Commentaries on the Civil War

Perseus Latin · Perseus Latin · 255 sections

3.60.1
Caesar not thinking it a proper time for animadversion, and regarding them greatly on account of their valour, declined all public notice of the affair, and contented himself with reprimanding them in private, admonishing them to expect every thing from his friendship, and to measure their future hopes by the experience of what he had already done for them. This rebuke, however, disgusted them greatly, and very much lessened their credit with the whole army, which they easily perceived, as well from the raillery they were often forced to bear, as in consequence of the secret reproaches and sense of their own minds. Thus prompted by shame, and perhaps imagining they were not cleared, but reserved to a more favourable opportunity, they resolved to desert, to try their fortunes elsewhere, and search for new friendships. Having imparted their design to a few of their clients, whom they judged fit instruments for so black a treason, they first attempted to murder C. Volusenus, general of the cavalry (as was afterwards known, when the war was over), that by so signal a piece of service they might the more effectually recommend themselves to Pompey’s favour. But finding that design attended with great hazard, and that no favourable opportunity offered for putting it in execution, they borrowed all the money they could, under pretence of reimbursing the troops, and making restitution; and having bought up a great number of horses, went over to Pompey, with those whom they had made acquainted with their design.
3.61.1
As they were persons of noble birth, liberally educated, came with a great train of horses and servants, had been highly honoured by Caesar, and were universally esteemed on account of their valour, Pompey carried them ostentatiously over all the camp, triumphing in this new and unusual acquisition; for till then, neither horse nor foot-soldier had deserted from Caesar to Pompey; whereas scarce a day passed without some desertion from Pompey’s army, especially among the new levies in Epirus, Aetolia, and those countries that had declared for Caesar. The brothers being well acquainted with the condition of Caesar’s camp, what was wanting to complete the fortifications, where the foible of the lines lay, the particular times, distance of places, strength and vigilance of the guards, with the temper and character of the officers who commanded in every post, made an exact report of all to Pompey.
3.62.1
Upon this intelligence, having already formed the design of forcing Caesar’s lines, he ordered the soldiers to make coverings of osier for their helmets, and provide themselves with fascines. This done, he embarked by night, in boats and small barks, a great number of light-armed troops and archers, with the fascines for filling up Caesar’s trenches; and having drawn together sixty cohorts from the greater camp and forts, led them about midnight towards that part of the enemy’s lines nearest the sea, a good distance from the main camp. Thither likewise he despatched the barks, on board of which were the light-armed troops and fascines, together wih all the galleys that lay at Dyrrhachium, giving each their particular instructions. Lentulus Marcellinus the questor, with the ninth legion, had charge of this part of the fortifications: and as his health was but infirm, Caesar had joined Fulvius Posthumus with him in tilhcommand.
3.63.1
This place was guarded by a ditch, fifteen feet broad, with a rampart towards the enemy, ten feet high, and of equal thickness. Behind this, at the distance of six hundred feet, was another rampart, somewhat lower than the former, and fronting the contrary way. Caesar, apprehending an attack from the sea, had raised this double rampart, some days before, that he might be able to defend himself against the enemy, should they charge him on both sides at once. But the extent of the circumvallation, and the continued labour of so many days, in inclosing a space of eighteen miles, had not allowed us time to finish the work. Accordingly, the line of communication, which ran along the sea-side, and was to have joined these two ramparts, was not yet completed. This Pompey was informed of by the Allobrogian brothers, which proved of fatal consequence to us. For upon guard, near the sea, suddenly the Pompeians arrived about day-break, and surprised them with their unexpected appearance. At the same time the troops that came by sea, launched their darts against the outward rampart and began to fill up the ditch with fascines; while the legionary soldiers, planting their scaling-ladders against the inner works, and plying those that defended them with darts and engines, spread a general terror over that part of the camp, which was still increased by the multitude of archers that came pouring upon them from all sides. The osiers they had bound round their helmets, contributed greatly to defend them from the stones thrown down from the rampart, which were the only weapons we had. At last, all things going against us, and our resistance becoming every moment more languid, the enemy discovered the defect before spoken of in our lines; and landing their men between the two ramparts, where the line of communication towards the sea remained unfinished, they attacked our soldiers in the rear, and obliged them to abandon both sides of the works.
3.64.1
Marcellinus hearing of this disorder, detached some cohorts to sustain the flying troops: but as the rout was become general, they could neither persuade them to rally, nor were able themselves to withstand the enemy’s charge. The like happened to a second detachment; insomuch that the several supplies sent, by catching the general terror, served only to add to the confusion and danger; for the multitude of runaways rendered the retreat the more difficult. In this action, the eaglebearer of the ninth legion finding himself dangerously wounded, and that his strength began to fail, called to some troopers who passed by, and said: I have preserved to the last moment of my life, with the greatest care, this eagle, with which I have been intrusted; and, now I am dying, I return it to Caesar, with the same fidelity. Carry it to him, I beseech you; nor suffer Caesar’s arms to experience, in losing it, an ignominy, with which they have been hitherto unacquainted. Thus the eagle was preserved ; but all the centurions of the first cohort were slain, except the first of the Principes.
3.65.1
And now the Pompeians, having made great slaughter of our men, approached the quarters of Marcellinus, to the no small terror of the rest of the cohorts; when Mark Antony, who commanded in the nearer redoubts, upon notice of what passed, was seen descending from the higher ground, at the head of twelve cohorts. His arrival put a stop to the enemy’s progress, and by enabling our men to recover from their extreme terror, restored them to their wonted courage. Soon after Caesar arrived in person, with some troops, being apprised of the attack by the smoke of the forts, the usual signal on these occasions; and perceiving the loss he had sustained, and that Pompey had forced the lines, being able to forage, and having an easy communication with the sea; he quitted his former project, which had proved unsuccessful, and encamped as near Pompey as he could.
3.66.1
When the intrenchments were finished, Caesar had notice from his scouts, that a certain number of the enemy’s cohorts, which to them appeared a complete legion, were retired behind a wood, and seemed to be on their march to the old camp. The situation of the two armies was this: some days before, when Caesar’s ninth legion was sent to oppose a body of Pompey’s troops, they thought proper to intrench themselves upon an opposite hill, and form a camp there. This camp bordered upon a wood, and was not above four hundred paces from the sea. But afterwards, for certain reasons, Caesar removed a little beyond that post; and Pompey, a few days after, took possession of it. But as his design was to place several legions there; leaving the inner rampart standing, he surrounded it with greater works. Thus the smaller camp, inclosed within one of larger circumference, served by way of a castle or citadel. He likewise carried an intrenchment from the left angle of the camp to the river, through a space of about four hundred paces, which enabled him to water freely and without danger. But he too, soon after, changed his mind, for reasons which it is not needful to repeat here; and abandoned the place, which thereby was left several days without troops, though the fortifications remained entire.
