you are really cultivating excellence, you should detest these men as enemies. For it is not by any characteristic of birth that what is friendly is distinguished from what is hostile, but it is determined by men's habits and actions, which, if they are good, can make that which is alien like unto itself, but if bad, can alienate everything, even that which is akin.

  23. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.30.1

    § 41.30.1 And you should speak in your own defence, because by the behaviour of these few we must all gain a bad name, even if we have done no wrong. For every one who learns of our numbers and impetuosity refers the errors of the few to us all; and thus, though we do not share in their gains, we bear an equal share of the reproach. 2 Who would not be indignant at hearing that while we have the name of Romans we do the deeds of Germans? Who would not lament the sight of Italy ravaged like Britain? Is it not outrageous that we are no longer harrying the possessions of the Gauls whom we have subdued, but are devastating the lands south of the Alps, as if we were hordes of Epirots or Carthaginians or Cimbri?

  24. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.30.3

    § 41.30.3 Is it not disgraceful for us to give ourselves airs and say that we were the first of the Romans to cross the Rhine and to sail the ocean, and then to plunder our native land, which is safe from harm at the hands of our foes, and to receive blame instead of praise, dishonour in place of honour, loss instead of gain, punishment instead of prizes?

  25. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.31.1

    § 41.31.1 “Do not think, now, that, because you are soldiers, that makes you better than the citizens at home; for you and they alike are Romans, and they, as well as you, both have been and will be soldiers. Nor think, again, that because you have arms, it is permitted you to injure others; for the laws have more authority than you, and some day you will certainly lay down these weapons. 2 Do not rely on your numbers, either; for the injured are, if they but unite, far more numerous than you. And they will unite, if you go on doing such deeds. Do not, because you have conquered the barbarians, despise the citizens also, over whom you have not the slightest superiority either in birth or in education, in training or in customs.

  26. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.31.3

    § 41.31.3 Instead, as is proper and advantageous for you, do no violence or wrong to any of them, but receive your provisions from them of their own free will and accept your rewards from their willing hands.

  27. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.32.1

    § 41.32.1 ”In addition to what I have just said and other considerations that might be mentioned if one chose to enlarge upon such matters, you must also bear in mind the fact that we have now come here to assist our outraged country and to defend her against her oppressors. 2 For, of course, if she were in no danger, we should neither have come into Italy under arms, since this is unlawful, nor should we have left unfinished our business with the Germans and the Britons, when we might have subjugated those regions also.

  28. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.32.3

    § 41.32.3 Would it not be absurd, then, if we who are here for vengeance upon the wrong-doers should show ourselves no less greedy of gain than they? Would it not be outrageous if we who have arrived to aid our country should force her to require other allies against us? 4 And yet I think my claims so much better justified than Pompey's that I have often challenged him to a judicial trial; and since he by reason of his guilty conscience has refused to have the matter decided peaceably, I hope by this act of his to attach the whole people and all the allies to my cause.

  29. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.32.5

    § 41.32.5 But now, if we are going to act in this manner, I shall not have any decent excuse to offer nor be able to charge my opponents with any unbecoming conduct. We must also pay all heed to the justice of our case; for with this the strength afforded by arms is full of hope, but without it that strength, even though for the moment it wins a success, has nothing enduring about it.

  30. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.33.1

    § 41.33.1 “That this is true in the nature of things most of you understand; at any rate you fulfil all your duties without urging. That is precisely why I have called you together, to make you witnesses as well as spectators of my words and deeds. 2 But you are not the sort of men I have been mentioning, and it is for this very reason that you receive praise; yet you observe how some few of you, in addition to having worked many injuries without suffering any penalty at all for them, are also threatening us. Now I do not believe it a good thing in any case for a ruler to be overridden by his subjects,

  31. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.33.3

    § 41.33.3 nor do I believe there could ever be any safety if those appointed to obey a person attempted to get the better of him. Consider what sort of order would exist in a household if the young should despise their elders, or what order in schools if the scholars should pay no heed to their instructors! What health would there be for the sick if the afflicted should not obey their physicians in all points, or what safety for voyagers if the sailors should turn a deaf ear to their captains? Indeed, it is in accordance with a natural law, both necessary and salutary, that the principle of ruling and of being ruled have been placed among men, and without them it is impossible for anything at all to continue to exist for even the shortest time. Now it is the duty of the one stationed over another both to discover and to command what is requisite, and it is the duty of the one subject to authority to obey without questioning and to carry out his orders.

  32. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.33.5

    § 41.33.5 It is for this reason in particular that prudence is everywhere honoured above folly and understanding above ignorance.

  33. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.34.1

    § 41.34.1 ”Since these things are so, I will never yield aught to these brawlers under compulsion nor give them a free rein perforce. 2 Why am I sprung from Aeneas and Iulus, why have I been praetor, why consul, for what end have I brought some of you out from home and levied others of you later, for what end have I received and held the proconsular power now for so long a time,

  34. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.34.3

    § 41.34.3 if I am to be a slave to some one of you and to be worsted by some one of you here in Italy, close to Rome, I, to whom you owe your subjugation of the Gauls and your conquest of Britain? 4 In fear or dread of what should I do so? That some one of you will kill me? Nay, but if you were all of this mind, I would voluntarily choose to die rather than destroy the dignity of my position as commander or lose the self-respect befitting my leadership.

