Exordia

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 148 sections

39.3.1
Now, while I am of the opinion that even those who have gained the upper hand are not unaware that, should you form your resolve and be stung to action by what has happened, it is not yet quite clear whether what has been done is good fortune or the opposite for them, yet if it turns out that the exploit has inspired them to become over-confident, this would already be another point in your favour. For the more they look down upon you, the sooner will they blunder.
40.1.1
I do not believe, men of Athens, that you are deliberating upon this occasion concerning only the city you have in mind, but concerning all the allied cities. For however you decide concerning the city in question, the other cities, looking to this decision, will probably expect to receive the same treatment themselves. Consequently you must, for the sake both of doing what is best and of guarding your own reputation, strive earnestly that you may be clearly seen to be devising measures which are alike expedient and just.
40.2.2
Now, the initiative in all such matters is in the hands of the generals. Most of these men, though they sail out under your orders, do not consider it their duty to cultivate those who are friendly to you, people whom they have taken over from their predecessors as men who have shared the same dangers as you throughout all our history, but each and all, having established their own private friendships, expect you to regard their personal flatterers as your friends also. But the facts are exactly the opposite.
40.3.1
You could find no more bitter or inevitable enemies than these flatterers. For the more gains they make by deception, the greater is the number of offences for which they think they are due to be punished. And no one could feel goodwill toward those at whose hands he expects to suffer some harm. However, the present is perhaps not the time to denounce them. Instead, I shall give you the advice that I consider in your interests.
41.1.1
I no not suppose, men of Athens, that there is one of all your number so disloyal to the city as not to feel distressed and pained by these events. If, then, it were possible by nursing indignation to render undone any of the things that have been done, this is what I should be urging upon you all. But since the facts are unalterable and you must take forethought whereby you may escape the same misfortune in the future, the keenness of your indignation, men of Athens, over what has now taken place ought to set the measure for your determination that the same shall not occur again, nor should you think that any of your advisers has such a wonderful plan to propose as will be capable of redressing the present evils without any of you shouldering a share of the burden. For no speech would be wonderful enough for that, only some divine intervention.
41.2.2
Now the origin of this present state of affairs hinges upon this fact, that, for the sake of a momentary popularity with you, some of those who speak in this place declared to the Assembly: There is no need to pay a special war-tax or to do military service, but everything will take care of itself. To be sure, the absurdity of this ought to have been exposed by some other speaker—the sort of exposure that profits the State: still, even as things now are, it seems to me that Fortune is somehow kinder to you than are those at the head of affairs.
41.3.1
For while the occurrence of one loss after another ought to be counted evidence of the villainy of those who are in charge, the fact that all your resources have not been destroyed long ago I, at least, judge to be a benefaction of the Fortune that attends you. In the interval, therefore, while Fortune allows a respite and is holding your foes in check, have a care for what lies in the future. Otherwise take heed lest at one and the same time you shall be bringing to justice those who have been appointed to the several posts, and your power, men of Athens, shall be declining; for it is impossible that this shall continue to stand, barring some miracle, if not one of you puts his hand to the task.
42.1.1
It is nothing out of the ordinary, men of Athens, that those public men who are always and unceasingly agitating on behalf of the oligarchies should be convicted of doing so upon this occasion also. On the contrary, one might much more reasonably be astonished that you, though aware of the truth, repeatedly prefer to listen to them rather than to those who speak in your own defence. It may very well be that it is difficult to act wisely in all public matters, just as it is in private matters, but certainly it is wrong to take a light view of things of the very greatest importance.
42.2.1
Assuredly all other considerations are of less consequence, and when you listen good-naturedly to speeches on behalf of government efficiency and killings and the overthrow of democracy, how can one help but consider that you too are out of your minds? For all other men profit by the example of their fellows and are themselves rendered much more cautious thereby, but you, even when you hear what is happening to the rest of the Greeks are incapable of taking alarm, but the very thing that you consider men to be witless for awaiting as individuals you seem to me to be calmly awaiting yourselves as a community that is, to learn by bitter experience.