3.67.1
Hither the scouts reported they saw the standard of a legion carried; which was likewise confirmed by those who were stationed in the higher forts. The place was about five hundred paces distant from Pompey’s new camp. Caesar, desirous to repair the loss he had sustained, and hoping he might be able to surprise this legion, left two cohorts in his intrenchments, to prevent any suspicion of his design; and with thirty-three more, amongst which number was the ninth legion, which had lost many centurions and soldiers, marched by a different rout, as privately as he could, against the legion which Pompey had lodged in the lesser camp. Neither was he deceived in his first conjecture: for he arrived before Pompey could have notice of his design; and though the intrenchments were strong, yet charging the enemy briskly with his left wing, where he himself commanded in person, he quickly drove them from the rampart. But as the gates were secured by a barricade, they still maintained the fight here for some time, our men endeavouring to break in, and the enemy to defend the camp. T. Pulcia, who betrayed the army of C. Antony, as we have related above, gave signal proofs of his valour on this occasion. But our men, at last, prevailed; and having cut down the barricade, broke first into the greater camp, and afterwards into the fort within it, whither the legion had retired, some of whom were slain, endeavouring to defend themselves.
3.68.1
But fortune, whose influence is very great, as in other things, so particularly in war; often effects mighty changes from the most trifling causes: as happened upon this occasion. For the cohorts of Caesar’s right wing being unacquainted with the situation of the camp, and mistaking the rampart which led to the river for one of its sides, marched on that way in quest of a gate; but perceiving at length their error, and that nobody defend. ed the intrenchment, they immediately mounted the rampart, and were followed by the whole cavalry.
3.69.1
This delay saved the enemy: for Pompey, having notice of what passed, brought up the fifth legion to sustain his party; so that at one and the same instant, his cavalry approached ours, and his troops were seen advancing in order of battle, by those who had taken possession of the camp: which quickly changed the face of affairs. For Pompey’s legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy succours, sallied by the Decuman port, and briskly charged our cohorts. On the other hand, Caesar’s cavalry, who had entered, by a narrow breach in the rampart, foreseeing that a retreat would be extremely difficult, began betimes to think of flying. The right wing which had no communication with the left, oberving the consternation of the cavalry, and fearing they should be overpowered within the camp, retired the same way they had entered. Many,to avoid being engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves from the rampart, which was ten feet high, into the ditch; where the first ranks being trodden to death, their bodies afforded a safe passage to those that followed. The left wing, who from the rampart whence they had driven the enemy, saw Pompey advancing against them, and their own men flyng; fearing to be entangled in the defiles, as they had the enemy upon them, both within and without the camp, retreated the same way they came. Nothing was to be seen but consternation, flying, and disorder: insomuch that all Caesar’s efforts to rally his troops were fruitless. If he seized any by the arm, they struggled till they got away. If he laid hold of the colours, they left them in his hands. Not a man could be prevailed on to face about.
3.70.1
In this calamity, what saved the army from entire destruction was, that Pompey, apprehending an ambuscade (probably because the success was beyond his hopes, as a little before he had seen his men worsted and put to flight), durst not, for some time, approach the intrenchments; and his cavalry were retarded in the pursuit by Caesar’s troops, who were possessed of all the gates and defiles. Be that as it will, a small matter proved of very great consequence to both parties: for the intrenchment between the camp and the river, stopped the course of Caesar’s victory, when he had already forced Pompey’s lines: and the same, by retarding the pursuit of his enemy, saved the army from destruction.
3.71.1
In these two actions, Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty private men, thirty officers, and several knights of note, as Flavius Tuticanus Gallus, a senator’s son; C. Felginus, of Placentia; A. Gravius, of Puteoli; and M. Sacrativir, of Capua. But the greatest part of these died without wounds, being trodden to death in the ditch, about the works, and on the banks of the river, occasioned by the flight and terror of their own men. He lost also thirty-two colours. Pompey was saluted emperor on this occasion; a title which he bore ever after, and suffered himself to be accosted by: but neither in the letters which he wrote, nor in his consular ensigns, did he think proper to assume the laurel. The prisoners were delivered up to Labienus at his own request; and this deserter, brutal and cruel as usual, diverted himself with insulting them in their calamity; and asked them sarcastically, if it was usual for veterans to run away; after which, he caused them all to be put to death.
3.72.1
This success gave such confidence and spirit to the Pompeian party, that they now no longer took any concern about the conduct of the war, but began to consider themselves as already victorious. They never reflected on the inconsiderable number of our troops, the disadvantage of the ground, the narrow passes we were engaged in, by their having first possession of the camp, the double danger, both within and without the fortification, and the separation of the two wings of the army, which hindered them from mutually succouring one another. They forgot that the advantage they had gained, was not the effect of a brisk and vigorous attack; and that our men had suffered more by crowding upon one another in the narrow passes, than by the sword of the enemy. In fine, they never called to mind the uncertain chance of war, and upon what minute causes good or bad success often depends; how a groundless suspicion, a panic terror, or a religious scruple, has frequently been productive ofthe most fatal events; when either by the misconduct of a general, or the terror of a tribune, some false persuasion has been suffered to take root in an army. But as if the victory had been purely the effect of their valour, and no change of fortune was to be apprehended, they every where proclaimed and made public the success of this day.
