History of the Peloponnesian War

but if you decide otherwise, you will not oblige them, but will rather pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in revolting you cannot properly maintain your empire. If, however, you determine to do so, even though it is not proper, you must also, overlooking what is right, punish these men from regard to expediency, or else give up your empire, and act the honest man without danger. Resolve, then, to requite them with the same penalty; and not to show yourselves, in escaping their designs, more insensible than those who formed them against you;

considering what they would probably have done, if they had prevailed over you; especially, as they were the first; to begin the wrong. For it is those who do ill to any one without reason, that persecute him most bitterly, nay, even to the death, from suspicion of the danger of their enemy's being spared;

since he who has suffered evil without any necessity, [but by provoking it himself,] is more bitter, if he escape, than one who was an enemy on equal terms. Be not therefore traitors to your own cause;

but bringing yourselves in feeling as near as possible to the actual state of suffering, and reflecting how you would in that case have valued their subjection above every thing, now pay them back in return, not indulging in weakness at the present moment, nor forgetting the danger which once hung over you. Punish these men, I say, as they deserve; and give a striking example to the rest of your allies, that whoever revolts will pay the penalty for it with his life. For if they know this, you will less frequently have to neglect your enemies, while you are fighting with your own confederates.

To this effect spoke Cleon. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the former assembly spoke most strongly against putting the Mytilenaeans to death, came forward then also, and said as follows.

"I neither blame those who have a second time proposed the discussion of the case of the Mytilenaeans, nor commend those who object to repeated deliberation on the most important subjects; but I think that the two things most opposed to good counsel are hasten and passion one of which is generally the companion of folly, and the other of coarseness and narrowness of mind.

And whoever contends that words are not to be the exponents of measures, is either wanting in understanding, or self-interested: wanting in understanding if he thinks it possible to express himself many other way on what is future and not certain; self-interested, if, when wishing to persuade to something base, he thinks that he could not speak to his credit on a discreditable subject, but that by clever calumniation he might confound both his opponents and audience. But most cruel of all are those who charge us besides with a display [of rhetoric] for pecuniary motives.

For if the only imputed ignorance, he who failed in carrying his point would retire with a character for want of understanding, rather than of honesty: but when a charge of dishonesty is brought against him, if successful, he is suspected; and if unsuccessful, together with his inability, le is also thought dishonest.

And the state is not benefited by such a system; for through fear it is deprived of its counsellors. Most prosperous indeed would it be, if such of its citizens were incapable of speaking; for then they would be less often persuaded to do wrong.

But the good citizen ought to show himself the better speaker not by terrifying his opponent, but by meeting him on equal terms; and the state that acts wisely should not, indeed, confer honour on the man who most frequently gives good advice, but neither should it detract from what he enjoys already; and so far from punishing him who is wrong in his judgment, it should not even degrade him.

For so the successful counsellor would be least tempted to speak any thing contrary to his real opinion, in order to gratify his nearers; and the unsuccessful one would be least anxious by the same means of gratification to bring over the multitude to his side also.

"But we do the contrary of this; and moreover, if any one be suspected of speaking with a view to his own advantage, though at the same time what is best, through grudging him the gain of which we have but an uncertain idea, we deprive the state of its certain benefit.

And thus good advice, given in a straightforward manner, has come to be no less suspected than bad; so that it is equally necessary for one who wishes to carry the most dreadful measures to win over the multitude by trickery, and for one who speaks on the better side to gain credit by falsehood.

And the state alone it is impossible, owing to these over-wise notions, to serve in an open manner and without deceiving it; for he who openly confers any good upon it is suspected of getting secretly, in some way or other, an advantage in return.

Now on subjects of the greatest importance, and with such an estimate of our conduct, we [orators] ought to speak with more extensive forethought than you who take but an off-hand view of measures; especially as we are responsible for the advice we give, whereas you are irresponsible for listening to it.

For if he who offered counsel, and he who followed it, suffered alike, you would judge more prudently. But as it is, through whatever passion you may at any time have met with disasters, you punish the single judgment of the man who persuaded you, and not your own, for having so numerously joined in the blunder.

