History of the Peloponnesian War

The Athenians were aware that they were making these preparations from a conviction of their weakness; and wishing to show that it was not a correct opinion, but that they were able, without moving the squadron stationed against Lesbos, at the same time to repel with ease that which was coming against them from the Peloponnese, they manned a hundred ships, going on board themselves, (with the exception of the knights and the pentacosio-medimni,) and their resident aliens; and having put out to the isthmus, they made both a display [of their power], and descents on whatever parts of the Peloponnese they pleased.

When the Lacedaemonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought that what had been told them by the Lesbians was not true; and considering themselves in a strait, as their allies at the same time had not joined them, and the thirty Athenian ships cruising round the Peloponnese were reported to be ravaging the land near their city, they returned home.

Afterwards, however, they prepared a fleet to send to Lesbos, and gave orders to the different states for ships to the number of forty, and appointed Alcidas, who was to conduct the expedition, their high-admiral.

The Athenians, too, returned with their hundred ships, when they saw that the Lacedaemonians had done so.

At the time that this squadron was at sea, they had about the largest number of ships they had ever possessed at once, in effective and fine condition : (though they had as many, or even more, at the beginning of the war.)

For a hundred kept guard round Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, while another hundred were cruising about the Peloponnese, besides those at Potidaea and in other places; so that altogether there were two hundred and fifty [in service] in the course of that one summer. And it was this, in conjunction with Potidaea, that most exhausted their revenues.

For at Potidaea the number of heavy-armed that kept guard at two drachmas a day,

(for each man received one for himself and another for his servant,) was at first three thousand; and not fewer than these remained there to the end of the siege, besides one thousand six hundred with Phormio, who went away before it was concluded while all the ships, too, received the same pay. In this way then was their money heedlessly lavished at first; and such was the largest number of ships manned by them.

At the same time that the Lacedaemonians were in the neighbourhood of the isthmus, the Mytilenaeans marched by land, both themselves and their auxiliaries, against Methymna, in hope of its being betrayed to them. After assaulting the city, when they did not succeed as they had expected to do, they withdrew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, and having rendered the condition of those towns more secure. and strengthened the fortifications, they returned home.

When they had retired, the Methymnaeans marched against Antissa; and being defeated by the inhabitants and their auxiliaries in a sortie that was made, many of them were slain, and the remainder retreated as quickly as possible.

The Athenians, on receiving this intelligence of the Mytilenaeans' commanding the country, and their own troops not being sufficient to keep them in check, sent, about the beginning of autumn, Paches son of Epicurus as commander, with a thousand heavy-armed of their own;

who having themselves rowed their ships, arrived at Mytilene, and enclosed it all round with a single wall; forts being built on some of the strongest points of it.

Thus the place was vigorously blockaded on both sides, by land and by sea; and the commencement of winter was near at hand.

The Athenians, being in want of money for the siege, although they had among themselves for the first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents, despatched to their allies also twelve ships to levy subsidies, and Lysicles with five others in command of them.

Accordingly he levied them in various places, cruising about; and having gone up the country from Myus in Caria, across the plain of the Maeander, as far as the hill of Sandius, he was both slain himself and many of the army besides, in an attack made by the Carians and the people of Anaea.

The same winter the Plataeans, (for they were still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians,) when distressed by the failure of their provisions, and when there was no hope of aid from Attica, and no other means of safety presented itself, both themselves and the Athenians who were besieged with them formed a design, in which they were at first unanimous, for all to sally forth and pass the walls of the enemy, if they could force their way over them; the attempt having been suggested to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, and Eupomidas son of Daïmachus, who was also one of their generals.

Subsequently half of them shrank from it, thinking it a great risk; but about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persevered in the attempt, [which they effected] in the following manner.

They made ladders to suit the height of the enemy's wall, measuring by the layers of bricks, where the wall looking toward them happened to be imperfectly whitewashed. Now many counted the layers at the same time; and though some would naturally miss the correct calculation, the majority would attain it; especially as they counted them many times over, and were also at no great distance, but the wall was easily observed by them as far as they wished.