3.73.1
Caesar, seeing all his former projects disconcerted, resolved to submit to fortune, and entirely change the manner of the war. He therefore called in all his forces from the forts, gave up the design of inclosing Pompey, and having assembled his army, addressed them as follows: That they ought not to be discouraged, or give way to consternation, upon what had lately happened, but oppose their many successful engagements to one slight and inconsiderable check. That fortune had already befriended them greatly, in the reduction of Italy without bloodshed; in the conquest of the two Spains, though defended by warlike troops, under the conduct of skilful and experienced leaders; and in the subjection of the neighbouring provinces, whence they could be plentifully supplied with corn. In fine, they ought to call to mind, how happily they had passed into Greece, through the midst of the enemy’s fleets, though possessed of all the coasts and havens. If they were not successful in every thing, they must endeavour, by prudence, to overcome the disappointments of fortune; and attribute their late disaster to the caprice of that goddess rather than to any fault on their side. That he had led them to an advantageous ground, and put them in the possession of the enemy’s camp, after driving them from all their works. If either some sudden consternation, the mistaking their way, or any other mishap, had snatched an apparent and almost certain victory out of their hands, they ought to exert their utmost endeavours to repair that disgrace, which would turn their misfortunes to a benefit, as happened at Gergovia, where those who at first dreaded to encounter the enemy, demanded earnestly in the end to be led to battle.
3.74.1
Having made this speech, he contented himself with stigmatizing, and reducing to private men, some of the standard bearers; for the whole army were so grieved at their loss, and so desirous of expunging the stain their glory had received, that there was no occasion either for the tribunes or the centurions to remind them of their duty; nay, they even undertook to punish themselves by the severest impositions, and demanded with great outcries to be led against the enemy; being seconded by some centurions of the first rank, I who, touched with their remonstrances, were for continuing in the post they then possessed, and putting all to the hazard of a battle. But Caesar did not think it prudent to expose to an action troops that had been just worsted, and in whom might remain too deep impressions of their late fright. He was for allowing them time to recover themselves; and having quitted his works, thought it needful to provide for the security of his convoys.
3.75.1
Accordingly, after proper care taken of the sick and wounded, and as soon as night approached, he sent all the baggage privately towards Apollonia, under a guard of one legion, with orders not to halt till they had reached the place. This affair despatched, he made two legions remain in the camp, and marching out all the rest about three in the morning at several gates, ordered them to follow the same route the baggage had taken. Soon after, that his departure might not have the appearance of a flight, and yet be known to the enemy as late as possible, he ordered the usual signal to be given, and setting out with the rest of his forces, lost sight of the camp in a moment. Pompey hearing of his retreat, prepared to follow him without delay, and hoping to surprise the army in its march, whilst encumbered with baggage, and not yet removed from its consternation, drew out all his troops, and sent out all his cavalry before to retard our rear, which, however, he could not overtake, because Caesar marching without baggage, had got a great way before him. But when we came to the river Genusus, we found the banks so steep and difficult, that before all the men could get over, Pompey’s cavalry came up, and fell upon our hindmost battalions. Caesar sent his horse to oppose them, intermixed with some light-armed troops; who charged with that vigour and success, as to put them all to rout, and leave a considerable number dead upon the field, and return without loss to the main body of their army.
3.76.1
Having completed the intended march of that day, and brought his army over the Genusus, he took up his quarters in his old camp at Asparagium, suffering none of the soldiers to stroll without the rampart, and charging the cavalry, who had been sent out under pretence of foraging, to return immediately to the Decuman port. Pompey likewise having completed that day’s march, encamped at his old post at Asparagium, where the troops having nothing to do, because the works were still entire; some made long excursions in quest of wood and forage; others who had come almost without any baggage, by reason the march was undertaken on a sudden, enticed by the nearness of their former camp, laid down their arms in their tents, quitted the intrenchments, and went to fetch what they had left behind them. This rendering them unable to pursue, as Caesar had foreseen; about noon, he gave the signal for decamping, led forth his troops, and doubling that day’s march, gained eight miles upon Pompey, who could not follow him by reason his troops were dispersed.
3.77.1
Next day Caesar decamped again at three in the morning, having sent away his baggage over night, that if he should find himself under a necessity of fighting, he might have his army clear of all encumbrance. The same he did the following days; by which means, though he had very difficult ways to pass, and some great rivers to cross, he suffered no loss during the whole march. For Pompey, after the first day’s hinderance, endeavouring in vain by long and forced marches to overtake Caesar, gave over the pursuit on the fourth, and began to think of taking other measures.
3.78.1
Caesar was under a necessity of going to Apollonia, to leave his wounded there, to pay his army, confirm his friends in their duty, and garrison the towns that had submitted. But he took no longer time to these affairs, than the importance of his other engagements would allow. For fearing that Pompey might surprise Domitius Calvinus, he put himself in full march to join him. The scheme he proceeded on was this: that if Pompey took the same route, he must leave the sea, the forces he had at Dyrrhachium, with all his ammunition and provision; which would bring them upon equal terms: if he passed into Italy, Caesar purposed to join Domitius, and march to its defence by the coast of Illyricum: in fine, should he fall upon Apollonia and Oricum, and endeavour to exclude him from the sea coast; in that case he reckoned to oblige him, by attacking Metellus Scipio, to leave every thing to succour him. Caesar therefore despatched couriers to Domitius, to acquaint him with his design; and leaving four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, with the sick and wounded, began his march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, on his side, guessing Caesar’s design, made what haste he could to join Scipio, that if Caesar should march that way, he might prevent his being overpowered; but should he still keep near Corcyra, and the sea, because of the legions and cavalry he expected from Italy; in that case, he purposed to fall upon Domitius with all his forces.
3.79.1
For these reasons both generals studied despatch, as well to afford timely succour to their friends, as not to miss an opportunity of distressing their enemies. But Caesar had turned off to Apollonia; whereas Pompey took the nearest way through Candavia for Macedonia. It happened, too, very days had been encamped near Scipio, quitted that station for the convenience of provisions, and was upon his march to Heraclea Sentica, a city of the Candavians; so that chance seemed to throw him directly in Pompey’s way, which Caesar had not then the least knowledge of. Pompey, too, having sent letters through all the states and provinces, relating to the action at Dyrrhachium, with representations that far exceeded the truth; a rumour began to prevail, that Caesar had been defeated with the loss of almost all his forces, and was forced to fly before Pompey. These reports raised him many enemies on his march, and induced some states to throw off their allegiance; whence it happened, that the couriers mutually sent by Caesar and Domitius, were all intercepted. But the Allobrogians in the train of Aegus and Roscillus, who, as we have seen before, had deserted from Caesar to Pompey, meeting some of Domitius’s scouts; either out of ancient custom, because they had served together in the Gallic wars; or from a motive of vain-glory; informed them of all that had passed; of Pompey’s victory, and Caesar’s retreat. Advice being given of this to Calvinus, who was not above four hours' march from the enemy, he avoided the danger by a timely retreat, and joined Caesar near Aeginium, a town on the borders of Thessaly.
