Cicero, de Oratore (on the Orator)

ToposText · Cicero · 860 sections

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§ 2.36 By what other voice, too, than that of the orator, is history,, the evidence of time, the light of truth, the life of memory, the directress of life, the herald of antiquity, committed to immortality? For if there be any other art, which professes skill in inventing or selecting words; if any one, besides the orator, is said to form a discourse, and to vary and adorn it with certain distinctions, as it were, of words and thoughts; or if any method of argument, or expression of thought, or distribution and arrangement of matter, is taught, except by this one art, let us confess that either that, of which this art makes profession, is foreign to it, or possessed in common with some other art.
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§ 2.37 But if such method and teaching be confined to this alone, it is not, though professors of other arts may have spoken well, the less on that account the property of this art; but as an orator can speak best of all men on subjects that belong to other arts, if he makes himself acquainted with them, (as Crassus observed yesterday,) so the professors of other arts speak more eloquently on their own subjects, if they have acquired any instruction from this art;
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§ 2.38 for if any person versed in agriculture has spoken or written with eloquence on rural affairs, or a physician, as many have done, on diseases, or a painter upon painting, his eloquence is not on that account to be considered as belonging to any of those arts; although in eloquence, indeed, such is the force of human genius, many men of every class and profession attain some proficiency even without instruction; but though you may judge what is peculiar to each art, when you have observed what they severally teach, yet nothing can be more certain than that all other arts can discharge their duties without eloquence, but that an orator cannot even acquire his name without it; so that other men, if they are eloquent, borrow something from him; while he, if he is not supplied from his own stores, cannot obtain the power of speaking from any other art.” [X.]
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§ 2.39 Catulus then said, “Although, Antonius, the course of your remarks ought by no means to be retarded by interruption, yet you will bear with me and grant me pardon; for I cannot help crying out, as he in the Trinummus says, so ably do you seem to me to have described the powers of the orator, and so copiously to have extolled them, as the eloquent man, indeed, must necessarily do; he must extol eloquence best of all men; for to praise it he has to employ the very eloquence which he praises. But proceed, for I agree with you, that to speak eloquently is all your own; and that, if any one does so on any other art, he employs an accomplishment borrowed from something else, not peculiar to him, or his own.”
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§ 2.40 “The night,” added Crassus, “has made you polite to us, Antonius, and humanized you; for in yesterday’s address to us, you described the orator as a man that can do only one thing, like a waterman or a porter, as Caecilius says; a fellow void of all learning and politeness.” “Why yesterday,” rejoined Antonius, “I had made it my object, if I refuted you, to take your scholars from you; but now, as Catulus and Caesar make part of the audience, I think I ought not so much to argue against you, as to declare what I myself think.
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§ 2.41 It follows then, that, as the orator of whom we speak is to be placed in the forum, and in the view of the public, we must consider what employment we are to give him, and to what duties we should wish him to be appointed. For Crassus yesterday, when you, Catulus and Caesar, were not present, made, in a few words, the same statement, in regard to the division of the art, that most of the Greeks have made; not expressing what he himself thought, but what was said by them; that there are two principal sorts of questions about which eloquence is employed; one indefinite, the other definite.
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§ 2.42 He seemed to me to call that indefinite in which the subject of inquiry is general, as, Whether eloquence is desirable; whether honours should be sought; and that definite in which there is an inquiry with respect to particular persons, or any settled and denned point; of which sort are the questions agitated in the forum, and in the causes and disputes of private citizens.
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§ 2.43 These appear to me to consist either in judicial pleadings, or in giving counsel; for that third kind, which was noticed by Crassus, and which, I hear, Aristotle himself, who has fully illustrated these subjects, added, is, though it be useful, less necessary.” “What kind do you mean?” said Catulus; “is it panegyric? for I observe that that is introduced as a third kind.” [XI.]
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§ 2.44 “It is so,” says Antonius; “and as to this kind of oratory, I know that I myself, and all who were present, were extremely delighted when your mother Popilia was honoured with a panegyric by you; the first woman, I think, to whom such honour was ever paid in this city. But it does not seem to me that all subjects on which we speak are to be included in art, and made subject to rules;
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§ 2.45 for from those fountains, whence all the ornaments of speech are drawn, we may also take the ornaments of panegyric, without requiring elementary instructions; for who is ignorant, though no one teach him, what qualities are to be commended in any person? For if we but look to those things which Crassus has mentioned, in the beginning of the speech which he delivered when censor in opposition to his colleague, That in those things which are bestowed on mankind by nature or fortune, he could contentedly allow himself to be excelled; but that in whatever men could procure for themselves, he could not suffer himself to be excelled, he who would pronounce the panegyric of any person, will understand that he must expatiate on the blessings of fortune;
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§ 2.46 and these are advantages of birth, wealth, relationship, friends, resources, health, beauty, strength, talent, and such other qualities as are either personal, or dependent on circumstances; and, if he possessed these, he must show that he made a proper use of them; if not, that he managed wisely without them; if he lost them, that he bore the loss with resignation; he must then state what he whom he praises did or suffered with wisdom, or with liberality, or with fortitude, or with justice, or with honour, or with piety, or with gratitude, or with humanity, or, in a word, under the influence of any virtue. These particulars, and whatever others are of similar kind, he will easily observe who is inclined to praise any person; and he who is inclined to blame him the contrary.”
