Exordia

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 148 sections

1.1.1
If it had been proposed to discuss some new measure, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the regular speakers had declared their opinions, and if any of their views had pleased me, I should have held my peace; otherwise, I should then have attempted to say what I myself think. But since you are now considering matters on which these speakers have often spoken before, I feel that, even if the first to rise, I may reasonably appear to be speaking after them.
1.2.1
Now, if our interests were prospering, there would be no need to deliberate; but since, as you all observe, they are in straits, I shall try, on that assumption, to advise what I consider best. In the first place, you ought to recognize that none of the policies you pursued while engaged in the war are to be used henceforth, but quite their opposites. For if those policies have brought your fortunes low, it is very likely that their opposites will improve them.
1.3.1
Next, you must consider that it is not the speaker who places upon you little or no burden who is in the right, for you see that, as a consequence of such optimistic speeches, our present condition has reached the limit of wretchedness, but rather the speaker who, putting aside the thought of pleasing you, shall tell you what ought to be done and by what means we may cease bringing disgrace upon ourselves and incurring losses. For, to speak truthfully, if all that a man passes over in his speech through reluctance to pain you is going to be passed over also by the course of events, it is right to harangue you for your pleasure; but if the charm of words, when unbecoming the occasion, becomes a penalty in action, it is shameful to cheat yourselves, and to do only under the utmost necessity what you should have done voluntarily long before.
2.1.1
The same thoughts do not present themselves to me, men of Athens, when I hear you refer by name to our form of government and again when I see the manner in which some of you treat those who speak in its defence. As you all know, the name you give to our government is democracy, but I see that some of you listen with more pleasure to those who advocate the opposite to it.
2.2.1
I wonder just what their motive may be. Or do you imagine they are making these speeches gratis? Well, the masters of the oligarchies, whose cause these men are pleading, might quietly increase their fees. But honestly, have you assumed that their principles are better than the other kind? So oligarchy, presumably, looks better to you than democracy! Then do you think the men themselves are better? And yet who could reasonably be regarded by you as honest when he speaks in public against the interest of the established government? Therefore it remains to conclude that you are mistaken when you hold this opinion. Consequently, be on your guard against falling into this error, men of Athens, so that you shall not some day give those who are plotting against you an opening, and only then learn that you have made a mistake, when it will no longer be of the least advantage to you.
2.3.1
Now, the fact that everything is not going as we might wish, men of Athens, either at home or among our allies, is perhaps not astonishing; for in many things the whim of Fortune prevails and there are many plausible reasons why everything does not turn out according to plan, men being but men. Yet for the common people to have no portion at all and their opponents a superabundance is something to astound and alarm intelligent men, as I judge it, men of Athens. This, then, is the starting point of my entire speech.
3.1.1
I believe, men of Athens, that in preference to a large sum of money you would choose the plan that will pay you in the matters you are now considering. This being so, it is then your duty to show yourselves willing hearers of your prospective counsellors; for not only in the event of someone having come here with a useful idea thought out, would you, having listened, have the benefit of it, but I also assume it to be part of your good fortune that many timely suggestions would occur to some men on the spur of the moment, so that from the whole number the choice of the advantageous is made easier for you.
4.1.1
It is your duty, men of Athens, to listen to every proposal made, since it is your prerogative to adopt whichever of them you choose. For it often happens that the same person is wrong on one point and right on another; and so by shouting him down when displeased you may perhaps deprive yourselves of many useful ideas, whereas by attending with decorum and in silence, you will act on every sound proposal, and if you think someone is making a foolish suggestion, you will ignore it. As for me, I am not accustomed to make long speeches, and even if previously I had been in the habit, I should not have taken this occasion to do so; instead, I shall tell you as briefly as I can what I consider to be in your interests.
5.1.1
I observe, men of Athens, that there is no mistaking what kind of speeches you would like to hear and to what kind you are averse. Yet to say what one thinks will find favour I consider to be the badge of those who wish to work some deception, whereas to endure, when one is speaking for measures he is convinced are advantageous to the State, either your heckling or what else you choose to do, I judge to be the part of a loyal and honest citizen.
5.2.1
And I should like to have you bear patiently with the speeches of both sides to this end, if for no other, in order that, if someone shall be found to offer a proposal better than those upon which you are intent, you may avail yourselves of it, but, if he falls short and is unable to make his point, that he may seem to have suffered this repulse through his own fault and not because of your refusing to listen. Furthermore, your experience would not be so disagreeable if you should listen to some fool making a long speech as it would if you prevented a man from speaking who had something timely to propose.
5.3.1
In all matters, of course, the first step toward right judgement is never to imagine you understand before learning, especially knowing as you do that many men before now have often changed their minds. If, then, you on your part are now convinced of these truths, I think that I on my part shall seem justified in speaking briefly in opposition and be found to propose the plans that are best for you.
