History of the Peloponnesian War

and the fleet of the Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus in the Messanian territory, their land-forces having also joined them.

The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up to them, and seeing their ships unmanned, attacked them, and now on their side lost a ship, through an iron grapple having been thrown on it, but the men swam out of it.

Afterwards, when the Syracusans had gone on board their ships, and were being towed along shore to Messana, the Athenians again advanced against them, and lost another vessel, the enemy having got their ships out into the open sea, and charged them first.

Thus the Syracusans had the advantage in the passage along shore and in the engagement, which was such as has been described, and passed on to the port of Messana.

The Athenians, on receiving tidings that Camarina was going to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither; while the Messanians, in the mean time, with all their forces made an expedition, at once by land and by sea, against Naxos, a Chalcidian town near their borders.

The first day, having driven the Naxians within their walls, they ravaged the land, and the next day sailed round with their fleet, and did the same in the direction of the river Acesines, while with their land-forces they made their incursion towards the city.

Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the highlands in great numbers to assist against the Messanians; and when the Naxians saw them, they took courage, and cheering themselves with the belief that the Leontines and other Grecian allies were coming to their aid, made a sudden sally from the town, and fell upon the Messanians, and having routed them, slew more than a thousand, the rest having a miserable return homeward; for the barbarians fell upon them on the road, and cut off most of them.

The ships, having put in at Messana, subsequently dispersed for their several homes. Immediately after this, the Leontines and their allies, in conjunction with the Athenians, turned their arms against Messana, in the belief of its having been weakened; and attempted it by an attack, the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, the land-forces on the side of the town.

But the Messanians, and some Locrians with Demoteles, who after its disaster had been left in it as a garrison, suddenly fell upon them, and routed the greater part of the Leontine troops, and slew many of them. The Athenians, on seeing it, landing from their ships, went to their assistance, and drove the Messanians back again into the town, having come upon them while in confusion; they then erected a trophy and returned to Rhegium.

After this, the Greeks in Sicily continued to make war on each other by land without the co-operation of the Athenians.

At Pylus, in the mean time, the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedaemonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remained where they were. But the watch was kept by the Athenians with great trouble, through want of both victuals and water;

for there was no spring but one in the citadel of Pylus itself, and that not a copious one; but most of them were drinking such water as they would be likely to find by digging through the shingle near the sea. They suffered too from want of room, being encamped in a narrow space;

and as the ships had no roadstead, some of them took their meals on shore in their turn, while others lay off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was caused by the time being prolonged beyond their expectation;

for they imagined that they should reduce them to surrender in a few days, shut up in a desert island as they were, and having only brackish water to drink.

The cause of this delay was the Lacedaemonians having proclaimed, that any one who wished should carry into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food that might be serviceable in the siege; rating it at a high price, and promising freedom to any of the Helots who should carry it in. Many others therefore carried it in, at all risks, and especially the Helots, putting out from any part of the Peloponnesians, as might happen, and landing by night on the side of the island towards the open sea.

But what they particularly watched for was a chance of being carried to shore by a wind;

for they more easily escaped the look-out of the triremes, when there was a breeze from sea-ward; as it was then impossible for the cruisers to anchor round it, while their own landing was effected in a reckless manner; for their boats being rated at their value in money, they drove them up on the beach, while the soldiers were watching for them at the landing-places in the island. But all that ran the risk in calm weather were taken prisoners.

Divers also swam in under water on the side of the harbour, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; but though these escaped unobserved at first, precautions were afterwards taken against them.

Indeed each party contrived in every possible manner, the one to throw in provisions, the other to prevent its being done without their observation.

When they heard at Athens the circumstances of the army, that it was thus being harassed, and that corn was thus taken in for the men in the island, they were perplexed, and afraid that winter might surprise them in the blockade. For they saw that both carrying provisions round the Peloponnese would then be impossible—at the same time they were in an uninhabited country, [where they could get none themselves,] and even in summer they were not able to send round sufficient supplies for them—and that the blockade by sea of so harbourless a country could not be continued; but that the men would either escape through their giving up their guard, or would watch for a storm, and sail out in the boats that carried the corn in for them.