"I came forward, however, neither to speak against any one in defence of the Mytilenaeans, nor to accuse any one. For the question we have to decide is not, if we take a wise view of it, respecting their guilt, but respecting our taking good counsel.

For though I should prove them to be utterly guilty, I will not for that reason also bid you to put them to death, unless it were expedient: and though they might claim some allowance, [I would not bid you make it,] unless it should appear good for the state.

But I am of opinion that we are deliberating for the future, rather than the present; and as to what Cleon most positively asserts, that it will be advantageous to us in future, with a view to less frequent revolts, if we hold out death as the penalty; I too as positively contradict him, with regard to what is good for the future, and maintain the opposite opinion.

And I beg you not to reject the utility of my advice for the plausibility of his. For his words might perhaps attract you, through being more just with regard to your present displeasure against the Mytilenaeans: but we are not holding a judicial inquiry in their case, that we should want what is just; but are deliberating respecting them, how they may be of service to us.

"Now the penalty of death has been enacted in states for many offences, and those not equal to this, but less heinous; and yet, urged on by hope, men venture to commit them; and no one ever yet came into danger with a conviction of his own mind that he would not succeed in his attempt.

What city, too, when bent on revolt, ever attempted it with deficient resources—according to its own idea—either internal, or by means of alliance with others?

Indeed all men, both in private and public capacity, are naturally disposed to do wrong, an there is no law that will keep them from it; atleast men have gone through all kinds of punishment in their enactments, to try if by any means they might be less injured by evil-doers, and it is probable that in early times the punishments for the greatest offences were more lenient; but as they are disregarded, they generally, in the course of time, extend to death;

and still even this is disregarded. Either, then, some fear more dreadful than this must be discovered, or this, at any rate, does not restrain men: but poverty inspiring ing boldness through necessity, and larger means inspiring ambition though insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life through some human passion or other, according as they are severally enslaved by some fatal and overpowering one, lead men on to dangers.

Moreover, hope and desire for every thing, the one taking the lead, and the other following; and the one devising the attempt, while the other suggests the facility of succeeding in it; cause the most numerous disasters; and though unseen, they are more influential than the dangers that are seen. Fortune, too, aids them no less in urging men on;

for by sometimes siding them unexpectedly, she induces them to run the risk even with inferior means; especially in the case of states, in as much as the venture is for the greatest object, namely, freedom, or empire over others: and as each individual, when acting in concert with all, unreasonably carries his ideas to an extravagant length concerning then.

In short, it is impossible [to remedy the evil], and the man is very simple who thinks, that when human nature is eagerly set on doing a thing, he has any means of diverting it, either by the rigour of laws, or any other kind of terror.

"We must not, then, either take bad counsel through trusting to the punishment of death as a thing to be relied on, or leave to those who have revolted no hope of being allowed to change their minds, and wipe out their offence in as short a time as possible.

For consider that at present, if any city, even after revolting, find that it will not succeed, it would come to terms while it has still means of refunding the expenses, and of paying tribute in future. But in the other case, which of then, think you, would not make better preparations for the attempt than they do now, and hold out against its besiegers to the utmost, if it is all one whether it surrender slowly or quickly?

And how can it fail to be injurious for us to be put to expense by sitting down before it, because it will not surrender; and if we take the city, to recover it in a ruined condition, and be deprived of the revenue from it in future?

For our strength against the enemy lies in this. So then we must not hurt ourselves, by being strict judges of the offenders, but rather see how, by punishing them moderately, we may be able in future to avail ourselves of the cities with unimpaired mean the score of money; and we must resolve to derive our protection not from severity of laws, but from attention to deeds. The very contrary of which we do at present;

and we have subdued any power that was [once] free, and, when harshly governed, naturally revolted for its independence, we fancy that we are bound to avenge ourselves with severity.

But in dealing wit freemen, we must not punish them rigorously when revolt, but watch them rigorously before they revolt and prevent their even coming to the thought of it; and when we have mastery of them, we should attach the guilt to as few as possible.