3.80.1
After the junction of the two armies, Caesar arrived at Gomphi, the first town of Thessaly, as you come from Epirus. A few months before, the inhabitants had of their own accord sent ambassadors to Caesar, to make an offer of what their country afforded, and petition for a garrison. But the report of the action at Dyrrhachium, with many groundless additions, had by this time reached their ears. And therefore Androsthenes, pretor of Thessaly, choosing rather to be the companion of Pompey’s good fortune, than associate with Caesar in his adversity, ordered all the people, whether slaves or free, to assemble in the town; and having shut the gates against Caesar, sent letters to Scipio and Pompey to come to his assistance, intimating, That the town was strong enough to hold out if they used despatch, but by no means in condition to sustain a long siege. Scipio, on advice of the departure of the armies from Dyrrhacium, was come to Larissa with his legions; and Pompey was yet far enough distant from Thessaly. Caesar having fortified his camp, ordered mantelets, hurdles, and scaling-ladders to be prepared for a sudden attack; and then exhorting his men, represented, Of how great consequence it was to render themselves masters of an opulent city, abounding in all things needful for the supply of their walls, and by the terror of whose punishment other states would be awed into submission; and this, he told them, must be done quickly, before any succours could arrive. Accordingly, seizing the opportunity offered by the uncommon ardour of the troops, he attacked the town the same day about three in the afternoon; and having made himself master of it before sun-set, gave it up to be plundered. From Gomphi, Caesar marched directly to Metropolis, and arrived before they were acquainted with the misfortune of their neighbours.
3.81.1
The Metropolitans at first following the example of Gomphi, to which they were moved by the same reports, shut their gates and manned the walls. But no sooner came they to understand the fate of their neighbour city, by some prisoners whom Caesar had produced for that end, than immediately they admitted him into the town. He suffered no hostilities to be committed, nor any harm to be done them; and so powerful was the example from the different treatment of these two cities, that not a single state in Thessaly refused to submit to Caesar, and receive his orders, except Larissa; which was awed by the numerous army of Metellus Scipio. As the country was good and covered with corn, which was near ripe, Caesar took up his quarters there, judging it a proper place to wait for Pompey in, and render the theatre of the war.
3.82.1
A few days after, Pompey arrived in Thessaly, and joining Metellus Scipio, harangued both armies. He first thanked his own for their late services, and then turning to Scipio’s troops, exhorted them to put in for their share of the booty, which the victory already obtained gave them the fairest prospect of. Both armies being received into one camp, he shared all the honours of command with Scipio, ordered a pavilion to be erected for him, and the trumpets to sound before it. This increase of Pompey’s forces, by the conjunction of two mighty armies, raised the confidence of his followers, and their assurance of victory to such a degree, that all delays were considered as a hinderance of their return to Italy; insomuch that if Pompey on any occasion acted with slowness and circumspection, they failed not to cry out, That he industriously protracted an affair, for the despatch of which one day was sufficient, in the view of gratifying his ambition for command, and having consular and pretorian senators amongst the number of his servants. Already they began to dispute about rewards and dignities, and fixed upon the persons who were annually to succeed to the consulship. Others sued for the houses and estates of those who had followed Caesar’s party. A warm debate arose in council in relation to L. Hirrus, whom Pompey had sent against the Parthians, whether, in the next election of pretors, he should be allowed to stand candidate for that office in his absence; his friends imploring Pompey to make good the promise he had made him at his departure, and not suffer him to be deceived by depending on the general’s honour; while such as aspired to this office complained publicly,that a promise should be made to any one candidate, when all were embarked in the same cause, and shared the like dangers.
3.83.1
Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther, were openly quarrelling about the high priesthood, which Caesar was in possession of. They even descended to personal abuse, and pleaded their several pretensions; Lentulus urging the respect due to his age; Domitius, his dignity, and the interest he had in the city; and Scipio his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus impeached L. Afranius before Pompey, charging him with having occasioned the loss of the army in Spain. And L. Domitius moved in council, that after the victory, all the senators in Pompey’s army and camps, should be appointed judges, and empowered to proceed against those who had stayed in Italy, or who had appeared cool, or shown any indifference to the cause; and that three billets should be given to these judges, one for acquittance, another for condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary fine. In a word, nothing was thought on but honours, or profit, or vengeance; nor did they consider by what methods they were to conquer, but what advantage they should make of victory.
3.84.1
Caesar having provided for the subsistence of his troops, who were now no longer fatigued, and had sufficiently recovered from the consternation the different actions at Dyrrhachium had thrown them into; thought it high time to make trial how Pompey stood affected to an engagement. Accordingly he drew out his men, and formed them in order of battle; at first near his own camp, and somewhat distant from the enemy: but perceiving this had no effect upon Pompey, who still maintained his post on the eminences, he each daydrew nearer, and by that conduct animated and gave fresh courage to his soldiers. His cavalry being much inferior to the enemy’s in number, he followed the method already mentioned; of singling out the strongest and nimblest of his foot-soldiers, and accustoming them to fight intermixed with the horse; in which way of combat they were become very expert by daily practice. This disposition, joined to constant exercise, so emboldened his cavalry, that though but a thousand in number, they would upon occasion sustain the charge of Pompey’s seven thousand, even in an open plain, and appear not greatly dismayed at their multitude: nay, they actually got the better in a skirmish that happened between them, and killed Aegus the Allobrogian, one of the two brothers who deserted to Pompey, with several others of his party.
3.85.1
Pompey, whose camp was on an eminence, drew up his army at the foot of the mountain, expecting, as may be presumed, that Casar would attack him in that advantageous situation. But Caesar despairing to draw Pompey to battle on equal terms, thought it would be his best course to decamp, and be always on the march; in hopes, that by frequent shifting his ground, he might the better be supplied with provisions; and that as the enemy would not fail following him, in the frequent marches he should make, he might perhaps find an opportunity of attacking them, and forcing them to fight: at least he was sure of harassing Pompey’s army, little accustomed to these continued fatigues. Accordingly the order for marching was given, and the tents struck; when Caesar perceived that Pompey’s army, which had quitted their intrenchments, had advanced farther towards the plain than usual, so that he might engage them at a less disadvantage: whereupon, addressing himself to his soldiers, who were just ready to march out of their trenches: Let us no longer think, says he, of marching; now is the time for fighting, so long wished for; let us therefore arm ourselves with courage, and not miss so favourable and opportunity. This said, he immediately drew out his forces.
