History of the Peloponnesian War

The Athenians in Sicily the same winter made a descent from their ships on the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had made an irruption on its borders from the interior; they also sailed against the islands of Aeolus.

On their return to Rhegium they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, a general of the Athenians, had come to succeed to the command of the ships under Laches;

the allies in Sicily having sailed and persuaded the Athenians to assist them with more vessels. For though the Syracusans commanded their land, yet, as they were excluded from the sea by only a few ships, they were making preparations, and raising a fleet, with a determination not to put up with it.

And the Athenians manned forty ships to send to them; thinking that so the war in that quarter would be more speedily brought to a conclusion, and at the same time wishing to practise their men in seamanship.

They despatched therefore one of their commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships; intending to send out Sophocles son of Sostradides, and Eurymedon son of Thucles, with the larger squadron.

So Pythodorus, being now in command of Laches' ships, sailed at the close of the winter to the fort of the Locrians, which Laches had formerly taken; and returned after being defeated in battle by the Locrians.

Just about the beginning of this spring, the fire flood issued from Aetna, as it had done on former occasions, and destroyed some of the territory of the Catanaeans, who live on Mount Etna, the largest mountain in Sicily.

It is said that this eruption took place fifty years after the preceding one; and that it has occurred three times in all since Sicily has been inhabited by the Greeks.

These were the events of this winter; and so ended the sixth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

THE following summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and an equal number of Locrians sailed and occupied Messana in Sicily, at the invitation of the inhabitants; and so Messana revolted from the Athenians.

This was chiefly done, by the Syracusans, because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and were afraid that the Athenians might hereafter make it their head-quarters and proceed against them with a larger force; by the Locrians, for hatred of the people of Rhegium, and with a wish to reduce them by hostilities on both sides.

At the same time too the Locrians had invaded the territory of Rhegium with all their forces, to prevent their going to the rescue of Messana, and also at the instigation of some exiles from Rhegium who were with them. For that town had been for a long time torn by faction, and it was impossible at the present time to resist the Locrians; for which reason they were the more determined to attack them.

After devastating the country, the Locrians retired with their land-forces, but their ships remained to guard Messana; and others that were being manned were to go to that station, and carry on the war from it.

About the same period of the spring, before the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an incursion into Attica, under the conduct of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; and pitching their camp in the country, proceeded to lay it waste.

But the Athenians despatched the forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, and the remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; for Pythodorus, the third of them, had already arrived in Sicily before them.

These they also ordered to attend, as they sailed by the island, to those of the Corcyraeans who were in the city, and who were being plundered by the exiles on the mountain; sixty ships having likewise sailed from the Peloponnese to assist those on the mountain, and with an idea, that as there was a great famine in the city, they should easily possess themselves of the government.

Demosthenes, who had continued in a private capacity since his return from Acarnania, was, at his own request, authorized by them to use that fleet, if he wished, for service about the Peloponnese.

When, on their voyage, they were off Laconia, and heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for hastening thither, but Demosthenes desired them to touch first at Pylus, and after doing what was necessary, then to proceed on their voyage. While they were making objections, a storm happened to come on, and carried the fleet to Pylus.

So Demosthenes immediately begged them to fortify the place, (for this, he said, was his object in sailing with them,) and showed them that there was great abundance of timber and stone, and that the post was a strong one, and unoccupied, both itself and a considerable distance of the country round. For Pylus is about four hundred stades from Sparta, and is situated in what was once the Messenian territory, being called by the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium. But the commanders said that there were many unoccupied promontories in the Peloponnese, if he wished to put the state to expense by occupying them.

He, however, considered that this was a more advantageous post than any other, inasmuch as there was a harbour close by, and the Messenians, who in early times were connected with the place, and spoke the same dialect with the Lacedaemonians, would do them very great injury by their excursions from it, and at the same time be trusty guardians of the place.