"Now consider what an error you would commit in this also, if persuaded by Cleon.

For at present the commons in all the states are well disposed towards you, and either do not revolt with the aristocratical party, or if compelled to do so, are straightway hostile to those who made them; and you have the mass of the city opposed to you on your side, when you proceed to war.

But if you butcher the commons of Mytilene, who took no part in the revolt, and when they had got possession of arms, voluntarily gave up the city; in the first place you will act unjustly by slaying your benefactors; and in the next you will produce for the higher classes of men a result which they most desire; for when they lead their cities to revolt, they will immediately have the commons on their side, because you had shown them beforehand that the same penalty is appointed for those who are guilty and those who are not.

On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to pretend not to notice it; that the only class still allied with us may not become hostile to us.

And this I consider far more beneficial towards retaining our empire—that we should voluntarily be treated with injustice—than that with justice we should put to the sword those whom we ought not. And so the identity of the justice and expediency of the punishment, which Cleon asserts, is found impossible to exist therein.

Being convinced then that this is the better course, and not allowing too much weight either to pity or to lenity (for neither do I, [any more than Cleon,] wish you to be influenced by these,) but judging from the advice itself which is given you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mytilenaeans whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to allow the rest to live where they are.

For this is both profitable for the future, and terrible to your enemies at the present moment; since whoever takes good advice against his adversaries is stronger than one who recklessly proceeds against them with violence of action.

To this effect spoke Diodotus. These being the views that were expressed in most direct opposition to one another, the Athenians, notwithstanding [their wish to reconsider the question], came to a conflict of opinion respecting them, and were nearly matched in the voting, though that of Diodotus prevailed.

And they immediately despatched another trireme with all speed, that they might not find the city destroyed through the previous arrival of the first; which had the start by a day and a night.

The Mytilenaean ambassadors having provided for the vessel wine and barley-cakes, and promising great rewards if they should arrive first, there was such haste in their course, that at the same time as they rowed they ate cakes kneaded with oil and wine; and some slept in turns, while others rowed.

And as there happened to be no wind against them, and the former vessel did not sail in any haste on so horrible a business, while this hurried on in the manner described; though the other arrived so much first that Paches had read the decree, and was on the point of executing the sentence, the second came to land after it, and prevented the butchery. Into such imminent peril did Mytilene come.

The other party, whom Paches had sent off as the chief authors of the revolt, the Athenians put to death, according to the advice of Cleon, amounting to rather more than one thousand. They also dismantled the walls of the Mytilenaeans, and seized their ships.

After this they did not impose any tribute on the Lesbians, but having divided the land, excepting that of the Methymnaeans, into three thousand portions, they set apart three hundred of them as consecrated to the gods, and to the rest sent out as shareholders those of their own citizens to whose lot they had fallen; with whom the Lesbians having agreed to pay in money two mince a year for each portion, farmed the land themselves.

The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent of which the Mytilenaeans were masters, and they were afterwards subject to Athens. Such then was the issue of affairs as regarded Lesbos.

In the course of the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians made an expedition under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, against the island of Minoa, which lies off Megara, and which the Megareans used as a fortress, having built a tower on it.

From this spot, being more close at hand, Nicias wished the Athenians to keep their guard [over Nisaea], instead of from Budorum and Salamis, and to prevent the Peloponnesians from sailing out thence unobserved, as was formerly the case, with triremes and privateers; and at the same time to see that nothing was imported by the Megareans.

Having therefore in the first instance taken by engines from the sea two towers which projected on the side of Nisaea, and having cleared the entrance to the strait between the island [and the continent], he proceeded to cut off all communication on the side of the mainland also, where there was a passage by a bridge over a morass for succouring the island, which lay not far off from the continent.

This having been accomplished by them in a few days, he afterwards left works on the island also, with a garrison, and retired with his forces.

It was also about the same period of this summer that the Plataeans, having no longer any provisions and being unable to endure the blockade, surrendered to the Peloponnesians in the following manner.