6.1.1
Although many speeches have been made, men of Athens, by all your counsellors, I do not see that you are now any nearer to discovering what ought to be done than before you came up to the Assembly. The cause of this, in my opinion, is the same as the cause of the wretched plight of our affairs in general, that the speakers do not offer advice about the business before you, but accuse and revile one another, accustoming you, in my judgement, to hearing, without process of law, all the mischief of which they are the cause, in order that if, after all, they do come to face the test some day, you, thinking you are hearing nothing new, but only the charges over which you have often been angry, may so become more merciful jurors and judges of their misdeeds.
6.2.1
Perhaps it would be foolish at the moment to inquire into the exact reason why they do this; but because it harms you, for this reason I censure them. For my own part, I will accuse no one today nor will I sponsor any charge that I shall not make good on the spot, nor, in general, will I do any of the things which these men do; but when I have stated as briefly as I can what I think best for your interests and most profitable for you who deliberate, I will step down.
7.1.1
Those who praise your forefathers, men of Athens, in my judgement choose a charming theme upon which to speak, and yet I do not think they do a favour to those whom they extol. For instance, when they undertake to tell of the deeds of those men, to which no speaker could do justice, while winning for themselves a reputation for ability to speak, they cause the valor of those men to seem to their hearers less than had been supposed. As for me, I consider the greatest commendation of those heroes to be the test of time, for although a long interval has gone by, no others have been able to exhibit greater deeds than those performed by them,
7.2.1
and I shall myself merely try to tell you after what manner I think you will be best able to make your preparations. For this is the situation; though we should all prove ourselves to be clever speakers, I know well that your interests would not be advanced in the slightest, but if just one speaker, no matter who, should come forward and be able to demonstrate convincingly what kind of preparation, and how great, and provided from what funds, would be to the State’s advantage, all our present apprehension is as good as dispelled. This I shall try to do, if, after all, I am able, having first told you briefly how my opinion stands with respect to our relations with the King.
8.1.1
Both parties seem to me to be in the wrong, men of Athens, both those who have supported the Arcadians and those who have supported the Spartans. For, just as if they had come here from one or the other of the two countries and were not of your own citizen body, to which both embassies are appealing, they are denouncing and abusing one another. This, however, was a concern of the visiting envoys, while to discuss the questions in the common interest and to consider your own interest without self-seeking is the duty of those who see fit to offer advice here in Athens.
8.2.1
Yet as things now are, if one could cancel the fact of their being known and their using the Attic speech, many people, I believe, would think the one group Arcadians and the other Spartans!
8.2.2
I know myself how difficult it is to propose the best procedure, for when you have been deceived and some of you want this and others that, if someone undertakes to suggest a compromise and then you do not wait to learn the facts, he will please neither party and will be put in the wrong with both sides.
8.3.2
Nevertheless, I shall choose to be thought to talk nonsense, if that, after all, is to be my fate, rather than to abandon you to certain people to be deceived in violation of what I consider best for you. And so, with your permission, I shall go into other details later, and proceed to explain what I think is best, starting from the premises upon which both sides agree.
9.1.1
I have taken the floor, men of Athens, because I do not hold the same views as some of those who have spoken. Still I shall not allege that these men out of villainy have expressed sentiments opposed to your best interests, but I say that many, while neglecting to judge events critically, make a practice of considering the words they will use, and if they chance to find an ample supply of these, of haranguing the people without more ado. In this they are wrong nor do they reflect in their own minds that, since it is the experience of all that over a long period many plans have worked out happily and some of them, because of the times, quite contrary to their promise, if some speaker cites the one kind and passes over the other, he will unconsciously be doing the easiest thing in the world, deceiving himself.
9.2.1
Now those who thus use the privilege of advising you seem to me to look upon the reputation for eloquence accruing to them from their speeches as an adequate ambition, but it is my opinion that the man who proposes to advise the State on matters of policy should rather consider how the measures adopted shall prove of benefit, and not how his remarks of the moment may find favour. For those who win esteem by their words ought to add to it the accomplishment of some useful work in order that not only now, but for all time, their utterances may have merit.
10.1.1
If you have decided, men of Athens, what it is best to do in the circumstances, it is a mistake to propose debate; for why should you be needlessly bored by listening to what you have yourselves judged to be expedient before hearing it discussed? But if, assuming that you must reach a judgement on the basis of what shall be said, you are exploring and deliberating, it is wrong to stop those who wish to speak, since by so doing you are deprived entirely of whatever practical proposal some speakers have thought up, and you cause other speakers to abandon their own conclusions in favour of what they think you desire to hear.
10.2.1
While to unite in forcing the speaker to express your wishes shows an intention to do wrong, the willingness to deliberate is proved when you listen to his views, scan them and, if any Is good, adopt it. I say this, not as one about to recommend measures opposed to those you are favouring, but as one who knows that, if you refuse to hear the opposition, they will say you have been deceived, while, if you do listen and are not persuaded, they will have been proved on the spot to be offering the worse proposals.
11.1.1
I think you all know, men of Athens, that you have not come here today to put any of the wrongdoers on trial but to deliberate about the present state of affairs. So it is our duty to defer all accusations and only when we put someone on trial should this or that man speak before you against another who, he has convinced himself, is an offender. But if anyone has something practical or profitable to say, now is the time to declare it. For accusation is for those who have fault to find with past actions, but in deliberative session the discussion is solely about present and future actions. Therefore the present is no occasion for abuse or blame but for taking counsel together, it seems to me. For this reason I shall try to guard against falling myself into the error which I condemn in these men and to offer the advice that I think best in the present state of affairs.