  35. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.34.5

    § 41.34.5 For a far greater danger than the unjust death of one man confronts the city, if the soldiers are to become accustomed to issue orders to their generals and to take the prerogatives of the law into their own hands.

  36. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.35.1

    § 41.35.1 No one of them, however, has so much as made this threat; if any had, I am sure he would have been slain forthwith by the rest of you. But they are for withdrawing from the campaign on the pretence of being wearied, and are for laying down their arms on the pretence of being worn out; and certainly, if they do not obtain my consent to this wish of theirs, they will leave the ranks and go over to Pompey, a fact which some of them make perfectly evident.2 And yet who would not be glad to be rid of such men, and who would not pray that such soldiers might belong to Pompey, seeing that they are not content with what is given them and are not obedient to orders, but simulating old age in the midst of youth and in strength simulating weakness, they claim the right to lord it over their rulers and to tyrannize over their leaders?

  37. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.35.3

    § 41.35.3 Why, I had a thousand times rather be reconciled with Pompey on any terms whatever or suffer any other conceivable fate than do anything unworthy of the proud traditions of my fathers, or of my own principles. 4 Or are you not aware that it is not sovereignty or gain that I desire, and that I am not so bent upon accomplishing any thing by every means at whatever cost and that I would lie and flatter and fawn upon people to this end? Give up your service, therefore, you — O what can I call you? Yet it shall be, not as you yourselves desire and say, but as is profitable for the republic and for myself."

  38. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.35.5

    § 41.35.5 After this speech he distributed lots among them for the infliction of the death penalty, and executed the most audacious; for these, as he had arranged should be the case, drew the lots. The rest he dismissed, saying he had no further need of them. So they repented of what they had done and were ready to renew the campaign.

  39. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.36.1

    § 41.36.1 While he was still on the way Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the man who later became a member of the triumvirate, advised the people in his capacity of praetor to elect Caesar dictator, and immediately named him, contrary to ancestral custom. 2 The latter accepted the office as soon as he entered the city, but committed no act of terror while holding it. On the contrary, he granted a return to all the exiles except Milo, and filled the offices for the ensuing year; for up to that time they had chosen no one temporarily in place of the absentees,

  40. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.36.3

    § 41.36.3 and since there was no aedile in the city, the tribunes were performing all the duties devolving upon those officials. Moreover he appointed priests in place of those who had perished, though he did not observe all the ceremonies that were customary in their case at such a juncture; and to the Gauls living south of the Alps and beyond the Po he gave citizenship because he had once governed them. 4 After accomplishing these things he resigned the title of dictator, since he had quite all the authority and functions of the position constantly in his grasp. For he exercised the power afforded by arms, and also received in addition a quasi-legal authority from the senate that was on the spot, in that he was granted permission to do with impunity whatever he might wish.

  41. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.37.1

    § 41.37.1 Having obtained this, he at once instituted an important and necessary reform. Those who had lent money, it seems, being now in need of large sums because of the civil strife and the wars, were collecting their loans most relentlessly, and many of the debtors for the same reasons were unable to pay back anything, even if they wished to do so, 2 since they did not find it easy to sell anything or to borrow more. Hence their dealing with each other were marked by much deceit and fraud, and there was fear that they might go to the point of accomplishing some fatal mischief. To be sure, the rate of interest had been lowered even before this time by some of the tribunes;

  42. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.37.3

    § 41.37.3 but since payment was not secured even thus, but instead the one class was ready to forfeit its securities, while the other demanded back its principal in cash, Caesar now came to the aid of both so far as he could. He ordered that securities should have a fixed valuation according to their worth, and he provided that arbiters for this purpose should be allotted to persons involved in such a dispute.

  43. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.38.1

    § 41.38.1 Since also many were said to possess much wealth but to be concealing it all, he forbade any one to possess more than sixty thousand sesterces in silver or gold; and he claimed he was not enacting this law himself, but was simply renewing a measure introduced on some previous occasion. 2 His object was either that those who were owing money should pay back a part of their debt to the lenders and the latter should lend to such as needed, or else that the well-to do might become known and none of them should keep his wealth all together, for fear some rebellion might be set afoot during his absence.

  44. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.38.3

    § 41.38.3 When the populace, elated at this, demanded also that rewards should be offered to slaves for information against their masters, he refused to add such a clause to the law, and furthermore invoked dire destruction upon himself if he should ever trust a slave when speaking against his master.