43.1.1
Perhaps none of you has ever inquired, men of Athens, just why men in adversity deliberate more wisely over their affairs than do the prosperous. This comes about for no other reason than this, that it is not natural for the prosperous to feel any alarm or to believe that such dangers as someone may report concern themselves; those, however, who are close in time to the mistakes through which they have come to adversity are rendered discreet with reference to future actions and inclined to moderation.
43.2.1
It therefore becomes serious-minded men at the very time that they enjoy the presence of Fortune at her best to show the greater eagerness to practise discretion. For no danger is so formidable that men who are on their guard cannot guard against it, and there is none that men who belittle it may not expect to suffer. I say this, not to frighten you needlessly, but in order that, when you hear rumors of danger, you may not despise them because of your present prosperity—they may come true unless you take forethought for your interests— but rather in order that, without waiting to learn by experience, you may forestall trouble, just as becomes men who at least claim to be second to none in point of discretion.
44.1.1
I assume, men of Athens, that the time for humoring you and the time for recommending the measures I regard as best are not the same; for often, I observe, humoring you contrary to one’s own judgement has earned more hatred than opposing at the outset. Now, if you all held the same opinions, I should not have come forward if you seemed to me to prefer the right course, considering it superfluous to speak before people doing the right thing of their own accord, nor again, if the contrary were true, for I should have thought that a lone person like myself was more likely to misapprehend the best measures than all of you.
44.2.1
But since I see some of you holding the same views as myself and the opposite to those held by others, I shall try with the support of these to persuade those who differ. Now, if you shall think it right to refuse to listen, you will make a mistake; but if you will listen in silence and bear with me in this, one of two benefits will accrue to you: for either you will be persuaded if we seem to advocate something advantageous, or you will be more firmly convinced of the rightness of your own views; for if the grounds upon which we think you are going somewhat astray shall be proved valueless, with the benefit of argument you will this time have chosen the plans approved before.
45.1.1
I could wish, men of Athens, that a certain person, who has won your approval as a speaker on the measures before you, might have deserved equal praise for the feasibility and workableness of his proposal. For I call the gods to witness that I bear the man no ill will and wish that his plan had been a good one for you. But do not forget, men of Athens, that making a good speech and choosing sound policies are miles apart, and that the one is the part of an orator and the other of a man of sense.
45.2.1
Now, you, the multitude, and especially the oldest among you, while not obliged to speak as well as the cleverest, for this art is for the practised speakers, are yet under obligation to have as much sense as they and even more, for it is long experience and having seen much that begets this faculty in us. Do not therefore, men of Athens, show yourselves unaware in this crisis that valorous deeds and bold exploits by word of mouth, unless backed by ready armament and physical force, though pleasant to hear, are hazardous in action.
45.3.1
For example, Do not leave a free hand to aggressors; you see what a fine slogan that is! Do not fail first to take a good look at the actual nature of the task. They must master the foe in battle who are really going to capture the majesty of this saying. For all things are easy to say, men of Athens, but not all are easy to do, for not so much toil and sweat come before speech as before action.
45.4.1
I do not think you are naturally inferior to the Thebans—I should be mad to say that—only less well prepared. What I do say is that now is the time to begin your preparation, since you have been negligent up to now, not the decisive struggle. For I am not speaking against the plan as a whole but I am opposed to your way of going about it.
46.1.1
You have all seen, men of Athens, with what zest the ambassadors have denounced our city. For, apart from what I cannot imagine, they have attempted to lay all offences at your doors. I admit, if their charges were true, you might reasonably be grateful that they were thus denouncing you to your faces instead of to others;
46.2.1
but since they have used the privilege of speaking here to distort the truth, failing to mention some things from which you would justly derive great praise, and making charges that are false and inapplicable to you, it is right that you should consider them unprincipled, when once they have been proved guilty of such conduct as this. For if they prefer to be regarded as accomplished rhetoricians rather than truly fair-minded men, it is not likely that even they themselves would claim to be gentlemen.
46.3.1
It is, of course, difficult to rise up to speak before you in your own defence, just as it is easy to speak against you. For, by Athena, I do not think that there are any other people in the whole world who would listen so complacently when reminded of their real faults as you do when you are reviled for faults that are not yours. What is more, I do not believe that even these men would lie to you with such effrontery if they were not aware of this, and if it were not clear in advance that of all people you are the most addicted to listening to whatever anyone may say against you.