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§ 2.47 “Why then do you hesitate,” said Catulus, “to make this a third kind, since it is so in the nature of things? for if it is more easy than others, it is not, on that account, to be excluded from the number.” “Because I am unwilling,” replied Antonius, “to treat of all that falls under the province of an orator, as if nothing, however small it may be, could be uttered without regard to stated rules.
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§ 2.48 Evidence, for instance, is often to be given, and sometimes with great exactness, as I was obliged to give mine against Sextus Titius, a seditious and turbulent member of the commonwealth; when, in delivering my evidence, I explained all the proceedings of my consulate, in which I, on behalf of the commonwealth, opposed him as tribune of the people, and exposed all that I thought he had done contrary to the interest of the state; I was detained long, I listened to much, I answered many objections; but would you therefore wish, when you give precepts on eloquence, to add any instructions on giving evidence as a portion of the art of oratory?” [XII.]
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§ 2.49 “There is, indeed,” said Catulus, “no necessity.” “Or if (as often happens to the greatest men) communications are to be delivered, either in the senate from a commander in chief, or to such a commander, or from the senate to auj king or people, does it appear to you that because, on such subjects, we must use a more accurate sort of language than ordinary, this kind of speaking should be counted as a department of eloquence, and he furnished with peculiar precepts? ““ By no means,” replied Catulus; “for an eloquent man, in speaking on subjects of that sort, will not be at a loss for that talent which he has acquired by practice on other matters and topics.”
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§ 2.50 “Those other kinds of subjects, therefore,” continued Antonius, “which often require to be treated with eloquence, and which, as I said just now, (when I was praising eloquence,) belong to the orator, have neither any place in the division of the parts of oratory, nor fall under any peculiar kind of rules, and yet must be handled as eloquently as arguments in pleadings; such are reproof, exhortation, consolation, all which demand the finest graces of language; yet these matters need no rules from art.”
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§ 2.51 “I am decidedly of that opinion,” said Catulus. “Well, then, to proceed,” said Antonius, “what sort of orator, or how great a master of language, do you think it requires to write history?” “If to write it as the Greeks have written, a man of the highest powers,” said Catulus; “if as our own countrymen, there is no need of an orator; it is sufficient for the writer to tell truth.” “But,” rejoined Antonius, “that you may not despise those of our own country, the Greeks themselves too wrote at first just like our Cato, and Pictor, and Piso.
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§ 2.52 For history was nothing else but a compilation of annals; and accordingly, for the sake of preserving the memory of public events, the pontifex maximus used to commit to writing the occurrences of every year, from the earliest period of Roman affairs to the time of the pontifex Publius Mucius, and had them engrossed on white tablets, which he set forth as a register in his own house, so that all the people had liberty to inspect it; and these records are yet called the Great Annals.
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§ 2.53 This mode of writing many have adopted, and, without any ornaments of style, have left behind them simple chronicles of times, persons, places, and events. Such, therefore, as were Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acusilas, and many others among the Greeks, are Cato, and Pictor, and Piso with us, who neither understand how composition is to be adorned (for ornaments of style have been but recently introduced among us), and, provided what they related can be understood, think brevity of expression the only merit.
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§ 2.54 Antipater, an excellent man, the friend of Crassus, raised himself a little, and gave history a higher tone; the others were not embellishers of facts, but mere narrators.” [XIII.] “It is,” rejoined Catulus, “as you say; but Antipater himself neither diversified his narrative by variety of thoughts, nor polished his style by an apt arrangement of words, or a smooth and equal flow of language, but rough-hewed it as he could, being a man of no learning, and not extremely well qualified for an orator; yet he excelled, as you say, his predecessors.”
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§ 2.55 “It is far from being wonderful,” said Antonius, “if history has not yet made a figure in our language; for none of our countrymen study eloquence, unless that it may be displayed in causes and in the forum; whereas among the Greeks, the most eloquent men, wholly unconnected with public pleading, applied themselves as well to other honourable studies as to writing history; for of Herodotus himself, who first embellished this kind of writing, we hear that he was never engaged in pleading; yet his eloquence is so great as to delight me extremely, as far as I can understand Greek writing.