12.1.1
I think that no man will deny, men of Athens, that it is the mark of a disloyal citizen and a low-minded man so to hate or favour anyone who enters into public life that he takes no thought for the State’s best interests, but shapes his public utterances sometimes to vent his malice and sometimes to prove his friendship, as a number of those are doing who come forward here to speak. To these I would say no more than this: that in my opinion, if they have done something of the kind, their greatest offence is not this, but rather that they show themselves unprepared ever to stop doing it!
12.2.1
As for yourselves, I give you this advice: do not be guilty of self-ruin and think it enough if you punish these men when you see fit; but, while holding them in check so far as lies in your power, you must yourselves, as becomes men deliberating on behalf of the State, put aside your own private feuds and aim at what is most to the common good, reflecting that the punishment of no individual, nor even of all the politicians in a body, can square the account if once the laws should be destroyed on which your very life depends.
13.1.1
Perhaps it might seem offensive to certain persons, men of Athens, if someone, an ordinary citizen and one of the common people like yourselves, should come forward after others who are eminent for both long political experience and reputation among you have already stated their opinions, and say that he thinks the others are not only wrong but not even near to discerning what ought to be done. Nevertheless, I feel so confident that I am going to give more profitable counsel than theirs that I shall not hesitate to declare all they have said to be worthless. I think that you too would be doing well if you kept in view, not the speaker, but the advice being offered. For the right thing, men of Athens, is to extend your goodwill, not to certain persons as though by hereditary privilege, but to those who from time to time offer the best counsel.
14.1.1
I should like you to listen attentively to what I am going to say, men of Athens; it is not unimportant. I wonder just why it is that, before we come up to the Assembly, any one of you whom a person may chance to meet is prepared to say readily by what means the present state of affairs may be improved; and then again, the minute you leave the Assembly, each man will be just as ready to say what we ought to do. But when we are met together and dealing with these problems, you hear anything rather than this from certain speakers.
14.2.1
Then has each one of you, men of Athens, the gift of deciding what ought to be done, and does each know how to state the duties of the rest, while he is reluctant himself to do his own, and then again, does each man as an individual, as if to give the impression of being one who would of course promptly do what is best, find fault with everyone else, but as a body are you committed to fighting shy of voting such measures as will ensure that you will one and all become engaged in performing some duty to the State?
14.3.1
Well then, if you really think that no crisis will arrive to make a breach in this fence of evasiveness, it would be grand to carry on after this fashion. But if you see your troubles drawing nearer, you must plan that you shall not have to grapple with them at close range when it is possible to forestall them from a distance, and that you shall not have those whom you now disregard exulting later on at your discomfiture
15.1.1
As for the problems now confronting the State, men of Athens, even though things are not as they should be, I do not consider it altogether difficult to discover by what action one may effect an improvement. I judge, on the other hand, that the manner in which I must speak to you about them means very grave irritation; not because you will fail to understand what a person will say but because you seem to me to have become so accustomed to hearing many untruths and anything rather than what best meets your needs, that I fear it may be the lot of the man who now makes the best proposal to earn for his reward at your hands the hostility which would properly have been the due of those who have deceived you.
15.2.1
For I observe that often you hate, not those who are to blame for your troubles, but those who have most recently made mention of them to you. Nevertheless, although I am so precisely measuring this hazard, I still think that I must put all other subjects aside and confine myself to saying what I think is the best advice about the present situation.
16.1.1
I should have wished, men of Athens, that you treat yourselves with that benevolence which you are accustomed to practise toward all other peoples. As it now is, you are better at rectifying the woes of others than you are at taking to heart the troubles which befall yourselves. Someone may perhaps say, of course, that this is exactly what brings the greatest glory to the State—to have deliberately chosen to assume many risks for the sake of sheer justice with no thought of selfish advantage. Now, while I for one believe this reputation which prevails concerning the State to be true and desire it to be, yet I assume it also to be an obligation of prudent men to exercise as much foresight in their domestic affairs as in those of strangers, so that you may show yourselves to be not only men of goodwill but sensible also.
17.1.1
Perhaps it really is the duty, men of Athens, of one who wishes to recommend some measure to you to attempt to speak in such a way that you will find it possible to hear him to the end; but otherwise his duty is to leave aside all other themes and discuss only those matters you are considering, and these as briefly as possible. For I do not think it due to any lack of speeches that now once more you observe all your affairs to be in a muddle, but the reason is that some are orating and playing politics for their own gain, and others, who have so far not given evidence of this offence, are more concerned to be thought good speakers than that some concrete good may be effected by what they say. As for me, that I may not unwittingly do the opposite of what I myself say is right, and say more about other matters than about those of which I have risen to speak, I shall disregard all other topics and endeavor to tell you forthwith what I recommend.
