History of the Peloponnesian War

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1.128.1.1
The Athenians also, in return, commanded the Lacedaemonians to drive out the pollution of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians having formerly raised up some suppliants of the Helots from the temple of Neptune at Taenarus, led them away and slew them: and for this they think they were themselves also visited with the great earthquake at Sparta.
1.128.2.1
They likewise ordered them to drive out the curse of Minerva of the Brazen-House; which was of the following kind.
1.128.3.1
When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, after being sent for by the Spartans for the first time from his command in the Hellespont, and brought to trial, was acquitted by them as not guilty, he was not sent out again in a public capacity; but in a private capacity, of his own accord, he took a trireme of Hermione, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and came to the Hellespont; nominally, to join in the war of the Greeks; but really, to carry out his measures with the king; which he had undertaken, in the first instance, from a desire of sovereignty over Greece.
1.128.4.1
Now it was from the following fact that he first established a claim for service with the king, and made a commencement of the whole business.
1.128.5.1
Having taken Byzantium when he was there before, after the return from Cyprus, (the Medes were in possession of it, and some connexions and relations of the king were taken in it,) on that occasion he sent back to the king those whom he had taken, not letting the other allies know, but giving out that they had escaped from him.
1.128.6.1
This he managed in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, to whom he had committed Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent Gongylus with a letter to him; in which, as was afterwards discovered, the following was written:
1.128.7.1
Pausanias, the general of Sparta, wishing to oblige thee, sends these men back to thee, after taking them in war. And I make a proposal, if thou also art pleased with it, that I should marry thy daughter, and make Sparta and the rest of Greece subject to thee. And I think that I am able to do this in concert with thee. If then any of these proposals please thee, send a trustworthy man to the sea, through whom in future we will confer.
1.129.1.1
Such was the purport of the writing; and Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, to the sea, and ordered him to succeed to the satrapy of Dascylium, superseding Megabates, who was governor be fore; and gave him a letter in answer, to send over as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium, and to show him the seal; and whatever message Pausanias should send him on his own affairs, to execute it in the best and most faithful manner possible.
1.129.2.1
On his arrival he did every thing as had been told him, and also sent over the letter; the following being written in reply to him:
1.129.3.1
Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom thou hast saved from Byzantium, and sent over the sea to me, there is laid up for thee in our house [the record of] a benefit registered for ever; and I am also pleased with thy proposals. And let neither night nor day stop thee, that thou shouldst be remiss in doing any of the things which thou hast promised me: neither let them be impeded by outlay of gold or silver, nor by number of troops, whithersoever there is need of their coming; but in conjunction with Artabazus, an honourable man, whom I have sent to thee, fear not to promote both my interest and thine own, as shall be most creditable and advantageous for both.
1.130.1.1
On the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, though he was even before held in high repute by the Greeks for his generalship at Plataea, was then much more exalted; and could no longer live in the ordinary style, but went out of Byzantium clothed in a Median dress; and when he went through Thrace, Medes and Egyptians formed his body-guard; and he had a Persian table laid for him, and could not conceal his purpose, but betrayed beforehand by trifling actions what he intended to practise in future on a larger scale.
1.130.2.1
He also made himself difficult of access, and indulged such a violent temper towards all, that no one dared to approach him; and this was none of the least reasons why the confederates went over from him to the Athenians.
1.131.1.1
The Lacedaemonians, on becoming acquainted with it, recalled him the first time on this very account; and when he went out the second time in the vessel of Hermione, without their orders, and appeared to be acting in this way, and did not return to Sparta when forcibly driven out from Byzantium by the Athenians after a siege, but news came of his being settled at Colonae in the Troad, and intriguing with the barbarians, and making his stay there for no good; under these circumstances they waited no longer, but the ephors sent a herald and a scytale, and told him not to leave the herald, else that they declared war against him.
1.131.2.1
Wishing to be as little suspected as possible, and trusting to quash the charge by means of money, he proceeded to return the second time to Sparta. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors, (for the ephors have power to do this to the king,) but afterwards, having settled the business, he subsequently came out, and offered himself for trial to those who wished to examine into his case.