In this way they ascertained the proper length of the ladders, guessing the measure from the thickness of the bricks.

Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was of the following construction. It consisted of two lines round the place, one against the Plataeans, and another in case any one should attack them on the outside from Athens; and the lines were about sixteen feet apart.

In this interval then of the sixteen feet there were quarters built, and partitioned out amongst the soldiers that were on guard; and these were continuous, so that it appeared but one thick wall, with battlements on each side.

At the distance of every ten battlements there were towers, of considerable size, and of the same breadth as the wall, reaching both to its inner and its outer front, so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but they passed through the middle of them.

During the nights therefore, whenever it was stormy and wet weather, they used to leave the battlements, and to keep watch from the towers, as they were only at a short distance one from another, and were covered in above. Such then was the nature of the wall by which the Plataeans were enclosed.

When they had made their preparations, having watched for a stormy night of wind and rain, and at the same time moonless, they went forth under the guidance of those who had been the authors of the enterprise. In the first place then they crossed the ditch which ran round their city, and then came up to the enemy's wall, unperceived by the sentinels; for they did not see before them in the dark, and did not hear them owing to the wind, which drowned with its clatter the noise of their approach;

besides, they went far apart from each other, that their arms might not clash together and betray them. They were also lightly armed, and had only the left foot shod, for security against slipping in the mire.

So they came up to the battlements at one of the spaces between the towers, knowing that they were deserted. First came those who carried the ladders, which they planted; then twelve lightarmed, with only a dagger and a breastplate, proceeded to mount, Ammias son of Coroelius leading them, and being the first to mount, and after him his followers, six going to each of the towers. Next after them came another party of light-armed, with darts, whose shields, that they might the more easily advance, others carried in the rear, and were ready to hand them to them whenever they came to the enemy.

When a considerable number had got up, the sentinels in the towers discovered it; for one of the Plataeans, in laying hold of the battlements, threw down a the from them, which made a noise as it fell.

And immediately a shout was raised, and the troops rushed to the wall, for they did not know what the alarm was, the night being dark, and the weather stormy; and besides, those of the Plataeans who had been left behind in the town sallied forth, and made an attack on the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side t where their men were getting over, that they might pay as little attention as possible to them.

Thus, though they were alarmed, and stood to their several posts, no one ventured to go to the rescue beyond his own station, but they were at a loss to conjecture what was going on.

Meanwhile their three hundred, whose orders were to give aid at whatever point it might be necessary, proceeded outside the wall in the direction of the shout.

Fire-signals of an attack from the enemy were likewise raised towards Thebes; but the Plataeans in the city also raised many others, which had been prepared beforehand for this purpose, that the indications of the enemy's signals might be indistinct, and so [their friends] might not come to their aid, thinking the business something different from what it really was, till those of their own number who had gone out should have escaped and gained their safety.

In the mean time, with regard to the party of Plataeans that were scaling the wall, when the first of them had mounted, and after putting the sentinels to the sword, had taken possession of each of the two towers, they posted themselves in them, and kept guard, to prevent any reinforcement coming through them; and when they had raised ladders to them from the wall, and sent up a considerable party of men, those at the towers kept in check with their missiles, both from above and below, such as were coming to the rescue; while the other and greater part of them had in the mean time planted many ladders, and thrown down the battlements, and were passing over between the towers.

As each successively effected his passage, he took his stand on the edge of the ditch; and thence they used their bows and darts against any one that came to the rescue along the wall, and tried to stop the passage [of their comrades].

When all were over, those on the towers descended—the last of them with great difficulty— and proceeded to the ditch; and in the mean time the three hundred were coming against them with torches.

Now the Plataeans, as they stood in the dark on the edge of the ditch, had a better view of them, and discharged their arrows and darts against the exposed parts of their bodies; while they themselves, in the obscurity of their position, were the less acen for the torches; so that even the last of the Plataeans got clear over the ditch, though with difficulty and by a violent effort;

for ice had frozen over it, not strong enough to allow of their walking on it, but rather watery, as it usually is with a wind more east than north; and the night being somewhat snowy in consequence of such a wind, had swollen the water in it, which they crossed with their heads barely above it. But at the same time their escape was mainly effected through the violence of the storm.

Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went in a body along the road leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates on their right, thinking that the Peloponnesians would least suspect their taking that road, towards their enemies' country; and in the mean time they saw them in pursuit with torches along the road to Cithaeron and the Oak-heads, in the direction of Athens.

So after they had gone six or seven stades along the road to Thebes, they then turned off, and took that which leads to the mountain, to Erythrae, and Hysiae; and having reached the hills, they escaped to Athens, to the number of two hundred and twelve out of one originally greater; for some of them turned back again into the city before they passed over the wall, and one bowman was taken prisoner at the outer ditch. So the Peloponnesians gave up the pursuit and returned to their posts;

while the Plataeans in the town, knowing nothing of what had happened, but having been informed by those who returned that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was day, and wished to make a truce for taking up their dead; when, however, they knew the truth, they ceased from their application. In this way then the party of Plataeans passed over the wall and were saved.

At the close of the same winter, Salaethus the Lacedaemonian was sent out from Lacedaemon in a trireme to Mytilene; and having gone by sea to Pyrrha, and thence by land, he entered Mytilene unobserved, along the bed of a torrent, where the lines round the town were passable, and told the magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica, and at the same time the ships would come which were to have assisted them before; and that he himself had been despatched in advance on this account, and to attend to all other matters.

The Mytilenaeans therefore took fresh courage, and thought less of coming to terms with the Athenians. And so ended this winter, and the fourth year of the war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

The following summer, after the Peloponnesians had despatched Alcidas, who was their high-admiral, (for they had conferred that office upon him,) with the two and forty ships to Mytilene, they themselves and their allies made an irruption into Attica; that the Athenians, being harassed both ways, might be the less able to send succours against the slips that were sailing to Mytilene.

The commander in this irruption was Cleomenes, as representative of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who was king, and still a minor, and Cleomenes was his father's brother.

They ravaged therefore both the parts which had been devastated before, if there were any thing that had shot up again, and all that had been passed over in their previous irruptions. And this invasion was most severely felt by the Athenians, next to the second;

for continually expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement performed by their ships, which they thought had by this time made their passage, they went on committing general devastation. When, however, none of the results which they expected was obtained, and when their provisions had failed, they returned, and were dispersed through their several countries.

The Mytilenaeans, meanwhile, as the ships from the Peloponnese had not come to them, but were wasting the time, and as their provisions had failed, were compelled to come to terms with the Athenians, by the following circumstances.

Since even Salaethus himself no longer expected the arrival of the fleet, he equipped as heavy-armed soldiers the commons who had before been only light-armed, with a view to sallying out against the Athenians;

but as soon as they were in possession of arms, they no longer obeyed their commanders, but collecting in groups, ordered those in power to bring the provision-stores into public view, and divide them amongst all; or they would themselves make terms with the Athenians, and deliver up the city.

The members of the government, knowing that they would not be able to prevent them, and that they would themselves be exposed to danger if excluded from the arrangement, made a general agreement with Paches and the army, that the Athenians should be at liberty to adopt what measures they chose respecting the Mytilenaeans; that they should receive the army into the city, and send ambassadors to Athens to plead their cause; and that until they returned, Paches should neither throw into prison, nor reduce to slavery, nor put to death, any of the Mytilenaeans. This was the nature of the agreement:

but those of the inhabitants who had been most prominent in negotiating with the Lacedaemonians, were very much alarmed when the army entered the city, and could not restrain themselves, but went and seated themselves by the altars, notwithstanding [the assurances that had been given]. Paches, however, raised them up with a promise to do them no harm, and deposited them in Tenedos until the Athenians should have come to some determination about them.

He also sent some triremes to Antissa, and won the place over; and arranged all other matters concerning the forces as he pleased.

Now the Peloponnesians on board the forty ships, who ought with all speed to have joined the Mytilenaeans, both lost time in cruising about the Peloponnese itself, and proceeded at their leisure during the rest of the voyage, unobserved by the Athenians at home, until they touched at Delos; after leaving which island they came to land at Icarus and Myconus, and there received the first tidings of the capture of Mytilene.