  45. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.39.1

    § 41.39.1 After accomplishing this and removing all the offerings in the Capitol, as well as the others, Caesar hastened to Brundisium toward the close of the year, before entering upon the consulship to which he had been elected. 2 And as he was attending to the details of his departure, a kite in the Forum let fall a sprig of laurel upon one of his companions. Later, while he was sacrificing to Fortune, the bull escaped before being wounded, rushed out of the city, and coming to a certain lake, swam across it.

  46. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.39.3

    § 41.39.3 Consequently he took greater courage and hastened his preparations, especially as the soothsayers declared that destruction should be his portion if he remained at home, but safety and victory if he crossed the sea. 4 After his departure the boys in the city divided of their own accord into two groups, one side calling themselves Pompeians and the other Caesarians, and, fighting with each other in some fashion or other without arms, those conquered who used Caesar's name.

  47. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.40.1

    § 41.40.1 While these events were occurring in Rome and in Spain, Marcus Octavius and Lucius Scribonius Libo, with the aid of Pompey's fleet drove out of Dalmatia Publius Cornelius Dolabella, who was there attending to Caesar's interests. 2 After this they shut up Gaius Antonius, who had been desirous of aiding him, on a small island, and there, after he had been abandoned by the natives and was oppressed by hunger, they captured him with all his troops save a few; for some had escaped in season to the mainland, and others, who were sailing across on rafts and were overtaken, made away with themselves.

  48. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.41.1

    § 41.41.1 Curio had meanwhile reduced Sicily without a battle, since Cato, the governor of the island, being no match for him and not wishing to expose the cities to danger needlessly, had already withdrawn to join Pompey; later, however, he crossed over to Africa and there perished. 2 Upon Curio's approach Lucius Caesar abandoned the city of Aspis where he happened to be by mere chance, and Publius Attius Varus, then in charge of the affairs of that region, was defeated by him and lost many troops and many ships.3 Juba, however, the son of Hiempsal and king of the Numidians, preferred the cause of Pompey as that of the people and the senate, and hated Curio both on this account and because the latter when tribune had attempted to take away his kingdom from him and to confiscate the land; accordingly he carried on a vigorous war against him. 4 For he did not wait for him to invade his home country of Numidia, but went to meet him while he was besieging Utica. He did not attack him, however, with his whole army, since he feared that Curio might put out to sea if he learned in advance of his approach; for he was evidently not so eager to repulse him as to take vengeance on him. Instead, he sent forward a few men

  49. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.41.5

    § 41.41.5 and spread the report that he himself had gone far away in another direction; then he followed after this force and did not fail of the results he had hoped for.

  50. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.42.1

    § 41.42.1 For, though Curio, under the impression that his enemy was approaching, had previously transferred his men to the camp near the sea and had formed the plan, in case he were hard pressed, of embarking on the ships and leaving Africa altogether, 2 he now, when he ascertained that only a few men were coming, and these without Juba, took courage and set out on the march that very night as if to a victory lying ready to hand, fearing that they might otherwise escape him; and after destroying some of the enemy's vanguard who were sleeping on the road he became much more emboldened.

  51. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.42.3

    § 41.42.3 Then, about dawn, he encountered the rest who had gone on ahead from the camp; and without any delay, in spite of the fact that his soldiers were exhausted both by the march and by want of sleep, he at once joined battle with them. 4 Thereupon, when the others stood their ground and were holding their own, Juba suddenly appeared and by the unexpectedness of his arrival as well as by his numbers overwhelmed them. Curio and most of the others he killed on the spot, and the rest he pursued up to their entrenchments, later confining them to the ships;

  52. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.42.5

    § 41.42.5 and in the midst of this rout he got possession of large amounts of treasure and destroyed many men. Indeed, many of them perished after escaping his grasp, some losing their footing while boarding their ships because of the crowding, and others going down with the vessels themselves when these became overloaded. 6 While this was occurring still others, out of fear that they might suffer the same fate, went over to Varus, expecting that their lives would be spared; but they received no considerate treatment.

  53. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.42.7

    § 41.42.7 For Juba asserted that it was he who had conquered them, and so slew nearly all of these, too. Thus Curio died after rendering most valuable assistance to Caesar and inspiring in him many hopes. And Juba received honours at the hands of Pompey and the senators who were in Macedonia, and was saluted as king; but by Caesar and those in the city he was called to account and declared an enemy, while Bocchus and Bogud were named kings, because they were hostile to him.

  54. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.43.1

    § 41.43.1 The ensuing year the Romans had two sets of magistrates, contrary to custom, and a mighty battle was fought. The people of the city had chosen as consuls Caesar and Publius Servius, along with praetors and all the other officers required by law. Those in Thessalonica had made no such appointments, 2 although they had by some accounts about two hundred of the senate and also the consuls with them and had appropriated a small piece of land for the auguries, in order that these might seem to take place under some form of law, so that they regarded the people and the whole city as present there.