18.1.1
I think that you would rightly pay attention, men of Athens, if any man should promise to demonstrate that in the matters you are considering justice and expediency coincide. Now I believe that I shall do this without difficulty if you on your part will comply with a very slight request of mine. Let none of you, according as one or another has an opinion about the present situation, be positive that he is right in all his conclusions; but, if it turns out that something be said against these, let him consider it, listening to all the points patiently, and then, if some suggestion seems to have been rightly made, adopt it. For the measure that succeeds will belong no less to you who adopted it than to him who proposed it to you. Surely the first step toward sound deliberation is not to have reached a decision before you have heard the discussions upon which you should base your decision. For the occasion and the method of ratifying your resolutions and of deciding in the first instance what seems expedient are not the same.
19.1.1
I have come forward, men of Athens, to consult with you whether I should speak or not, and I shall explain to you for what reason I am at a loss how to decide this by myself. It is obligatory, in my opinion, that one who seeks to gratify neither himself nor certain people, but wishes to say on your behalf what he is convinced is most expedient, should both support good measures proposed by either side, and, conversely, oppose all unfair proposals which either side thinks fit to urge. Accordingly, if you should submit to hear both these lines of argument briefly, you would deliberate much better on the remaining questions; but, if you should desert me before learning my views, it would be my lot to be put in the wrong with both sides without being guilty of injustice to either. Now, I do not deserve to be in this plight. Therefore, if you bid me, I am prepared to speak; otherwise it is well for me to keep silence.
20.1.1
I consider it both just and profitable, men of Athens, for you to lay aside charges and accusations when we are to deliberate, and for each one to say what he thinks is best concerning the matters before you. For while we all understand that through the fault of certain men our affairs are in a bad way, it is the task of your counsellor to suggest by what means they may be improved.
20.2.1
Moreover, I for my part regard as stern accusers of the wrongdoers, not those who scrutinize their past actions on such occasions as this, when they will pay no penalty, but those who prove able to offer such advice as may effect some amelioration of our present situation; for with the help of these men it would also be possible at your leisure to bring those guilty men to justice.
20.3.1
Accordingly, I consider all other topics to be out of place but shall attempt to tell you what I think would be expedient in the matters you are now considering, making this request only: if after all I do make mention of any of those things done in the past, do not think that I am speaking by way of accusation, but in order that, having shown you wherein you then erred, I may now avert your suffering the same misfortune again.
21.1.1
If all along, men of Athens, we had been as peaceful as at this moment, playing into the hands of no politician, I believe that the events which now have happened would never have taken place and that in many other respects we should be in better shape. But of late, because of the high-handedness of some men, it is impossible either to come forward or speak, or in general to get in a word.
21.2.1
The consequences of this are numerous and perhaps not to our liking. Accordingly, if what you wish is to be all the time getting this kind of news, to be considering what you ought to do, and to be in such a plight as at present, you will vote the same measures as for years past—to launch triremes, to embark, to pay a special war-tax and all that sort of thing, forthwith. Then in three or five days, if rumors of hostile movements cease and our enemies become inactive, you will once more assume that there is no longer need to act. This is just what happened when we heard that Philip was in the Hellespont and again when the pirate triremes put in at Marathon.
21.3.2
For just as a man would properly employ a force in arms, men of Athens, you are accustomed to handle your deliberations, with dispatch. What you ought to do, however, is to deliberate at leisure but put your decisions into effect with speed, and to make up your minds to this, that unless you shall provide an adequate food-supply and place some general of good sense in charge of the war, and be willing to abide by the decisions so taken, you will have to your credit just a lot of decrees, and while you will have squandered all that you have spent, your interests will be not a whit advanced and in angry mood you will put on trial whomever it pleases you. For my part, I wish you to be seen repelling your enemies before sitting in judgement on your fellow-citizens; for it is a crime for us to make war upon one another rather than upon them.
21.4.2
In order, therefore, that I may not censure only— the easiest of all things shall explain how I think you may accomplish this, requesting you not to make an uproar or get the idea that I am merely procrastinating and interposing delay. For it is not those who say At once and Today who speak most to the point, for we could not prevent by the present reinforcement what has already happened; but it will be the man who shows what armament, once furnished, will be able to hold out until we either get the upper hand of our enemies or by accepting terms bring the war to an end. For in this way we should no longer suffer aggression in time to come.
22.1.1
I believe that all of you, men of Athens, would agree that our city, when deliberating about any of her domestic affairs, should have as much concern for advantage as for justice, but when the question has to do with our allies or the general interests of Greece, as in the present instance, she ought to be mindful of nothing so scrupulously as of justice. Because in the former matters, expediency suffices, but in such as the latter, honor as well ought to play a part.
22.2.1
For, of the actions themselves they become arbiters to whom the decisions belong; of the opinion formed of them, however, no man is so powerful as to be the arbiter; but whatever opinion shall attach to the actions, such is that which the multitude spreads abroad concerning the actors. Therefore you must look to it diligently that your actions shall be manifestly just.
