Commentaries on the Civil War

Perseus Latin · Perseus Latin · 255 sections

2.9.1
When the work was raised to the height of one story, they laid a floor over it, the extremities of whose beams were concealed in the thickness of the wall; that they might not by appearing on the outside, be liable to be set on fire. Thence they continued the wall directly upwards, as far as their galleries and mantles would allow. Here they laid two beams crosswise, whose extremities almost reached the angles of the wall, for supporting the floor, which was to serve as a roof to the whole. Over these beams they laid the joists of the roof, and boarded them with planks. The roof was so contrived as to project a little beyond the wall, in order to suspend from it what might be necessary to shelter the workmen, while employed in completing the story. This floor was paved with tiles and clay, to render it proof against fire, and had besides a covering of strong mattresses, to break the force of stones and darts. At the same time they suspended from the beams of the roof, that projected beyond the wall, curtains made of strong cables, woven to the depth of four feet, and which went round the three sides of the tower that were exposed to the engines of the enemy; having experienced on former occasions, that this kind of cover was impenetrable to any dart or engine whatever. When this part of the tower was finished, roofed, and sheltered from the enemy’s blows, they removed their mantles to another, and by means of engines elevated the roof entire from the first story, as far as the curtains would allow. There, secure from all insult, they laboured at the wall, elevating the roof a second time, and thereby enabling themselves both to continue the work, and lay the interjacent floors. In this manner they proceeded from story to story, mounting them one upon another, till without danger or wounds, they had completed the number of six, leaving loop-holes in convenient places, for the engines to play through.
2.10.1
When, by means of this tower, they thought they had sufficiently provided for the security of the works around it, they resolved to build a gallery sixty feet long, of wood, two feet in thickness, to extend from the brick tower to the tower of the enemy, and the very walls of the town. The form of the gallery was this: First, two beams of equal length were laid upon the ground, at the distance of four feet from one another; and in these were fixed little pillars five feet high, joined at the top by beams designed to suppirt the roof of the gallery. Over these were laid rafters, two feet square, fastened strongly with nails and plates of iron. The upper part of the roof was composed of square laths, four inches thick, which were placed at a small distance one from another, to bear the tiles that were to be laid upon them. Thus was the whole finished with a sloping roof, which being partly composed of tiles and mortar, was proof against fire, and had besides a covering of hides, to hinder the mortar from being washed away by spouts of water. Over all we threw strong mattresses, to screen the hides from fire and stones. This work was finished close by the brick tower, under cover of four mantles, and immediately carried forward upon rollers, in the manner ships are launched, till it unexpectedly reached the very tower of the enemy.
2.11.1
The Marseillians astonished at so threatening and unlooked-for a machine, pushed forward with levers the largest stones they could find, and tumbled them from the top of the wall upon the gallery. But the strength of the wood resisted the violence of their blows, so that they fell to the ground without doing any hurt. Observing this, they changed their design, and poured down upon us burning barrels of pitch and tallow. But these likewise rolled along the roof without damage, and falling upon the ground, were afterwards thrust away with forks and long poles. Meanwhile our soldiers, under protection of the gallery, were endeavouring with their levers to undermine the enemy’s tower. The gallery itself was defended by tne tower of brick whence our engines played without intermission insomuch that the enemy, driven from their tower and walls, were at last obliged to abandon their defence. By degrees the tower being undermined, part of it fell down, and the rest was so shaken that it could not stand long.
2.11.2
Upon this the enemy, alarmed at so unexpected a misfortune, discouraged by the downfall of the tower, awed by such a testimony of the wrath of the gods, and dreading the plunder and devastation of their city, came forth in the habit of suppliants, and with outstretched hands, besought the compassion of the army and generals.
2.12.1
At this new and unexpected sight, all acts of hostility ceased, and the soldiers, laying aside their ardour for the fight, were eager to hear and get acquainted with the proposals of the enemy, who arriving ib presence of the army and generals, threw themselves at their feet, requesting them to suspend all further operations till Caesar’s arrival. They told them: That as the works were now completed, and the tower destroyed, they were sensible the city could no longer hold out, and therefore meant not to defend it: that in the mean time, no prejudice could arise to the besiegers from this respite, because, if they refused to submit upon Caesar’s coming, he would have it in his power to treat them as he pleased. They added, that if the whole tower should be brought down, it would be impossible to hinder the soldiers from yielding to the desire of plunder, by breaking into and pillaging the town. This, and much more of the same nature (for the Marseillians are a learned people), they urged in a very moving and pathetic strain.
2.13.1
The generals, moved by these monstrances, drew off the soldiers from the works, discontinued the attack, and contented themselves with posting guards in convenient places. Compassion occasioned a kind of truce till Caesar’s arrival; so that on neither side were any acts of hostility committed, but every thing was quiet and secure, as if the siege had beenl= at an end. For Caesar had earnestly recommended it to Trebonius, by letter, to prevent, if possible, the city’s being taken by storm, lest the soldiers, irritated by their revolt, and the resistance they had found, should put all the youth to the sword, as they threatened to do. Nay, they were even then hardly restrained from breaking into the town, and loudly murmured against Trebonius for delaying a conquest which they looked upon as certain.
2.14.1
But the Marseillians, a nation without faith, aimed at nothing further in all this, than to find a time and opportunity to deceive us, and put in practice the treacherous purpose they had formed. For after some days, our men suspecting no danger, but relying upon the good faith of the enemy, while some were retired to their tents, others laid down, to rest in the trenches, overpowered by the long fatigue they had undergone, and all the arms laid up and removed out of sight, suddenly they sallied from the town, and the wind being high, and favourable to their design, set fire to the works. The flame in a moment spread itself on all sides, insomuch that the battery, the mantles, the tortoise, the tower, the machines, and the gallery were entirely destroyed, before it was possible to discover whence the disaster arose. The suddenness of the accident made our men immediately run to their arms, where every one took what came first to hand. Some sallied out upon the enemy, but were checked by the arrows and darts poured upon them from the town; insomuch that the Marseillians, sheltered by their walls, burnt without any difficulty the tower of brick and the gallery. Thus the labour of many months was destroyed in an instant, by the treachery of an enemy, and the violence of the wind. Next day they made the same attempt, favoured by the same wind, and with yet greater assurance, against the tower and terrace of the other attack. They approached them boldly, and threw plenty of fire upon them; but our men, grown wise by their late misfortune, had made all necessary preparations for their defence, so that after losing many men, they were obliged to retreat into the city, without effecting their purpose.
2.15.1
Trebonius immediately resolved to repair his loss, in which he found himself warmly seconded by the zeal of the soldiers. They saw the works, which had cost so much labour and toil, destroyed by the perfidy of a people, who made no scruple of violating the most sacred engagements: they saw that their credulity had been abused, and that they were become the jest of their enemies, which grieved and provoked them at the same time. But it was still difficult to determine whence they might be supplied with wood, to repair all these works. There was none in the neighbourhood of Marseilles, the trees having been all cut down for a great way round. They resolved therefore to raise a terrace of a new kind, and such as history no where mentions before that time. They raised two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and distant from one another, nearly the breadth of the former mount. Over these they laid a floor, and to render it firm, besides its being supported on either side, placed pillars underneath between the walls, to bear it up where it was weakest, or had a greater stress of weight to support. There were moreover cross beams, which rested upon niches in the wall; and to render the several floors proof against fire, hurdles were laid over them, which were afterwards covered with clay. The soldiers, thus sheltered over head by the roof, on the right and left by walls, and before by a breast-work, brought the necessary materials without danger, and by the eagerness with which they laboured, soon completed the whole, leaving overtures in convenient places to sally out upon occasion.
2.16.1
The enemy seeing we had repaired, in so short a time, what they imagined must have cost us the labour of many days; that there was now no hope left, either of deceiving us, or sallying out upon us with success; that all the approaches to the city by land, might in like manner be shut up by a wall and towers, so as to render it impossible for them to appear upon their works, our walls overtopping and commanding theirs, that they could neither discharge their javelins, nor make any use of their engines, in which their principal hope lay; and that they were now reduced to the necessity of fighting us upon equal terms, though conscious of their great inferiority in point of valour; they were forced to have recourse again to the same conditions of truce they had so ill observed before.
2.17.1
M. Varro, in farther Spain, having early notice of what passed in Italy, and beginning to distrust the success of Pompey’s affairs, spoke in a very friendly manner to Caesar. He said, That he was indeed under particular obligations to Pompey, who had made him his lieutenant-general, but at the same time was no less indebted to Caesar: that he was not ignorant of the duty of a lieutenant, employed by his general in an office of trust; but that he likewise knew his own strength, and the attachment of the whole province to Caesar. After this manner he talked in all companies, nor declared expressly for either side. But when he afterwards understood, that Caesar was detained by the siege of Marseilles; that the armies of Petreius and Afranius had joined, and daily grew stronger by the arrival of new succours; that there was room to hope for every thing; that the hither province had unanimously declared in their favour; that Caesar himself was reduced to great straits at Lerida, of all which Afranius wrote largely, magnifying his own advantages, he began to alter with fortune.
2.18.1
He raised troops over the whole province; added thirty auxiliary cohorts to the two legions he had already under his command; formed great magazines of corn to supply Marseilles, and the armies under Afranius and Petreius; ordered the Gaditani to furnish him with ten ships of war; caused a considerable number to be built at Hispalis; sent all the money and ornaments he found in the temple of Hercules to Cales; left there a garrison of six cohorts, under the command of Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, the friend of Domitius, who had sent him thither to look after an inheritance of his; conveyed all the arms, public and private, to Gallonius’s house; spoke every where disadvantageously of Caesar; declared several times from his tribunal, that Caesar had been worsted, and that many of his soldiers had gone over to Afranius, as he was well assured by undoubted testimonies: by all which, having struck a terror into the Roman citizens of that province, he obliged them to promise him one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, twenty thousand weight of silver, and one hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat. The states well affected to Caesar he loaded with heavy contributions; confiscated the effects of such as had spoken against the commonwealth; quartered soldiers upon them; harassed them with arbitrary judgments; and in fine, obliged the whole province to take an oath of fidelity to himself and Pompey. Hearing of what had passed in hither Spain, he prepared for war. His design was, to shut himself up with his two legions in Cales, where all the provisions and shipping lay, because he very well understood, that the whole province was in Caesar’s interest, for he judged it would be easy in that island, with the ships and provisions he had to draw out the war into length.
2.18.2
Caesar, though called upon by many and necessary affairs to return to Italy, resolved, however, not to leave Spain, till he had entirely quelled the war in that province; for he knew that hither Spain had many obligations to Pompey, and that most of the inhabitants were strongly in his interest.
2.19.1
Having therefore detached two legions into farther Spain, under the command of Q. Cassius, tribune of the people, he himself advanced, by great journeys, at the head of six hundred horse. He sent orders before to the magistrates, and the principal men of every state, to meet him by a certain day at Cordova. All obeyed; every state sent his deputies; nor was there a single Roman citizen of any consideration, who did not repair thither on this occasion, The very senate of Cordova, of their own proper motion, shut their gates against Varro, stationed guards and sentinels along the walls, and detained two cohorts, called Calonicae, which chanced to march that way, that they might serve to protect the town. At the same time those of Carmona, the most considerable state in the province, drove out of their city three cohorts, which Varro had left to garrison the citadel, and shut their gates against them.