  55. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.43.3

    § 41.43.3 They had not appointed new magistrates for the reason that the consuls had not proposed the lex curiata; but instead they employed the same officials as before, merely changing their names and calling some proconsuls, others propraetors, and others proquaestors. 4 For they were very careful about precedents, even though they had taken up arms against their country and abandoned it, and they were anxious that the acts rendered necessary by the exigencies of the situation should not all be in violation of the strict requirement of the ordinances.5 Nevertheless, these men mentioned were the magistrates of the two parties in name only, while in reality it was Pompey and Caesar who were supreme; for the sake of good repute they bore the legal titles of proconsul and consul respectively, yet their acts were not those which these offices permitted, but whatever they themselves pleased.

  56. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.44.1

    § 41.44.1 Under these conditions, with the government divided in twain, Pompey was wintering in Thessalonica and not keeping a very careful watch upon the coast; for he did not suppose that Caesar had yet arrived in Italy from Spain, and even if he were there, he did not suspect that he would venture to cross the Ionian Sea in the winter, at any rate. 2 But Caesar was in Brundisium, waiting for spring, and when he ascertained that Pompey was some distance off and that the mainland opposite was rather carelessly guarded, he seized upon the “chance of war” and attacked him while his attention was relaxed. At any rate, when the winter was about half gone, he set out with a portion of his army, as there were not enough ships to carry them all across at once,

  57. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.44.3

    § 41.44.3 and eluding Marcus Bibulus, to whom the guarding of the sea had been committed, he crossed to the Ceraunian Headlands, as they are called, the outermost point of Epirus, near the mouth of the Ionian Sea. Arriving there before it became noised abroad that he would sail at all, he sent the ships to Brundisium for the others; 4 but Bibulus damaged them on the return voyage and actually took some in tow, so that Caesar learned by experience that the voyage he had made was more fortunate than prudent.

  58. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.45.1

    § 41.45.1 During this delay, then, he won over Oricum and Apollonia and other points there which had been abandoned by Pompey's garrisons. This Corinthian Apollonia is well situated as regards the land and as regards the sea, and most excellently in respect to rivers. 2 What I have marvelled at, however, above all else, is that a huge fire issues from the ground near the Aous river and neither spreads to any extent over the surrounding land nor sets on fire even the place where it abides nor makes it at all dry, but has grass and trees flourishing very near it. In pouring rains it increases and towers aloft.

  59. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.45.3

    § 41.45.3 For this reason it is called Nymphaeum, and in fact it furnishes an oracle, of this kind. You take incense and after making whatever prayer you wish cast it in the fire as the vehicle of the prayer. 4 At this the fire, if your wish is to be fulfilled, receives it very readily, and even if the incense falls somewhat outside, darts forward, snatches it up, and consumes it. But if the wish is not to be fulfilled, the fire not only does not go to it, but, even if it falls into the very flames, recedes and flees before it.

  60. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.45.5

    § 41.45.5 It acts in these two ways in all matters save those of death and marriage; for concerning these two one may not make any inquiry of it at all. Such is the nature of this marvel.

  61. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.46.1

    § 41.46.1 Now as Antony, to whom had been assigned the duty of conveying across those who remained at Brundisium, continued to tarry, and no message even came about them because of the winter and because of Bibulus, Caesar suspected that they had adopted a neutral attitude and were watching the course of events, as often happens in civil strife. 2 Wishing, therefore, to sail to Italy in person and unattended, he embarked on a small boat in disguise, saying that he had been sent by Caesar; and forced the captain to set sail, although there was a wind.

  62. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.46.3

    § 41.46.3 When, however, they had got away from land, and the gale swept violently down upon them and the waves buffeted them terribly, so that the captain did not longer dare even under compulsion to sail farther, but undertook to return even without his passenger's consent, than Caesar revealed himself, as if by this act he could stop the storm, and said, “Be of good cheer: you carry Caesar.”4 Such spirit and such hope had he, either naturally or as the result of some oracle, that he felt firm confidence in his safety even contrary to the appearance of things. Nevertheless, he did not get across, but after struggling for a long time in vain sailed back.

  63. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.47.1

    § 41.47.1 After this he encamped opposite Pompey, near Apsus. For Pompey, as soon as he had learned of his arrival, had made no delay, but hoping to crush him easily before he should receive the others who were with Antony, hastily marched with a considerable force toward Apollonia. 2 Caesar advanced to meet him as far as the river, thinking that even as he was he would prove a match for the troops then approaching; but when he learned that he was inferior in numbers, he halted. And in order that it might not be thought either that he was halting through fear or that he was making the first move in the war, he submitted some conciliatory proposals to the other side and delayed on this pretext.

  64. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.47.3

    § 41.47.3 Pompey, perceiving his motive, wished to try conclusions with him as soon as possible and for this reason undertook to cross the river. But the bridge broke down under the weight and some of the advance guard, thus isolated, perished. Then he desisted, discouraged because he had failed in the first action of the war. Meanwhile Antony also had arrived, and Pompey in fear retired to Dyrrachium.