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§ 2.56 After him, in my opinion, Thucydides has certainly surpassed all historians in the art of composition; for he is so abundant in matter, that he almost equals the number of his words by the number of his thoughts; and he is so happy and judicious in his expressions, that you are at a loss to decide whether his facts are set off by his style, or his style by his thoughts; and of him too we do not hear, though he was engaged in public affairs, that he was of the number of those who pleaded causes, and he is said to have written his books at a time when he was removed from all civil employments, and, as usually happened to every eminent man at Athens, was driven into banishment.
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§ 2.57 He was followed by Philistus of Syracuse, who, living in great familiarity with the tyrant Dionysius, spent his leisure in writing history, and, as I think, principally imitated Thucydides But afterwards, two men of great genius, Theopompus and Ephorus, coming from what we may call the noblest school of rhetoric, applied themselves to history by the persuasion of their master Isocrates, and never attended to pleading at all. [XIV.]
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§ 2.58 At last historians arose also among the philosophers; first Xenophon, the follower of Socrates, and afterwards Callisthenes, the pupil of Aristotle and companion of Alexander. The latter wrote in an almost rhetorical manner; the former used a milder strain of language, which has not the animation of oratory, but, though perhaps less energetic, is, as it seems to me, much more pleasing. Timseus, the last of all these, but, as far as I can judge, by far the most learned, and abounding most with richness of matter and variety of thought, and not unpolished in style, brought a large store of eloquence to this kind of writing, but no experience in pleading causes.”
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§ 2.59 When Antonius had spoken thus, “What is this, Catulus?’ said Csesar. “Where are they who say that Antonius is ignorant of Greek? how many historians has he named! and how learnedly and judiciously has he spoken of each! ““On my word,” said Catulus, “while I wonder at this, I cease to wonder at what I regarded with much greater wonder before, namely, that he, being unacquainted with these matters, should have such power as a speaker.” “But, Catulus,” said Antonius,” my custom is to read these books, and some others, when I have leisure, not to hunt for anything that may improve me in speaking, but for my own amusement.
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§ 2.60 What profit is there from it then? I own that there is not much; yet there is some: for as, when I walk in the sun, though I may walk for another purpose, yet it naturally happens that I gain a deeper colour; so when I have read those books attentively at Misenum, (for at Rome I have scarcely opportunity to do so,) I can perceive that my language acquires a complexion, as it were, from my intercourse with them. But, that you may not take what I say in too wide a sense, I only understand such of the Greek writings as their authors wished to be understood by the generality of people.
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§ 2.61 If I ever fall in with the philosophers, deluded by the titles to their books, as they generally profess to be written on well-known and plain subjects, as virtue, justice, probity, pleasure, I do not understand a single word of them; so restricted are they to close and exact disputations. The poets, as speaking in a different language, I never attempt to touch at all; but amuse myself, as I said, with those who have written history, or their own speeches, or who have adopted such a style that they seem to wish to be familiar to us who are not of the deepest erudition. [XV.]
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§ 2.62 But I return to my subject. Do you see how far the study of history is the business of the orator? I know not whether it is not his most important business, for flow and variety of diction; yet I do not find it anywhere treated separately under the rules of the rhetoricians. Indeed, all rules respecting it are obvious to common view; for who is ignorant that it is the first law in writing history, that the historian must not dare to tell any falsehood, and the next, that he must be bold enough to tell the whole truth? Also, that there must be no suspicion of partiality in his writings, or of personal animosity?
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§ 2.63 These fundamental rules are doubtless universally known. The superstructure depends on facts and style. The course of facts requires attention to order of time, and descriptions of countries; and since, in great affairs, and such as are worthy of remembrance, first the designs, then the actions, and afterwards the results, are expected, it demands also that it should be shown, in regard to the designs, what the writer approves, and that it should be told, in regard to the actions, not only what was done or said, but in what manner; and when the result is stated, that all the causes contributing to it should be set forth, whether arising from accident, wisdom, or temerity; and of the characters concerned, not only their acts, but, at least of those eminent in reputation and dignity, the life and mariners of each.
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§ 2.64 The sort of language and character of style to be observed must be regular and continuous, flowing with a kind of equable smoothness, without the roughness of judicial pleadings, and the sharp-pointed sentences used at the bar. Concerning all these numerous and important points, there are no rules, do you observe, to be found in the treatises of the rhetoricians. “In the same silence have lain many other duties of the orator; exhortation, consolation, precept, admonition, all of which are subjects for the highest eloquence, and yet have no place in those treatises on the art which are in circulation.
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§ 2.65 Under this head, too, there is an infinite field of matter; for as Crassus observed) most writers assign to the orator two kinds of subjects on which he may speak; the one concerning stated and defined questions, such as are treated in judicial pleadings or political debates, to which he that will may add panegyrics; the other, what all authors term, (though none give any explanation,) questions unlimited in their kind, without reference to time or person. When they speak of this sort of subjects, they do not appear to know the nature and extent of it;
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§ 2.66 for if it is the business of an orator to be able to speak on whatever subject is proposed without limitation, he will have to speak on the magnitude of the sun, and on the shape of the earth; nor will be able, when he has undertaken such a task, to refuse to speak on mathematical and musical subjects. In short, for him who professes it to be his business to speak not only on those questions which are confined to certain times and persons, (that is, on all judicial questions,) but also on such as are unlimited in their kinds, there can be no subject for oratory to which he can take exception. [XVI.]