2.20.1
This determined Varro to make all possible despatch, that he might reach Cales, as soon as possible, lest his march should be intercepted; so great and apparent was the affection of the province to Caesar. When he was advanced a little way, he received letters from Cales, which informed him, That as soon as Caesar’s edict was known, the principal men of Cales, with the tribunes of the cohorts he had left in garrison, had conspired to drive Gallonius from the city, and preserve the town and island for Caesar; that this project being formed, they had warned Gallonius to retire of his own accord, while he yet might with safety; threatening, if he did not, to come to some immediate resolution against him: that Gallonius, terrified by so general a revolt, had accordingly left Cales. Upon this intelligence, one of the two legions, known by the name of Vernacula, took up their ensigns in Varro’s presence, quitted the camp, and marched directly to Hispalis, where they sat down in the market-place and cloisters, without committing the least act of violence, which so wrought upon the Roman citizens residing in the town, that every one houses. Varro, astonished at these proceedings, turned back with design to reach Italica, but was informed that the gates were shut. At last, finding himself surrounded on all sides, and the ways every where beset, he wrote to Caesar that he was ready to resign the legion under his command, to whomsoever he should order to receive it. Caesar sent Sextus Caesar to take the command; and Varro, having resigned the legion accordingly, came to him at Cordova. After giving him an account of the state of the province, he faithfully resigned all the public money he had in his hands, and informed him of the quantity of corn and shipping he had prepared.
2.21.1
Caesar, assembling the states at Cordova, returned thanks severally to all who had declared in his favour; to the Roman citizens, for having made themselves masters of the town in his name; to the Spaniards, for driving out Pompey’s garrisons: to the people of Cales, for having frustrated the designs of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty; to the military tribunes and centuriens sent thither to guard the place, for having confirmed them in their resolutions by their example. He remitted the tribute imposed by Varro upon the Roman citizens; restored their estates to those who had been deprived of them for speaking their thoughts freely; distributed rewards to a great many, both in public and private, and gave all room to hope for like favours in the issue. After a stay of two days at Cordova, he went to Cales, where he restored to the temple of Hercules all the treasures and ornaments which had been carried off, and lodged in private houses. He committed the government of the province to Q. Cassius, assigned him four legions for that purpose; and embarking for Tarraco on board the fleet which Varro had obliged the Gaditani to furnish, arrived there in a few days. There he found deputies from almost all the states of the province, and having, in like manner as at Cordova, both publicly and privately rewarded some states; he left Tarraco came by land to Narbonne, and thence to Marseilles. There he was informed of the law touching the dictatorship, and that M. Lepidus the pretor had named him to that office.
2.22.1
The Marseillians, overwhelmed with profusion of calamities, reduced to the utmost distress by famine, worsted in two different engagements by sea, weakened by continual sallies, assaulted by a heavy pestilence, occasioned by the length of the siege, and their constant change of diet (for they were obliged to feed upon old meal and musty barley, which had been long treasured up in their magazines against an accident of this kind), their tower being overthrown, a great part of their walls undermined, and no prospect of relief from armies or the provinces, which were now all reduced under Caesar’s power, they resolved to surrender in good earnest. But some days before, Domitius, who was apprized of their intentions, having prepared three ships (two of which he assigned to his followers, and embarked in person on board the third), took occasion, during a storm, to make his escape. Some of Brutus’s galleys, which he had ordered to keep constantly cruising before the port, chancing to get sight of him, prepared to give chace. That in which Domitius was, escaped under favour of the tempest; but the two others, alarmed at seeing our galleys so near them, re-entered the port. Caesar spared the town, more in regard to its antiquity and reputation, than any real merit it could plead. He obliged the citizens however to deliver up their arms, machines, and ships of war, whether in the port or arsenal; to surrender all the money in their treasury; and to receive a garrison of two legions. Then sending the rest of the army into Italy, he himself set out for Rome.
2.23.1
About the same time, C. Curio sailed from Sicily into Africa, with two of the four legions which had been put under his command by Caesar, and five hundred horse; having conceived the highest contempt of the troops headed by P. Attius Varus. After two days and three nights sailing, he landed at a place called Aquilaria. This place is about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and has a very convenient harbour for ships in the summer time, sheltered on each side by a promontory. L. Caesar, the son, waited for him at Clupea, with ten galleys, which P. Attius had taken in the war against the pirates, and repaired at Utica, for the service of the present war. But terrified at the number of ships Curio brought with him, he stood in for the coast; where, running his galley on shore, he left her, and went by land to Adrumetum. C. Confidius Longus commanded in that town, with one legion: and here also the rest of the fleet repaired after Caesar’s flight. M. Rufus the questor pursuing them, with twelve galleys, which Curio had brought with him from Africa, to guard the transports; when he saw Caesar’s own galley upon the strand, he towed her off, and returned with the fleet to Curio.
2.24.1
Curio ordered him to sail directly for Utica, and followed himself with the land army. After a march of two days, he arrived at the river Bagradas, where he left C. Caninius Rebilus with the legions, and advanced before with the cavalry, to take a view of the Cornelian camp, which was judged to be a situation extremely advantageous. It is a high rock, jutting out into the sea, steep and rough on both sides, but with an easier descent where it fronts Utica. It lies little more than a mile from Utica in a direct line; but as there is a fountain about half way, which runs towards the sea, and overflowing the plain, forms a morass; to avoid this, in marching to Utica, it is necessary to take a compass of six miles.
2.25.1
When he had taken a view of this post, he went next and examined Varus’s camp, which was under the walls of the town, towards the gate named the Gate of War. The situation of it was extremely advantageous; for on the one side it was covered by the city of Utica itself, and on the other by a kind of theatre, which stood without the walls, the works round which took up so much room, that they rendered the approach to the camp extremely difficult. At the same time he saw all the ways crowded with people, who, out of fear of being pillaged, were carrying their most valuable effects into the city. He detached the cavalry against them to disperse them, and likewise have an opportunity of making some booty. Upon which, Varus ordered six hundred Numidian horse to advance to their assistance, which he further strengthened with four hundred foot, sent by Juba, a few days before, to reinforce the garrison of Utica. This king inherited from his father an affection for Pompey, and besides personally hated Curio; who, during his tribuneship had published a law to deprive him of his kingdom. The Numidian cavalry soon came to blows with ours; but were not able to stand their first charge, retreating to their camp, with the loss of a hundred and twenty men. Meantime, upon the arrival of Curio’s fleet he ordered proclamation to be made among the merchant ships, which were at Utica, to the number of two hundred, that he would treat them as enemies, if they did not immediately repair to the Cornelian camp. Upon this proclamation, they instantly weighed anchor, and leaving Utica, sailed whither they were ordered; by which means the army was plentifully supplied with every thing they stood in need of.
2.26.1
These things despatched, Curio repaired to his camp at Bagrada, where, with the joint acclamations of the whole army, he was saluted by the name of Imperator. Next day he led his army towards Utica, and encamped not far from the town. But before he had finished his entrenchments, he was informed by some parties of horse, who were upon the scout, that a powerful body of horse and foot had been sent by the king of Utica: at the same time a great cloud of dust began to appear, and soon after the enemy’s van was in view. Curio, astonished at a motion so unexpected, sent the cavalry before to sustain their first charge, and keep them in play: he, meanwhile, drawing off the legions from the works, with all possible expedition, formed them in order of battle. The horse engaged according to orders; and with such success, that before the legions could be duly drawn up, the whole reinforcement sent by the king, who marched without order or apprehension of danger, falling into confusion, at last betook themselves to flight. The cavalry, wheeling nimbly along the shore, escaped, with little loss, into the town; but great numbers of the infantry were cut to pieces.
2.27.1
Next night, two centurions of the nation of the Marsi, with twenty-two private soldiers, deserted from Curio, and went over to Attius Varus. These, either believing the thing themselves, or desirous to carry grateful tidings to Varus (for we easily believe what we wish, and readily hope that others will fall into our way of thinking), assured him, that the whole army was extremely averse to Curio, and would infallibly revolt, if he would but advance, and come to a conference with them, Accordingly Varus drew out his legions next day. Curio did the same; and the two armies stood facing one another in order of battle, with a small valley between them.
2.28.1
Sextus Quintilius Varus, who, as we have related above, had been made prisoner at Corfinium, was now in the enemy’s army: for Caesar having granted him his liberty, he had retired into Africa. Curio had brought over with him from Sicily the very same legions, who had revolted some time before to Caesar at the siege of Corfinium: so that excepting a few centurions who had been changed, the officers and companies were the same as had formerly served with this very Quintilius. He made use of this handle to debauch the army of Curio; and began with putting the soldiers in mind of their former oath to Domitius, and to himself, that general’s questor; he exhorted them not to carry arms against the old companions of their fortune, who had shared with them in all the hazards of that siege; nor fight in defence of that party, who treated them ignominiously, and as deserters. To these considerations, he added offers of a liberal recompense, if they would follow his fortune and that of Attius. But his speech made no impression upon Curio’s troops, so that both armies retired to their respective camps.
2.29.1
But an uncommon panic soon spread itself over Curio’s camp, which the various discourses of the soldiers served only to increase. For every one had his opinion, and added the suggestions of his own fear to that which he heard from others. These reports spreading from one to many, and receiving additions in every new relation, there appeared to be several authors of the same notions That in a civil war it was lawful for every soldier to choose what side he pleased; that the same legion, who a little before had fought on the side of the enemy, might, without scruple, return again to the same cause, since Caesar’s conferring favours upon his enemies, ought not to render them unmindful of prior and greater obligations: that even the municipal towns were divided in their affection, and sided some with one party, some with another. These discourses proceeded not from the Marsi and Peligni alone, but ran like a torrent through the whole camp. However, some of the soldiers blamed their companions for this so great freedom of talk and others, who affected to appear more diligent than the rest, enlarged in their accounts of it to the officers.
2.30.1
For these reasons,Curio summoning a council of war, began to deliberate were for attacking, at all hazards, the camp of Varus, in order to find employment for the soldiers, whose idleness they considered as the cause of all the present alarms. Besides, it was better, they said, to trust to valour, and try the fortune of a battle, than see themselves abandoned by their men, and delivered up to the barbarity of the enemy. Others were for retiring, during the night, to the Cornelian camp, where they would have more time to cure the infatuation of the soldiers; and whence, in case of a disaster, they could, with more safety and ease, make good their retreat into Sicily, by means of the great number of ships they were there provided with.
2.31.1
Curio relished neither of these notions: the one, he thought, argued cowardice; the other, a rash boldness: to retreat, would have all the appearance of a shameful flight; to attack, they must resolve to fight in a place of disadvantage. With what hope, said he, can we attack a camp fortified by nature and art? And what advantage can we draw from an attempt, whence we shall be obliged to retire with loss ? Does not success always secure to a general the affection of his troops, whereas ill fortune is evermore followed with contempt ? And what would a decampment imply but an ignominious flight, an absolute despair of all things, and an unavoidable alienation of the whole army? That we ought not to let the modest think we distrust them, nor the insolent that we fear them; because the knowledge of our fear only augments the presumption of the one, and an apprehension of being suspected, abates the zeal of the other. But if what is reported of the discontent of the army be true, which I am yet unwilling to believe, at least to the degree some pretend; we ought, for that reason, rather to hide and dissemble our fears, than by an unreasonable discovery of them, to add strength to the evil: that, as in some cases, it was necessary to conceal the wounds of the body, that the enemy might not conceive hope from our misfortunes; so also ought we to hide the indisposition of an army: that by retreating in the night, as some proposed, they would only furnish a fairer occasion to the ill-affected to execute their purpose: for fear and shame are powerful restraints by day, but night entirely divests them of their force: that he was neither so rash, as to attack a camp without hopes of success; nor so blinded by fear, as to be at a loss what measures to pursue: that he thought it his duty to examine things to the bottom; and as he had called them together to deliberate upon the present state of affairs, doubted not, with their assistance, to take such measures as would be attended with success.