22.3.1
By rights, of course, all men should feel toward those who are wronged as each would think fit to demand of all others to feel toward himself if something should go amiss, which I pray may not happen. Since, however, certain persons, contrary to their own judgement, take the opposite stand, I shall first address a few words to them and thereupon offer what I assume to be the best advice for you.
23.1.1
No small detriment you would esteem it, as I believe, men of Athens, if some offensive opinion and discreditable to the city should come to prevail abroad. Now then, right as you are in this judgement, your actions in general are not consistent with it; but time and again you are misled into doing things that not even you yourselves would say are honorable. And while I am aware that all men receive with more pleasure those who praise than those who rebuke, yet I do not think it right in quest of this goodwill to say anything but what I judge to be in your interests.
23.2.2
If, then, at the outset your judgement had been sound, there would have been no need to assume that as a body you must do what as individuals you condemn, so that this very thing should not be happening which is now going on. While every man goes about saying How disgraceful, how shocking! and How long will this business go on?, every man sitting here with you is himself one of those who do such things. As for me, I should certainly have wished that, just as I know it pays you to listen to the speaker who makes the best proposals, so I might be sure it would also pay the one who made them; for so I should be much happier. As it now is, I have fears; nevertheless, I shall not be deterred from saying what I am confident will prove to be best, even if you shall not be convinced.
24.1.1
Even if the speaker were one who had never spoken on another subject before you, men of Athens, surely now, discussing the groundless charges which the ambassadors bring against the State, he might well, I think, meet with indulgence from all.
24.1.2
For in certain other contests to be worsted by one’s adversaries may seem to be not so much a reproach as a misfortune, because luck and the officials in charge and many other factors play a part in the winning or the losing of a contest; but in the event of men having no self-justification to offer worthy of the merits of their case we shall find the reproach of those found in this plight to attach to nothing but their intelligence.
24.2.1
Surely if it had been some other people before whom these speeches about you were being made, I do not think these men would be finding it so easy to lie nor would the hearers have tolerated many of their assertions. But as things now are, I think that in general all and every take advantage of your simplicity and in particular these men have done so on the present occasion; for they have found in you such an audience for charges against yourselves as they would have found in no other people, as I know for a certainty.
24.3.2
And well may you, in my view, men of Athens, for this turn of events be grateful to the gods and detest these men. For the fact that they see the democracy of Rhodes, which used to address you much more presumptuously than these, now become your suppliant, I consider a piece of good fortune for the State; but that these stupid men should neither consider this, though it is so plain to see, nor that you have often gone to the rescue of them one after another, and that you have been put to more trouble rectifying the errors of their rashness and infatuation, whenever they have chosen to make war on their own account, than in managing your own affairs, might well have aroused in you the profoundest wrath, it seems to me.
24.4.1
Perhaps, however, it is the destiny of these people never to be wise when prosperous. Still it is the fitting thing for you, because you are who you are and because of the past performance of the State, to make a point of demonstrating to all men that, as in former times, so now and always we prefer to practise justice, though certain others, wishing to enslave their own fellow-citizens, accuse them falsely before us.
25.1.1
If you were of the same mind, men of Athens, when listening to the speeches of those who counsel you and when judging the outcome of measures taken, offering advice would be the safest thing in the world. For if you met with good luck and success—because one must always use words of good omen—the credit for these would be common to yourselves and the sponsor. But, as things are, you most enjoy listening to those who say what you wish to hear, yet often you charge them with deceiving you if everything does not turn out the way you would like,
25.2.1
not taking this into account, that of the task of studying and calculating the best measures, within human limitations, and of explaining them to you, each man is himself the arbiter, but of their execution and profitableness the control, for the most part, lies in the power of Fortune. As a human being it is enough for a man to stand accountable for his own thinking; but to stand accountable also for the play of Fortune is quite impossible.
25.3.1
Certainly, if a way had been discovered whereby a man might address the people with safety to the State and without hazard to himself, it would be madness to ignore it; but since it is a certainty that one who declares an opinion on actions about to be taken will share in the benefits therefrom accruing and participate in the credit for these benefits, I consider it shameful to speak as a loyal citizen, yet not face the test if some danger shall arise therefrom.
25.3.2
So I pray the gods that such measures as are destined to profit both the State and myself may occur to my mind to suggest and to you to adopt. For to seek by any and every means to be on the winning side is either one of two things, I should say, a sign of mental derangement or of one who is bent on selfish gain.
26.1.1
If only it might be, men of Athens, that, when assembling to discuss the present questions or any others, the seemingly best for you and the really best might be one and the same! It is your duty, however, when deliberating on matters of supreme importance and of general concern, to be willing to listen to all your counsellors, as it seems to me, thinking it shameful, men of Athens, to create an uproar now when a number of speakers wish to propose some measure, but later to enjoy hearing these same men denouncing what has been done.
26.2.1
I myself know, and I think you do too, that just now those please you most who express the same views that you yourselves wish to hear; but if something turns out contrary to what you now expect—and may this not be the case —that you will believe that these men have deceived you, while those whom you cannot now endure you will then think to be right. In reality, it is those who have done most to persuade you of the wisdom of the proposals which you are now considering who have most to gain by the opposition securing an opportunity to speak.