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§ 2.67 “But if we are disposed to assign to the orator that sort of questions, also, which are undefined, unsettled, and of extreme latitude, so as to suppose that he must speak of good and evil, of things to be desired or avoided, honourable or dishonourable, profitable or unprofitable; of virtue, justice, temperance, prudence, magnanimity, liberality, piety, friendship, fidelity, duty, and of other virtues and their opposite vices, as well as on state affairs, on government, on military matters, on civil polity, on morality; let us take upon us that sort of subjects also, but so that it be circumscribed by moderate limits.
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§ 2.68 I think, indeed, that all matters relative to intercourse between fellow-citizens, and the transactions of mankind in general, every thing that concerns habits of life, administration of public affairs, civil society, the common sense of mankind, the law of nature, and moral duties, falls within the province of an orator, if not to such an extent that he may answer on every subject separately, like the philosophers, yet so at least that he may interweave them judiciously into his pleadings; and may speak upon such topics as those who established laws, statutes, and commonwealths, have spoken upon them, with simplicity and perspicuity, without any strict order of discussion, or jejune contention about words.
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§ 2.69 That it may not seem wonderful that no rules on so many topics of such importance are here laid down by me, I give this as my reason: As, in other arts, when the most difficult parts of each have been taught, other particulars, as being easier, or similar, are not necessary to be taught: for example, in painting, he who has learned to paint the figure of a man, can paint one of any shape or age without special instruction; and as there is no danger that he who excels in painting a lion or a bull, will be unable to succeed in painting other quadrupeds; (for there is indeed no art whatever, in which everything capable of being effected by it is taught by the master; but they who have learned the general principles regarding the chief and fixed points, accomplish the rest of themselves without any trouble;)
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§ 2.70 so I conceive that in oratory, whether it be an art, or an attainment from practice only, he who has acquired such ability, that he can, at his pleasure, influence the understandings of those who listen to him with some power of deciding, on questions concerning public matters, or his own private affairs, or concerning those for or against whom he speaks, will, on every other kind of oratorical subject, be no more at a loss what to say than the famous Polycletus, when he formed his Hercules, was at a loss how to execute the lion’s skin, or the hydra, although he had never been taught to form them separately.” [XVII.] [71] Catulus then observed, “You seem to me, Antonius, to have set clearly before us what he who designs to be an orator ought to learn, and what he may assume from that which he has learned without particular instruction; for you have reduced his whole business to two kinds of causes only, and have left particulars, which are innumerable, to practice and comparison. But take care lest the hydra and lion’s skin be included in those two kinds, and the Hercules, and other greater works be left among the matters which you omit. For it does not seem to me to be less difficult to speak on the nature of things in general, than on the causes of particular persons, and it seems even much more difficult to discourse on the nature of the gods, than on matters that are litigated amongst men.”
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§ 2.72 “It is not so,” replied Antonius; “for to you, Catulus, I will speak, not so much like a person of learning, as, what is more, one of experience. To speak on all other subjects is, believe me, mere play to a man who does not want parts or practice, and is not destitute of common literature or polite instruction; but, in contested causes, the business is of great difficulty; I know not whether it be not the greatest by far of all human efforts, where the abilities of the orator are, by the unlearned, estimated according to the result and success; where an adversary presents himself armed at all points, who is to be at once attacked and repelled; where he, who is to decide the question, is averse, or offended, or even friendly to your adversary, and hostile to yourself; when he is either to be instructed or undeceived, restrained or incited, or managed in every way, by force of argument, according to the cause and occasion; when his benevolence is often to be turned to hostility, and his hostility to benevolence; when he is to be moved, as by some machinery, to severity or to indulgence, to sorrow or to merriment,
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§ 2.73 you must exert your whole power of thought, and your whole force of language; with which must be joined a delivery varied, energetic, full of life, full of spirit, full of feeling, full of nature. If any one, in such efforts as these, shall have mastered the art to such a degree, that, like Phidias, he can make a statue of Minerva, he will, like that great artist, find no difficulty in learning how to execute the smaller figures upon the shield.” [XVIII.]
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§ 2.74 “The greater and more wonderful you represent such performances,” said Catulus, “the greater longing possesses me to know by what methods or precepts such power in oratory may be acquired; not that it any longer concerns me personally, (for my age does not stand in need of it, and we use I to pursue a different plan of speaking, as we never extorted decisions from the judges by force of eloquence, but rather received them from their hands, after conciliating their goodwill only so far as they themselves would permit,) yet I wish to learn your thoughts, not for any advantage to myself, as I say, but from a desire for knowledge.