2.32.1
He then dismissed the council; and assembling the soldiers, put them in mind of what advantage their steadiness and zeal had been to Caesar at Corfinium, and how serviceable towards the conquest of the greatest part of Italy. It was you, said he, that gave the example, and all the municipal towns soon followed: their submission to Caesar was your work; and therefore it is not without reason, that he is so particularly attached to you, and that Pompey hates you sincerely. It was you that obliged him to quit Italy, without being forced to it by the loss of a battle. Caesar, who ranks me in the number of his dearest friends, has committed my safety to your care, with Sicily and Africa, without which it would be impossible to defend either Rome or Italy. You are now in the presence of those who exhort you to abandon us: and indeed what could be more desirable to them, than at the same time to ensnare us, and fix upon you the stain of an infinite crime? What worse opinion could an enraged enemy testify of you, than to suppose you capable of betraying those, who own themselves indebted to you for all; and of throwing yourselves into the power of a party, who consider you as the authors of all their misfortunes? Are you strangers to Caesar’s exploits in Spain? Two armies defeated! Two generals overcome! Two provinces brought under subjection! And all this in the space of forty days, is it likely that those, who, with forces unbroken, could not stand their ground, will be able to resist, now they are vanquished? And will you who followed Caesar before fortune declared in his favour, now return to the vanquished, when fortune has already decided the quarrel, and you are upon the point of obtaining the reward of your services? They charge you with having abandoned and betrayed them, contrary to the faith of oaths. But is it indeed true, that you abandoned Domitius? Or did he not rather meanly abandon you, at a time when you were ready to suffer every thing for his sake? Did he not, unknown to you, resolve to seek his safety in flight? And were you not, after being thus basely betrayed by him, indebted to Caesar’s goodness for your preservation? How could your oath bind you to one, who, after throwing away the ensigns of his authority, and divesting himself of his office, surrendered himself a private man and a captive into the power of another? The new engagement you were then brought under alone subsists at present, and ought quite to obliterate that, which the surrender of your general, and his loss of liberty, have made void. But though I doubt not of your being satisfied with Caesar, you may perhaps have taken offence at me. And, indeed, I have no thought of mentioning any services I may have done you: which, as yet, come far short of my intentions, and your expectations: but you are not ignorant, that the rewards of military service come not till after the conclusion of the war; and I believe you little doubt what the issue of this will be. Nor need I, on this occasion, decline taking notice of the diligence I have used, the progress already made, and the good fortune that has hitherto attended me. Are you dissatisfied that I have landed my army safe in Africa, without the loss of a single ship ? That I dispersed the enemy’s fleet at the first onset ? That within the space of two days I have twice defeated their cavalry? That I forced two hundred of their merchantmen to quit the port of Utica and join me? And that I have reduced them to a situation where it is impossible for them to receive any supplies either by land or sea? Can you think of abandoning a cause conducted by such leaders, and attended with such success; to followthe fortune of those who so ignominiously delivered up Corfinium, relinquished Italy, surrendered Spain, and have already sustained considerable losses in the African war? I never pretended to more than being a follower of Caesar: it was you that honoured me with the title of Imperator, which I am ready this moment to resign, if you think me unworthy of the favour. Restore me my former name, that it may not be said I was honoured, to be covered afterwards with the greater ignominy.
2.33.1
These remonstrances made such an impression upon the soldiers, that they frequently interrupted him while he was speaking, and appeared deeply touched at his suspecting their fidelity. As he retired, they all gathered round him, exhorting him not to be discouraged, or scruple to hazard a battle, and make trial of their fidelity and bravery. This behaviour of the troops wrought so great a change in the minds of the officers, that Curio, with the joint concurrence of them all, resolved to give battle the first opportunity that offered. Accordingly, drawing out his men next day, in the same place he had done for some time past, he ranged them in order of battle. Attius Varus did the same; that if an opportunity offered, either of corrupting the soldiers, or fighting to advantage, he might be in readiness to lay hold of it.
2.34.1
Between the two armies lay a valley, as we have observed above, not indeed considerable for its breadth, but steep and difficult of ascent. Both sideswaited till the other should pass it, that they might engage to more advantage. Curio observing that all the horse on Varus’s right wing, together with the lightarmed foot, had ventured down into this valley, detached his cavalry against them, with two cohorts of Marrucinians; whose first shock the enemy were not able to sustain, but returned full speed to their own men, leaving the light-armed foot behind, who were surrounded and cut to pieces in the sight of Varus’s army; which, fronting that way, was witness to the flight of the one, and the slaughter of the other. Upon this Rebilus, one of Caesar’s lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily, on account of his consummate knowledge in the art of war; Why, says he, do you delay seizing the favourable moment? You see the enemy struck with terror. Curio made no answer, only desired his soldiers to remember what they had promised the day before, and marching the first, commanded them to follow him. The valley was so steep and difficult, that the first ranks could not ascend, but with the assistance of those that came after. But the Attinian army was so dispirited with fear, and the flight and slaughter of their troops, that they never thought of making resistance, fancying themselves already surrounded by our cavalry; so that before we could arrive within reach of the dart, the whole army of Varus fled and retreated to their camp.
2.35.1
In this flight, one Fabius Pelignus, a centurion of the lowest rank in Curio’s army, as he was pursuing the fugitives, called with a loud voice to Varus as if he had been one of his own men, who wanted to admonish him of something. Varus hearing himself named several times, turned and stood still, demanding who he was, and what he wanted. Fabius would certainly have killed him, had not Varus warded it off with his shield. Fabius himself was soon after surrounded and slain. Meanwhile, the multitude of fugitives so closed up the gates of the camp, and pressed upon one another in such a manner, that more were crowded to death, than fell either in the battle or pursuit. Nay, the camp itself was very near being taken; because great numbers, instead of stopping there to defend it, made directly for the town. But both the nature of the ground, and the fortifications themselves, prevented the assault; and the rather, as Curio’s soldiers being armed only for battle, had brought with them none of the necessary tools to force a camp. Curio brought back his army without the loss of a man, Fabius excepted. Of the enemy, about six hundred were killed, and a thousand wounded. After Curio had drawn off his men, all the wounded quitted the camp, and retired into the city, as did a great many others, who, overcome by fear, sheltered themselves there also under the same pretence. Varus observing this, and that a universal dread had seized the army, left only a trumpet in the camp, with a few tents for show, and, about midnight, silently entered the town with all his forces.
2.36.1
Next day Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and draw a line ofcircumvallation round it. There was in the town a multitude of men unfit for the fatigues of war, through a long enjoyment of peace. The inhabitants themselves were strongly attached to Caesar, for ancient favours received from him. The senate was composed of people greatly differing in their tempers, and the losses already sustained spread terror through all ranks. A surrender was publicly talked of, and all concurred in soliciting Varus not to ruin them by his obstinacy and perverseness. While these things were in agitation, messengers sent by king Juba arrived, who informed them of the approach of his army, and exhorted them to defend the city; which contributed not a little to confirm their wavering minds.
2.37.1
Curio received the same news, but for some time would not believe it, so greatly did he confide in his good fortune. Besides, Caesar’s success in Spain was already known in Africa; whence he concluded it improbable that Juba would attempt any thing against him. But when he was for certain informed with his whole army, he retired from before the town to the Cornelian camp, laid in great quantities of corn and wood, began to fortify himself, and sent directly to Sicily for the cavalry, and the two legions he had left there. The camp itself was very advantageous for protracting the war, being strong both by nature and art, near the sea, and abounding in water and salt, great quantities of which had been carried thither from the neighbouring saltpits. Neither ran he any hazard of being straitened for wood and corn, as the country abounded in trees and grain. He resolved, therefore, with the consent of the whole army, to wait here the arrival of the rest of the troops, and make preparation for continuing the war.
2.38.1
This resolution being taken, and meeting with general approbation, some of the townsmen, who had deserted to Curio, informed him, that the war in which Juba was engaged with the Leptitani, having obliged him to return into his own kingdom, he had only sent his lieutenant Sabura, with a small body of forces, to the assistance of the Uticans. Upon this intelligence, to which he too hastily gave credit, he changed his design, and resolved to give battle. The fire of youth, his courage, good success, and self-confidence, contributed greatly to confirm him in this resolution. Urged by these considerations, about the beginning of the night, he sent all his cavalry towards the enemy’s camp, which was upon the river Bagradas, and where Sabura, of whom we have spoken before, commanded in chief. But the king followed with all his forces, and was not above six miles behind him. The cavalry which Curio had detached, marched all night, and coming unexpectedly upon the enemy, attacked them before they were ready to receive the charge: for the Numidians, according to the custom of that barbarous country, were encamped without order or rule. Falling upon them therefore, in this confusion, and oppressed with sleep, they slew great numbers, and obliged the rest to fly in the utmost consternation; after which they returned to Curio with the prisoners they had taken.
2.39.1
Curio had set out with all his forces about the fourth watch of the night, leaving only five cohorts to guard his camp. After a march of six miles he was met by his cavalry, who informed him of all that had passed. He asked the prisoners, who commanded at Bagradas? They answered, Sabura. Upon this, without making any further inquiries, for fear of being detained too long, he turned to the troops next to him, and said, Do you not see, fellow-soldiers, that the report of the prisoners corresponds exactly with the intelligence given by the deserters? Juba is not with the army. It must consist of but a few troops, since they were not able to withstand the charge of a small body of horse. Haste, therefore, in the pursuit of glory, booty, and victory. What the cavalry had done was indeed considerable, because they were but few in number in comparison of the Numidians; but as vanity always makes us believe our merit to be greater than it is, they themselves boasted immoderately of the action, and endeavoured to enhance the value of it. They made a mighty parade of the booty. The prisoners too, as well infantry as cavalry, marched in procession before them. And indeed the whole army imagined, that to delay the battle, was no other than to delay the victory; so that the ardour of the troops perfectly seconded Curio’s hopes. He therefore hastened his march, ordering the horse to follow, that he might as soon as possible come up with the frighted enemy. But as they were fatigued with their late march, they found themselves unable to keep pace with the army; but stopped, some in one place, some in another; which, however, retarded not Curio’s hopes.
2.40.1
Juba having notice from Sabura of the action in the night, detached to his assistance two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, of his ordinary guard, with that part of the infantry in which he put the greatest confidence. Himself followed leisurely with the rest of the troops, and about forty elephants, suspecting that Curio, who had sent the cavalry before, could not be far off with his army. Sabura drew up his horse and foot, ordering them to give ground upon the enemy’s attack, and, as through fear, counterfeit a flight. Meanwhile he told them, that he would give the signal of battle when he saw proper, and direct their motions as the case might require.
2.40.2
Curio, flattered with new hopes, and imagining, by the enemy’s motions, that they were preparing for flight, made his troops come down from the mountain into the plain;
2.41.1
and advancing still farther, though his army was already very much fatigued, halted at last to give the men breath. That moment Sabura sounded the charge, led on his men in order of battle, and went from rank to rank to animate the troops; but he suffered only the cavalry to come to blows, keeping the infantry at a distance within sight. Curio was not wanting on his side, but exhorted his men to place all their hopes in their valour. And indeed neither the infantry, though fatigued with their march, nor the cavalry, though few in number, and spent with toil, showed any want of valour, or backwardness to fight; though the last in particular did not exceed two hundred, the rest having stopped by the way. These, wherever they attacked the enemy, obliged them to give ground, but they could neither pursue far, nor drive their horses on with impetuosity, On the other hand, the Numidian cavalry began to surround our men, and charge them in the rear. When the cohorts advanced against them, they fell back, and by the quickness of their retreat, eluded the charge, but immediately returning, they got behind our men, and cut them off from the rest of the army. Thus it was equally dangerous for them to maintain their ranks, or advance to battle. The enemy’s forces increased continually, by the reinforcements sent from the king; ours, on the contrary, were disabled by fatigue. Neither could our wounded men retire, or be sent to any place of safety, the whole army being invested by the enemy’s horse. These despairing of safety, as is usual for men in the last moments of life, either lamented their own fate, or recommended their relations to their fellow-soldiers, if any should be so fortunate as to escape that danger. The whole army was filled with consternation and grief.