1.132.1.1
Now the Spartans had no clear proof, neither his enemies nor the state at large, on which they could safely rely in punishing a man who was of the royal family and at present holding an honourable office; (for as his cousin and guardian, he was regent for Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was king and at present a minor;) but by his contempt of the laws, and imitation of the barbarians, he gave room for many suspicions of his not wishing to be content with things as they were.
1.132.2.1
And they reviewed his other acts, in whatever on any occasion he had lived beyond the established usages; and especially, that on the tripod at Delphi, which the Greeks dedicated as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, he had formerly on his own individual responsibility presumed to have the following distich inscribed:— The Greek Pausanias, victor o'er the Mede,To Phoebus this memorial decreed.
1.132.3.1
This distich then the Lacedaemonians at the very time erased from the tripod, and engraved by name all the cities that had joined in overthrowing the barbarian, and had dedicated the offering. This, however, was considered to be an act of guilt in Pausanias; and since he had put himself in his present position, it appeared to have been done in much closer keeping with his present views. They also heard that he was tampering with the Helots; and it was the fact too;
1.132.4.1
for he was promising them liberation and citizenship, if they would join in an insurrection, and in carrying out the whole of his plan. But not even then did they think right to believe even any of the Helots [themselves] as informers, and to proceed to any great severity against him;
1.132.5.1
acting according to the custom which they usually observe towards their own citizens, not to be hasty in adopting any extreme measure in the case of a Spartan without unquestionable evidence: until a man of Argilus, it is said, who was about to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the king, and who had before been his favourite and very much trusted by him, gave information to them; having been alarmed at a thought which struck him, that none of the messengers before him had hitherto come back again; and so, having counterfeited the seal, in order that if he were mistaken in his surmise, or if Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the writing, he might not discover it, he opened the letter, and found written in it—having suspected some additional order of the kind—directions to put him also to death.
1.133.1.1
Then, however, the ephors, on his showing them the letter, gave greater credence to it; but still wished to be ear-witnesses of Pausanias' saying something. When therefore, from a concerted plan, the man had gone to Taenarus as a suppliant, and had built himself a hut, divided into two by a partition wall, in which he concealed some of the ephors; and when Pausanias came to him, and asked the reason for his becoming a suppliant, they heard all distinctly; while the man charged him with what had been written, and set forth the other particulars, one by one, saying that he had never yet endangered him at all in his services with respect to the king, yet had been, just like the mass of his servants, preferred to death; and Pausanias acknowledged these very things, and desired him not to be angry for what had happened, but gave him the security of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to go as quickly as possible, and not to put an obstacle in the way of his designs.
1.134.1.1
After hearing him accurately, the ephors then went away, and having now certain knowledge [of his guilt], were preparing to arrest him in the city. But it is said that when he was just going to be arrested in the street, from seeing the face of one of the ephors as he approached him, he understood for what purpose he was coming; and on another of them making a secret nod, and out of kindness showing him [their object], he set off running to the temple of Minerva of the Brazen-House, and reached his place of refuge first; for the sacred ground was near at hand. To avoid suffering from exposure to the open air, he entered a building of no great size, which formed part of the temple, and remained quiet in it.
1.134.2.1
The ephors were at the moment distanced in the pursuit; but afterwards they took off the roof of the building; and having watched him in, and cut him off from egress, they barricaded the doors; and sitting down before the place, reduced him by starvation.
1.134.3.1
When he was on the point of expiring in his present situation in the building, on perceiving it, they took him out of the temple while still breathing;
1.134.4.1
and when he was taken out, he died immediately. They were going therefore to cast him, as they do malefactors, into the Caeadas; but afterwards they thought it best to bury him some where near But the god at Delphi subsequently ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to where he died, (and he now lies in the entrance to the sacred ground, as monumental columns declare in writing;) and as what had been done was a pollution to them, he ordered them to give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen-House. So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for Pausanias.
1.135.1.1
The Athenians then, inasmuch as the god himself had decided this to be a pollution, retorted by commanding the Lacedaemonians to drive it out.—
1.135.2.1
Now the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians, and charged Themistocles also as an accomplice in the medizing of Pausanias, as they discovered from the examinations in his case; and demanded that he should be punished with the same penalties.