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§ 2.75 Nor have I occasion for any Greek master to repeat his hackneyed precepts, when he himself never saw the forum, or was present at a trial; presumption similar to what is told of Phormio the peripatetic; for when Hannibal, driven from Carthage, came to Ephesus as an exile to seek the protection of Antiochus, and, as his name was held in great honour among all men, was invited by those who entertained him to hear the philosopher whom I mentioned, if he were inclined; and when he had signified that he was not unwilling, that copious speaker is said to have harangued some hours upon the duties of a general, and the whole military art;
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§ 2.76 and when the rest of the audience, who were extremely delighted, inquired of Hannibal what he thought of the philosopher, the Carthaginian is reported to have answered, not in very good Greek, but with very good sense, that ‘he had seen many doting old men, but had never seen any one deeper in his dotage than Phormio.’ Nor did he say so, indeed, without reason; for what could have been a greater proof of arrogance, or impertinent loquacity, than for a Greek, who had never seen an enemy or a camp, or had the least concern in any public employment, to deliver instructions on the military art to Hannibal, who had contended so many years for empire with the Romans, the conquerors of all nations? In this manner all those seem to me to act, who give rules on the art of speaking; for they teach others that of which they have no experience themselves. But they are perhaps less in error in this respect, that they do not attempt to instruct you, Catulus, as he did Hannibal, but boys only, or youths.” [XIX.]
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§ 2.77 “You are wrong, Catulus,” said Antonius, “for I myself have met with many Phormios. Who, indeed, is there among those Greeks that seems to think any of us understand anything? To me, however, they are not so very troublesome; I easily bear with and endure them all; for they either produce something which diverts me, or make me repent less of not having learned from them. I dismiss them less contumeliously than Hannibal dismissed the philosopher, and on that account, perhaps, have more trouble with them; but certainly all their teaching, as far as I can judge, is extremely ridiculous.
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§ 2.78 For they divide the whole matter of oratory into two parts; the controversy about the cause and about the question. The cause they call the matter relating to the dispute or litigation affecting the persons concerned; the question, a matter of infinite doubt. Respecting the cause they give some precepts; on the other part of pleading they are wonderfully silent.
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§ 2.79 They then make five parts, as it were, of oratory; to invent what you are to say, to arrange what you have invented, to clothe it in proper language, then to commit it to memory, and at last to deliver it with due action and elocution; a task, surely, requiring no very abstruse study. For who would not understand without assistance, that nobody can make a speech unless he has settled what to say, and in what words, and in what order, and remembers it? Not that I find any fault with these rules, but I say that they are obvious to all; as are likewise those four, five, six, or even seven partitions, (since they are differently divided by different teachers,) into which every oration is by them distributed;
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§ 2.80 for they bid us adopt such an exordium as to make the hearer favourable to us, and willing to be informed and attentive; then to state our case in such a manner, that the detail may be probable, clear, and concise; next, to divide or propound the question; to confirm what makes for us by arguments and reasoning, and refute what makes for the adversary; after this some place the conclusion of the speech, and peroration as it were; others direct you, before you come to the peroration, to make a digression by way of embellishment or amplification, then to sum up and conclude.
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§ 2.81 Nor do I altogether condemn these divisions; for they are made with some nicety, though without sufficient judgment, as must of necessity be the case with men who had no experience in real pleading. For the precepts which they confine to the exordium and statement of facts are to be observed through the whole speech;
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§ 2.82 since I can more easily make a judge favourable to me in the progress of my speech, than when no part of the cause has been heard; and desirous of information, not when I promise that I will prove something, but when I actually prove and explain; and I can best make him attentive, not by the first statement, but by working on his mind through the whole course of the pleading.
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§ 2.83 As to their direction that the statement of facts should be probable, and clear, and concise, they direct rightly; but in supposing that these qualities belong more peculiarly to the statement of facts than to the whole of the speech, they seem to me to be greatly in error; and their whole mistake lies assuredly in this, that they think oratory an art or science, not unlike other sciences, such as Crassus said yesterday might be formed from the civil law itself; so that the general heads of the subject must first be enumerated, when it is a fault if any head be omitted; next, the particulars under each general head, when it is a fault if any particular be either deficient or redundant; then the definitions of all the terms, in which there ought to be nothing either wanting or superfluous. [XX.]
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§ 2.84 “But if the more learned can attain this exactness in the civil law, as well as in other studies of a small or moderate extent, the same cannot, I think, be done in an affair of this compass and magnitude. If, however, any are of opinion that it can be done, they must be introduced to those who profess to teach these things as a science; they will find everything ready set forth and complete; for there are books without number on these subjects, neither concealed nor obscure. But let them consider what they mean to do; whether they will take up arms for sport or for real warfare; for with us a regular engagement and field of battle require one thing, the parade and school of exercise another. Yet preparatory exercise in arms is of some use both to the gladiator and the soldier; but it is a bold and ready mind, acute and quick at expedients, that renders men invincible, and certainly not less effectively if art be united with it.