2.42.1
Curio perceiving the general alarm, and that neither his exhortations nor prayers were regarded, ordered the troops to retire with the standards to the nearest mountains, as the only resource in the present exigence. But the cavalry detached by Sabura had already seized them. All hope being now lost, some were slain while endeavouring to fly; others threw themselves upon the ground, partly in despair, partly unable to make any efforts for their own safety. At this moment, Cn. Domitius, who commanded the horse, addressing Curio, encavalry that remained, promising not to abandon him. Can I, says Curio, look Caesar in the face, after having lost an army he had committed to my charge? So saying, he continued fighting till he was slain. Very few of the cavalry escaped, those only excepted who had stopped to refresh their horses; for perceiving at a distance the rout of the whole army, they returned to their camp. All the infantry were slain to a man.
2.43.1
When this disaster was known, M. Rufus the questor, whom Curio had left to guard the camp, entreated his men not to lose courage. They begged and requested him to reconduct them into Sicily; which he promised, and ordered the masters of the transports to have their ships in readiness at night along the shore. But fear had so universally seized the minds of the soldiers, that some cried out Juba was arrived with his troops; some that Varus approached with the legions, the dust of whose march they pretended to discern; and others, that the enemy’s fleet would be upon them in an instant; though there was not the least ground for these reports The consternation thus becoming general, each man thought only of his own sailed immediately, and their flight drew after it that of the transports; so that only a very few small frigates obeyed the summons, and came to the general rendezvous. The disorder was so great upon the shore, every one striving who should first embark, that many boats sunk under the crowd, and others were afraid to come near the land.
2.44.1
Thus only a few soldiers and aged men, who either through interest or compassion were received on board, or had strength enough to swim to the transports, got safe to Sicily. The rest, deputing their centurions to Varus by night, surrendered to him. Juba, coming up next day, claimed them as his property, put the greater number to the sword, and sent a few of the most considerable, whom he had selected for that purpose, into Numidia. Varus complained of this violation of his faith; but durst not make any resistance. The king made his entrance into the city on horseback, followed by a great number of senators, among whom were Servius Sulpicius, and Licinius Damasippus. Here he stayed a few days, to give what orders he thought necessary; and then returned, with all his forces, into his kingdom.
3.argument.1
I. Caesar reserves some judgments given upon persons for bribery at elections. II. He sets out for Brundusium. III. Pompey’s mighty preparations for war. IV. Caesar embarks and arrives at the Promontory of Ceraunium. VI. His fleet returning from Brundusium is intercepted by the enemy VII. M. Octavius, one of Pompey’s adherents, laying siege to Salona, is obliged, by a sudden sally of the inhabitants, to abandon his lines. VIII. Caesar’s embassy to Pompey with proposals of peace. IX. Caesar makes himself master of Oricum. X. Also of Apollonia, and the whole country round about. XI. Caesar and Pompey encamp over against each other on the banks of the river Apsus. XII. Caesar’s transports sailing from Brundusium, put back immediately for fear of the enemy. XIII. Pompey’s fleet reduced to great straits. XIV. Conferences set on foot about a peace, which come to nothing. XV. Bibulus, admiral of Pompey’s fleet, dies. XVI. Pompey’s answer to Caesar’s proposals of peace. XVII. The conferences about a peace renewed, but without effect. XVIII. A commotion in Rome. XXI. Libo, one of Pompey’s followers, blocks up the port of Brundusium with a fleet XXII. But by the valour and conduct of Antony, is forced to quit his project. XXIII. Antony and Kalenus transport Caesar’s troops to Greece, with wonderful good success. XXVII. Pompey, to avoid being shut up between two armies, retires to Asparagium. XXVIII. Scipio, a partizan of Pompey, behaves very tyrannically in Asia. XXIX. The motions of Caesar’s lieutenants in Thesally, Aetolia, and Macedonia. XXXIV. Young Pompey burns Caesar’s fleet in the port of Oricum. XXXV. Caesar cuts off Pompey’s communication with Dyrrhachium. XXXVI. And besieges him in his camp. XXXIX. Many attempts and dispositions on both sides, with various turns of fortune. XL. Caesar’s troops, distressed for want of corn, make bread of a certain root. XLIII. Pompey repulsed in a sally. XLVII. Kalenus, one of Caesar’s lieutenants, possesses himself of several towns in Achaia. XLVIII. Caesar offers Pompey battle. XLIX. Another embassy, with proposals of peace, which are rejected. L. Pompey distressed for want of forage, resolves to break through Caesar’s lines. LI. Roscillus and Aegus, disgusted at some check they had received from Caesar, revolt to Pompey. LII. Pompey breaks through Caesar’s lines, after making great slaughter of his troops. LXI. Caesar desists from the design of inclosing Pompey, and makes a speech to his men. LXII. Caesar retires to Asparagium, and is followed by Pompey. LXV. Thence to Apollonia. LXVII. And then to Gomphi, a town of Thessaly, which, refusing to open its gates, is taken by assault the first day. LXVIII. Metropolis submits, and their example is followed by other Thessalian states. LXIX. Pompey arrives in Thessaly, elated with his success, and confident of victory. LXX. Caesar resolves to give battle. His resolution with respect to his cavalry. LXXII. Pompey likewise resolves to give battle, and boasts of an assured victory. LXXIII. The disposition of Pompey’s army. LXXIV. The disposition of Caesar’s. LXXV. Caesar’s speech to his soldiers. LXXVI. The battle of Pharsalia, in which Caesar obtains a complete victory. LXXVII. Caesar makes himself master of Pompey’s camp. LXXVIII. Where he finds great riches. LXXIX. Pompey’s flight. LXXX. Caesar pursues Pompey’s troops, and obliges them to surrender. LXXXI. The number of men killed on each side. LXXXII. Meanwhile, Laelius, a follower of Pompey, blocks up the port of Brundusium with a fleet. LXXXIII. And Cassius burns some ships in Sicily belonging to Caesar. LXXXIV. Caesar pursues Pompey. LXXXV. Pompey flying to Pelusium is murdered there by some of king Ptolemy’s court. LXXXVI. Some prodigies that happened on the day of Caesar’s victory. LXXXVII. Caesar pursuing Pompey to Alexandria, hears there the news of his death. LXXXVIII. And is unexpectedly entangled in a new war.
3.1.1
Caesar, as dictator, holding the Comitia, Julius Caesar, and P. Servilius, were chosen consuls; for this was the year in which he could be elected to that magistracy, consistent with the laws. This affair being despatched, as Caesar saw public credit at a stand over all Italy, because nobody paid their debts; he ordered that arbiters should be chosen, who should make an estimate of the possessions of all debtors, and should convey them in payment to their creditors, at the price they bore before the war. This regulation he thought best calculated to restore public credit, and prevent the apprehension of a general abolition of debts, which is but too common a consequence of wars and civil dissensions. At the same time, in consequence of an address to the people, he reestablished the praetors and tribunes, who had been deprived upon a charge of bribery, at a time when Pompey awed the city by his legions. These decisions were so little conformable to law, that sentence was often pronounced by a party of judges different from those who attended the pleadings. As these had made him an offer of their service in the beginning of the war, he accounted the obligation the same as if he had actually accepted of their friendship; but thought it better their restoration should seem to flow from the people, than appear a mere act of bounty in him, that he might neither be charged with ingratitude to his followers, nor accused of invading the prerogatives of the people.
3.2.1
All this business, with the celebration of the Latin festivals, and the holding of the comitia for elections, took him up eleven days, at the end of which he abdicated the dictatorship, and immediately set out from Rome, in order to reach Brundusium, where he had ordered twelve legions, with all the cavalry, to rendezvous. But he had scarce ships to carry over twenty thousand legionary soldiers, and six hundred horse, which alone hindered him from putting a speedy end to the war. Besides, the legions were considerably weakened by their many losses in the Gallic war, and the long and painful march from Spain; and an unhealthful autumn in Apulia, and about Brundusium, with the change of so fine a climate as that of Gaul and Spain, had brought a general sickness among the troops.
3.3.1
Pompey having had a whole year to complete his preparations, undisturbed by wars, and free from the interruption of an enemy, had collected a mighty fleet from Asia the Cyclades, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Eygpt, and had given orders for the building of ships in all parts. He had exacted great sums from the people of Asia and Syria; from the kings, tetrarchs, and dynasties of those parts; from the free states of Achaia, and from the corporations of the provinces subject to his command.
3.4.1
He had raised nine legions of Roman citizens; five he had brought with him from Italy; one had been sent him from Sicily, consisting wholly of veterans, and called Gemella, because composed of two; another from Crete and Macedonia, of veteran soldiers likewise, who, having been disbanded by former generals, had settled in those parts; and two more from Asia, levied by the care of LenC iESA tulus. Besides all these, he had great numbers from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus; whom, together with Antony’s soldiers, he distributed among the legions by way of recruits. He expected also two legions that Metellus Scipio was to bring out of Syria. He had three thousand archers, drawn together from Crete, Lacedemon, Pontus, Syria, and other provinces; six cohorts of slingers; and two of mercenaries. His cavalry amounted to seven thousand; six hundred of which came from Galatia, under Dejotarus; five hundred from Cappadocia, under Ariobarzanes; and the like number had been sent him out of Thrace, by Cotus, with his son Sadalis at their head. Two hundred were from Macedonia, commanded by Bascipolis, an officer of great distinction; five hundred from Alexandria, consisting of Gauls and Germans, left there by A. Gabinius, to serve as a guard to king Ptolemy; and now brought over by young Pompey in his fleet, together with eight hundred of his own domestics. Tarcundarius Castor and Donilaus furnished three hundred Gallograecians: the first of these came himself in person; the latter sent his son. Two hundred, most of them archers, were sent from Syria, by Comagenus of Antioch, who lay under the greatest obligations to Pompey. There were likewise a great number of Dardanians and Bessians, partly volunteers, partly mercenaries; with others from Macedonia, Thessaly, and the adjoining states and provinces; who altogether made up the number mentioned above.
3.5.1
To subsist this mighty army, he had taken care to amass vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other countries; resolving to quarter his troops, during the winter, at Dyrrhachium, Apollonia, and the other maritime towns, to prevent Caesar’s passing the sea; for which purpose, he ordered his fleet to cruise perpetually about the coasts. Young Pompey commanded the Egyptian squadron ; D. Lalius and C. Triarius the Asiatic; C. Cassius the Syrian; C. Marcellus and C. Coponius the Rhodian; Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius the Liburnian and Achaian: but the chief authority was vested in M. Bibulus, who was admiral of the whole, and gave his orders accordingly.
3.6.1
Caesar, upon his arrival at Brundusium, harangued his troops, and told them: That as they were now upon the point of seeing an end of all their toils and dangers, they ought baggage behind them in Italy, that they might embark with less confusion, and in greater numbers; putting all their hopes in victory, and the generosity of their general. The whole army testified their approbation of what was proposed, and called out that they were ready to submit to his orders. Accordingly having put seven legions on board, as we have before observed, he set sail the fourth of January, and arrived next day at the Ceraunian mountains: where, having found, among the rocks and shelves, with which that coast abounds, a tolerable road; and not daring to go to any port, as he apprehended they were all in the enemy’s possession; he landed his troops at a place called Pharsalus, whither he brought his fleet, without the loss of a single ship.
3.7.1
Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus were at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships: and Bibulus had a hundred and ten at Corcyra. But the first durst not hazard an engagement, though Caesar was escorted by no more than twelve galleys, only four of which had decks: and Bibulus had not time to reassemble his sailors and soldiers, who were dispersed in full security; for no news of Caesar’s approach had reached those parts, till his fleet was seen from the continent.