1.135.3.1
In compliance with this, (he happened to have been ostracised, and though he had a residence at Argos, used to travel about to the rest of the Peloponnese,) they sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were very ready to join in the pursuit, certain men who were told to bring him wherever they might fall in with him.
1.136.1.1
Themistocles, being aware of this beforehand, fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra; for he had been a benefactor to that people. But when the Corcyraeans alleged that they were afraid to keep him at the risk of incurring the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, he was carried over by them to the main-land opposite.
1.136.2.1
And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the work, as they heard on inquiry in what direction he was going, he was compelled in a strait to stop at the house of Admetus, the king of the Molossians, who was not on friendly terms with him.
1.136.3.1
He happened to be from home; but Themistocles, addressing himself as a suppliant to his wife, was instructed by her to take their child, and seat himself on the hearth.
1.136.4.1
And when Admetus came not long after, he declared who he was, and begged him not to avenge himself on a banished man, for whatever he himself might have urged against any request of his to the Athenians; for in that case he would receive evil from the king, when he was far his inferior in power; whereas it was the part of a noble nature to avenge itself on its equals [alone], and on fair terms. Besides, he had himself opposed the king with regard to some request merely, and not on a point of bodily safety; whereas he, if he gave him up, (he mentioned by whom and for what he was being pursued, would deprive him of security of life. The king, after hearing him, raised him up with his son (for so he was sitting with him, and this was the most prevailing mode of supplication).
1.137.1.1
And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came no long time after, he did not give him up; but as he wished to go to the king, sent him by land to the other sea, to Pydna, which was in Alexander's dominions. There he found a merchant vessel putting to sea for Ionia, and having gone on board, was carried by a storm to the armament of the Athenians, that was blockading Naxos.
1.137.2.1
In his fear he told the master who he was, (for he was unknown to those in the vessel,) and on what account he was flying; and said, that if he did not save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a pecuniary consideration; that their only hope of safety lay in no one's leaving the vessel till the voyage could be continued; and that if he complied with his request, he would remember him with becoming gratitude. The master did so; and after lying out at sea off the naval encampment a day and a night, subsequently arrived at Ephesus.
1.137.3.1
And Themistocles rewarded him by a present of money (for there came to him afterwards money from Athens, sent by his friends, and from Argos that which had been secretly laid up there): and having gone up the country with one of the Persians on the coast, he sent a letter to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who was lately come to the throne. The purport of the letter was this:
1.137.4.1
I Themistocles am come to thee, who have done most harm of all the Greeks to your house, as long as I was compelled to defend myself against thy father who had attacked me, but still far more good, when he was retreating in circumstances of safety to me, but of peril to him. And return for a benefit is owed me; (he mentioned his sending to him from Salamis previous information of the retreat of the Greeks, and the non-destruction of the bridges at that time through his instrumentality, to which he falsely laid claim;) and now I am come with power to do thee great good, being persecuted by the Greeks because of my friendship for thee. But I wish to wait a year, and then explain in person to thee the objects of my coming.
1.138.1.1
The king, it is said, approved of his plan, and told him to do so. During the time that he waited he learnt as much as he could of the Persian language, and the institutions of the country;
1.138.2.1
and having gone to him after the expiration of the year, he became an influential person with him, so as none of the Greeks had hitherto been, both on account of his previous reputation, and the hope which he suggested with regard to Greece, namely, that he would make it subject to him; but most of all, from his showing himself talented by actual proofs.
1.138.3.1
For Themistocles was one who most clearly displayed the strength of natural genius, and was particularly worthy of admiration in this respect, more than any other man: for by his own talent, and without learning any thing towards it before, or in addition to it, he was both the best judge of things present with the least deliberation, and the best conjecturer of the future, to the most remote point of what was likely to happen. Moreover, the things which he took in hand he was also able to carry out; and in those in which he had no experience he was not at a loss to form a competent judgment. He had too the greatest foresight of what was the better course or the worse in what was as yet unseen. In a word, by strength of natural talent, and shortness of study, he was the best of all men to do off-hand what was necessary.
1.138.4.1
He ended his life by disease; though some say that he purposely destroyed himself by poison, on finding that he was unable to perform what he had promised to the king.