  65. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.48.1

    § 41.48.1 As long as Bibulus was alive, Antony had not dared even to set out from Brundisium, so close guard did the other keep over it; but when Bibulus, succumbing to the hardships, died, and Libo succeeded him as admiral, Antony scorned him and set sail with the intention of forcing the passage. 2 When driven back to land, he repelled the other's vigorous attack upon him and later, when Libo was anxious to disembark somewhere, he allowed him to find anchorage nowhere along that part of the mainland.

  66. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.48.3

    § 41.48.3 So the admiral, being in need of anchorage and water, since the little island in front of the harbour, which was the only place he could approach, is destitute of water and harbour alike, sailed off to some distant point where he was likely to find both in abundance.4 In this way Antony was enabled to set sail, but later, although he met with no harm at Libo's hands, even when the other attempted to attack them on the high seas (for a violent storm came up which prevented the attack), both he and Libo suffered injuries from the storm itself.

  67. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.49.1

    § 41.49.1 When the soldiers had got safely across, Pompey, as I have said, retired to Dyrrachium, and Caesar followed him, encouraged by the fact that, with the reinforcements that had arrived, he was superior to the adversary in the number of troops then at his disposal. 2 Dyrrachium is situated in the land formerly regarded as belonging to the tribe of Illyrians called Parthini, but now and even at that time regarded as part of Macedonia; and it is very favourably placed, whether it be the Epidamnus of the Corcyraeans or another city. Those who record this fact refer both its founding and its name to a hero Dyrrachius;

  68. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.49.3

    § 41.49.3 but the other authorities have declared that the place was renamed by the Romans with reference to the difficulties of the rocky shore, because the term Epidamnus has in the Latin tongue the meaning of “loss,” and so seemed to be of ill-omen for their voyages thither.

  69. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.50.1

    § 41.50.1 Pompey after taking refuge in this town of Dyrrachium built a camp outside the city and surrounded it with deep moats and a stout palisade. Caesar encamped over against him and made assaults, in the hope of quietly capturing the palisades by the superior number of his troops; and when he was repulsed, he attempted to wall it in. 2 While he was engaged in this task, Pompey was constructing palisades, cross-walls and ditches, and placing towers on the elevations and guards in them, so as to make the circuit of the encompassing wall complete and to make an attack impracticable for the foe, even if they conquered.3 There were meanwhile many, though slight, encounters between them, in which now one party, now the other, was victorious or beaten, so that a few were killed on both sides alike. Upon Dyrrachium itself Caesar made an attempt by night, between the marshes and the sea, in the expectation that it would be betrayed by its defenders. He got inside the narrows, 4 but at that point was attacked both in front and in the rear by large forces which had been conveyed along the shore in boats and very nearly perished himself. After this occurrence Pompey took courage and planned a night assault upon the enclosing wall; and attacking it unexpectedly, he captured a portion of it by storm and caused great slaughter among the men encamped near it.

  70. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.51.1

    § 41.51.1 Caesar, in view of this occurrence and because his grain had failed, inasmuch as the whole sea and land in the vicinity were hostile, and because for this reason some had actually deserted, feared that he might either be defeated while watching his adversary or be abandoned by his other followers. Therefore he levelled all the works that had been constructed, destroyed also all the parallel walls, and thereupon set out suddenly and hastened into Thessaly. 2 During this same time, it seems, while Dyrrachium was being besieged, Lucius Cassius Longinus and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus had been sent by him into Macedonia and Thessaly. Longinus had been disastrously defeated in Thessaly by Scipio and by Sadalus, a Thracian; 3 and Calvinus had been repulsed from Macedonia by Faustus, but on receiving accessions from the Locrians and Aetolians had invaded Thessaly with these troops, and after being ambushed had afterwards set ambuscades himself and conquered Scipio in battle, thereby winning over a few cities. 4 Thither, accordingly, Caesar hastened, thinking that by uniting with these officers he could more easily secure an abundance of provisions and thus continue the war. When no one would receive him, because of his reverses, he reluctantly held aloof from the larger settlements, but assaulted Gomphi, a little town in Thessaly; and upon taking it he put many to death and plundered everything,

  71. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.51.5

    § 41.51.5 in order that by this act he might inspire the rest with terror. Metropolis, another town, for example, did not even contend with him but forthwith capitulated without a struggle; and as he did no harm to its citizens he more easily won over some other places by his course in these two instances.

  72. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.52.1

    § 41.52.1 So he was once more becoming powerful. Pompey did not pursue him, for he had withdrawn suddenly by night and had hastily crossed the Genusus river; however, he was of the opinion that he had brought the war to an end. Consequently he assumed the title of imperator, though he uttered no boastful words about it and did not even wind laurel about his fasces, disliking to show such exultation over the downfall of citizens.2 From this same motive he neither sailed to Italy himself nor sent any others there, though he might easily have taken possession of it all. For with his fleet he was far superior, as he had five hundred swift ships and could land at all points at the same time; moreover, the sentiment of that country was not opposed to him in any case, and, even if it had been ever so hostile, the people were no match for him in war.