When he could not convince either the generals or the soldiers, having subsequently communicated his views to the subordinate officers also, he remained quiet from stress of weather; till the soldiers themselves, in their want of occupation, were seized with a desire to set to and fortify the post.

Accordingly they took the work in land, and proceeded with it, though they had no iron tools, but carried stones just as they picked them up, and put them together, as they severally might happen to fit; while the mortar, wherever it was necessary to use any, for want of hods they carried on their back, stooping down in such a way that it might best he on, and clasping their hands behind them, to prevent its falling off.

Indeed in every way they made haste to anticipate the Lacedaemonians, by completing the most assailable points of tie work before they came to the rescue; for the greater part of the position was strong by nature, and had no need of fortifications.

Now the Lacedaemonians happened to be celebrating a festival; and, moreover, when they heard it, they made light of it, thinking that when they took the field, either the enemy would not wait their attack, or they should easily take the place by storm. To a certain extent also the fact of their army being still before Athens delayed them.

So the Athenians, after fortifying in six days the side towards the interior, and what most required it, left Demosthenes there with five ships to protect the place, while with the main body of the fleet they hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

When the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of Pylus, they returned home with all speed; for the Lacedaemonians and Agis their king thought that the affair of Pylus closely affected them; and, besides, having made their incursion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, they were in want of provisions for most of their troops; while stormy weather, coming on with greater violence than was usual at that season, distressed the army.

So that for many reasons it happened that they returned quicker than usual, and that this was the shortest incursion they had made; for they remained in Attica but fifteen days.

At this same period, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having got together a few Athenians from the guard-stations, and a large body of the allies in that neighbourhood, took possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony from Mende, and hostile [to Athens], which was betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans having immediately come to its rescue, he was beaten out of it, and lost many of his soldiers.

On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci immediately went to the rescue of Pylus; but the other Lacedaemonians were more slow in marching against it, as they had but just reached home from a different expedition.

They despatched orders also through the rest of the Peloponnese to bring up their reinforcements to Pylus as quickly as possible and sent for their sixty ships at Corcyra. These having been hauled over the isthmus of Leucas, and having so escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, reached Pylus; the land-forces also having by that time arrived.

While the Peloponnesians were yet sailing up, Demosthenes anticipated them by secretly sending two ships with a message to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus to join him, as the place was in danger.

So the ships sailed with all speed, according to the orders of Demosthenes; while the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the place both by land and sea, hoping easily to take a building completed in haste, and with only a few men in it.

At the same time, expecting the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus to its relief, they intended, in case of their not having taken it before, to bar also the entrances into the harbour, that the Athenians might not be able to come to anchor in it.

For the island that is called Sphacteria both secures the harbour, by stretching in a line with it, and close off it, and narrows its entrances; on one side, near the Athenian fortifications and Pylus, leaving a passage for two ships; on the other, towards the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. It was all woody and pathless from its desert condition, and in extent about fifteen stades. The entrances then they intended to bar with a close line of vessels, with their heads looking outwards;

while fearing this island, lest the enemy should carry on their operations against them from it, they conveyed over some heavy-armed troops into it, and posted others along the mainland.

For so they thought that both the island would be unfavourable to the Athenians, and the mainland also, as it did not afford any landing-place; for the shores of Pylus itself outside the inlet, looking towards the open sea, would present no ground from which they might proceed to the aid of their countrymen; and so they should storm the place, in all probability, without the risk of a sea-fight, as there were no provisions in it, and it had been occupied after short preparation.

Having adopted these resolutions, accordingly they conveyed over the heavy-armed into the island, drafting them by lot from all the lochi There had also been some others sent over before in turns; but these last who went, and who were left there, were four hundred and twenty in number, with their attendant Helots; their commander being Epitadas son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him both by sea and land at once, made his own preparations also; and having drawn up under the fortifications the triremes he had remaining from those that had been left him, he enclosed them in a stockade, and armed the crews taken out of them with shields of an inferior kind, and in most cases made of osiers. For it was not possible in so lonely a place to provide themselves with arms; but even these they had got from a thirty-oared privateer and skiff belonging to some Messenians, who happened to have come to them. Of these Messenians there were also about forty heavy-armed, whose services he used with the rest.