1.138.5.1
Now there is a monument to him in the Asiatic Magnesia, in the market-place; for he was governor of the country, the king having given him Magnesia, which brought him in fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus for wine, (for it was considered more productive of wine than any other place at that time,) and Myus for provisions in general.
1.138.6.1
But his relations say that his bones were carried, by his own command, and laid in Attica without the knowledge of the Athenians; for it was not lawful to give them burial, as they were the bones of a man banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, who had been the most distinguished of all the Greeks in their day.
1.139.1.1
On the occasion then of their first embassy the Lacedaemonians gave orders to this effect, and received commands in return about driving out the accursed. But on going subsequently to the Athenians, they commanded them to raise the siege of Potidaea, and leave, Aegina independent; and declared, most especially and distinctly of all, that there would be no war, if they rescinded the decree respecting the Megareans, in which it had been declared that they should not use the ports in the Athenian empire, or the Attic market.
1.139.2.1
But the Athenians were neither disposed to obey them in the other points nor to rescind the decree; as they charged the Megareans with an encroaching cultivation of the consecrated and unenclosed land, and with receiving the run-away slaves.
1.139.3.1
Finally, when the last ambassadors had come from Lacedaemonians, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and mentioned none of the things which they usually had before, but simply this, The Lacedaemonians are desirous that there should be peace; and there would be, if you were to leave the Greeks independent; the Athenians called an assembly, and proposed the subject for their consideration, and resolved, once for all, to deliberate and answer respecting all their demands.
1.139.4.1
And many others came forward and spoke, supporting both views of the question; both that they should go to war, and that the decree should not be an obstacle to peace, but that they should rescind it: and then came forward Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the first man of the Athenians at that time, and most able both in speaking and acting, and advised them as follows.
1.140.1.1
"I always adhere to the same opinion, Athenians, that we should make no concessions to the Lacedaemonians; although I know that men are not persuaded to go to war, and act when engaged in it, with the same temper; but that, according to results, they also change their views. Still I see that the same advice, or nearly the same, must be given by me now as before; and I claim from those of you who are being persuaded to war, that you will support the common resolutions, should we ever meet with any reverse; or not, on the other hand, to lay any claim to intelligence, if successful. For it frequently happens that the results of measures proceed no less incomprehensibly than the counsels of man; and therefore we are accustomed to regard fortune as the author of all things that turn out contrary to our expectation.
1.140.2.1
Now the Lacedaemonians were both evidently plotting against us before, and now especially are doing so. For whereas it is expressed in the treaty, that we should give and accept judicial decisions of our differences, and each side [in the mean time] keep what we have; they have neither themselves hitherto asked for such a decision, nor do they accept it when we offer it; but wish our complaints to be settled by war rather than by words; and are now come dictating, and no longer expostulating.
1.140.3.1
For they command us to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to leave Aegina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megareans; while these last envoys that have come charge us also to leave the Greeks independent.
1.140.4.1
But let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle, if we did not rescind the decree respecting the Megareans, which they principally put forward, [saying,] that if it were rescinded, the war would not take place: nor leave in your minds any room for self-accusation hereafter, as though you had gone to war for a trivial thing.
1.140.5.1
For this trifle involves the whole confirmation, as well as trial, of your purpose. If you yield to these demands, you will soon also be ordered to do something greater, as having in this instance obeyed through fear: but by resolutely refusing you would prove clearly to them that they must treat with you more on an equal footing.
1.141.1.1
"Henceforth then make up your minds, either to submit before you are hurt, or, if we go to war, as I think is better, on important or trivial grounds alike to make no concession, nor to keep with fear what we have now acquired; for both the greatest and the least demand from equals, imperiously urged on their neighbours previous to a judicial decision, amounts to the same degree of subjugation.
1.141.2.1
Now with regard to the war, and the means possessed by both parties, that we shall not be the weaker side, be convinced by hearing the particulars. The Peloponnesians are men who cultivate their land themselves;
1.141.3.1
and they have no money either in private or public funds. Then they are inexperienced in long and transmarine wars, as they only wage them with each other for a short time, owing to their poverty. And men of this description can neither man fleets nor often send out land armaments;
1.141.4.1
being at the same time absent from their private business, and spending from their own resource sand, moreover, being also shut out from the sea: but it is super-abundant revenues that support wars, rather than compulsory contributions.