3.8.1
Caesar having landed his troops, sent the fleet back the same night to Brundusium, to bring over his other legions and cavalry. Fufius Kalenus, lieutenant-general, had the charge of this expedition, with orders to use the utmost despatch. But setting sail too late, he lost the benefit of the wind, which offered fair all night, and fell in with the enemy. For Bibulus hearing at Corcyra of Caesar’s arrival, forthwith put to sea, in hopes of intercepting some of the transports; and meeting the fleet as it returned empty, took about thirty ships, which he immediately burned, with all that were on board; partly to satisfy his own vengeance for the disappointment he had received; partly to deter the rest of the troops from attempting the passage. He then stationed his fleet along the coast, from Salona to Oricum, guarded all places with extraordinary care, and even lay himself aboard, notwithstanding the rigour of the winter; declining no danger nor fatigue, and solely intent upon intercepting Caesar’s supplies.
3.9.1
After the departure of the Liburnian his command, sailed from Illyricum, and came before Salona. Having spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations in those parts, he drew Issa to revolt from Caesar. But finding that the council of Salona was neither to be moved by promises nor threats, he resolved to invest the town. Salona is built upon a hill, and advantageously situated for defence; but as the fortifications were very inconsiderable, the Roman citizens, residing there, immediately surrounded the place with wooden towers; and finding themselves too few to resist the attacks of the enemy, who soon overwhelmed them with wounds, betook themselves to their last refuge, by granting liberty to all slaves capable of bearing arms, and cutting off the women’s hair, to make cords for their engines. Octavius perceiving their obstinacy, formed five different camps round the town, that they might at once suffer all the inconveniences of a siege, and be exposed to frequent attacks. The Salonians, determined to endure any thing, found themselves most pressed for want of corn; and therefore sent deputies to Caesar to solicit a supply, patiently submitting to all the other hardships they laboured under. When the siege had now continued a considerable time, and the Octavians began to be off their guard, the Salonians, finding the opportunity favourable, about noon, when the enemy were dispersed, disposed their wives and children upon the walls, that every thing might have its wonted appearance; and sallying in a body with their enfranchised slaves, attacked the nearest quarters of Octavius. Having soon forced these, they advanced to the next; thence to a third, a fourth, and so on through the rest; till having driven the enemy from every post, and made great slaughter of their men, they at length compelled them, and Octavius their leader, to betake themselves to their ships. Such was the issue of the siege. As winter now approached, and the loss had been very considerable; Octavius, despairing to reduce the place, retired to Dyrrhachium, and joined Pompey.
3.10.1
We have seen that L. Vibullius Rufus, Pompey’s chief engineer, had fallen twice into Caesar’s hands, and been as often set at liberty; the first time at Corfinium, the next in Spain. Having been therefore twice indebted to him for his life, and being also much in Pompey’s esteem, Caesar thought him a proper person to negotiate between them. His instructions were; That it was now time for both to desist from their obstinacy, and lay down their arms, without exposing themselves any more to the precarious events of fortune. That the losses they had already sustained ought to serve as lessons and cautions, and fill them with just apprehensions with regard to the future. That Pompey had been forced to abandon Italy, had lost Sicily and Sardinia, the two Spains, with about a hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens, who had perished in these countries. That himself too had been a considerable sufferer by the death of Curio, the destruction of the African army, and the surrender of his forces at Corcyra. That it was therefore incumbent on them to show some regard to the sinking state of the commonwealth, having sufficiently experienced, by their own misfortunes, how prevalent fortune was in war. That the present moment was the most favourable in this respect; because, not having yet tried one another’s strength, and considering them as equals, there would be more likelihood of agreeing on terms: whereas, if one of them once got the superiority, he would exact every thing from the other, and give up nothing. That as hitherto they had been unable to settle the conditions of peace, they ought to refer them to the decision of the senate and people of Rome; and, in the meantime, to obtain a free and unbiassed judgment, both swear to disband their armies in three days' time. That when they were once divested of their national and auxiliary forces, in which their whole confidence lay, they would find themselves under a necessity of submitting to the decree of the senate and people. In fine, that to give Pompey a proof of his readiness to perform these proposals, he would give immediate orders for the discharge of all his forces, both in garrison and in the field.
3.11.1
Vibullius having received these instructions, thought it necessary to give Pompey speedy notice of Caesar’s arrival, that he might be provided against that event, before he laid open the commission he was charged with. Accordingly, journeying day and night, and frequently changing horses, for the greater expedition, he at length got to Pompey, and informed him that Caesar was approaching with all his forces. Pompey was at that time in Candavia, from whence he was marching through Macedonia, to his winter quarters at Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. Concerned at this unexpected news, he hastened his march to Apollonia, to prevent Caesar’s making himself master of the sea-coasts. Meanwhile Caesar, having landed his forces, marched the same day to Oricum. Upon his arrival there, L. Torquatus, who commanded in the town for Pompey, with a garrison of Parthinians, ordered the gates to be shut, and the Greeks to repair to their arms, and man the walls. But they refusing to fight against the authority of the people of Rome, and the inhabitants, of their own accord, endeavouring to admit Caesar, Torquatus, despairing of relief, opened the gates, and surrendered both himself and the town to Caesar, who readily granted him his life.
3.12.1
Caesar having made himself master of Oricum, marched directly to Apollonia. Upon the report of his arrival, L. Staberius, who commanded in the place, ordered water to be carried into the castle, fortified it with great care, and demanded hostages of the townsmen. They refused to comply; declaring they would not shut their gates against the consul of the Roman people, nor presume to act in contradiction to the judgment of the senate, and of all Italy. Staberius finding it in vain to resist, privately left the place; upon which, the Apollonians sent deputies to Caesar, and received him into the town. Bullidenses, Amantiani, with the rest of the neighbouring countries, and all Epirus, followed their example; acquainting Caesar, by their ambassadors, that they were ready to execute his commands.
3.13.1
Meanwhile Pompey, having notice of what passed at Oricum and Apollonia, and being apprehensive for Dyrrhachium, marched day and night to reach the place. At the same time it was reported that Caesar was not far off; which meeting with the more credit, because of their hasty march, put the whole army into such consternation, that many abandoning their colours in Epirus and the neighbouring states, and others throwing down their arms, every thing had the appearance of a precipitate flight. But upon Pompey’s halting near Dyrrhachium, and ordering a camp to be formed; as the army had not even then recovered its fright, Labienus advanced before the rest, and swore never to abandon his genshould assign him. The other lieutenants did the same, as likewise the military tribunes and centurions, whose example was followed by the whole army. Caesar, finding that he was prevented in his design upon Dyrrhachium, pursued his march more leisurely, and encamped on the river Apsus, in the territories of the Apollonians; that he might protect the possessions of a state, which had so warmly declared in his favour. Here he resolved to pass the winter in tents, and wait the arrival of the rest of his legions out of Italy. Pompey did the like, and having encamped on the other side of the Apsus, assembled there all his legions and auxiliaries.
3.14.1
Kalenus having embarked the legions and cavalry at Brundusium, according to the instructions he had received, put to sea with his whole fleet; but had not sailed very far till he was met by letters from Caesar, informing him that all the Grecian coasts were guarded by the enemy’s fleet. Upon this, he recalled his ships, and returned again into the harbour. Only one continued its route, which carried no soldiers, nor was subject to the orders of Kalenus, but belonged to a private commander. This vessel arriving before Oricum, fell into the hands of Bibulus, who, not sparing the very children, put all on board to death, both freemen and slaves. So much did the safety of the whole army depend upon a single moment.
3.15.1
Bibulus, as we have related above, lay at Oricum, with his fleet; and as he deprived Caesar of all supplies by sea, so was he, in like manner, greatly incommoded by Caesar at land; who, having disposed parties along the coast, hindered him from getting water or wood, or coming near the shore. This was attended with many inconveniences, and threw him into great straits; insomuch that he was obliged to fetch all his other necessaries, as well as wood and water, from the island of Corcyra; and once, when foul weather prevented his receiving refreshments from thence, the soldiers were necessitated, for want of water, to collect the dew, which, in the night, fell on the hides that covered their ships. Yet he bore all these difficulties with surprising firmness, and continued resolute in his design of not unguarding the coast. But at last, being reduced to the above-mentioned extremity, and Libo having joined him, they called from two of Caesar’s lieutenants, one of whom guarded the walls of Oricum, and the other the sea-coasts; that they wanted to confer with Caesar about affairs of the greatest consequence, if they could but have an opportunity. To gain the more credit, they let fall some expressions that seemed to promise accommodation; and in the meanwhile demanded and obtained a truce; for Marcus and Acilius believing their proposals to be serious, knew how extremely grateful they would be to Caesar, and doubted not but Vibullius had succeeded in his negotiation.
3.16.1
Caesar was then at Buthrotum, a town over against Corcyra; whither he was gone, with one legion, to reduce some of the more distant states, and supply himself with corn, which then began to be scarce. Here, receiving letters from Acilius and Marcus, with an account of Libo and Bibulus’s demands, he left the legion, and returned to Oricum. Upon his arrival, he invited them to a conference. Libo appeared, and made an apology for Bibulus: That being naturally hasty, and bearing a personal grudge to Caesar, contracted during the time of his edileship and questorship, he had, for that reason, declined the interview; to prevent any obstructions from his presence to the success of so desirable and advantageous a design: that Pompey was, and ever had been inclined to lay down his arms, and terminate their differences by an accommodation; but as yet had not sent him sufficient powers to treat; which, however, he doubted not soon to receive, as the council had intrusted him with the whole administration of the war: that if he would therefore make known his demands, they would send them to Pompey, who would soon come to a resolution upon their representations. In the meantime, the truce might continue, and both parties abstain from acts of hostility, till an answer could be obtained. He added something about the justice of their cause, and their forces, both natural and auxiliary;
3.17.1
to which Caesar neither at that time returned any answer, nor do we now think it of importance enough to be transmitted to posterity. Caesar’s demands were: That he might have leave to send ambassadors to Pompey; and that they would either stipulate for their return, or undertake themselves to convey them in safety: that with regard to the truce; such were the fleet kept back his supplies and transports, and his forces deprived them of water and access to the shore. If they expected any abatement on his side, they must likewise abate in guarding the coast; but if they still persisted in their former vigilance, neither would he yield in what depended on him: that, notwithstanding, the accommodation might go forward without any obstruction from this mutual denial. Libo declined receiving Caesar’s ambassadors, or undertaking for their safe return, and chose to refer the whole matter to Pompey; yet insisted on the truce. Caesar perceiving, that the only aim of the enemy was to extricate themselves out of their present straits and danger, and that it was in vain to entertain any hopes of peace, turned all his thoughts to the vigorous prosecution of the war.
3.18.1
Bibulus having kept at sea for many days, and contracted a dangerous illness by the cold and perpetual fatigue, as he could neither have proper assistance on board, nor would be prevailed upon to quit his post, he at last sunk under the weight of his distemper. After his death, nobody succeeded in the command of the whole fleet; but each squadron was governed, independently of the rest, by its particular commander.
3.18.2
When the surprise occasioned by Caesar’s sudden arrival was over, Vibullius, in presence of Libo, L. Lucceius, and Theophanes, who were among Pompey’s most intimate counsellors, resolved to deliver the commission he had received from Caesar. But scarce had he begun to speak, when Pompey interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed no further. What, says he, is my life or country to me, if I shall seem to be beholden to Caesar for them? And will it be believed that I am not indebted to him for them, if he, by an accommodation, restores me to Italy? Caesar was informed of this speech, after the conclusion of the war, by those who were present when it was delivered: he still continued, however, by other methods, to try to bring about an accommodation.