  73. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.52.3

    § 41.52.3 But he wished to be far from giving the impression that Italy was the stake for which he was fighting, and did not think he ought to cause any fear to the people who were then in Rome. Hence he made no attempt on Italy, nor even sent to the government any despatch about his successes; but after this he set out against Caesar and came into Thessaly.

  74. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.53.1

    § 41.53.1 As they lay opposite each other the appearance of the camps bore, indeed, some semblance of war, but their arms were idle as in time of peace. As they considered the greatness of the danger and foresaw the obscurity and uncertainty of the issue, and still felt some regard for their common ancestry and their kinship, they continued to delay. 2 Meanwhile they exchanged propositions looking toward friendship and appeared to some likely even to effect an empty reconciliation. The reason was that they were both reaching out after the supreme power and were influenced greatly by native ambition and greatly also by acquired rivalry, —

  75. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.53.3

    § 41.53.3 since men can least endure to be outdone by their equals and intimates; hence they were not willing to make any concessions to each other, since each felt that he might win, nor could they feel confident, if they did reach some agreement, that they would not be always striving to gain the upper hand and would not fall to quarrelling again over the supreme issue.

  76. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.54.1

    § 41.54.1 In temper they differed from each other to this extent, that Pompey desired to be second to no man and Caesar to be first of all, and the former was anxious to be honoured by a willing people and to preside over and be loved by men who fully consent, whereas the latter cared not at all if he ruled over even an unwilling people, issued orders to men who hated him, and bestowed the honours with his own hand upon himself. 2 The deeds, however, through which they hoped to accomplish all that they wished, were perforce common to both alike. For it was impossible for any one successfully to gain these ends without fighting against his countrymen, leading foreigners against kindred, obtaining vast sums by unjust pillage, and killing unlawfully many of his dearest associates.3 Hence, even though they differed in their desires, yet in their acts, by which they hoped to realise those desires, they were alike. Consequently they would not yield to each other on any point, in spite of the many claims they put forward, and finally came to blows.

  77. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.55.1

    § 41.55.1 The struggle proved a mighty one and unparalleled by any other. In the first place, the leaders themselves had the name of being the most skilled in all matters of warfare and clearly the most distinguished not only of the Romans but also of all other men then living. They had been trained in arms from boyhood, had constantly been occupied with them, had performed deeds worthy of note, had been conspicuous for great valour and also for great fortune, and were therefore most worthy of commanding and most worthy of victory. 2 As to their forces, Caesar had the largest and the most genuinely Roman portion of the state legions and the most warlike men from the rest of Italy, from Spain, and the whole of Gaul and the islands that he had conquered; Pompey had brought along many from the senatorial and the equestrian order and from the regularly enrolled troops, and had gathered vast numbers from the subject and allied peoples and kings.

  78. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.55.3

    § 41.55.3 With the exception of Pharnaces and Orodes (for he tried to win over even the latter, although an enemy since the time he had killed the Crassi ), all the rest who had ever been befriended at all by Pompey gave him money and either sent or brought auxiliaries. 4 Indeed, the Parthian had promised to be his ally if he should receive Syria; but as he did not get it, he lent him no help. While Pompey, then, greatly excelled in numbers, Caesar's followers were their equals in strength; and so, the advantages being even, they were an equal match for each other and the risks they incurred were equal.

  79. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.56.1

    § 41.56.1 As a result of these circumstances and of the very cause and purpose of the war a most notable struggle took place. For the city of Rome and its entire empire, even then great and mighty, lay before them as the prize, since it was clear to all that it would be the slave of him who then conquered. 2 When they reflected on this fact and furthermore thought of their former deeds, — Pompey of Africa, Sertorius, Mithridates, Tigranes, and the sea, and Caesar of Gaul, Spain, the Rhine, and Britain, —

  80. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.56.3

    § 41.56.3 they were wrought up to the highest pitch of excitement, believing that those conquests, too, were at stake, and each being eager to acquire the other's glory. For the renown of the vanquished, far more than his other possessions, becomes the property of the victor, since, the greater and more powerful the antagonist that a man overthrows, the greater is the height to which he himself is raised.

  81. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.57.1

    § 41.57.1 Therefore they delivered to their soldiers also many exhortations, but very much alike on both sides, saying all that is fitting to be said on such an occasion with reference both to the immediate results of the struggle and to the subsequent results. As they both came from the same state and were talking about the same matters 2 and called each other tyrants and themselves liberators from tyranny of the men they addressed, they had nothing different to say on either side, but stated that it would be the lot of one side to die, of the other to be saved, of the one side to be captives, of the other to enjoy the master's lot, to possess everything or to be deprived of everything, to suffer or to inflict a most terrible fate.

  82. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.57.3

    § 41.57.3 After addressing some such exhortations to the citizens and furthermore trying to inspire the subject and allied contingents with hopes of a better lot and fears of a worse, they hurled at each other kinsmen, sharers of the same tent, of the same table, of the same libations. 4 Yet why should any one, then, lament the fate of the others involved, when those very leaders, who were all these things to each other, and had, moreover, shared many secret plans and many exploits of like character, who had once been joined by domestic ties and had loved the same child, one as a father, the other as grandfather, nevertheless fought? All the ties with which nature, by mingling their blood, had bound them together, they now, led by their insatiable lust of power, hastened to break, tear, and rend asunder. Because of them Rome was being compelled to fight both in her own defence and against herself, so that even if victorious she would be vanquished.