1.141.5.1
And men who till the land themselves are more ready to wage war with their persons than with their money: feeling confident, with regard to the former, that they will escape from dangers; but not being sure, with regard to the latter, that they will not spend it before they have done; especially should the war be prolonged beyond their expectation, as [in this case] it probably may. For in one battle the Peloponnesians and their allies might cope with all the Greeks together;
1.141.6.1
but they could not carry on a war against resources of a different description to their own; since they have no one board of council, so as to execute any measure with vigour; and all having equal votes, and not being of the same races, each forwards his own interest; for which reasons nothing generally is brought to completion. For some of them wish to avenge themselves as much as possible on some particular party;
1.141.7.1
while others wish as little as possible to waste their own property. And after being slow in coming together, it is but during a small part of the time that they look to any of the general interests, while during the greater part they are contriving for their own. And each individual does not imagine that he will do any harm by his own neglect, but thinks that it is the business of every one else too to look out for himself; so that through the same idea being individually entertained by all, the common cause is collectively sacrificed without their observing it.
1.142.1.1
" Most of all will they be impeded by scarcity of money, while, through their slowness in providing it, they continue to delay their operations;
1.142.2.1
whereas the opportunities of war wait for no one. Neither, again, is their raising works against us worth fearing, or their fleet.
1.142.3.1
With regard to the former, it were difficult even in time of peace to set up a rival city; much more in a hostile country, and when we should have raised works no less against them:
1.142.4.1
and if they build [only] a fort, they might perhaps hurt some part of our land by incursions and desertions; it will not, however, be possible for them to prevent our sailing to their country and raising forts, and retaliating with our ships, in which we are so strong.
1.142.5.1
For we have more advantage for land-service from our naval skill, than they have for naval matters from their skill by land.
1.142.6.1
But to become skilful at sea will not easily be acquired by them.
1.142.7.1
For not even have you, though practising from the very time of the Median war, brought it to perfection as yet; how then shall men who are agriculturalists and not mariners, and, moreover, will not even be permitted to practise, from being always observed by us with many ships, achieve any thing worth speaking of?
1.142.8.1
Against a few ships observing them they might run the risk, encouraging their ignorance by their numbers; but when kept in check by many, they will remain quiet; and through not practising will be the less skilful, and therefore the more afraid. For naval service is a matter of art, like any thing else;
1.142.9.1
and does not admit of being practised just when it may happen, as a by-work; but rather does not even allow of any thing else being a by-work to it.
1.143.1.1
"Even if they should take some of the funds at Olympia or Delphi, and endeavour, by higher pay, to rob us of our foreign sailors, that would be alarming, if we were not a match for them, by going on board ourselves and our resident aliens; but now this is the case; and, what is best of all, we have native steersmen, and crews at large, more numerous and better than all the rest of Greece.
1.143.2.1
And with the danger before them, none of the foreigners would consent to fly his country, and at the same time with less hope of success to join them in the struggle, for the sake of a few days' higher pay. The circumstances of the Peloponnesians then seem, to me at least, to be of such or nearly such a character;
1.143.3.1
while ours seem both to be free from the faults I have found in theirs, and to have other great advantages in more than an equal degree.
1.143.4.1
Again, should they come by land against our country, we will sail against theirs; and the loss will be greater for even a part of' the Peloponnese to be ravaged, than for the whole of Attica. For they will not be able to obtain any land in its stead without fighting for it; while we have abundance, both in islands and on the mainland. Moreover, consider it [in this point of view]: if we had been islanders, who would have been more impregnable?
1.143.5.1
And we ought, as it is, with views as near as possible to those of islanders, to give up all thought of our land and houses, and keep watch over the sea and the city; and not, through being enraged on their account, to come to an engagement with the Peloponnesians, who are much more numerous; (for if we defeat them, we shall have to fight again with no fewer of them: and if we meet with a reverse, our allies are lost also; for they will not remain quiet if we are not able to lead our forces against them;) and we should make lamentation, not for the houses and land, but for the lives [that are lost]; for it is not these things that gain men, but men that gain these things. And if I thought that I should persuade you, I would bid you go out yourselves and ravage them, and show the Peloponnesians that you will not submit to them for these things, at any rate.