Wishing, however, to know the exact truth of the matter, they put into Embatum in the Erythraean territory seven days having elapsed from he taking of Mytilene when they did so. After hearing the exact truth, they consulted on the present state of affairs; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:

Alcidas, and the rest of my Peloponnesian colleagues in the command of the forces, my opinion is that we should sail straightway to Mytilene, before we have been heard of.

For in all probability we shall find great want of watchfulness, as is usual on the part of men who have but recently taken possession of a city. By sea, indeed, where they have no thought of any enemy attacking them, and where our strength mainly lies, this will be altogether the case; and even their land-forces are likely to be dispersed through the houses too carelessly.

If then we were to fall upon them suddenly and in the night, I hope that with the aid of those in the city, (if, indeed, there be any one left who wishes us well,) possession of the place might be gained.

And let us not shrink from the danger, but consider that the proverbial surprises of war are nothing else than chances such as this; which if any one should guard against in his own case, and avail himself of them, when he saw them in the case of his enemy, he would be a most successful general.

Such was his speech; but he did not persuade Alcidas. On the other hand, some of the exiles from Ionia and the Lesbians who were on board with them, advised, that since lie was afraid of that danger, he should seize one of the Ionian cities, or Cyme in Aeolia; so that having a city as the base of their operations they might excite Ionia to revolt: (and there was reason to hope this, for their arrival was unwelcome to no one.) If then they should take away from the Athenians this their chief source of revenue, and if at the same time they should themselves incur the expense of keeping a fleet of observation, they thought they should prevail on Pisuthnes also to take part in the war with them.

He did not, however, accede to this proposal either; but was most strongly inclined, since he had come too late for Mytilene, to reach the Peloponnese again as quickly as possible.

Weighing therefore from Embatum, he coasted along, and having touched at Myonnesus, a place belonging to the Teians, he butchered most of the prisoners he had taken on his passage.

On his coming to anchor at Ephesus ambassadors came from the Samians of Anaea, and told him that he was not liberating Greece in the right way, by destroying men who were neither raising their hands against him, nor were hostile to him, but allies of the Athenians through necessity; and if he did not cease, he would bring few of his enemies into friendship with him, but would find many more of his friends become his enemies.

He was convinced [by these arguments], and set at liberty all the Chians he had still in his hands, and some of the others. [ And there had been very many taken by him]; for at the sight of his ships the men did not fly, but rather came to them, thinking they were from Athens; and they had not even the slightest expectation, that while the Athenians had command of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would dare to cross over to Ionia.

From Ephesus Alcidas sailed as quickly as possible, and took to flight. For while still lying at anchor off Clarus, he had been seen by the Salaminian and the Paralus ships, (which happened to be sailing from Athens,) and fearing pursuit, he took his course across the open sea, intending to make no land voluntarily but the Peloponnese.

Now tidings of him had been sent to Paches and the Athenians from the Erythraean country, and indeed from every quarter; for as Ionia had no fortified towns, the alarm was great lest the Peloponnesians in coasting along, even though they did not intend to stay, might at the same time assault and plunder the cities. And now the Paralus and Salaminian, having seen him at Clarus, themselves brought intelligence of the fact. Accordingly he made chase with all speed, and continued in pursuit of him as far as the isle of Patmos, but returned when he found that he was not within distance to be overtaken.

He considered it, however, a lucky thing, as he did not fall in with them out at sea, that they had not been overtaken any where near shore, and obliged to form an encampment, and so give his forces the trouble of watching and blockading them.

As he coasted along on his return, he touched, amongst other places, at Notium, [the port] of the Colophonians, where they had settled after the capture of the upper city by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been called in by individuals on the ground of a factious quarrel. The city was taken about the time that the second irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica took place.

Those then who had fled for refuge to Notium, and settled there, having again split into factions, one party introduced and kept in the fortified quarter of the town an auxiliary force of Arcadians and barbarians sent by Pisuthnes; and those of the Colophonians in the upper city who formed the Median party, went in with them and joined their community;