3.86.1
Pompey likewise, as was afterwards known, had resolved to offer battle, in compliance with the repeated importunities of his friends. He even said in a council of war, held some days before, that Caesar’s army would be defeated before his infantry came to engage. And when some expressed their surprise at this speech: I know, says he, that what I promise appears almost incredible; but hear the reasons on which I ground my confidence, that you may advance to battle with the greater assurance. I have persuaded the cavalry, and obtained their promise for the performance, that as soon as the armies are formed, they shall fall upon Caesar’s right wing, which they will easily be able to outflank and surround. This must infallibly occasion the immediate rout of that wing, and consequently of the rest of Caesar’s troops. without danger or loss on our side. Nor will the execution be attended with any difficulty, as we are so much superior to them in horse. Be ready therefore for battle; and since the so much desired opportunity of fighting is come, take care not to fall short of the good opinion the world entertains of your valour and experience.
3.87.1
Labienus spoke next, highly applauding this scheme of Pompey, and expressing the greatest contempt of Caesar’s army: Think not, says he, addressing himself to Pompey, that these are the legions which conquered Gaul and Germany. I was present in all those battles, and can, of my own knowledge, affirm, that but a very small part of that army now remains: great numbers have been killed, as must of necessity happen, in such a variety of conflicts: many perished during the autumnal pestilence in Apulia: many are returned to their own habitations: and not a few were left behind to guard Italy. Have you not heard, that the cohorts in garrison, at Brundusium, are made up of invalids ? The forces, which you now behold, are composed of new levies, raised in Lombardy, and the colonies beyond the Po: for the veterans, in whom consisted the main strength of the army, perished all in the two defeats at Dyrrhachium. Having finished this speech, he took an oath, which he proffered to all that were present, never to return to camp otherwise than victorious. Pompey commended his zeal, took the oath himself, and the rest followed his example, without hesitation. After these endeparted, full of joy and expectation; considering themselves as already victorious, and relying, entirely on the ability of their general; who, in an affair of that importance, they were confident would promise nothing without an assurance of success.
3.88.1
When Caesar approached Pompey’s camp, he found his army drawn up in this manner: In the left wing were the two legions delivered by Caesar, at the beginning of the quarrel, in consequence of a decree of the senate; one of which was called the first, the other the third legion: and here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio was in the centre, with the legions he had brought out of Syria. The Cilician legion, joined to the Spanish cohorts, brought over by Afranius, formed the right wing. These Pompey esteemed his best troops, distributing the less expert between the wings and the main body. He had in all a hundred and ten cohorts, amounting to five and forty thousand; besides two cohorts of volunteers, who had served under him in former wars; and who, out of affection to their old general, though their legal time was expired, flocked to his standard on this occasion, and were dispersed amongst the whole army. His other seven cohorts were left to guard the camp and the adjoining forts. As the Enipeus, a river with very steep banks, covered his right wing, he placed all his horse, slingers, and archers in the left.
3.89.1
Caesar observing his ancient custom, placed the tenth legion in the right, and the ninth in the left wing. As this last had been considerably weakened by the general actions at Dyrrhachium, he joined the eighth to it in such manner, that they formed as it were but one legion, and had orders mutually to relieve each other. His whole army amounted to fourscore cohorts, making in all twenty-two thousand men; besides two cohorts left to guard the camp. Domitius Calvinus was in the centre, Mark Antony on the left, and P. Sylla on the right. Caesar took his post opposite to Pompey, at the head of the tenth legion. And as he had observed the disposition of the enemy contrived to out-flank his right wing, to obviate that inconvenience, he made a draught of six cohorts from his rear line, formed them into a separate body, and opposed them to Pompey’s horse; instructing them in the part they were to act; and admonishing them, that the success of that day would depend chiefly on their courage. At the same time, he charged the whole army, and in particular the third line, not to advance to battle without orders; which, when he saw it proper, he would give, by making the usual signal.
3.90.1
When he was exhorting them to battle, as military custom required, and reminding them of the many favours they had, on all occasions, received at his hands, he chiefly took care to observe, That they had themselves been witnesses of his earnest endeavours after peace; that he had employed Vatinius to solicit a conference with Labienus, and sent A. Clodius to treat with Scipio; that he had pressed Libo, in the warmest manner, at Oricum, to grant him a safe conduct for his ambassadors; in a word, that he had left nothing unattempted to avoid wasting the blood of his soldiers, and to spare the commonwealth the loss of one of her armies. After this speech, observing his soldiers ardent for the fight, he ordered the trumpets to sound a charge.
3.91.1
Among the volunteers in Caesar’s army was one Crastinus, a man of distinguished courage, who the year before, had been first centurion of the tenth legion. This brave officer, as soon as the signal was given, calling to those next him: Follow me, said he, you that were formerly under my command, and acquit yourselves of the duty you owe to your general. This one battle more will crown the work, by restoring him to his proper dignity, and us to the enjoyment of our freedom. At the same time, turning to Caesar: General, says he, this day you shall be satisfied with my behaviour, and whether I live or die, I will take care to deserve your commendations. So saying he marched up to the enemy, and began the attack at the head of a hundred and twenty volunteers.
3.92.1
Between the two armies, there was an interval sufficient for the onset: but Pompey had given his troops orders to keep their ground, that Caesar’s army might have all that way to run. This he is said to have done by the advice of C. Triarius, that the enemy’s ranks might be broken and themselves put out of breath, by having so far to run; of which disorder he hoped to make an advantage. He was besides of opinion, that our javelins would have less effect, by the troops continuing in their post, than if they sprung forward at the very time they were launched; and as the soldiers would have twice as far to run as usual, they must be weary and breathless by the time they came up with the first line. But herein Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient reason; because there is a certain alacrity and ardour of mind, naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed by the desire of fighting; and which an able general, far from endeavouring to repress, will, by all methods he can devise, foment and cherish. Nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on every side, and the whole army raise a shout, in order to animate the courage of their own men, and strike terror into the enemy.
