Euthyphro

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 233 sections

9.3
Socrates. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.
9.4
Euthyphro. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.
9.5
Socrates. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?
9.6
Euthyphro. What is to hinder, Socrates?
9.7
Socrates. Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.
9.8
Euthyphro. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.
9.9
Socrates. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?
9.10
Euthyphro. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.
10.1
Socrates. We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?
10.2
Euthyphro. I don’t know what you mean, Socrates.
10.3
Socrates. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.
10.4
Euthyphro. I think I understand.
10.5
Socrates. Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?
10.6
Euthyphro. Of course.
10.7
Socrates. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?
10.8
Euthyphro. No, for that reason.
10.9
Socrates. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?
10.10
Euthyphro. Certainly.
10.11
Socrates. Then one does not see it because its a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?
10.12
Euthyphro. I agree.
10.13
Socrates. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?
10.14
Euthyphro. Certainly.
10.15
Socrates. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?
10.16
Euthyphro. Obviously.
10.17
Socrates. Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro. It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?
10.18
Euthyphro. Yes.
10.19
Socrates. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?
10.20
Euthyphro. No, for this reason.
10.21
Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
10.22
Euthyphro. I think so.
10.23
Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.
10.24
Euthyphro. Of course.
10.25
Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.
10.26
Euthyphro. How so, Socrates?
10.27
Socrates. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?
10.28
Euthyphro. Yes.
10.29
Socrates. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.
10.30
Euthyphro. Very true.
11.1
Socrates. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are different from each other. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness?
11.2
Euthyphro. But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won’t stay where we put it.
11.3
Socrates. Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won’t stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they stay fixed, as you yourself see.
11.4
Euthyphro. I think the jest does very well as it is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.
11.5
Socrates. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.
11.6
Euthyphro. I do.
12.1
Socrates. But is everything that is right also holy? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?
12.2
Euthyphro. I can’t follow you, Socrates.
12.3
Socrates. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet said, who wrote:Zeus the creator, him who made all things, thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence. Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how?
12.4
Euthyphro. By all means.
12.5
Socrates. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don’t you think so, too?
12.6
Euthyphro. Certainly.
12.7
Socrates. But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness?
12.8
Euthyphro. Yes, he does fear.
12.9
Socrates. Then it is not correct to say where fear is, there also is reverence. On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?
12.10
Euthyphro. Perfectly.
12.11
Socrates. It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is, there also is the right; but holiness is not everywhere where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent?
12.12
Euthyphro. No, I agree; for I think the statement is correct.
12.13
Socrates. Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two; or don’t you agree?
12.14
Euthyphro. I agree.
12.15
Socrates. Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.
12.16
Euthyphro. This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.
13.1
Socrates. I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by attention. I don’t suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?
13.2
Euthyphro. Certainly.
13.3
Socrates. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
13.4
Euthyphro. Yes.
13.5
Socrates. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
13.6
Euthyphro. That is so.
13.7
Socrates. Then the huntsman’s art is the art of attending to dogs?
13.8
Euthyphro. Yes.
13.9
Socrates. And the oxherd’s art is that of attending to oxen?
13.10
Euthyphro. Certainly.
13.11
Socrates. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?
13.12
Euthyphro. Yes.
13.13
Socrates. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman’s art are benefited and made better; or don’t you think so?
13.14
Euthyphro. Yes, I do.
13.15
Socrates. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art and oxen by the oxherd’s and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?
13.16
Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, I do not.
13.17
Socrates. But for its benefit?
13.18
Euthyphro. Of course.
13.19
Socrates. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?
13.20
Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, not I.
13.21
Socrates. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by attention to the gods just because I did not think you meant anything like that.
13.22
Euthyphro. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.
13.23
Socrates. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?
13.24
Euthyphro. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.
13.25
Socrates. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?
13.26
Euthyphro. Exactly.
13.27
Socrates. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?
13.28
Euthyphro. Yes.
13.29
Socrates. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?
13.30
Euthyphro. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.
13.31
Socrates. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?
13.32
Euthyphro. Yes.
13.33
Socrates. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.
13.34
Euthyphro. And what I say is true, Socrates.
13.35
Socrates. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me, what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?
14.1
Euthyphro. They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.
14.2
Socrates. Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?
14.3
Euthyphro. Of course.
14.4
Socrates. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?
14.5
Euthyphro. Certainly.

Perseus Greek. CTS URN tlg0059.tlg001.perseus-eng2. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. Source.