Above all, they were alarmed by the conduct of the Lacedaemonians; for they imagined that it was from their having some strong point on their side that they made no more overtures to them;

and they regretted not having assented to the treaty. Cleon observing their suspicions of him, with regard to the obstacles thrown in the way of the convention, said that their informants did not speak the truth. When those who had come with the tidings advised them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, he himself, with Theogenes, was chosen by the Athenians for that purpose.

Aware therefore that he would be compelled either to give the same account as those whom he was slandering, or to be proved a liar if he gave a different one, he advised the Athenians—seeing that they were really more inclined in their minds for a fresh expedition—that they should not send commissioners, nor delay and waste their opportunity, but sail against the men, if they thought the report was true.

And he pointedly alluded to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was general at the time; hating him, and tauntingly observing, that it was easy, if their generals were men, to sail with a force and take those in the island; and that if he had himself been in office, he would have done it.

Nicias, observing that the Athenians began to murmur at Cleon for not sailing as it was, if he thought it so easy, and at the same time seeing that he aimed his taunts at him, desired him to take whatever force he chose, as far as the generals were concerned, and make the attempt.

Cleon, thinking at first that he only pretended to give up the command to him, was prepared to accept it; but when he found that he really wished to transfer it to him, he drew back, and said that he was not general, but they; being afraid now, and not supposing that Nicias would have brought himself to retire in his favour.

He, however, again urged him to undertake it, and resigned the command against Pylus, and called on the Athenians to attest it. They, as the multitude is ever wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition, and tried to escape from what he had said, pressed Nicias the more to give up the command to him, and called loudly on Cleon to set sail.

So that not knowing how to evade his words any longer, he undertook the voyage, and, coming forward, said, that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but would set sail, taking with him no one out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that were there, with some targeteers that had come to their aid from Oenus, and four hundred bowmen from other quarters. With these, in addition to the soldiers at Pylus, he said that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot.

The Athenians were seized with laughter at his vain talking, but nevertheless the sensible part of them were pleased with the business, reckoning that they should gain one of two good things; either to be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or, if deceived in their opinion, to get the Lacedaemonians into their hands.

When he had thus arranged every thing in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, having associated with himself one of the generals at Pylus, namely, Demosthenes, he prepared to set sail as quickly as possible.

He chose Demosthenes for his colleague, because he heard that he was himself meditating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed by their want of room, and being a besieged rather than a besieging party, were eager to run all risks. The firing of the island had moreover given him confidence.

For formerly, in consequence of its being extensively covered with wood, and pathless, from its having always been uninhabited, he was afraid, and considered this to be rather in favour of the enemy; as when he landed with a large force, they might attack him from an unseen position, and so do him damage. For, owing to the forest, their mistakes and amount of forces would not be so distinctly seen by him, while all the blunders of his troops would be visible to them; so that they might fall on him unexpectedly at whatever point they pleased, it being always in their power to make the attack.

And if, again, he should force them to an engagement in the forest, he thought the smaller number, with knowledge of the country, would have an advantage over the larger without that knowledge; and that their own army, great as it was, might imperceptibly be cut off, while they could not see in which direction to assist each other.

It was, above all, from his disaster in Aetolia, which in a great measure had been occasioned by the forest, that these thoughts struck him.

The soldiers, however, having been compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island, and take their dinners, with a guard posted in advance; and one of them having unintentionally set fire to a small part of the wood, and a wind having afterwards risen, the greater part of it was consumed before they were aware of it.