The main body, both of the unarmed and the armed, he posted at the most fortified and secure points of the place, facing the interior, with orders to repel the land-forces, should they make an assault; while lie himself, having picked from the whole force sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, proceeded outside the wall to the sea, where he most expected that they would attempt a landing, on ground which was difficult, indeed, and rocky, looking as it did to the open sea, but still, as their wall was weakest at that point, he thought that this would tempt them to be eager in attacking it.

For they built it of no great strength just there, expecting never to be beaten at sea themselves; and also thinking that if the enemy once forced a landing, the place then became easy to take.

At this point then he went down to the very sea, and posted his heavy-armed, to prevent a landing, if possible; while he encouraged them with these words:

Soldiers, who have shared with me this adventure, let none of you in such an emergency wish to show himself clever by calculating the whole amount of the danger that surrounds us, but rather to charge the enemy with reckless confidence, and with the probability of escaping by these means. For circumstances which are as pressing as ours by no means admit of calculation, but require the danger to be faced as quickly as possible.

But indeed I see the greater part of them favourable to us, if we will but stand our ground, and not, through being alarmed at the enemy's numbers, throw away the advantages we have. For the difficulty of landing which the place presents I consider to be in our favour:

for while we remain where we are, this assists us in the struggle; but if we retreat, we shall find that though [naturally] difficult, it will be easy when there is no one to offer resistance. And in that case we shall find the enemy the more formidable on this very account, because his retreat will not be easily effected, even though he may be driven back by us. For while on board their ships, they are most easy to repel; but when they have once landed, they are then on equal terms with us.

Nor should you be very much alarmed at their numbers; for though great, they will engage in small detachments, through the impossibility of bringing to: and it is not an army on the land, fighting on equal ground, while superior in numbers; but one on board a fleet, for which, when at sea, many lucky chances are required [to make it effective]. So that I consider their difficulties a fair equivalent for our numbers;

and at the same time I call on you, Athenians as you are, and knowing from experience as you do the nature of a naval descent on the coast of others, namely, that if a man should stand his ground, and not retreat for fear of the roaring surf and the terrors of the ships sailing to shore, he would never be driven back; [I call on you, I say,] now in your own case to stand your ground, and by resisting them along the very beach to save both yourselves and the place.

When Demosthenes had thus encouraged them, they were more inspirited, and went down against them, and ranged themselves close along the sea.

The Lacedaemonians, moved from their position, and assaulted the fort at the same time both with their army by land and with their ships, of which there were forty-three; the admiral on board being Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he assaulted it just where Demosthenes was expecting him.

So the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, landward and seaward; while their opponents, divided into detachments of a few ships, because it was not possible for more to bring to, and relieving each other in turn, were sailing up against them with all eagerness and mutual exhortation, if by any means they might force their passage and take the place.

The most distinguished of all, however, was Brasidas. For being captain of a trireme, and seeing that, in consequence of the difficulty of the position, the captains and steersmen, even where it did seem possible to land, shrunk back and were cautious of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out, and said, that it was not right to be chary of timbers, and put up with the enemy's having built a fort in their country; but he bade them shiver their vessels to force a landing, and told the allies not to shrink, in return for great benefits received, to sacrifice their ships for the Lacedaemonians on the present occasion, but to run them ashore, and land by any means, and secure both the men and the place.

In this way he urged on the rest, and having compelled his own steersman to run the ship ashore, he stepped on the gang-board, and was endeavouring to land when he was cut down by the Athenians, and fainted away after receiving many wounds. Having fallen into the ship's bows, his shield slipped from around his arm into the sea; and on its being thrown ashore, the Athenians picked it up, and afterwards used it for the trophy which they erected for this attack.

The rest were eager to land, but unable, both from the difficulty of the ground and from the Athenians standing firm and not giving way.