26.3.1
For if it shall be able to show that the proposals which seem best to these men are not the best, when as yet no mistake has been made, it will by so doing nullify their risks for them; yet if it fails to persuade, they will later, at any rate, have no occasion to find fault, but, having obtained all that it was the duty of men to give, a hearing, they will rightly be content if defeated, and along with all the rest share in the outcome, whatever that maybe.
27.1.1
I think it your duty, men of Athens, when deliberating about such important matters to allow freedom of speech to every one of your counsellors. For my own part, I have never at any time considered it difficult to make you understand what proposals are best—for, to put it simply, I think you all have decided that,—but only difficult to persuade you to act on these proposals. For when a measure has been approved and confirmed by a vote, it is then as far from being put into effect as before it was approved.
27.2.1
It certainly is something for which I think you owe gratitude to the gods that those who, through their own arrogance, not long ago made war upon you now repose the hopes of their own deliverance in you alone, and you have good reason to be delighted at the present opportunity. For the effect will be, if you decide about it as you ought, to rid ourselves, by the language of deeds, of the slanders circulated by the traducers of our city, and also to maintain our good repute.
28.1.1
The hopes aroused by what has been previously said, men of Athens, are great and glorious; I fancy that most of you have been somewhat swayed by them without really thinking. As for myself, I have never been minded to tell you for the sake of your momentary gratification anything that I did not think would also subsequently prove to be of advantage. Naturally it is a trait common to most men to like those who join in applauding them, whatever they do, but to dislike those who find fault with them. Nevertheless, the sensible man should always strive to make reason the master of his feelings.
28.2.1
I should have been glad, myself, to see you happy at putting into effect the measures going to profit you, that I might have been found both meeting your wishes and giving good advice. But since I see you about to try the opposite measures, I think I ought to speak against them, even if I shall be hated for it by certain persons. So, if you will not endure to hear even one word from me, you will be thought to be preferring such a course of action, not through an error of judgement, but through your natural propensity to do wrong. However, if you do listen, you may perhaps be won over to the other view, which I think would be most to your advantage. But if you refuse to listen, some will plead ignorance of what was advantageous, while others—well, what a man likes to say he will say.
29.1.1
In the first place, it is nothing strange, men of Athens, that among you are found some who, when action has to be taken, will speak against measures already voted. Now, if they were doing this after you had given them the floor while still deliberating, it would be the right thing to denounce them for insisting upon speaking a second time to questions on which they had been defeated; as it is, there is nothing unreasonable in their desiring to express views which then you did not submit to hear,
29.2.1
and it is you who may well be criticized, men of Athens, because, when you deliberate about something, you do not allow each to say what he thinks, but, if the one side captures you first by their plea, you would hear no one from the other side. From this arises a situation embarrassing for you, because the men whose advice, before going wrong, you might have followed, you applaud later for denouncing your mistakes.
29.3.1
This very thing is about to happen to you again, it seems to me, unless on the present occasion, giving impartial audience to all, and submitting to this tedious duty, you shall choose the best proposals and judge those who find any fault with them to be no loyal citizens.
29.3.2
Now I have thought it fair to tell you first of all my views about the questions you are considering, in order that, if these meet with your favour, I may also explain the rest of my ideas, but, if you disapprove, that I may neither bore you nor tire myself out.
30.1.1
It was your duty, men of Athens, before going to war to have considered what armament would be available for the coming campaign, but if, as a matter of fact, war was not foreseen, it was your duty to have considered also the question of armament on that occasion when you were deliberating for the first time about war after it had become certain. If you shall say that you have commissioned many armies which your commanders have ruined, no one will accept this excuse of you. For the same people cannot both absolve those in charge of their operations and claim that through fault of these men these operations are not succeeding.
30.2.1
Since, however, past events cannot be altered and it is necessary to safeguard our interests as present facilities permit, I see no fitting occasion for laying charges but shall try to offer what I think is the best counsel.
30.2.2
Now, first of all, you must admit this principle, that it is the duty of every man to apply to the task the same superabundance of eagerness and emulation that he displayed of indifference in times past; because thus there is a bare hope that we may be able, though far behind in the pursuit, to overtake what we have let slip.
30.3.1
In the next place, there must be no discouragement over what has happened, because what is worst in the past is the best hope for the future. What, then, do I mean by this, men of Athens? That it is because you do nothing that you ought to do that your affairs are in a bad way; since if you were doing everything you should and your affairs were in this state, there would be not even a hope of improvement.
31.1.1
Nothing is more mischievous, men of Athens, than that those who address your Assembly should both censure and employ the same practices. For there is no man so unintelligent as to deny that to behave factiously among themselves and to accuse one another when no one is on trial means damage to your interests. I think myself that these men would be better citizens if, when addressing the Assembly, they should turn the contentiousness they feel toward one another against the enemies of the State; and to you I recommend not to take sides with either of these factions or to consider how either one is to gain the mastery, but how you as a body are to prevail over your enemies.