46.4.2
Now, if you must be punished for this fatuousness, to listen to undeserved charges against the State would be that penalty; but if something must, in all fairness, be said on behalf of the truth, it is for this purpose that I have come forward, confident, not that I shall unaided be able to speak with eloquence worthy of your past actions, but that these actions, however one may speak, will be seen to be just.
46.5.1
It would be my wish, men of Athens, that you become equally willing listeners when you are being defended, and not, through having been beguiled, become all too eager to praise the speeches of these men. For no one would go on judging it vice on your part if you have been led astray by some clever speaker, but it would be thought vice on the part of those who devoted their energies to deceiving you.
47.1.1
I suppose, men of Athens, you would all say you wish to have put into effect what each one considers best for the city. Quite so, but it happens that the same plan has not been judged the best by all of you; otherwise some of you would not be bidding the speaker Go on and others Sit down. Now, to those who hold the same measures to be expedient as does the one who is about to speak there is no need of a single word, for they are already convinced; but to those who think that the opposite course is for the best, I wish to speak briefly.
47.2.1
Unless you will listen, it is, of course, absolutely impossible to learn anything, any more than if you keep quiet when no one is speaking. But if you do listen it is impossible to miss one or the other of two benefits for either, being all persuaded and of the same mind, you will be more unanimous in your decision—and nothing better than this could happen for the present emergency—or else, if the speaker be unable to make his point, you will have more confidence in the decisions already reached.
47.3.1
Apart from these two possibilities, there is a suspicion, and by no means to your credit, that, although you have come to the assembly under obligation to choose the best plan on the basis of what shall be said, instead, you will be found, before reaching a judgement on the basis of the speeches, to have been convinced of something in your own minds, and this so strongly that you are not even willing to hear anything to the contrary.
48.1.1
Perhaps some of you, men of Athens, regard me as a nuisance, speaking on the same subjects time after time. But if you scan things rightly, it is not I who shall justly bear the blame for this, but rather those who do not obey your decrees. For if those men had done at the outset what you enjoined, it would not have been necessary for us to speak a second time or, if they had complied on the second occasion, a third time. As it is, the more often you have voted what your duty demanded, the less those men, it seems to me, have been prepared to act upon it.
48.2.1
Previously, I confess by the gods, I did not know what was the point of the saying: Responsibility reveals the man. But now I think I could even tell another what it means. For the officials, or some of them— to avoid saying all—feel not even the slightest regard for your decrees but consider how they shall make some gain. Certainly, if it had been feasible for me to make a payment, I might have been justly rebuked for this very reason, if I chose to annoy you through balking at a paltry expenditure. But as things are, it is not feasible, as these men themselves have not failed to observe.
48.3.1
What is more, if, in the case of a service due to you they think I am going to leave it to themselves to decide, they are fools. And, perhaps, they both wish and expect it; this I will not do, but if they will allow me, I shall launch the ship and do my duty; otherwise, I shall reveal to you the names of those responsible.
49.1.1
In my opinion, men of Athens, no intelligent citizen would deny that it is best of all for the city, preferably at the outset not to do anything inexpedient, but otherwise, that those should be on hand who will object at once. To this must be added, however, that you shall be willing to listen and learn; for nothing is gained by having a man who will give the best counsel unless he shall have people who will listen to him.
49.2.1
Neither would the following suggestion prove unprofitable as the next step, that whatever deceptions anyone shall practise upon you through some well-timed maneuver, or the late hour of the day or by any other opening, that there should be someone who will scrutinize the measures a second time, when you, being arbiters of your own conduct, are willing to listen, so that of the measures should prove to be such as those assert who then persuaded you, you may put them into effect more wholeheartedly as having passed the test: but if, after all, they are found to be otherwise, that you may halt before going farther. For it would be a shocking thing that those who had failed to choose the best plan should be forced to put the worst into effect, and not have a chance to reconsider and choose from among other alternatives the plan that had stood second.