And such was the revolution of fortune, that Athenians fighting from land, and that a part of Laconia, were repelling Lacedaemonians when sailing against them; while Lacedaemonians were landing from ships, and on their own country, now hostile to them, to attack Athenians. [I call it a revolution of fortune,] for it formed at that time the main glory of the Lacedaemonians, that they were an inland people, and most powerful by land; and of the Athenians, that they were a maritime people, and had by far the most powerful navy.

Having then made their attacks during that day and part of the following, they ceased from them, and on the third sent some of their ships to Asine, to fetch timber for the construction of their engines; hoping that though the wall opposite the harbour was high, yet as the landing was most practicable there, they would take it by means of engines.

Meanwhile the Athenian ships from Zacynthus arrived, fifty in number; for they were reinforced by some of the guard-ships at Naupactus, and four Chians.

When they saw both the mainland and the island crowded with heavy-armed, and the ships in the harbour, and not sailing out of it; being at a loss where to get anchorage, they sailed at the time to the island of Prote, which is not far off, and is uninhabited, and there they passed the night. The next day they weighed anchor in readiness for an engagement in the open sea, should the enemy be disposed to put out to meet them there; if not, intending to sail in and attack them.

They, however, neither put out to meet them, nor had done what they had intended, viz. to bar the entrances; but remaining quiet on shore, were manning their ships, and preparing, in case of any one's sailing in, to engage in the harbour, which is of no small extent.

The Athenians, on perceiving this, advanced against them by each entrance; and finding most of their ships already afloat and drawn up to meet them, they attacked and put them to flight, and chasing them as well as the short distance permitted, disabled many, and took five, one of them with its crew; while the rest they charged after they had taken refuge under the land. Some too were battered while still being manned, before they got under weigh; while others they lashed to their own, and began to tow off empty, the crews having taken to flight.

The Lacedaemonians seeing this, and being exceedingly distressed at the disaster, because their men were being intercepted on the island, went to the rescue, and rushing into the sea with their arms, laid hold of the vessels, and began to pull them back again; every one thinking the business to be obstructed in that part in which he was not himself engaged.

Thus the uproar occasioned was great, and the very reverse of what was habitual to both parties with regard to ships: for the Lacedaemonians, in their eagerness and dismay, were absolutely engaged in a sea-fight, so to speak, from the land; and the Athenians, victorious as they were, and wishing to follow up their present success as far as possible, were engaged in a land-fight from their vessels.

After inflicting much labour and many wounds on each other, they separated;

and the Lacedaemonians saved their empty vessels, excepting those first taken. Both sides having returned to their encampment, the Athenians erected a trophy, gave back the slain, secured the wrecks, and immediately began to cruise round the island, and guarded it vigilantly, considering the men as intercepted; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had by this time come with their contingents from all the cities, remained stationary at Pylus.

When tidings of what had taken place at Pylus reached Sparta, it was determined that, in so great a calamity, the authorities should go down to the camp, and immediately decide on inspection what they thought best.

They, seeing that it was impossible to assist their men, and not wishing to run the risk of their perishing by starvation, or being overpowered and taken by superior numbers, determined to conclude with the Athenian generals, if they were willing, an armistice concerning matters at Pylus, and then send ambassadors to Athens on the subject of a convention, and to try to recover their men as quickly as possible.

The generals having acceded to their proposal, an armistice was concluded on the following terms: That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians, the ships with which they had fought the battle, and all in Laconia that were vessels of war; and should make no attack on the fort, either by land or sea. That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send over to their men in the island a stipulated quantity of corn, ready-kneaded, viz. two Attic choenixes of barley-meal a man, with two cotylae of wine and a piece of flesh; and half that quantity for each attendant. That they should send in these rations under the eyes of the Athenians, and that no vessel should sail in by stealth. That the Athenians should keep guard over the island, nevertheless, so long as they did not land on it, and should abstain from attacking the forces of the Peloponnesians, either by land or by sea.