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§ 2.85 “I will now, therefore, form an orator for you, if I can; commencing so as to ascertain, first of all, what he is able to do. Let him have a tincture of learning; let him have heard and read something; let him have received those very instructions in rhetoric to which I have alluded. I will try what becomes him; what he can accomplish with his voice, his lungs, his breath, and his tongue. If I conceive that he may reach the level of eminent speakers, I will not only exhort him to persevere in labour, but, if he seem to me to be a good man, will entreat him; so much honour to the whole community do I think that there is in an excellent orator, who is at the same time a good man. But if he shall appear likely, after he has done his utmost in every way, to be numbered only among tolerable speakers, I will allow him to act as he pleases, and not be very troublesome to him. But if he shall be altogether unfit for the profession, and wanting in sense, I will advise him to make no attempts, or to turn himself to some other pursuit.
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§ 2.86 For neither is he, who can do excellently, to be left destitute of encouragement from us, nor is he, who can do some little, to be deterred; because one seems to me to be the part of a sort of divinity; the other, either to refrain from what you cannot do extremely well, or to do what you can perform not contemptibly, is the part of a reasonable human being; but the conduct of the third character, to declaim, in spite of decency and natural deficiency, is that of a man who, as you said, Catulus, of a certain haranguer, collects as many witnesses as possible of his folly by a proclamation from himself.
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§ 2.87 Of him then, who shall prove such as to merit our exhortation and encouragement, let me so speak as to communicate to him only what experience has taught myself, that, under my guidance, he may arrive at that point which I have reached without any guide; for I can give him no better instructions. [XXI.]
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§ 2.88 “To commence then, Catulus, by taking an example from our friend Sulpicius here; I first heard him, when he was but a youth, in a cause of small importance; he was possessed of a voice, figure, deportment, and other qualifications suited for the profession which we are considering. His mode of speaking was quick and hurried, which was owing to his genius; his style animated and somewhat too redundant, which was owing to his youth. I was very far from entertaining a slight opinion of him, since I like fertility to show itself in a young man; for, as in vines, those branches which have spread too luxuriantly are more easily pruned than new shoots are produced by culture if the stem is defective; so I would wish there to be that in a youth from which I may take something away. The sap cannot be enduring in that which attains maturity too soon.
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§ 2.89 I immediately saw his ability; nor did I lose any time, but exhorted him to consider the forum as his school for improving himself, and to choose whom he pleased for a master; if he would take my advice, Lucius Crassus. To this advice he eagerly listened, and assured me that he would act accordingly; and added also, as a compliment, that I too should be a master to him. Scarce a year had passed from the time of this conversation and recommendation of mine, when he accused Caius Norbanus, and I defended him. It is incredible what a difference there appeared to me between him as he was then and as he had been a year before; nature herself led him irresistibly into the magnificent and noble style of Crassus; but he could never have arrived at a satisfactory degree of excellence in it, if he had not directed his efforts, by study and imitation, in the same course in which nature led him, so as intently to contemplate Crassus with his whole mind and faculties. [XXII.]
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§ 2.90 “Let this, then, be the first of my precepts, to point out to the student whom he should imitate, and in such a manner that he may most carefully copy the chief excellencies of him whom he takes for his model. Let practice then follow, by which he may represent in his imitation the exact resemblance of him whom he chose as his pattern; not as I have known many imitators do, who endeavour to acquire by imitation what is easy, or what is remarkable, or almost faulty;
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§ 2.91 for nothing is easier than to imitate any person’s dress, or attitude, or carriage; or if there is anything offensive in a character, it is no very difficult matter to adopt it, and be offensive in the same way; in like manner as that Fusius, who even now, though he has lost his voice, rants on public topics, could never attain that nervous style of speaking which Caius Fimbria had, though he succeeds in imitating his distortion of features and broad pronunciation; but he neither knew how to choose a pattern whom he would chiefly resemble, and in him that he did choose, he preferred copying the blemishes.
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§ 2.92 But he who shall act as he ought, must first of all be very careful in making this choice, and must use the utmost diligence to attain the chief excellencies of him whom he has approved. “What, let me ask, do you conceive to be the reason why almost every age has produced a peculiar style of speaking? a matter on which we cannot so easily form a judgment in regard to the orators of our own country, (because they have, to say the truth, left but few writings from which such judgment might be formed,) as those of the Greeks, from whose writings it may be understood what was the character and tendency of eloquence in each particular age.
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§ 2.93 The most ancient, of whom there are any works extant, are Pericles and Alcibiades, and, in the same age, Thucydides, writers perspicacious, pointed, concise, abounding more in thoughts than in words. It could not possibly have happened that they should all have the same character, unless they had proposed to themselves some one example for imitation. These were followed in order of time by Critias, Theramenes, and Lysias. There are extant many writings of Lysias, some of Critias; of Theramenes we only hear. They all still retained the vigorous style of Pericles, but had somewhat more exuberance.