49.3.1
Now while all other men, I observe, stand ready to submit to an accounting at any time, whenever they are confident that some measure of theirs has been honestly put through, yet these men, on the contrary, resent it if you desire now to reverse your action in matters wherein you have made a mistake, thinking their deception ought to prevail rather than spend time on an inquiry. So, even if the majority of you are perhaps not unaware of pressure on the part of these men, it is still one’s duty, once he has been given the floor, to declare what action he thinks best under the circumstances.
50.1.1
Whatever measure is going to benefit the whole State, men of Athens, I pray that all speakers will propose and you will adopt. I, at any rate, shall say what I have persuaded myself is most to your advantage, asking only this of you—that you neither consider those who urge you to take the field to be for this reason brave, nor those who undertake to oppose them to be for this reason cowards; for the test of speech and the test of action, men of Athens, are not the same; rather we must now show ourselves to have been wise in counsel and later, if in the end this proposal is adopted, display the deeds of courage.
50.2.1
Your enthusiasm, I allow, is worthy of all praise and such as a man of goodwill toward the State might pray for; but the more intense your enthusiasm the more foresighted you should now be to employ it as you ought. For you know that no choice of a course of action justifies itself unless the end it achieves be beneficial and honorable. I am sure I once heard here in your presence, men of Athens, a man who was thought to be lacking neither in sense nor in experience of war.
50.3.1
I refer to Iphicrates, who said, A general must so choose to risk a battle, that not this or that may result but just this, for such were his exact words. The meaning of this was obvious, for he meant that he might come off victorious. So, when you take the field, whoever is leader is master of you, but now each one of yourselves is a general. Thus it is your duty to show yourselves to have made such decisions as will inevitably be good for the State and that you shall not, for the sake of mere hopes of future goods, bring about something not so good as the prosperity you at present enjoy.
51.1.1
I should have thought, men of Athens, that no one who has a clean conscience about the measures taken would prefer a complaint against those who move to bring these matters to an accounting; for the more often one examines into them, the more the authors of them are bound to grow in esteem. These men themselves, however, seem to me to render it manifest that they have not acted with the State’s interests in view. At any rate, just as if they were bound to be found guilty if they should come again to an accounting, they assume the defensive and say we are acting outrageously. And yet when you accuse of outrageous conduct those who wish to investigate, what are we citizens to say of those who in that very transaction have perpetrated a fraud against our own selves?
52.1.1
It would be the righteous thing, men of Athens, for you to feel the same anger toward those who attempt to deceive you as toward those who have been able to do so. For what it was in the power of these men to do has been done, and they led you along. That these designs have fallen short of success, credit is due to Fortune and to the fact that you are now wiser than when you were misled by these men. Yet the State, I believe, is so far from being able to exact justice of the wrongdoers, that it seems to me you must content yourselves if you shall be able to avoid sustaining loss; so formidable are the trickeries and chicaneries and, not to particularize, certain salaried public services that have been organized against you. To denounce the villainy of these men, however, would not at this juncture be most opportune: but I do wish to say what I deem advantageous with reference to the matters I have risen to discuss.
53.1.1
The bickering and disorder, men of Athens, that are accustomed to injure the State all the time, have proceeded on this occasion from the same men as always. But the thing to do is not so much to blame these men—for perhaps they do it out of spite and quarrelsomeness and, what is the chief reason, because it pays them to do so—as to blame yourselves, men of Athens, if, after assembling on matters of common interest and prime importance, you sit and listen to private bickerings and cannot figure out for yourselves that the tirades directed against one another by all the speakers, when no one is on trial, cause you to pay the penalties for the offences of which they convict one another.
53.2.1
For outside of a few perhaps, to avoid saying all, not one of them abuses another that any of your interests may be forwarded; very far from it, but in order that he may himself with the greater immunity succeed in doing what he says, if so-and-so did it, would be the most outrageous conduct imaginable.
53.3.1
Do not take my word for it that this is so but consider for a little. Has anyone ever stood up before you and said, I have come forward, men of Athens, desiring to get my hands on something of yours, not for your sakes? Certainly not a single one. Instead, they say for your sakes and on your account and cite these plausible motives.