The enemy assaulted their wall and they were incapable of defending it. So when the Lacedaemonian commander was aware of their powerless condition, lie did not wish to take it by storm, (for such were his instructions from Lacedaemon, in order that if a treaty should ever be made with the Athenians, and they should agree to restore such places as they had respectively taken in the war, Plataea might not be given up, on the strength of its inhabitants having voluntarily gone over to them,) but he sent to them a herald with this question, Were they disposed voluntarily to surrender their city to the Lacedaemonians, and submit to them as their judges;

and that they should punish the guilty, but no one contrary to justice? Such were the words of the herald; and they, being now in a state of extreme weakness, surrendered the city. The Peloponnesians then fed the Plataeans for nine days, till the judges from Lacedaemon, five in number, arrived.

When they were come, no charge was preferred against them; but they called them forward, and merely asked them this question, Had they in any particular done the Lacedaemonians and the allies any service during the present war?

They made a speech [in reply], for they had requested permission to speak at greater length, and had deputed to plead their cause Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus, who came forward and said as follows:

"The surrender of our city, Lacedaemonians, we made with full confidence in you, not supposing that we should be subjected to such a trial as this, but that it would be one more consistent with law; and with an agreement that we should not, as we now are, be at the mercy of any other judges but yourselves; thinking that so we should best obtain what was fair.

But as things are, we fear that we have failed at once in both expectations. For with reason we suspect that our contest is for life or death, and that you will not prove impartial; inferring this from the fact of there having been made against us no previous charge for us to reply to, (but it was ourselves who requested permission to speak,) and from the question put to us being so concise; a true answer to which tells against us, while a false one is open to refutation.

Being involved, however, in perplexity on all sides, we are compelled, and it seems the safer course, to say something at all risks; for the words that had been left unspoken might occasion to men in our situation the self-accusing thought, that if they had been spoken, they might have saved us.

But in addition to our other disadvantages, the work of convincing you is also surrounded with difficulties. Were we unacquainted with each other, we might derive assistance from bringing forward fresh proofs of what you did not know: but as it is, every thing will be said to men who know it already; and our fear is, not that you have before considered our services as inferior to your own, and now make that fact a ground of accusation against us; but that, through your determination to gratify another party, we are brought to a trial which is already decided against us.

" Nevertheless, while we urge what claims of justice we have, both against the Thebans, and with respect to you, and the rest of the Greeks, we will remind you of our good deeds, and endeavour to persuade you [to have mercy on us].

With regard then to your brief question, 'whether we have done any service to the Lacedaemonians and the allies in this war,' we say, that if you ask us as enemies, you are not wronged by us, though you should have received no good at our hands; and that if you consider us as friends, you are yourselves more in the wrong, for having marched against us.

With respect, however, to what happened during the peace, and in opposition to the Mede, we proved ourselves good and true men; for we have not now been the first to break the peace, and we were then the only part of the Boeotians who joined in attacking the Mede for the liberty of Greece.

Even though we are an inland people, we were present in the sea-fight at Artemisium, and in the battle fought in our territory we stood by you and Pausanias; and whatever other perilous achievement was performed by the Greeks, we took part in every thing beyond our strength.

And to you, Lacedaemonians, in particular, at the very time when, after the earthquake, the greatest alarm surrounded Sparta, because of the Helots who had established themselves in revolt at Ithome, we sent the third part of our own people to your assistance: and you ought not to forget this.

"With regard to events of early date, and of the greatest importance, such was the part we thought right to act; though afterwards we became your enemies. But it is you that are to blame for that; for on our requesting an alliance with you, when the Thebans had used violence towards us, you rejected our suit, and told us to apply to the Athenians, since they were near to us, whereas you lived far away from us.

In the war, however, you neither suffered, nor would have suffered, any improper treatment from us.

But if we would not revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we did no wrong in that; for it was they who assisted us against the Thebans, when you refused; and to give them up would not then have been honourable—especially as we had taken them for allies after receiving good from them, and at our own request, and had shared the rights of citizenship with them—but it was only reasonable that we should heartily obey their commands.