In this way then observing, on a clearer view, that the Lacedaemonians were more numerous than he had expected—for before this, he imagined that they took in provisions for a smaller number—and now perceiving that the Athenians were more in earnest about it, as a thing that was worth their attention, and that the island was more easy to land on, he was preparing for the adventure, by sending for troops from the neighbouring allies, and getting every thing else in readiness, when Cleon, after previously sending him word that he was coming, arrived at Pylus with the forces he had asked for.

After their meeting, they sent, in the first place, a herald to the camp on the continent, wishing to know whether, without running any risk, they would desire the men in the island to surrender to them their arms and themselves, on condition of their being kept in mild custody, till some general agreement were concluded.

When they did not accept their proposal, they waited one day, and on the next put out by night, having embarked all their heavy-armed on board a few vessels, and a little before morning effected a landing on each side of the island, both that of the open sea and that of the harbour, amounting to about eight hundred heavy-armed, and proceeded at a run against the first post in the island.

For the following was the way in which the men were disposed. In this first guard there were thirty heavy-armed; the centre and most level part was held by their main body, and Epitadas their commander; while a small division guarded the very corner of the island, towards Pylus, which on the sea side was precipitous, and on the land side least exposed to assault. For there stood there an old fort, rudely built of stone, which they thought might be of service to them, if they should be driven to a compulsory retreat. In this way then were they posted.

The Athenians immediately put to the sword the men forming the first guard, whom they had thus attacked; for they were still in their beds, or only just taking up their arms, the landing having surprised them, as they fancied that the ships were only sailing, according to custom, to their stations for the night.

As soon as it was morning, the rest of the forces also disembarked, viz. all the crews of seventy ships and rather more, (except the lowest rank of rowers,) with their different equipments; eight hundred bowmen, and no less a number of targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all others who were in any positions about Pylus, except the garrison on the fortifications.

By the arrangement of Demosthenes, they were divided into parties of two hundred, more or less, and occupied the highest grounds, that the enemy might be most severely harassed by being surrounded on all sides, and not know where to make resistance, but be annoyed by a double discharge of missiles; being attacked by those behind them, if they charged those before, and by those posted on each side, if they made a flank movement.

And so, wherever they went, they would have the enemy on their rear, light-armed, and the most difficult to deal with, being strong at a distance from the use of arrows, darts, stones, and slings, and it being impossible even to get near them; for they would conquer while flying, and when their enemy retreated, would press them close. It was with such a view of the case that Demosthenes both originally planned the descent, and made his arrangements in the execution of it.

The party under Epitadas, which was also the main division in the island, on seeing the first post cut off, and an army advancing against themselves, closed their ranks, and advanced to meet the heavy-armed of the Athenians, with a wish to engage with them; for they were stationed on their front, but the light-armed on their flanks and rear. They could not however come up with them, and avail themselves of their superior skill in arms;

(for the light troops kept them in check with their missiles from both sides; while at the same time the heavy-armed did not come on to meet them, but remained still;) but the irregulars, on whatever point they ran up and charged them most closely, they routed; and these again would retreat, and still defend themselves, being lightly equipped, and easily getting a good start in their flight, from the difficult nature of the ground, and its rough condition through being before uninhabited, over which the Lacedaemonians with their heavy armour could not pursue them.

For some short time then they skirmished with each other in this way. But when the Lacedaemonians were no longer able with vigour to dash out against them where they made their attack, the light-armed, observing that they were now slackening in their resistance, and themselves deriving most confidence from a closer view—appearing as they did many times more numerous than the enemy—and having now more accustomed themselves to look on them no longer with such terror, because they had not at once suffered as much as they had expected, when they were first landing with spirits cowed at the thought of attacking Lacedaemonians; [under these circumstances, I say,] they despised them, and with a shout rushed on them in one body, and attacked them with stones, arrows, and darts, whichever came first to their hand.

From the shouting thus raised, while they ran upon them, bewilderment seized them, as men unaccustomed to such a mode of fighting. The dust also from the wood that had been burnt was rising thick into the air, and it was impossible for any one to see before him, for the arrows and stones which, together with the dust, were flying from such a host of men.