3.19.1
As the two camps were only separated by the river Apsus, the soldiers had frequent discourse among themselves; and it was settled by mutual consent, that no act of hostility should pass during the conferences. Caesar taking advantage of this opportunity, sent P. Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to forward to the utmost an accommodation; and to demand frequently with a loud voice, Whether it might not be permitted to citizens, to send deputies to their fellow citizens about peace: that this had never been denied even to fugitives and robbers, and could much less be opposed, when the only design was to prevent the effusion of civil blood. This and much more he said, with a submissive air, as became one employed to treat for his own and the common safety. He was heard with great silence by both parties, and received this answer from the enemy: That A. Varro had declared he would next day appear at an interview, whither the deputies of both parties might come in perfect security, and mutually make known their demands. The hour of meeting was likewise settled; which being come, multitudes on both sides flocked to the place; the greatest expectations were formed; and the minds of all seemed intent upon peace. T. Labienus, advancing from the crowd, began in a low voice to confer with Vatinius, as if to settle the articles of the treaty. But their discourse was soon interrupted by a multitude of darts that came pouring in on all sides. Vatinius escaped the danger, by means of the soldiers, who protected him with their shields; but Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtus, centurions, and some private men, were wounded. Labienus then lifted up his voice, and cried: Leave off prating of an accommodation; for you must not expect peace, till you bring us Caesar’s head.
3.20.1
About the same time, M. Caelius Rufus, pretor at Rome for foreign affairs, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on his entrance into his office, ordered his tribunal to be fixed near that of the city pretor, C. Trebonius, and promised to receive the complaints of such as should appeal to him, in regard to the estimation and payments, made in consequence of Caesar’s late regulation. But such was the equity of the decree, and the humanity of Trebonius, who, in so nice and critical an affair, thought it necessary to conduct himself with the utmost clemency and moderation, that no pretence of appeal could be found. For to plead poverty, personal losses, the hardness of the times, and the difficulty of bringing their effects to sale, is usual enough even with reasonable minds: but to own themselves indebted, and yet aim at keeping their possessions entire, would have argued a total want both of honesty and shame. Accordingly not a man was found who had made any such demand. Caelius’s whole severity, therefore, was pointed against those, to whom the inheritance of the debtor was adjudged; and having once embarked in the affair, that he might not seem to have engaged himself to no purpose in an unjustifiable cause, he published a law, by which he allowed the debtors six years for the discharge of their debts, wihch they were to clear at equal payments, without interest.
3.21.1
But the consul Servilius, and the rest of the magistrates opposing the law, when he found it had not the effect he expected, he thought proper to drop that design; and in the view of inflaming the people, proposed two new laws; the one, to exempt all the tenants in Rome from paying rents; the other, for a general abolition of debts. This bait took with themultitude, and Caelius at their head, came and attacked C. Trebonius on his tribunal, drove him thence, and wounded some about him. The consul Servilius reported these things to the senate, who interdicted to Caelius the functions of his office. In consequence of this decree, the consul refused him admittance into the senate, and drive him out of his tribunal, when he was going to harangue the people. Overwhelmed with shame and resentment, he openly threatened to carry his complaints to Caesar; but privately gave notice to Milo, who had been banished for the murder of Clodius, to come into Italy, and join him with the remains of the gladiators, which he bought formerly to entertain the people with, in the shows he gave them. With this view he sent him before to Turinum, to solicit the shepherds to take arms, and went himself to Casilinum: where hearing that his arms and ensigns had been seized at Capua, his partisans at Naples, and their design of betraying the city discovered; finding all his projects defeated, the gates of Capua shut against him, and the danger increased every moment, because the citizens had taken arms, and began to consider him as a public enemy; he desisted from the project he had formed, and thought proper to change his rout.
3.22.1
In the meantime Milo, having despatched letters to all the colonies and free towns, intimating that what he did was in virtue of Pompey’s authority, who had sent him orders by Bibulus, endeavored to draw over the debtors to his party. But not succeeding in his design, he contented himself with setting some slaves at liberty, and with them marched to besiege Cosa, in the territory of Turinum. Q. Paedius the pretor, with a garrison of one legion, commanded in the town: and here Milo was slain by a stone from a machine on the walls. Caelius giving out that he was gone to Caesar, came to Thurium, where endeavouring to debauch the inhabitants, and corrupt by promises of money the Spanish and Gaulish horse, whom Caesar had sent thither to garrison the place, they slew him. Thus these dangerous beginnings, that by reason of the multiplicity of affairs wherewith the magistrates were distracted, and the ticklish situation of the times, threatened great revolutions, and alarmed all Italy, were brought to a safe and speedy issue.
3.23.1
Libo leaving Oricum, with the fleet under his command, consisting of fifty sail, came to Brundusium, and possessed himself of an island directly facing the harbour, judging it of more consequence to secure a post, by which our transports must necessarily pass, than guard all the coasts and havens on the other side. As his arrival was unexpected, he surprised and burned some transports, and carried off a vessel loaded with corn. The consternation was great among our men, insomuch that having landed some foot, with a party of archers, in the night, he defeated our guard of cavalry, and had so far the advantage, by the commodiousness of his post, that he wrote Pompey word, he might draw the rest of the navy on shore, and order them to be careened; for he alone, with his squadron, would undertake to cut off Caesar’s supplies.
3.24.1
Antony was then at Brundusium, who confiding in the valour of the troops, ordered some boats belonging to the fleet to be armed with hurdles and galleries, and having filled them with chosen troops, disposed them in several places along the shore. At the same time, he sent two three-benched galleys, which he had caused to be built at Brundusium, to the mouth of the harbour, as if with design to exercise the rowers. Libo perceiving them advance boldly, and hoping he might be able to intercept them, detached five quadriremes for that purpose. At their approach, our men rowed towards the harbour, whither the enemy, eager of the pursuit, inconsiderately followed them; for now Antony’s armed boats, upon a signal given, came pouring upon them from all parts, and on the very first onset took a quadrireme, with all the soldiers and sailors on board, and forced the rest to an ignominious flight. To add to this disgrace, the cavalry, which Antony had posted ail along the coast, hindered the enemy from watering; which reduced them to such straits that Libo was forced to quit the blockade or Brundusium, and retire with his fleet.
3.25.1
Several months had now passed; the winter was almost over; meantime, neither the ships nor legions were yet arrived, which Caesar expected from Brundusium. He could not help thinking that some opportunities had been lost, as it was certain the wind had many times offered fair, and there was a necessity of trusting to it at last. The longer the delay in sending over the troops, the more vigilant and alert were the enemy in guarding the coast, and the greater their confidence to hinder the passage; nay, Pompey, in his letters, frequently reproached them, that as they had not prevented the first embarkation, they ought at least to take care that no more of the troops got over; and the season itself was becoming less favourable, by the approach of milder weather, when the enemy’s fleet would be able to act and extend itself. For these reasons, Caesar wrote sharply to his lieutenants at Brundusium, charging them not to omit the first opportunity of sailing, as soon as the wind offered fair, and to steer for the coast of Apollonia, which they could approach with less danger, as it was not so strictly guarded by the enemy, who were afraid of venturing on a coast so ill provided with havens.
3.26.1
The lieutenants, roused and emboldened by these letters, and encouraged by the exhortations of the troops themselves, who professed they were ready to face any danger for Caesar’s sake, embarked under the direction of M. Antony and Fufius Kalenus, and setting sail with the wind at south, passed Apollonia and Dyrrhachium next day. Being descried from the continent, C. Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian squadron at Dyrrhachium, put out to sea, and the wind slackening upon our fleet, it was near falling into the hands of the enemy; but a fresh gale springing up at south, saved us from that danger. Coponius however desisted not from the pursuit, hoping by the labour and perseverance of the mariners, to surmount the violence of the tempest; and though we had passed Dyrrhachium with a very hard gale, still continued to follow us. Our men, apprehensive of an attack, should the wind again chance to slacken, seized an advantage fortune threw in their way, and put into the port of Nyphaeum, about three miles beyond Lissus. This port is sheltered from the south-west wind, but lies open to the south; but,they preferred the hazard they might be exposed to by the tempest, to that of fighting. At that instant, by an unusual piece of good fortune, the wind, which for two days had blown from the south, changed to the south west. This was a sudden and favourable turn: for the fleet so lately in danger from the enemy, was sheltered in a safe commodious port; and that whichthreatened ours with destruction, was in its turn exposed to the utmost peril.
3.27.1
By this unexpected change, the storm, which protected our fleet, beat so furiously on the Rhodian galleys, that they were all, to the number of sixteen, broken to pieces against the shore. Most of the soldiers and mariners perished among the rocks: the rest were taken up by our men, and sent by Caesar’s orders to their several homes.
3.28.1
Two of our transports, unable to keep up with the rest, were overtaken by the night: and not knowing where the fleet had put in, cast anchor over against Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded in the place, sent out some boats and small vessels to attack them: at the same time he urged them to surrender, promising quarter to such as would submit. One of these vessels carried two hundred and twenty new-raised soldiers; the other less than two hundred veterans. On this occasion appeared, how great a defence against danger results from firmness of mind. The new levies, frighted at the number of their adversaries, and fatigued with sea-sickness, surrendered on promise of their lives. But when they were brought to Otacilius, regardless of the oath he had taken, he ordered them all to be cruelly slain in his presence. The veterans, on the contrary, though they hadboth the storm and a leaky vessel to struggle with, abated nothing of their wonted bravery: but having spun out the time till night under pretence of treating, obliged the pilot to run the vessel ashore, where finding an advantageous post, they continuedthe remainder of the night. At day-break, Otacilius detached against them part of the coast, and pursued them sword in hand; but they defendedthemselves with great bravery, and having slain some of the enemy, rejoined, without loss, the rest of the troops.
3.29.1
Upon this the Roman citizens inhabiting Lissus, to whom Caesar had before made a grant of the town, after fortifying it with great care, opened their gates to Antony, and furnished him with every thing he stood in need of. Otacilius, dreading the consequences of this revolution, quitted the place, and fled to Pompey. Antony having landed his troops, which consisted of three veteran legions, one new raised, and eight hundred horse, sent most of the transports back again to Brundusium, to bring over the rest of the foot and cavalry; retaining, nevertheless, some ships of Gaulish structure, that if Pompey, imagining Italy destitute of troops, should attempt to run thither, as was commonly rumoured, Caesar might be able to follow him. At the same time he gave Caesar speedy notice of the number of forces he had brought over with him, and the place where he had landed.
3.30.1
This intelligence reached Caesar and Pompey much about the same time; for both had seen the fleet pass Apollonia and Dyrrhachium, and had in consequence directed their march that way; but neither knew, for some days, into what harbour it had put. On the first news of Antony’s landing, the two generals took different resolutions; Caesar, to join him as soon as possible; Pompey, to oppose his march, and, if possible, draw him into an ambuscade. Both quitted their camps on the Apsus about the same time; Pompey, privately, during the night; Caesar, publicly, by day. But Caesar, who had the river to cross, was obliged to fetch a compass, that he might come at a ford. Pompey, on the other hand, having nothing to obstruct his march, advanced by great journeys against Antony; and, understanding that he was not far off, posted his troops on an advantageous ground, ordering them to keep within their camp, and light no fires, that his approach might not be perceived. But Antony being informed of it by the Greeks, would not stir out of his lines, and sending immediate notice to Caesar, was joined by him next day. On advice of Caesar’s arrival, Pompey, that he might not be shut up between two armies, quitted the place, and coming with all his forces to Asparagium, a town belonging to the Dyrrhachians, encamped there on an advantageous ground.
3.31.1
About the same time Scipio, notwithstanding some checks he had received near Mount Amanus, assumed the title of emperor; after which he exacted great sums of money from the neighbouring states and princes; obliged the farmers of the revenue to pay the two years' taxes, which lay in their hands, and advance a third by way of loan, and sent orders to the whole province; for levying cavalry. Having got a sufficient number together, he quitted the Parthians, his nearest enemies who not long before had slain M. Crassus, and held Bibulus invested; and marched out of Syria with his legions and cavalry. When he arrived in Asia Minor, he found the whole country filled with terror on account of the Parthian war; and the soldiers themselves declared, that they were ready to march against an enemy, but would never bear arms against a consul, and their fellow-citizens. To stifle these discontents, he made considerable presents to the troops, quartered them in Pergamus and other rich towns, and gave up the whole country to their discretion.