1.144.1.1
I have also many other grounds for hoping that we shall conquer, if you will avoid gaining additional dominion at the time of your being engaged in the war, and bringing on yourselves dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans.
1.144.2.1
But those points shall be explained in another speech at the time of the events. At the present time let us send these men away with this answer: that with regard to the Megareans, we will allow them to use our ports and market, if the Lacedaemonians also abstain from expelling foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies ( for it forbids neither the one nor the other in the treaty): with regard to the states, that we will leave them independent, if we also held them as independent when we made the treaty; and when they too restore to the states a permission to be independent suitably to the interests, not of the Lacedaemonians themselves, but of the several states, as they wish: that we are willing to submit to judicial decision, according to the treaty: and that we will not commence hostilities, but will defend ourselves against those who do. For this is both a right answer and a becoming one for the state to give.
1.144.3.1
But you should know that go to war we must; and if we accept it willingly rather than not, we shall find the enemy less disposed to press us hard; and, moreover, that it is from the greatest hazards that the greatest honours also are gained, both by state and by individual.
1.144.4.1
Our fathers, at any rate, by withstanding the Medes—though they did not begin with such resources [as we have], but had even abandoned what they had—and by counsel, more than by fortune, and by daring, more than by strength, beat off the barbarian, and advanced those resources to their present height. And we must not fall short of them; but must repel our enemies in every way, and endeavour to bequeath our power to our posterity no less [than we received it].
1.145.1.1
Pericles spoke to this effect; and the Athenians, thinking that he gave them the best advice, voted as he desired them, and answered the Lacedaemonians according to his views, both on the separate points, as he told them, and generally, that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to have their complaints settled by judicial decision, according to the treaty, on a fair and equal footing. So they went back home, and came on no more embassies afterwards.
1.146.1.1
These were the charges and differences that each side had before the war, beginning from the very time of the affairs at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless they continued to have intercourse during them, and to go to each other's country without any herald, though not without suspicion; for what was taking place served to break up the treaty, and was a pretext for war.
2.1.1.1
The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and their respective allies now begins from this period, at which they ceased from further intercourse with each other without a herald, and having once proceeded to hostilities, carried them on continuously; and the history of it is written in order, as the several events happened, by summers and winters.
2.2.1.1
For the thirty years' truce which was made after the reduction of Euboea lasted fourteen years; but in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus had still two months to be archon at Athens; in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea, and in the beginning of spring, rather more than three hundred men of the Thebans, (led by Pythangelus, son of Phylidas, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, Boeotarchs,) about the first watch entered with their arms into Plataea, a town of Boeotia, which was in alliance with the Athenians.
2.2.2.1
There were certain men of the Plataeans who called them in, and opened the gates to them, namely, Nauclides and his party, who wished, for the sake of their own power, to put to death those of the citizens who were opposed to them, and to put the city into the hands of the Thebans.
2.2.3.1
They carried on these negotiations through Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, a very influential person at Thebes. For the Thebans, foreseeing that the war would take place, wished to surprise Plataea, which had always been at variance with them, while it was still time of peace, and the war had not openly broken out. And on this account, too, they entered the more easily without being observed, as no guard had been set before [the gates].
2.2.4.1
After piling their arms in the market-place, they did not comply with the wish of those who called them in by immediately setting to work, and going to the houses of their adversaries; but determined to make a proclamation in friendly terms, and to bring the city to an agreement rather, and to friendship; and the herald proclaimed, that whoever wished to make alliance according to the hereditary principles of all the Boeotians, should come and pile his arms with them, supposing that the city would easily come over to them by this method.
2.3.1.1
The Plataeans, on finding that the Thebans were within their walls, and that their city was unexpectedly taken, being very much alarmed, and thinking that far more had entered than really had, (for they did not see them in the night,) came to an agreement, and having accepted the terms, remained quiet; especially since they were proceeding to no violent measures against any one.