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§ 2.94 Then behold Isocrates arose, from whose school, as from the Trojan Horse, none but real heroes proceeded; but some of them were desirous to be distinguished on parade, gome in the field of battle. [XXIII.] Accordingly those Theopompi, Ephori, Philisti, Naucratae, and many others, differ in genius, but in their manner bear a strong resemblance both to each other and to their master; and those who applied themselves to causes, as Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, and a multitude of others, although they were dissimilar in abilities one to another, yet were all engaged in imitating the same kind of natural excellence; and as long as the imitation of their manner lasted, so long did that character and system of eloquence prevail.
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§ 2.95 Afterwards, when these were dead, and all recollection of them grew gradually obscure, and at last vanished, more lax and remiss modes of speaking prevailed. Subsequently Demochares, who, they say, was the son of Demosthenes’ sister and the famous Demetrius Phalereus, the most polished of all that class, in my opinion, and others of like talents, arose; and if we choose to pursue the list down to the present times, we shall understand, that, as at this day all Asia imitates the famous Menecles of Alabanda, and his brother Hierocles, to both of whom we have listened, so there has always been some one whom the generality desired to resemble.
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§ 2.96 “Whoever, then, shall seek to attain such resemblance, let him endeavour to acquire it by frequent and laborious exercise, and especially by composition; and if our friend Sulpicius would practise this, his language would be more compact; for there is now in it at times, as farmers say of their corn when in the blade, amidst the greatest fertility, a sort of luxuriance which ought to be, as it were, eaten down by the use of the pen.”
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§ 2.97 Here Sulpicius observed, “You advise me rightly, and I am obliged to you; but I think that even you, Antonius, have never written much.” “As if,” rejoined Antonius, “I could not direct others in matters in which I am deficient myself; but. indeed, I am supposed not to write even my own accounts. But in this particular a judgment may be formed from my circumstances, and in the other from my ability in speaking, however small it be, what I do in either way.
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§ 2.98 We see, however, that there are many who imitate nobody, but attain what they desire by their own natural powers, without resembling any one; a fact of which an instance may be seen in you, Caesar and Cotta; for one of you has acquired a kind of pleasing humour and wit, unusual in the orators of our country; the other an extremely keen and subtle species of oratory. Nor does Curio, who is about your age, and the son of a father who was, in my opinion, very eloquent for his time, seem to me to imitate any one much; but by a certain force, elegance, and copiousness of expression, has formed a sort of style and character of eloquence of his own; of which I was chiefly enabled to judge in that cause which he pleaded against me before the Centumviri, in behalf of the brothers Cossi, and in which no quality was wanting in him that an orator, not merely of fluency, but of judgment, ought to possess. [XXIV.]
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§ 2.99 “But to conduct, at length, him whom we are forming to the management of causes, and those in which there is considerable trouble, judicial trials, and contested suits, (somebody will perhaps laugh at the precept which I am going to give, for it is not so much sagacious as necessary, and seems rather to proceed from a monitor who is not quite a fool, than from a master of profound learning,) our first precept for him shall be, That whatever causes he undertakes to plead, he must acquire a minute and thorough knowledge of them.
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§ 2.100 This is not a precept laid down in the schools; for easy causes are given to boys. ‘The law forbids a stranger to ascend the wall; he ascends it; he beats back the enemy; he is accused.’ It is no trouble to understand such a cause as this. They are right, therefore, in giving no precepts about learning the cause; for such is generally the form of causes in the schools. But in the forum, wills, evidence, contracts, covenants, stipulations, relationship by blood, by affinity, decrees, opinions of lawyers, and even the lives and characters of those concerned in the cause, are all to be investigated; and by negligence in these particulars we see many causes lost, especially those relative to private concerns, as they are often of greater intricacy.
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§ 2.101 Thus some, while they would have their business thought very extensive, that they may seem to fly about the whole forum, and to go from one cause to another, speak upon causes which they have not mastered, whence they incur much censure; censure for negligence, if they voluntarily undertake the business, or for perfidiousness, if they undertake it under any engagement; but such censure is assuredly of worse consequence than they imagine, since nobody can possibly speak on a subject which he does not understand, otherwise than to his own disgrace; and thus, while they despise the imputation of ignorance, which is in reality the greater fault, they incur that of stupidity also, which they more anxiously avoid.
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§ 2.102 “It is my custom to use my endeavour, that every one of my clients may give me instructions in his own affairs himself, and that nobody else be present, so that he may speak with the greater freedom. I am accustomed also to plead to him the cause of his adversary, in order to engage him to plead his own, and state boldly what he thinks of his own case. When he is gone, I conceive myself in three characters, my own, that of the adversary, and that of the judge. Whatever circumstance is such as to promise more support or assistance than obstruction, I resolve to speak upon it; whereever I find more harm than good, I set aside and totally reject that part entirely;
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§ 2.103 and thus I gain this advantage, that I consider at one time what I shall say, and say it at another; two things which most speakers, relying upon their genius, do at one and the same time; but certainly those very persons would speak considerably better, if they would but resolve to take one time for premeditation, and another for speaking.