3.93.1
Caesar’s soldiers entirely defeated Pompey’s hopes, by their good discipline and experience. For, perceiving the enemy did not stir, they halted, of their own accord, in the midst of their career; and having taken a moment’s breath, put themselves, a second time, in motion; marched up in good order, flung their javelins, and then betook themselves to their swords. Nor did Pompey’s men act with less presence of mind: for they sustained our attack, kept their ranks, bore the discharge of our darts: and having launched their own, immediately had recourse to their swords. At this instant, Pompey’s horse, accompanied by the archers and slingers, attacked Caesar’s; and having compelled them to give ground, began to extend themselves to the left, in order to flank the infantry. Whereupon Caesar gave the appointed signal to the six cohorts, who fell on the enemy’s horse with such fury, that they not only drove them from the field of battle, but even compelled them to seek refuge in the highest mountains. The archers and slingers, deprived of their protection, were soon after cut to pieces. Meanwhile the six cohorts, not content with this success, wheeled round upon the enemy’s left wing, and began to charge it in the rear:
3.94.1
whereupon Caesar, perceiving the victory so far advanced, to complete it, brought up his third line, which till then had not engaged. Pompey’s infantry being thus doubly attacked, in front by fresh troops, and in rear, by the victorious cohorts, could no longer resist, but fled to their camp. Nor was Caesar mistaken in his conjecture, when, in exhorting his men, he declared that victory would depend chiefly on the six cohorts, which formed the body of reserve, and were stationed to oppose the enemy’s horse; for by them were their cavalry defeated, their archers and slingers cut to pieces, and their left wing surrounded and forced to fly.
3.94.2
Pompey seeing his cavalry routed, and that part of the army on which he chiefly depended put into disorder, despaired of being able to restore the battle, and quitted the field. Repairing immediately to his camp, he said aloud, to the centurions, who guarded the pretorian gate, so as all the soldiers might hear him: Take care of the camp, and defend it vigorously in case of an attack. I go to visit the other gates, and give orders for their defence. This said, he retired to his tent, despairing of success, yet waiting the event.
3.95.1
Caesar, having forced the Pompeians to seek refuge in their camp, and not willing to allow them time to recover From their consternation, exhorted his troops to make the best of their present victory, and vigorously attack the enemy’s intrenchments. Though the battle had lasted till noon, the weather being extremely hot; yet, prepared to encounter all difficulties, they cheerfully complied with his orders. The camp was bravely defended, for some time, by the cohorts left to guard it; and particularly by a great number of Thracians, and other barbarians, who made a very stout resistance; for as to such troops as had there sought refuge from the field of battle, they were in too great a consternation to think of any thing more than a safe retreat. It was not, however, possible for the troops posted on the rampart, long to stand the multitude of darts continually poured upon them ; which, in the end, obliged them to retire covered with wounds, and under the conduct of their tribunes and centurions, seek shelter in the mountains adjoining to the camp.
3.96.1
On entering Pompey’s camp, we found tables ready-covered, sideboards loaded with plate, and tents adorned with branches of myrtle; that of L. Lentulus, with some others, was shaded with ivy. Every thing gave proofs of the highest luxury, and an assured expectation of victory; whence it was easy to see, that they little dreamed of the issue of that day, since, intent only on voluptuous refinements, they pretended, with troops immersed in luxury, to oppose Caesar’s army accustomed to fatigue, and inured to the want of necessaries.
3.96.2
Pompey finding our men had forced his intrenchments, mounted his horse, quitted his armour for a habit more suitable to his ill fortune, and withdrawing by the Decuman port, rode full speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there; but continuing his flight day and night, without intermission, he arrived at the sea-side, with thirty horse, and went on board a little bark; often complaining, That he had been so far deceived in his opinion of his followers, as to see those very men, from whom he expected victory, the first to fly, and in a manner betray him into the hands of his enemies.
3.97.1
Caesar having mastered the enemy’s camp, requested his soldiers not to leave the victory imperfect, by busying themselves about the plunder. Finding them ready to obey, he began a line of circumvallation round the mountain. The Pompeians quickly abandoned a post, which, for want of water, was not tenable, and endeavoured to reach the city of Larissa: whereupon Caesar, dividing his army, left one part in Pompey’s camp, sent back another to his own camp, and having, with four legions, taken a nearer road than that by which the enemy passed, he found means to intercept them, and, after six miles march, drew up in order of battle. But the Pompeians once more found protection from a mountain, at the foot of which ran a rivulet. Though Caesar’s troops were greatly fatigued, by fighting the whole day, before night he had flung up some works, sufficient to prevent the enemy from having any communication with the rivulet. As by this step they were cut off from all hopes of relief, or of escaping, they sent deputies to treat about a surrender. Affairs continued in this situation all that night, of which some few senators, who had accompanied them, took the advantage to make their escape.
3.98.1
At break of day, they all, by Caesar’s order, came down into the plain, and delivered up their arms; humbly imploring his goodness, and suing for mercy. Caesar spoke to them with great mildness, and to alleviate their apprehensions, cited various instances of his clemency, which he had, on so many occasions, made evident. In fact, he gave them their lives, and forbade his soldiers to offer them any violence, or to take any thing from them. He then sent for the legions, which had passed the night in camp, to relieve those that had accompanied, him in the pursuit; and being determined to follow Pompey, began his march, and arrived the same day at Larissa.
3.99.1
This battle cost Caesar no more than two hundred soldiers: but he lost thirty centurions, men of singular courage. Among these latter was Crastinus, whose gallantry and intrepidity, in marching up to battle, has been taken notice of. This brave officer, fighting, regardless of danger, received a wound in the mouth, from a sword. Nor was he deceived in promising himself Caesar’s approbation, who was thoroughly sensible of his merit, and greatly applauded his behaviour in this action. On Pompey’s side, there fell about fifteen thousand: but upwards of four and twenty thousand were taken prisoners: for the cohorts that guarded the forts, surrendered to Sylla; though many escaped into the adjacent countries. One hundred and eighty colours were taken, and nine eagles. L. Domitius, flying towards the mountains, and growing faint through the fatigue, was overtaken and killed by some horsemen.
3.100.1
About this time D. Laelius arrived with his fleet at Brundusium, and possessesd himself of the island over against the harbour, as Libo had done before. Vatinius, who commanded in the place, having equipped several boats, endeavoured to entice some of Laelius’s ships within the haven, and took a five-benched galley, with two smaller vessels, that had ventured too far into the port; then disposing his cavalry along the shore, he prevented the enemy from getting fresh water. But Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for sailing, brought water in transports from Corcyra and Dyrrhachium; still keeping to his purpose, from which neither the disgrace of losing his ships, nor the want of necessaries could divert him, till he received intelligence of the battle of Pharsalia.