3.32.1
Meanwhile the money demanded of the province was levied with great rigour, and various pretences were devised, to serve as a ground to new exactions. Slaves and freemen were subject to a capitation tax. Imposts were laid upon pillars and doors of houses. Corn, soldiers, mariners, arms, engines, carriages, in a word, every thing that had a name, furnished a sufficient handle for extorting money. Governors were appointed not only over towns, but over villages and castles; and he that acted with the greatest rigour and cruelty, was accounted the worthiest man and best citizen. The province swarmed with lictors, overseers, and collectors, who, besides the sums imposed by public authority exacted money likewise on their own account, colouring their iniquitous demands with a pretence that they had been expelled their country and native homes, and were in extreme want of every thing. Add to all these calamities, immoderate usury, an evil almost inseparable from war; for so great sums are then exacted, beyond what a country is able to furnish, they are obliged to apply for a delay, which at any price is still accounted a favour. Thus the debts of the province increased considerably during these two years. Nor were the Roman citizens the only sufferers on this occasion; for certain sums were demanded of every state and corporation, as a loan upon the senate’s decree; and the farmers of the revenue were ordered to advance the next year’s tribute, in like manner as when they first entered upon office.
3.33.1
Besides all this, Scipio gave orders for seizing the treasures of the temple of Diana at Ephesus, with all the statues of that goddess. But when he came to the temple, attended by many persons of senatorian rank, he received letters from Pompey, desiring him to lay aside all other concerns, and make what haste he could to join him, because Caesar had passed into Greece with his whole army. In consequence of this order, he sent back the senators who had been summoned to attend him at Ephesus, made preparations for passing into Macedonia, and began his march a few days after. Thus the Ephesian treasures escaped being plundered.
3.34.1
Caesar having joined Antony’s army, and recalled the legion he had left at Oricum to guard the sea-coast, judged it necessary to advance farther into the country, and possess himself of the more distant provinces. At the same time,deputies arrived from Thessaly and Aetolia with assurances of submission from all the states in those parts, provided he would send troops to defend them. Accordingly he despatched L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, called the twenty-seventh, and two hundred horse, into Thessaly; and C. Calvissius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and some cavalry, into Aetolia; charging them in a particular manner, as those provinces lay the nearest to his camp, that they would take care to furnish him with corn. He likewise ordered Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, and five hundred horse, to march into Macedonia: for Menedemus, the principal man of that country, having come ambassador to Caesar, had assured him of the affection of the province.
3.35.1
Calvisius was well received by the Aetolians, and having driven the enemy’s garrisons from Calydon and Naupactum, possessed himself of the whole country. Cassius arriving in Thessaly with his legion, found the state divided into two factions. Egesaretus, a man in years, and of established credii, favoured Pompey; Petreius, a young nobleman of the first rank, exerted his whole interest in behalf of Caesar.
3.36.1
About the same time Domitius arrived in Macedonia; and while deputies were attending him from all parts, news came that Scipio approached with his legions, which spread a great alarm through the country; as fame, for the most part, magnifies the first appearances of things. Scipio, without stopping any where in Macedonia, advanced by great marches towards Domitius; but being come within twenty miles of him, suddenly changed his route, and turned off to Thessaly, in quest of Cassius Longinus. This was done so expeditiously, that he was actually arrived with his troops, when Cassius received the first notice of his march: for to make the more despatch, he had left M. Favonius at the river Haliacmon, which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts, to guard the baggage of the legions, and ordered him to erect a fort there. At the same time, king Cotus’s cavalry, which had been accustomed to make inroads into Thessaly, came pouring upon Cassius’s camp; who, knowing that Scipio was upon his march, and believing the cavalry to be his, retired in a fright to the mountains that begirt Thessaly, and thence directed his course towards Ambracia. Scipio preparing to follow him, received letters from M. Favonius, that Domitius was coming up with his legions, nor would it be possible for him to maintain the post he was in, without his assistance. Scipio, upon his intelligence, changed his resolution, gave over the pursuit of Cassius, and advanced to the relief of Favonius. As he marched day and night without intermission, he arrived so opportunely, that the dust of Domitius’s army, and his advanced parties, were descried at the same time. Thus Domitius’s care preserved Cassius, and Scipio’s diligence Favonius.
3.37.1
Scipio continued two days in his camp upon the Haliacmon, which ran between him and the army of Domitius, put his troops in motion on the third, and by day-break forded the river. Early next morning he drew up his troops in order of battle at the head of his camp. Domitius was not averse to an engagement; but as between the two camps there was a plain of six miles, he thought that the fittest place for a field of battle, and drew up his men at some distance from Scipost; yet hardly could Domitius restrain his men from advancing to attack him though a rivulet with steep banks, that ran in the front of the enemy’s camp, and opposed their passage. Scipio observing the keenness and alacrity of our troops, and fearing that next day he should either be forced to fight against his will, or ignominiously keep within his camp; after great expectations raised, by too hastily crossting the river, he saw all his projects defeated; and decamping in great silence during the night, returned to his former station, beyond the Haliacmon, and posted himself on a rising ground, near the river. A few days after, he formed an ambuscade, of cavalry, by night, in a place where our men were wont to forage: and when Q. Varus, who commanded the horse under Domitius, came next day, according to custom; suddenly the enemy rose from their lurking holes: but our men bravely sustained the attack, soon recovered their ranks, and in their turn vigorously charged the enemy. About fourscore fell on this occasion; the rest betook themselves to flight; and our men returned to their camp, with the loss of only two of their number.
3.38.1
After this rencounter, Domitius, hoping to draw Scipio to a battle, feigned to decamp for want of provisions; and having made the usual signal for retreating, after a march of three miles, drew up his cavalry and legions in a convenient plain, shrouded from the enemy’s view. Scipio, preparing to follow, sent the horse and light-armed infantry before to explore his route, and examine the situation of the country. When they were advanced a little way, and their first squadrons had come within reach of our ambush; beginning to suspect something from the neighing of the horses, they wheeled about, in order to retreat; which the troops that followed observing, suddenly halted. Our men, finding that the ambush was discovered, and knowing it would be in vain to wait for the rest of the army, fell upon the two squadrons that were most advanced. M. Opinius, general of the horse to Domitius, was amongst these, but somehow found means to escape. All the rest were either slain, or made prisoners.
3.39.1
Caesar having drawn off his garrisons from the sea-coast, as we have related above, left three cohorts at Oricum to defend the town, and committed to their charge the one of his lieutenants, had the command of these troops; who, for the greater security, caused the ships to be drawn up into the harbour behind the town, and made them fast to the shore. He likewise sunk a transport in the mouth of the haven, behind which another rode at anchor, on whose deck a tower was erected, facing the entrance of the port, and filled with troops, to be ready in case of surprise.
3.40.1
Young Pompey, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having notice of this, came to Oricum; weighed up the vessel that had been sunk in the mouth of the harbour; and, after an obstinate resistance, took the other, which had been placed there by Acilius, to guard the haven. He then brought forward his fleet, on which he had raised towers, to fight with the greater advantage; and having surrounded the town on all sides, attacked it by land with scaling ladders, and by sea from the towers, sending fresh men continually in the place of those that were fatigued, and thereby obliging us to yield, through weariness and wounds. At the same time he seized an eminence, on the other side of the town, which seemed a kind of natural mole, and almost formed a peninsula over against Oricum; and by means of this neck of land, carried four small galleys, upon rollers, into the inner part of the haven. Thus the galleys, that were made fast to the land, and destitute of troops, being attacked on all sides, four were carried off, and the rest burned. This affair despatched, he left D. Laelius, whom he had taken from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to prevent the importation of provisions from Biblis and Amantia; and sailing for Lissus, attacked and burned the thirty transports which Antony had left in that haven. He endeavoured likewise to take the town; but the Roman citizens of that district, aided by the garrison Caesar had left, defended it so well, that at the end of three days, he retired without effecting his purpose, having lost some men in the attempt.
3.41.1
Caesar being informed that Pompey was at Asparagium, marched thither with his army; and having taken the capital of the Parthinians by the way, where Pompey had a garrison; arrived the third day in Macedonia, and encamped at a small distance from the enemy. The next day he drew out all his forces, formed them before his camp, and offered Pompey battle. Finding that he kept within his lines, he led back his troops, and began to think of pursuing other measures. Accordingly, on the morrow, by a long circuit, and through very narrow and difficult ways, he marched, with all his forces, to Dyrrhachium; hoping either to oblige Pompey to follow him thither, or cut off his communication with the town, where he had laid up all his provisions, and magazines of war; which happened accordingly. For Pompey, at first, not penetrating his design, because he counterfeited a route different from what he really intended, imagined he had been obliged to decamp for want of provisions: but being afterwards informed of the truth, by his scouts, he quitted his camp next day, in hopes to pre vent him by taking a nearer way. Caesar, suspecting what might happen, exhorted his soldiers to bear the fatigue patiently; and allowing them to repose during only a small part of the night, arrived next morning at Dyrrhachium, where he immediately formed a camp, just as Pompey’s van began to appear at a distance.
3.42.1
Pompey, thus excluded from Dyrrhachium, and unable to execute his first design, came to a resolution of encamping on an eminence, called Petra, where was a tolerable harbour, sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered part of his fleet to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought him from Asia, and the other provinces subject to his command. Caesar, apprehending the war would run into length, and despairing of supplies from Italy, because the coasts were so strictly guarded by Pompey’s fleet; and his own galleys, built, the winter before, in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were not yet arrived; despatched L. Canuleius, one of his lieutenants, to Epirus, for corn. And because that country lay at a great distance from his camp, he built granaries in several places, and wrote to the neighbouring states to carry their corn thither. He likewise ordered search to be made for what corn could be found in Lissus, the country of the Parthinians, and the other principalities in those parts. This amounted to very little; partly occasioned by the soil, which is rough and mountainous, and obliges the inhabitants often to import grain; partly because Pompey, foreseeing Caesar’s wants, had, some days before, ravaged the country of the Parthinians, plundered their houses, and, corn.
3.43.1
For these reasons, Caesar formed a project, which the very nature of the country suggested. All round Pompey’s camp, at a small distance, were high and steep hills. Caesar took possession of those hills, and built forts upon them; resolving, as the nature of the ground would allow, to draw lines of communication from one fort to another, and inclose Pompey within his works. His views herein were; first, to facilitate the passage of his convoys, which the enemy’s cavalry, which was very strong and fine, would no longer cut off; next. to distress this very cavalry, for want of forage; and lastly, to lessen the great reputation and high idea entertained of Pompey, when it should be reported all over the world, that he had suffered himself to be blockaded, and, as it were, imprisoned by Caesar’s works; and durst not hazard a battle to set himself at liberty.
3.44.1
Pompey would neither leave the sea and Dyrrhachium, where he had all his magazines and engines of war, and whence he was supplied with provisions by means of his fleet; nor could prevent the progress of Caesar’s works, without fighting, which, at that time, he was determined against. He could do nothing therefore but extend himself, by taking as many hills, and as large a circuit of country as possible, to give his adversary the more trouble, and divide his forces. This he did, by raising twenty-four forts, which took in a circumference of fifteen miles, wherein were arable and pasture lands, to feed his horses and beasts of burden. And as our men had carried their circumvallation quite round, by drawing lines of commuication from fort to fort, to prevent the sallies of the enemy, and guard against the attacks in the rear; in like manner, Pompey’s men had surrounded themselves with lines, to hinder us from breaking in upon them, and charging them behind. They even perfected their works first, because they had more hands, and a less circuit to inclose. When Caesar endeavoured to gain any place, Pompey, though determined not to oppose him with all his forces, nor hazard a general action, failed not, however, to detach parties of archers and slingers; who wounded great numbers of our men, and occasioned such a dread of their arrows, that almost all the soldiers furnished themselves, with coats of danger.