53.3.2
Come now, men of Athens, consider why in the world you, for whose sakes they all speak, are on the whole no better off now than before, while these, who all say for your sakes, without a single one having ever said for our own sakes, have turned from beggars into rich men. It Is because, though they say they love you, men of Athens, they love not you but themselves.
53.4.1
The portion they allow you is to have a laugh and to raise a hubbub and now and then to have a hope, but they would not want you to get or acquire for the State any benefit in the proper sense of the word. Yes, and on the day when you are freed of this lamentable weakness you will be unable to endure even the sight of them. At present with their drachma and gallon measure and four obols they regulate the populace like a sick man, giving you, men of Athens, doles very similar to the diets of the physicians. For these diets neither put strength into the patient nor allow him to die, and these doles neither allow you to cry quits and engage in some different and better business, nor can they alone suffice.
54.1.1
It is just and right and important, men of Athens, that we too should exercise care, as you are accustomed, that our relations with the gods shall be piously maintained. Therefore our commission has been duly discharged for you, for we have sacrificed to Zeus the Saviour and to Athena and to Victory, and these sacrifices have been auspicious and salutary for you. We have also sacrificed to Persuasion and to the Mother of the Gods and to Apollo, and here also we had favorable omens. And the sacrifices made to the other gods portended for you security and stability and prosperity and safety. Do you, therefore, accept the blessings which the gods bestow.
55.1.1
There was, as it seems, a time in your history, men of Athens, when the democracy compelled any man whom it observed to be prudent and honest to perform public service and to hold office, not through lack of those who wished to do so—for, while deeming the city to be fortunate in all other respects, in this one particular I consider it has never been fortunate, that the supply of those who wish to reap a harvest from the public business never fails it—but the democracy used to make out of this a fine showing for itself, creditable and profitable to the State, men of Athens.
55.2.1
For on the one hand, these men, the kind who hold office year after year, when earnest and upright men from a different class were given them as yokemates, used to show themselves more circumspect; and on the other hand, the kind of men among you who are honest and upright in office, but not at all of the sort to push their way and appeal for support, were not shut out of the posts of trust. But now, men of Athens, you appoint your magistrates in exactly the same manner as you appoint your priests. Then you are amazed when this one is prosperous and that one, to your dismay, is year after year taking a rich spoil, while the rest of you go around envying these men their blessings!
55.3.1
For you are the worst people for taking away the offices that fall to your class, and for enacting laws about them if someone serves twice as commissioner of police or something of the sort, but you allow the same men to be generals all the time. There is perhaps some excuse for allowing those engaged in the active services to continue, but to allow the others, who, though doing nothing, have an endless tenure of office and are themselves endlessly benefited is folly. Instead, you ought to bring in some of your own number, and there are not a few of you. For if you set up a standard, as it were, anyone who is worth anything will thereafter come forward of his own accord.
56.1.1
It seems to me a fine and seemly thing, men of Athens, for a man who has convinced himself he has something profitable to say to take the floor, but I consider it altogether shameful to force people to listen against their will. And I think, if you will but take my advice today, you will be better able both to choose the best measures and to shorten the speeches of those who come to the platform.
56.2.1
What, then, do I advise? First of all, men of Athens, to require the man who comes forward to confine himself to the matters you are considering. For otherwise someone may embrace many other topics in his speech and say many witty things, especially those who are smart at it, as some of these are. Well, if you have come here to listen to fine phrases, the thing to do is to make them and listen to them, but if you have come to deliberate about a choice of measures, I urge you to judge the measures strictly by themselves, eliminating all passages of a nature to mislead.
56.3.1
This, then, is my first point. My second, which to some of you will perhaps be inconsistent with cutting the speeches shorter, is that you listen in silence. For on the question whether this or that is expedient and which choice the State might more rightly prefer, there are few arguments to be presented, unless by such persons as wish to prattle aimlessly, nor would anyone have occasion to state them a second time. As for the claim that it is only fair to listen to the heckling, and to give an answer and to make speech after speech, there is no one who could not do that. Thus by heckling you do not get rid of speeches; instead you are forced in addition to hear speeches that are totally irrelevant. Accordingly my judgement concerning the matter before you now begins.

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