3.101.1
Much about the same time Cassius arrived in Sicily, with the Syrian, Phoenician, and Cilician fleets. And as Caesar’s fleet was divided into two parts, in one of which P. Sulpicius the pretor commanded at Vibo, in the straits; in the other M. Pomponius at Messana; Cassius was arrived at Messana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his coming. And finding him unprepared, without guards, order, or discipline, he took the opportunity of a favourable wind, and sent several fire-ships against him, which consumed his whole fleet, thirty-five in number, twenty of which were decked. The terror occasioned by this blow was so great, that though there was an entire legion in garrison at Messana, they durst scarce look the enemy in the face; and would doubtless have delivered up the town, had not the news of Caesar’s victory reached them, by means of the cavalry stationed along the coast. Cassius then sailed for Sulpicius’s fleet at Vibol, which finding at anchor near the shore by reason the consternation was become general over the whole island; he put the same stratagem in practice as before. For taking the advantage of a favourable wind, he made forty fire-ships advance against them, and the flame catching hold on both sides, quickly reduced five galleys to ashes. The conflagration continuing to spread, roused the indignation of some veteran soldiers, who had been left to guard the ships. Accordingly they went on board, weighed anchor, and, attacking the enemy, took two quinqueremes, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he escaped in a boat. Two three-benched galleys were sunk; and soon after he was informed of the defeat at Pharsalia, by some of Pompey’s own followers; for hitherto he had regarded it as a false report, spread about by Caesar’s lieutenants and friends. Upon this intelligence he quitted Sicily, and retired with his fleet.
3.102.1
Caesar laying all other thoughts aside, determined to pursue Pompey, whithersoever he should retire, to prevent his drawing together fresh forces, and renewing the war. He marched every day as far as the body of cavalry he had with him could hold out, and was followed, by shorter marches, by a single legion. Pompey had issued a proclamation at Amphipolis, enjoining all the youth of the province, whether Greeks or Romans, to join him in arms. But whether this was with intent to conceal his real design of retreating much farther, or to try to maintain his ground in Macedonia, if nobody pursued him, is hard to determine. Here he lay one night at anchor, sending to what friends he had in the town, and raising all the money he possibly could. But being informed of Caesar’s approach, he departed with all expedition, and came in a few days to Mitylene. Here he was detained two days by the badness of the weather; and sailed to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. There he was informed, that the Antiochians, and Roman citizens trading thither, had with joint consent seized the castle, and sent deputies to such of his followers as had taken refuge in the neighbouring states, not to came near Antioch at their peril. The same had happened at Rhodes to L. Lentulus, the consul of the foregoing year, to P. Lentulus a consular senator, and to some other persons of distinction; who, following Pompey in his flight, and arriving at that island, were refused admittance into the town andharbour, and received an order to withdraw immediately, which they were necessitated to comply with; for the fame of Caesar’s approach had now reached the neighbouring states.
3.103.1
Upon this intelligence Pompey laid aside his design of going into Syria, seized all the money he found in the public bank, borrowed as much more as he could of his friends, sent great quantities of brass on board for military uses; and having raised two thousand soldiers, amongst the public officers, merchants, and his own servants, sailed for Pelusium. Here, by accident, was king Ptolemy, a minor, warring with a great army against his sister Cleopatra; whom, some months before, by the assistance of his friends, he had expelled the kingdom, and was then encamped not far distant from her. Pompey sent to demand his protection, and a safe retreat in Alexandria, in consideration of the friendship that had subsisted between him and his father. The messengers, after discharging their commission, began to converse freely with the king’s troops, exhorting them to assist Pompey and not despise him in his adverse fortune. Among these troops were many of Pompey’s old soldiers, whom Gabinius, having draughted out of the Syrian army, had carried to Alexandria, and, upon the conclusion of the war, left there with the young king’s father.
3.104.1
The king’s ministers, who had the care of the government during his minority, being informed of this, either out of fear, as they afterwards pretended, lest Pompey should debauch the army, and thereby render himself master of Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his low condition (as friends, in bad fortune, often turn enemies), spoke favourably to the deputies in public, and invited Pompey to court; but privately despatched Achillas, captain of the king’s guards, a man of singular boldness, and to murder him. They accosted him with an air of frankness, especially Septimius, who had served under him as a centurion in the war with the pirates; and inviting him into the boat, treacherously slew him. L. Lentulus was likewise seized by the king’s command, and put to death in prison.
3.105.1
When Caesar arrived in Asia he found that T. Ampius, having formed the design of seizing the treasures of the Ephesian Diana, and summoned all the senators in the province to bear witness to the sum taken, had quitted that project upon Caesar’s approach, and betaken himself to flight. Thus was the temple of Ephesus a second time saved from plunder by Caesar. It was remarked in the temple of Minerva at Elis, that the very day Caesar gained the battle of Pharsalia, the image of victory, which before stood fronting the statue of the goddess, turned towards the portal of the temple. The same day, at Antioch in Syria, such a noise of fighting and trumpets was heard two several times, that the inhabitants ran to arms and manned their walls. The like happened at Ptolemais. At Pergamus, in the inner recesses of the temple, called by the Greeks Adyta, where none but priests are allowed to enter, the sound of Cymbals was heard. And in the Temple of Victory, at Trallis, where a statue was consecrated to Caesar, a palm sprouted betweeh the joining of the stones that arched the roof.
3.106.1
Caesar, after a short stay in Asia, hearing that Pompey had been seen at Cyprus, and thence conjecturing that he was for Egypt, because of the interest he had in that kingdom, and the advantages it would afford him, left Rhodes, with a convoy of ten Rhodian galleys, and a few others from Asia, having on board two legions, one of which he ordered to follow him from Thessaly, the other detached from Fufius’s army in Achaia; and eight hundred horse. In these legions were no more than three thousand two hundred men: the rest, fatigued with the length of the march, or weakened with wounds, had not been able to follow him. But Caesar depending on the reputation of his former exploits, scrupled not to trust the safety of his person to a feeble escort, believingno place would dare to attempt any thing against him. At Alexandria he was informed of Pompey’s death: and upon landing, was accosted in a clamorous manner by the soldiers, whom Ptolemy had left to garrison the city: and he observed that the mob appeared dissatisfied to see the fasces carried before him, which they interpreted a degradation of the sovereign authority. Though this tumult was appeased, yet each day produced some fresh disturbance, and many of the Roman soldiers were murdered in all parts of the city.