  83. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.58.1

    § 41.58.1 Such was the struggle in which they joined; yet they did not immediately come to close quarters. Sprung from the same country and from the same hearth, with almost identical weapons and similar formation, each side shrank from beginning the battle, and shrank from slaying any one. 2 So there was great silence and dejection on both sides; no one went forward or moved at all, but with heads bowed they stood motionless, as if devoid of life. Caesar and Pompey, therefore, fearing that if they remained quiet any longer their animosity might become lessened or they might even become reconciled, hurriedly commanded the trumpeters to give the signal and the men to raise the war cry in unison.

  84. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.58.3

    § 41.58.3 Both orders were obeyed, but the combatants were so far from being imbued with courage, that at the sound of the trumpeters' call, uttering the same notes, and at their own shout, raised in the same language, they showed their sense of relationship and betrayed their kinship more than ever, and so fell to weeping and lamenting. But after a long time, when the allied troops began the battle, the rest also joined in, fairly beside themselves at what they were doing.

  85. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.59.1

    § 41.59.1 Those who fought at long range were less sensible of the horrors, as they shot their arrows, hurled their javelins, discharged their slings without knowing whom they hit; 2 but the heavy-armed troops and the cavalry had a very hard time of it, as they were close to each other and could even talk a little back and forth; at one and the same moment they would recognize those who confront them and would wound them, would call them by name and would slaughter them, would recall the towns they had come from and would despoil them.

  86. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.59.3

    § 41.59.3 Such were the deeds both done and suffered by the Romans and by the others from Italy who were with them on the campaign, wherever they met each other. Many sent messages home through their very slayers. But the subject force fought both zealously and relentlessly, showing great zeal, as once to win their own freedom, so now to secure the slavery of the Romans; they wanted, since they were reduced to inferiority to them in all things, to have them as fellow-slaves.

  87. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.60.1

    § 41.60.1 Thus it was a very great battle and full of diverse incidents, partly for the reasons mentioned and partly on account of the numbers and the variety of the armaments. There were vast bodies of heavy-armed soldiers, vast bodies of cavalry, in another group archers and still others that were slingers, so that they occupied the whole plain, and scattered over it, they fought often with each other, since they belonged to the same arms, but often with men of the other arms indiscriminately. 2 The Pompeians surpassed in cavalry and archers; hence they would surround troops at a distance, employ sudden assaults, and retired after throwing their opponents into confusion; then they would attack them again and again, turning now to this side and now to that.

  88. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.60.3

    § 41.60.3 The Caesarians, therefore, were on their guard against this, and by wheeling round always managed to face their assailants, and when they came to close quarters with them, would seize hold of both men and horses in the eagerness of the struggle; for light-armed cavalry had been drawn up with their cavalry for this very purpose. 4 And all this took place, as I said, not in one spot, but in many places at once, scattered all about, so that with some contending at a distance and others fighting at close quarters, this body smiting its opponents and that group being struck, one detachment fleeing and another pursuing, many infantry battles and many cavalry battles as well were to be seen.

  89. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.60.5

    § 41.60.5 Meanwhile many incredible things were taking place. One man after routing another would himself be turned to flight, and another who had avoided an opponent would in turn attack him. One soldier who had struck another would be wounded himself, and a second, who had fallen, would kill the enemy who stood over him. Many died without being wounded, and many when half dead kept on slaying. 6 Some were glad and sang paeans, while the others were distressed and uttered lamentations, so that all places were filled with shouts and groans. The majority were thrown into confusion by this fact, for what was said was unintelligible to them, because of the confusion of nations and languages, and alarmed them greatly, and those who could understand one another suffered a calamity many times worse; for in addition to their own misfortunes they could hear and at the same time see those of their neighbours.

  90. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.61.1

    § 41.61.1 At last, after they had carried on an evenly-balanced struggle for a very long time and many on both sides alike had fallen or been wounded, Pompey, since the larger part of his army was Asiatic and untrained, was defeated, even as had been made clear to him before the action. 2 For thunderbolts had fallen upon his camp, a fire had appeared in the air over Caesar's camp and had then fallen upon his own, bees had swarmed about his military standards, and many of the victims after being led up close to the very altar had run away.

  91. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.61.3

    § 41.61.3 And so far did the effects of that contest extend to the rest of mankind that on the very day of the battle collisions of armies and the clash of arms occurred in many places. In Pergamum a noise of drums and cymbals rose from the temple of Dionysus and spread throughout the city; 4 in Tralles a palm tree grew up in the temple of Victory and the goddess herself turned about toward an image of Caesar that stood beside her; in Syria two young men announced the result of the battle and vanished; and in Patavium, which now belongs to Italy but was then still a part of Gaul, some birds not only brought news of it but even acted it out to some extent,

  92. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.61.5

    § 41.61.5 for one Gaius Cornelius drew from their actions accurate information of all that had taken place, and narrated it to the bystanders. These several things happened on that very same day and though they were, not unnaturally, distrusted at the time, yet when news of the actual facts was brought, they were marvelled at.