And here the action became distressing to the Lacedaemonians; for their caps were not proof against the arrows, and darts were broken in them, when they were struck; and they could make no use of their weapons, being excluded, so far as sight was concerned, from any view before them; and not hearing, for the louder shouts of the enemy, their own word of command, while danger surrounded them on every side, and they had no hope of any means of defending and saving them selves.

At last, when many were now being wounded from constantly moving in the same place, they formed into a close body, and went to the fort in the corner of the island, which was not far off, and to their own guards there.

On their giving way, the light-armed then at once took courage, and pressed on them with a far louder shout than ever. Those of the Lacedaemonians then who were overtaken in the retreat were slain; but the greater part escaped to the fort, and with the garrison that was there ranged themselves all along it, to defend themselves where it was assailable.

The Athenians, on coming up, could not surround and enclose them, owing to the natural strength of the place, but advanced in front, and endeavoured to force their position.

And thus for a long time, indeed for the greater part of the day, though suffering from the battle, dust, and sun, both sides held out; the one striving to drive them from the high ground, the other not to give way; and the Lacedaemonians now defended themselves more easily than before, as there was no surrounding them on the flanks.

When the business was still undecided, the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were labouring in vain; but if they would give him a part of the bowmen and light-armed, to go round in their rear by a way that he should himself discover, he thought he could force the approach.

Having received what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, that they might not observe it, and, advancing wherever the precipitous side of the island allowed a passage, and where the Lacedaemonians, relying on the strength of the ground, kept no guard, with great labour and difficulty he got round unobserved, and suddenly appearing on the height in their rear, struck the enemy with dismay at the unexpected movement, and gave much greater confidence to his friends by the sight of what they were looking for.

And now the Lacedaemonians were exposed to missiles on both sides, and reduced to the same result (to compare a small case with a great one) as that which happened at Thermopylae; for those troops were cut off through the Persians' getting round by the path; and these, being more assailed on all sides, no longer held their ground, but from fighting, as they were, a few against many, and from weakness of body through want of provisions, they began to retreat; and so the Athenians now commanded the approaches.

Cleon and Demosthenes, aware that if they gave way even the least degree more, they would be destroyed by the Athenian forces, stopped the engagement, and kept their men off them, wishing to take them alive to Athens, if by any means, in accordance with their proposals, they might be induced to surrender their arms, and yield to their present danger.

And so they sent a herald, to ask if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be treated at their discretion.

On hearing this, the greater part of them lowered their shields, and waved their hands, to show that they accepted the proposal. After this, when the cessation of hostilities had taken place, a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes, and Styphon the son of Pharax, on the other side; for Epitadas, the first of their former commanders, had been killed, and Hippagretas, the next in command, was lying amongst the slain, still alive, but given up for dead; and Styphon had been chosen, according to custom, to take the command in case of any thing happening to them.

He, then, and those who were with him, said that they wished to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland, and ask what they should do.

When the Athenians would not allow any of them to leave the island, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland; and when questions had passed between them twice or thrice, the last man that came over to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland brought them this message; The Lacedaemonians bid you to provide for your own interests, so long as you do nothing dishonourable. So after consulting by themselves, they surrendered their arms and their persons.

That day and the following night the Athenians kept them in custody; but the next day, after erecting a trophy on the island, they made all their other arrangements for sailing, and distributed the men amongst the captains of the fleet, to take charge of; while the Lacedaemonians sent a herald, and recovered their dead. Now the number of those who were killed in the island, or were taken alive, was as follows.

There had crossed over in all four hundred and twenty heavy-armed, two hundred and ninety-two of which were taken [to Athens] alive, and the rest were slain. Of those that were living about one hundred and twenty were Spartans. On the side of the Athenians there were not many killed; for the battle was not fought hand to hand.