2.3.2.1
But by some means or other while making these negotiations, they observed that the Thebans were not numerous, and thought that by attacking them they might easily overpower them; for it was not the wish of the great body of the Plataeans to revolt from the Athenians.
2.3.3.1
They determined therefore to make the attempt; and proceeded to join each other by digging through the partition-walls [of their houses], that they might not be seen going through the streets; and set waggons without the cattle in the streets, to serve for a barricade; and got every thing else ready, as each seemed likely to be of service for the business in hand.
2.3.4.1
When things were in readiness, as far as they could make them so, having watched for the time when it was still night and just about day-break, they began to go out of their houses against them; that they might not attack them by day-light, when they would be more bold, and on equal terms with themselves, but in the night, when they would be more timid, and fight at a disadvantage through their own acquaintance with the city. So they assailed them immediately, and came to close quarters with them as quickly as they could.
2.4.1.1
The Thebans, on finding themselves outwitted, proceeded to close their ranks, and repel their attacks, wherever they might fall upon them.
2.4.2.1
And twice or thrice they beat them off; but afterwards, when the men were assailing them with a great clamour, and the women and slaves were raising a loud shouting and screaming from the houses, and pelting them with stones and tiles, and a violent rain also had come on in the night, they were frightened, and turned and fled through the city, the greater part of them, through the dark and dirt, (for the event happened at the end of the month,) being unacquainted with the ways out, by which they were to save themselves; while they had pursuers who were acquainted with them, to prevent their escaping: so that many were put to death.
2.4.3.1
Moreover, one of the Plataeans had shut the gate by which they had entered, and which was the only one opened, by driving the spike of a spear into the bar, instead of a bolt; so that there was no longer any way out even by that.
2.4.4.1
As they were chased up and down the city, some of them mounted the wall and threw themselves over, and perished most of them: others came to a lone gate, and, a woman having given them an axe, cut through the bar without being observed, and went out, but in no great numbers, for it was quickly discovered; while others met their fate scattered about in different parts of the city.
2.4.5.1
But the largest and most united body of them rushed into a spacious building which joined on to the wall, and the near door of which happened to be open, thinking that the door of the building was a gate [of the city], and that there was a passage straight through to the outside.
2.4.6.1
When the Plataeans saw them cut off, they consulted whether they should burn them where they were, by setting fire to the building, or treat them in any other way.
2.4.7.1
At last, both those and all the rest of the Thebans that were yet alive, and wandering up and down the city, agreed to deliver up themselves and their arms to the Plataeans, to do with them as they pleased.
2.4.8.1
Thus then fared the party who were in Plataea.
2.5.1.1
The rest of the Thebans, who were to have joined them with all their forces while it was still night, in case those who had entered should be at all unsuccessful, on receiving on their march the tidings of what had happened, advanced to their succour.
2.5.2.1
Now Plataea is seventy stades distant from Thebes, and the rain which had fallen in the night made them proceed the slower; for the river Asopus was flowing with a full stream, and was not to be crossed easily.
2.5.3.1
So by marching through the rain, and having passed the river with difficulty, they arrived too late; as some of the men had been by this time slain, and others of them were kept alive as prisoners.
2.5.4.1
When the Thebans learned what had happened, they formed a design against those of the Plataeans who were outside the city, (for there were both men and stock in the fields, inasmuch as the evil had happened unexpectedly in time of peace,) for they wished to have all they could take to exchange for their own men within, should any happen to have been taken alive. Such were their plans.
2.5.5.1
But the Plataeans, while they were still deliberating, having suspected that there would be something of this kind, and being alarmed for those outside, sent out a herald to the Thebans, saying that they had not acted justly in what had been done, by endeavouring to seize their city in time of treaty; and told them not to injure what was without; else they also would put to death the men whom they had alive in their hands; but if they withdrew again from the territory, they would give the men back to them.
2.5.6.1
The Thebans give this account of the matter, and say that they swore to it. But the Plataeans do not acknowledge that they promised to give back the men immediately, but when proposals had first been made, in case of their coming to any agreement: and they deny that they wore to it.

Perseus Greek. CTS URN tlg0003.tlg001.1st1K-eng2. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Source.