31.2.1
And I pray to the gods that those who out of contentiousness or spite or any other motive express any other sentiments than those they believe to be advantageous may cease to do so; for to invoke a curse when speaking in council is perhaps unseemly. Therefore, while I should myself lay the blame for this bad state of affairs, men of Athens, upon no one except these men as a class, and although I think you ought to exact an accounting of them when you have the leisure, yet for the present I think you should consider only how the existing situation may be bettered.
32.1.1
I should have wished, men of Athens, that some of the speakers had displayed as much eagerness to present the best proposals as they did to be thought good speakers, in order that these men might have been regarded as honest instead of clever at speaking and that your interests, just as is proper, might have been in better shape. As it now is, however, some seem to me to be entirely content with the reputation for speaking, but to be taking no thought for what will subsequently befall you.
32.2.1
And certainly I wonder whether speeches of this sort are capable of deceiving the speaker as much as those to whom they are addressed, or whether these men knowingly express before the Assembly opinions directly opposed to what they themselves think best. For if they are unaware that he who is going to do what requires to be done must not have audacity based upon words but power based upon armament, nor yet self-confidence based upon the assumption that our enemies will be weak, but confidence that we shall overmaster them even if they shall be strong, the elegance of their speeches has prevented them, as it seems, from apprehending the most vital facts. Yet if they should not even deny awareness of these facts, and some ulterior motive underlies their predilection for this conduct, how can one help assuming that this motive, whatever it may be, is base?
32.3.2
As for me, I shall not be deterred from saying what I think, although I see that you have been bewitched; for it would be foolish, because you have wrongly yielded to the spell of oratory, for the man who in his turn is going to offer better proposals and much more to your advantage, to give in to fear. And I ask of you to listen patiently, bearing in mind that you would not have formed your present opinions either unless you had listened to the speeches by which you have been persuaded.
32.4.1
Accordingly, just as you would have thought it necessary to test a coin if you were judging what its worth might be, so I ask of you to scrutinize in the light of what we have to say against it the speech that has been made, and if you find it to your advantage, agree with the speaker, and may good fortune attend you; but if, after all, as you examine each detail, it shall seem alien to your interests, to change your plans before falling into error and to adopt the counsels that are right.
33.1.1
Most of all I should desire, men of Athens, that you be convinced by the words I am about to utter, but if after all it should turn out otherwise, I should prefer above all else that by me, at least, they had been spoken.
33.1.2
It is a difficult thing, as it seems, not only to explain to you what ought to be done, but even to discover it by solitary reflection. Anyone would observe this if he believed you would consider, not his speech, but the business upon which you are engaged, and set more value upon being thought an honest man than upon showing himself to be a clever speaker.
33.2.1
I, at any rate,—so help me Heaven—after it occurred to me to reflect upon our present problems, began to hit upon themes, and no end of them, to which you would have listened not without pleasure. For instance, on the theme You are the most just of the Greeks, I observed and now observe many changes to ring, and again, You are born of the noblest ancestors, and many such topics. Yet these themes, though affording pleasure so long as they are being aired, after that vanish away;
33.3.1
and it is the duty of the speaker to show himself the adviser of some course of action through which the gain of some real benefit shall also afterwards accrue to you. Such a policy as this I know by now from experience to be rare and hard to discover. Neither is it enough merely to get a vision of such policies unless a man shall also be able to convince you, who jointly are to assume the responsibility. On the contrary, there is an obligation resting upon both alike, upon me to tell you what I have convinced myself is advantageous, upon you to listen, to judge and, if it is your pleasure, to adopt.
34.1.1
It was not hard to see, men of Athens, the other day when you thought there was no need to hear those who desired to speak in opposition to the views of a certain speaker, that what is now coming to pass would occur—that those who were then prevented from speaking would do so before a subsequent meeting of the Assembly. If, therefore, you shall do the same as before, and refuse to listen to those who wish to support the decisions then approved, these men in turn will take the matter to the next meeting and denounce these decisions.
34.2.1
In no way, men of Athens, could your situation be made worse nor could you show yourselves more absurd than if none of your decisions should seem to be finally settled and, disregarding the policies that pay, you should achieve no forward step, but, like the crowds at shows, side with those who captivate you first. Do not let this happen, men of Athens, but performing this tedious duty and giving impartial audience to both sides, first choose a policy you will also carry out and then assume that whoever opposes measures thus once sanctioned is unprincipled and disloyal to you.
34.3.1
For while it is pardonable that a man who has not obtained a hearing should feel convinced that he has himself better plans thought out than those approved by you, yet to go on acting shamelessly after you have given a hearing and decided between alternatives, instead of giving in to the judgement of the majority and retiring, would plainly justify suspicion of some other motive by no means honorable. As for me, although I should have thought it proper to remain silent on this occasion had I observed you abiding by your previous decisions—for I am one of those who are convinced that these are to your advantage—yet, now that certain members seem to have changed their minds because of the speeches made by these men, even though you perhaps know that what they say is neither true nor for your good, I will nevertheless make this clear in case you are unaware of it.