  93. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.62.1

    § 41.62.1 Of Pompey's followers who were not destroyed on the spot some fled whithersoever they could, and others who were captured later on. Those of them who were soldiers of the line Caesar enrolled in his own legions, exhibiting no resentment. 2 Of the senators and knights, however, he put to death all whom he had previously captured and spared, except some whom his friends begged off; for he allowed each friend on this occasion to save one man.

  94. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.62.3

    § 41.62.3 The rest who had then for the first time fought against him he released, remarking: “Those have not wronged me who supported the cause of Pompey, their friend, without having received any benefit from me.” 4 This same attitude he adopted toward the princes and the peoples who had assisted Pompey. He pardoned them all, bearing in mind that he himself was acquainted with none or almost none of them, whereas from his rival they had previously obtained many favours.

  95. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.62.5

    § 41.62.5 Indeed, he praised these far more than he did those who, after receiving favours from Pompey, had deserted him in the midst of dangers; 6 the former he could reasonably expect would be favourably disposed to him also, but as to the latter, no matter how anxious they seemed to be to please him in anything, he believed that, inasmuch as they had betrayed their friend in this crisis they would, on occasion, not spare him either.

  96. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.63.1

    § 41.63.1 A proof of his feeling is that he spared Sadalus the Thracian and Deiotarus the Galatian, who had been in the battle, and Tarcondimotus, who was ruler of a portion of Cilicia and had been of the greatest assistance to Pompey in the matter of ships. 2 But what need is there to enumerate the rest who had sent auxiliaries, to whom also he granted pardon, merely exacting money from them? He did nothing else to them and took from them nothing else, though many had received numerous large gifts from Pompey, some long ago and some just at that time.

  97. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.63.3

    § 41.63.3 He did give a certain portion of Armenia that had belonged to Deiotarus, to Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, yet in this he did not injure Deiotarus at all, but rather conferred an additional favour upon him. For he did not curtail his territory, but after occupying all of Armenia previously occupied by Pharnaces, he bestowed one part of it upon Ariobarzanes and another part upon Deiotarus. 4 These men, then, he treated in this wise. Pharnaces, on his side, made a plea that he had not assisted Pompey and therefore, in view of his behaviour, deserved to obtain pardon; but Caesar showed him no consideration, and furthermore reproached him for this very thing, that he had proved himself base and impious toward his benefactor.

  98. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:41.63.5

    § 41.63.5 Such humanity and uprightness did he show throughout to all those who had fought against him. At any rate, all the letters that were found filed away in Pompey's chests which convicted any persons of good-will toward the latter or ill-will toward himself he neither read nor had copied, but burned them immediately, 6 in order not to be forced by what was in them to take several measures; and for this reason, if no other, one ought to hate the men who plotted against him. I make this statement with a particular purpose, since Marcus Brutus Caepio, who afterwards killed him, was not only captured by him but also spared.

  99. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:42.1.1

    § 42.1.1 Book 42 Such was the general character of the battle. As a result of it Pompey straightway despaired of all his projects and no longer took any account of his own valour or of the multitude of troops remaining to him or of the fact that Fortune often restores the fallen in a moment of time; yet previously he had always possessed the greatest cheerfulness and the greatest hopefulness on all occasions of failure. 2 The reason for this was that on those occasions he had usually been evenly matched with his foe and hence had not taken his victory for granted; but by reflecting beforehand on the two possible issues of events while he was still cool-headed and was not yet involved in any alarm he had not neglected to prepare for the worst. In this way he had not been compelled to yield to disasters and had always been able easily to renew the conflict; but this time, as he had expected to prove greatly superior to Caesar, he had taken no precautions.

  100. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0385.tlg001:42.1.3

    § 42.1.3 For instance, he had not placed his camp in a suitable position, nor had he provided a refuge for himself in case of defeat. And whereas he might have delayed action and so have prevailed without a battle, — since his army kept increasing every day and he had abundant provisions, being in a country for the most part friendly and being also master of the sea, — nevertheless, whether of his own accord, because he expected to conquer in any event, or because his hand was forced by associates, he joined issue. Consequently, as soon as he was defeated, he became greatly terrified and had no opportune plan or sure hope to enable him to face the danger anew. Thus it is that whenever an event befalls a man unexpectedly and contrary to all calculation, it humbles his spirit and strikes his reason with panic, so that he becomes the poorest and weakest judge of what must be done.

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Via ToposText (topostext.org), a project of the Aikaterini Laskaridis Foundation created by Brady Kiesling. Translated by Earnest Cary (1879-19??). Composed ca. 230 CE. Licence: public domain. Source.