3.107.1
For these reasons he sent into Asia for some of the legions which he had raised out of the remains of Pompey’s army: being himself necessarily detained by the Etesian winds, which are directly contrary to any passage by sea from Alexandria. Meantime, considering the difference between Ptolemy and his sister, as subject to the cognizance of the Roman people, and of him as consul; and the rather, because the alliance with Ptolemy, the father, had been contracted during his former consulship; he gave the king and Cleopatra to understand, that it was his pleasure they should dismiss their troops, and instead of having recourse to arms, come and plead their cause before him.
3.108.1
Pothinus the eunuch, governor to the young king, had the chief management of affairs during his minority. This minister complained bitterly to his friends, that the king should be summoned to plead his cause before Caesar: afterwards finding among those that sided with the king, some who were disposed to enter into his views, he privately sent for the army from Pelusium to Alexandria, and conferred the chief command upon Achillas, the same we have spoken of before: inciting him by letters and promises, both in the king’s name and his own to execute such orders as he should receive from him. Ptolemy, the father, by his will had appointed the eldest of the two sons, and his elder daughter, joint heirs of the kingdom. For the more certain accomplishment of his design, he in the same will implored the protection of the Roman people; adjuring them by all the gods, and the treaties he had made at Rome, to see it put in execution. A copy of this will was sent by ambassadors to Rome, to be deposited in the public treasury; but the domestic troubles preventing it, it was left in the hands of Pompey. The original, signed and sealed, was kept at Alexandria.
3.109.1
While this affair was debated before Caesar, who passionately desired to terminate the matter amicably, and to the satisfaction of both parties, he was informed that the king’s army, with all the cavalry, were arrived at Alexandria. Caesar’s forces were by no means sufficient to give them battle without the town; and therefore the only course left was to secure the most convenient posts within the city, till he should get accquainted with Achillas’s designs. Meantime he ordered all the soldiers to their arms, and admonished the king, to send some persons of the greatest authority to Achillas, to forbid his approach. Discorides and Serapion, who had both been ambassadors at Rome, and in great credit with Ptolemy, the father, were deputed to this office. But no sooner did they come before Achillas, than without giving them a hearing, or enquiring after the message they brought, he ordered them to be seized and put to death. One was killed upon the spot; and the other, having received a dangerous wound, was carried off for dead by his attendants. Upon hearing this, Caesar took care to secure the king’s person, the authority of whose name would authorise his proceedings, and occasion Achillas and his associates to be esteemed seditious and rebellious.
3.110.1
Achillas’s army was far from being contemptible, whether we regard their number, courage, or experience in war. It amounted to twenty thousand effective men, many of whom were originally Romans, brought into the country by Gabinius, when he came to settle Auletes on the throne; and who, having afterwards married and settled in Alexandria, were devoted to the Ptolemean interest. There were also some brigades raised in Syria and Cilicia, together with a considerable number of renegade slaves, who had deserted their masters, and found protection in Egypt, by entering into the service. If any of these was seized by his master, their companions flocked to his rescue, regarding his safety as a common cause, because they were all embarked in the like guilt. These would often take upon them to put to death the king’s ministers, to plunder the rich, for the sake of increasing their pay, to invest the royal palace, to banish some, and send for others home, with other liberties of the like nature, which the Alexandrian army claims by a kind of prescription. Besides these, he had likewise two thousand horse, who, during the late troubles, and the wars that ensued, had arms. These had restored Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, killed Bibulus’s two sons, warred against the Egytians with success, and acquired a thorough experience in military affairs.
3.111.1
Achillas trusting to the valour of his troops, and despising the handful of men that followed Caesar, quickly made himself master of Alexandria, the palace only excepted, where Caesar thought proper to make his stand, and which he attacked briskly, though without effect. But it was on the side of the harbour that the greatest efforts were made. On that, in effect, the victory depended. Besides two and twenty constant guard-ships, there were in the port fifty galleys, from three to five banks of oars, which the year before 'had been sent to Pompey’s assistance, and were returned since the battle of Pharsalia. Had Achillas been once master of these vessels, he might have cut Caesar off from all communication with the ocean, and consequently from all hopes of receiving supplies of victuals or forces. Thus the Egyptians, in hopes of a complete victory, and the Romans to avoid a certain ruin, exerted themselves with incredible vigour. At length Caesar carried his point, and not only set fire to the vessels abovementioned, but to all that were in the arsenals, after which he passed some troops into the Isle of Pharos.
3.112.1
The Pharos is a tower of prodigious height and wonderful workmanship, built in an island, from whence it takes its name. This island, lying over against Alexandria, makes a haven, and is joined to the continent by a causeway of nine hundred paces, and by a bridge. Here dwell several Egyptians, who have built a town, and live by pillaging the ships that are thrown upon their coast, either by mistake or tempest. As it is situate at the entrance of the port, which is but narrow, it absolutely commands it. Caesar knowing the importance of this post, whilst the enemywere engaged in the assault, landed some troops there, seized the tower, and put a garrison into it; thereby securing a safe reception for the supplies he had sent for on allsides. In the other quarters of the town, the fight was maintained with equal advantage, neither party losing ground, because of the narrowness of the passes, which enabled them easily to support themselves. After a few men killed on necessary places, fortified them in the night. In this quarter was a small part of the king’s palace, where Caesar was lodged upon his first arrival; and adjoining thereto a theatre, that served instead of a citadel, and had a communication with the port and other arsenals. These works he increased afterwards, that they might serve instead of a rampart, to prevent his being obliged to fight against his will. Meantime Ptolemy’s youngest daughter, hoping the throne would be vacant, fled from palace to Achillas, and joined with him in the prosecution of the war. But they soon disagreed about the command, which increased the largesses to the soldiers, each party endeavouring to gain them by large presents. During these transactions, Pothinus, Ptolemy’s governor, and regent of the kingdom, being discovered in a clandestine correspondence with Achillas, whom he encouraged to the vigorous prosecution of his enterprise, Caesar ordered him to be put to death. Such was the beginning of the Alexandrian war.

Perseus Latin. CTS URN phi0448.phi002.perseus-eng3. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Source.