35.1.1
It would have been just and proper, men of Athens, for each member then to try to convince you of what he believed to be best when you were considering these matters for the first time, in order that two evils might not be resulting which are above all others damaging to the city—that no decision of yours should be proving final and that you should be convicting yourselves of madness by changing your minds. Since, however, certain men who then kept silence are now finding fault, I wish to address a few words to them.
35.2.2
For I am amazed at the political procedure of these men, or rather I consider it vile. For if, though free to recommend measures when you are considering questions, they choose instead to denounce decisions once made, they play the part of doubledealers, not as they claim, of men of goodwill. I should like to ask them—and what I am about to say is not to become the signal for any tirade—just why, since they praise the Spartans in all other respects, they do not imitate the most admirable of all their practices, but rather do the very opposite.
35.3.1
For they say, men of Athens, that among them each man airs any opinion he may have until the question is put, but when the decision has been ratified, they all approve it and work together, even those who opposed it. Therefore, though few, they prevail over many and by actions well timed they get what they cannot get by war; nor does any occasion or means of effecting what is to their own advantage escape them; not, by Zeus, as we do who, thanks to these men and their like, in trying to get the better of one another instead of the enemy, have wasted all our time,
35.4.1
and if anyone is for making peace in time of war, we hate him, and if anyone talks war in time of peace, we fight him, and if anyone advocates keeping quiet and minding our own business, we claim that he is wrong too, and in general we are overfull of recriminations and empty hopes.
35.4.2
What then, Sir, someone may say, what do you recommend, since you find fault with this conduct? By Zeus, I will tell you.
36.1.1
In the first place, men of Athens, I am not altogether sure that a man would reasonably fear on your account lest your deliberations would be the worse for your refusing to listen to your counsellors. For, to begin with, Fortune—to whom be thanks—arranges much of your business to take care of itself, so well that you would pray for nothing better, because little of it would be in good shape through such foresight as is exercised by those in authority. Next, you know in advance, not only what speeches each man will make, but also with what motives each one harangues you, and if it were not spiteful, I should also have said, for what price.
36.2.1
I think you are prudent in reducing to a minimum the time for being cheated. If I were intending to speak in the same vein as the rest, I should not have thought it necessary to bore you by speaking. As it is, I think I have something to say that will be worth your while to hear, and utterly different from what is expected by the majority. It will be short. Listen and examine it, and, if it pleases you, adopt it.
37.1.1
I shall make the beginning of my speech both short and reasonable, men of Athens, nor shall I deliver the whole of it. For I believe that, while it is the way of a man who intends deception to cast about for a plan whereby he may conceal from you, his hearers, by means of his words the disagreeable aspects of the situation, on the other hand, the first duty of a man who has resolved to deal candidly with you is to declare which side he has come forward to endorse, in order that,
37.2.1
if after hearing this statement you are willing to hear the sequel, he may enlighten you and explain what measures seem best to himself, but if you shall reject his views, that he may have done with the matter and neither annoy you nor tire himself out.
37.2.2
This, then, will be my first statement: It is my opinion that the democratic party in Mytilene has been wronged and that it is your duty to obtain justice for them. For obtaining this justice I have a plan to propose when once I have demonstrated that they have been wronged and that it is your duty to go to their aid.
38.1.1
First of all, men of Athens, it is not altogether surprising that those who wish to tender you advice do not readily find the words, because, when the conditions that require consideration are bad, it is inevitable that the recommendations made concerning them should also be disagreeable. Of course, if by your refusing to listen there is hope of this situation becoming better, that is the thing to do, but if everything is going to get worse and nothing better by so doing, why should you, having allowed things to come to the worst, after a longer interval than has now elapsed, and with greater difficulty, try to save the situation, though, starting from present conditions, it is still possible even now to set things to rights and effect a change for the better?
38.2.2
Certainly it is reasonable for you to feel angry after these unhappy experiences; but to vent your anger, not upon the parties responsible, but upon everybody in turn, ceases to be either reasonable or right: because those who are in no way responsible for past events but can tell you how an improvement may be effected for the future would rightly meet with gratitude, not hostility, from you. If you treat these men with untimely irritation, you will make them hesitate to rise and speak.
38.3.1
And yet I am myself not unaware that often it is the lot, not of those who are guilty, but of persons who get in the way of those who are angry, to suffer unpleasant consequences. In spite of this I have risen to advise you, for I have confidence myself that I shall not be found to be advocating any inferior measure, men of Athens, but have really better proposals to offer you than other speakers.
39.1.1
The events that have occurred, men of Athens, are such as you have all heard, but you must not allow yourselves to be at all dismayed, reflecting that to be discouraged in the face of the present troubles is neither improving the situation nor worthy of yourselves. On the contrary, to consider it incumbent on yourselves to set these things to rights would manifestly be in keeping also with your reputation. Men such as you would profess to be should prove themselves superior to other breeds in times of stress.
39.2.1
As for me, I should by no means have wished these calamities to come upon the city nor yet for you to suffer misfortune, but if, after all, this had to happen and was in store as something predestined, I consider it to your profit that these events have occurred just as they have. For the dispensations of Fortune exhibit sharp reversals and impartial visitations to both sides, whereas the events that follow upon the villainy of men make for sure defeat.

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