3.45.1
Both parties disputed every post with great obstinacy: Caesar, that he might inclose Pompey within as narrow a space as possible; and Pompey, that he might have liberty to extend himself; which occasioned many sharp skirmishes. In one of these, Caesar’s ninth legion having possessed themselves of an eminence, which they began to fortify, Pompey seized the opposite mount, with a resolution to hinder their works. As the access on one side was very easy, he sent first some archers and slingers, and afterwards a strong detachment of light-armed foot, plying us, at the same time, with his military engines; which obliged our men to desist; as they found it impossible at once to sustain the enemy’s charge, and go forward with their works. Caesar, perceiving that his men were wounded from all sides, resolved to quit the place and retire. But as the descent, by which he must retreat, was pretty steep, the Pompeians charged him briskly in drawing off, imagining he gave way through fear. Pompey went so far as to say, That he consented to be accounted a general of no merit, if Caesar’s men got off without considerable loss.
3.46.1
Caesar, concerned about the retreat of his men, ordered hurdles to be fixed on the ridge of the hill fronting the enemy: behind which he dug a moderate ditch, and rendered the place as inaccessible as he could, on all sides. When this was done, he began to file off the legionary soldiers, supporting them by some light-armed troops, posted on their flanks, who, with arrows and stones, might repulse the enemy. Pompey’s troops failed not to pursue them, with great outcries and fierce menaces, overturned the hurdles, and used them as bridges to get over the ditch. Which Casar observing, and fearing some disaster might ensue, should he seem to be driven from a post, which he quitted voluntarily; when his forces were got half down the hill, encouraging them by Antony, who had the command of that legion, he gave the signal to face about, and fall on the enemy. Immediately the soldiers of the ninth legion, forming themselves into close order, launched their darts; and advancing briskly up the hill against the enemy, forced them to give ground, and at last betake themselves to flight; which was not a little incommoded by the hurdles, palisades, and ditch, Caesar had thrown up to stop to secure their retreat, having killed several of the enemy, and lost only five of their own number, retired without the least disturbance, and inclosing some other hills within their lines, completed the circumvallation.
3.47.1
This method of making war was new and extraordinary; as well in regard to the number of forts, the extent of the circumvallation, the greatness of his works, and the manner of attack and defence, as on other accounts. For whoever undertakes to invest another, is, for the most part, moved thereto, either by some previousdefeat he has sustained, the knowledge of his weakness, to take advantage of his distress, to profit by a superiority of forces; or, in fine, to cut off his provisions, which is the most ordinary cause of. these attempts. But Caesar, with an inferior force, besieged Pompey, whose troops were entire, in good order, and abounded in all things. For ships arrived every day, from all parts, with provisions; nor could the wind blow from any quarter, that was not favourable to some of them; whereas Caesar’s army, having consumed all the corn round about, was reduced to the last necessities. Nevertheless the soldiers bore all with singular patience ; remembering, that though reduced to the like extremity the year before, in Spain, they had yet, by their assiduity and perseverance, put an end to a very formidable war. They called to mind too their sufferings at Alesia, and their still greater distresses before Avaricum, by which, however, they triumphed over mighty nations. When barley or pulse was given them instead of corn, they took it cheerfully; and thought themselves regaled when they got any cattle, which Epirus furnished them with in great abundance.
3.48.1
They discovered in the country a root, called chara, which they pounded and kneaded with milk, so as to make a sort of bread of it. This furnished a plentiful supply; and when their adversaries reproached them with their want, by way of answer to their insults, they threw their loaves at them.
3.49.1
By this time, the corn began to ripen, and the hopes of a speedy supply supported the soldiers under their present wants. Nay, they were often heard to say one to another, that they would sooner live on the bark of trees, than let Pompey escape. For they were informed from time to time, by deserters, that their horses were almost starved, and the rest of their cattle actually dead; that the troops themselves were very sickly; partly occasioned by the narrow space in which they were inclosed, the number and noisesome smell of dead carcases, and the daily fatigue to which they were unaccustomed, partly by their extreme want of water. For Caesar had either turned the course of all the rivers and brooks that ran into the sea, or dammed up their currents. And as the country was mountainous, intermixed with deep valleys, by driving piles into the earth, and covering them with mould, he stopped up the course of the waters. This obliged the enemy to search for low and marshy places, and to dig wells, which added to their daily labour. The wells too, when discovered, lay at a considerable distance from some parts of the army, and were soon dried up by the heat. Caesar’s army, on the contrary, was very healthy, abounded in water, and had plenty of all kinds of provisions, corn excepted, which they hoped to be soon supplied with, as the season was now pretty far advanced, and harvest approached.
3.50.1
In this method of making war, new stratagems were every day put in practice by both generals. Pompey’s soldiers, observing by the fires the place where our cohorts were upon guard, stole thither privately by night, and pouring upon them a flight of arrows, retired instantly to their camp, which obliged our men to have fires in one place, and keep guard in another.
3.51.1
Meanwhile P. Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure had left to command the camp, being informed of what passed, came to the assistance of the cohort, with two legions. His arrival soon put the Pompeians to flight, who could not stand the very sight and shock of his troops; but seeing their first ranks broken, took to their heels, and quitted the place. Sylla checked the ardour of his men, whom he would not suffer to continue the pursuit too far; and it was the general belief, that had he pursued the enemy warmly, that day might have put an end to the war. His conduct, however, cannot be justly censured; for the difference is great between a lieutenant and a general; the one is tied up to act according to instructions; the other, free from restraint, is at liberty to lay hold of all advantages. Sylla, who was left by Caesar to take care of the camp, was satisfied with having disengaged his own men, and had no intention to hazard a general action, which might have been attended with ill consequences, and would have looked like arrogating the part of a general. The Pompeians found it no easy matter to make good their retreat; for having advanced from a very disadvantageous pest to the summit of the hill, they had reason to fear our men would charge them in descending, and the rather, as it was very near sunset, for they had protracted the affair almost till night, in hopes of accomplishing their design. Thus Pompey, compelled by necessity, immediately took possession of an eminence, at such a distance from our fort, as to be secure from darts and military engines. Here he encamped, threw up an intrenchment, and drew his forces together to defend the place.
3.52.1
At the same time we were engaged in two other places; for Pompey attacked several castles together to divide our forces, and hinder the forts from mutually sucouring one another. In one of these, Volcatius Tullus, with three cohorts, sustained the charge of a whole legion, and forced them to retire. In the other, the Germans, sallying out of their intrenchments, slew several of the enemy, and returned again without loss.
3.53.1
Thus there happened no less than six actions in one day; three near Dyrrhachium, and three about the lines. In computing the number of the slain, it appeared that Pompey lost about two thousand men, with several volunteers and centurions, among whom was Valerius Flaccus, the son of Lucius, who had formerly been praetor of Asia. We gained six standards, with the loss of no more than twenty men in all the attacks; but in the fort, not a soldier escaped being wounded; and four centurions belonging to one cohort, lost their eyes. As a proof of the danger they had been exposed to, and the efforts they had sustained, they brought and counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows that had been shot into the fort, and showed him the centurion Scaeva’s buckler, which was pierced in two hundred and thirty places. Caesar, as a reward for his services both to himself and the republic, presented him with two hundred thousand asses, and advanced him directly from the eighth rank of captains to the first; it appearing that the preservation of the fort was chiefly owing to his valour. He also distributed military rewards among the other offithem double pay, and a double allowance of corn.
3.54.1
Pompey laboured all night at his fortifications, raised redoubts the following lays, and having carried his works fifteen feet high, covered that part of his camp with mantelets. Five days after, taking advantage of very dark night, he walled up the gates of his camp, rendered all the avenues impracticable; and drawing out his troops in great silence about midnight, returned to his former works.
3.56.1
Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochis, having been reduced by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have related above; Caesar thought it expedient to pursue his conquests, and attempt to gain Achaia. Accordingly he despatched Fufius Kalenus thither, ordering Sabinus and Cassius to join him, with the cohorts under their command. Rutilius Lupus, Pompey’s lieutenant in Achaia, hearing of their approach, resolved to fortify the isthmus, and thereby hinder Furius from entering the province. Delphos, Thebes, and Orchomenus, voluntarily submitted to Calenus; some states he obtained by force, and sending deputies to the rest endeavoured to make them declare for Caesar. These negotiations found sufficient employment for Fufius.
3.55.1
Caesar meanwhile drew up his army every day, offering Pompey battle upon equal ground; and, to provoke him to accept it, advanced so near his camp, that his van was within engine-shot of the rampart. Pompey, to preserve his reputation, drew out his legions too, but posted them in such a manner, that his third line touched the rampart, and the whole army lay under cover of the weapons discharged from thence.
3.57.1
Whilst these things passed in Achaia and at Dyrrhachium, and it was now known that Scipio was arrived in Macedonia. Caesar still adhering to his former views of peace, despatched Clodius to him, an intimate friend of both, whom he had taken into his service upon Scipio’s recommendation. At his departure, he charged him with letters and instructions to this effect: That he had tried all ways to bring about a peace; but believed he had hitherto miscarried, through the fault of those to whom his proposals were addressed, because they dreaded presenting them to Scipio’s authority to be such, as not only privileged him to advise freely, but even to enforce his counsels, and compel the obstinate to hearken to reason: that he was possessed of an independent command, and had an army at his disposal to give weight to his interposition: that in employing it for so desirable an end, he would gain the indisputable praise of having restored quiet to Italy, peace to the provinces, and saved the empire. Clodius reported this commission to Scipio, and at first met with a favourable reception, but was afterwards denied audience: for Favonius having sharply reprimanded Scipio, as we learned after the conclusion of the war, the negotiation was discontinued, and Clodius returned to Caesar without success.
3.58.1
Caesar, the more effectually to shut up Pompey’s horse at Dyrrhachium, and hinder them from foraging, blocked up the two narrow passes, of which we have spoken, with strong works, and raised forts to defend them. Pompey finding his cavalry rendered by this means unserviceable, conveyed them some days after by sea to his camp again. Forage was so scarce, that they were forced to have recourse to the leaves of trees, and the roots of green reeds, bruised; for the corn sown within their lines was all consumed; nor had they had any supplies but what came a long way about by sea, from Corcyra and Acarnania; and even this was so inconsiderable, that to increase the quantity, they were forced to mix it with barley, and by these contrivances support their horses. At last, all expedients being exhausted, and the horses dying daily, Pompey thought it time to attempt to force the barricade, and set himself at liberty.
3.59.1
Among the cavalry in Caesar’s camp were two brothers, Allobrogians by birth, named Roscillus and Aegus, the sons of Adbucillus, who had long held the chief sway in his own state; men of singular bravery, and who had been of signal service to Caesar in all his Gallic wars. For these reasons he had raised them to the highest offices in their own country, got them chosen into the senate before they were of age, given them lands in Gaul taken from the enemy, besides pecuniary rewards to a great value, insomuch that from very moderate beginnings they had risen to vast wealth. These men were not only highly honoured by Caesar on account of their bravery, but in great esteem with the whole army. But presuming on Caesar’s friendship, and foolishly elated with their prosperity, they used the troopers ill, defrauded them of their pay, and secreted all the plunder to their own use. The Gaulish cavalry, offended at these proceedings, went in a body to Caesar, and openly complained of the two brothers; adding, among other accusations, that, by giving in false musters, they received pay for more men than they had.

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