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§ 2.104 “When I have acquired a thorough understanding of the business and the cause, it immediately becomes my consideration what ground there may be for doubt. For of all points that are disputed among mankind, whether the case is of a criminal nature, as concerning an act of violence; or controversial, as concerning an inheritance; or deliberative, as on going to war; or personal, as in panegyric; or argumentative, as on modes of life; there is nothing in which the inquiry is not either what has been done, or is being done, or will be done, or of what nature a thing is, or how it should be designated. [XXV.]
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§ 2.105 “Our causes, such at least as concern criminal matters, are generally defended by the plea of not guilty; for in charges of extortion of money, which are the most important, the facts are almost all to be denied; and in those of bribery to procure offices, it is seldom in our power to distinguish munificence and liberality from corruption and criminal largess. In accusations of stabbing, or poisoning, or embezzlement of the public money, we necessarily deny the charge. On trials, therefore, the first kind of causes is that which arises from dispute as to the fact. In deliberations, the discussion generally springs from a question as to what is to be done, rarely about anything present or already done.
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§ 2.106 But oftentimes the question is not whether a thing is a fact or not, but of what nature it is; as when the consul, Caius Carbo, in my hearing, defended the cause of Opimius before the people, he denied no circumstance of the death of Caius Gracchus, but maintained that it was a lawful act for the good of his country; or, as when Publius Africanus replied to the same Carbo, (then tribune of the people, engaging in political affairs with very different views, and asking a question about the death of Tiberius Gracchus,) ‘that he seemed to have been lawfully put to death.’ But every thing may be asserted to have been done lawfully, which is of such a kind that it may be said that it ought to have been done, or was properly or necessarily done, or done unawares, or by accident.
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§ 2.107 Then the question, ‘what a thing should be called,’ arises when there is a dispute by what term an act should be designated; as was the great point of dispute between myself and our friend Sulpicius in Norbanus’s cause; for though I admitted most of the charges made by him on the other side, I still denied that treason had been committed by Norbanus; on the signification of which word, by the Apuleian law, the whole cause depended.
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§ 2.108 And in this species of causes some lay it down as a rule, that both parties should define clearly and briefly the term that gives rise to the question. This seems to me extremely puerile; for it is quite a different thing from defining words, when any dispute arises among the learned about matters relating to science; as when it is inquired, what is an art, what is a law, what is a state? On which occasions reason and learning direct, that the whole force of the thing which you define should be expressed in such a manner that there be nothing omitted or superfluous;
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§ 2.109 but this neither Sulpicius did in that cause, nor did I attempt to do it; for each of us, to the best of our abilities, enlarged with the utmost copiousness of language upon what it was to commit treason. Since, in the first place, a definition, if one word is objectionable, or may be added or taken away, is often wrested out of our hands; and in the next, the very practice itself savours of school learning and almost puerile exercise; and besides, it cannot penetrate into the mind and understanding of the judge, for it glides off before it has made any impression. [XXVI.]
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§ 2.110 “But in that kind of causes in which it is disputed of what nature any thing is, the contest often arises from the interpretation of writing; when there can be no controversy but about something that is doubtful. For even the case, in which the written letter differs from the intention, involves a species of doubt, which is cleared up when the words which are wanting are supplied; and such addition being made, it is maintained that the intention of the writing was clear; and if any doubt arises from contradictory writings, it is not a new kind of controversy that arises, but a cause of the former sort is doubled; and this can either never be determined, or must be so determined, that by supplying the omitted words, the writing which we defend, whichsoever of the two it is, may be rendered complete. Thus, of those causes which arise from a controversy about a writing, when anything is expressed ambiguously, there exists but one kind.
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§ 2.111 But as there are many sorts of ambiguities, (which they who are called logicians seem to me to understand better than other men; while those of our profession, who ought to know them full as well, seem to be ignorant of them,) so that is the most frequent in occurrence, either in discourse or writing, when a question arises from a word or words being left out.
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§ 2.112 They make another mistake when they distinguish this kind of causes, which consist in the interpretation of writing, from those in which it is disputed of what nature a thing is; for there is nowhere so much dispute respecting the exact nature of a thing as in regard to writing, which is totally separated from controversy concerning fact.
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§ 2.113 There are in all, therefore, three sorts of matters, which may possibly fall under doubt and discussion; what is now done, what has been done, or what is to be done; what the nature of a thing is, or how it should be designated; for as to the question which some Greeks add, whether a thing be rightly done, it is wholly included in the inquiry, what the nature of the thing is. [XXVII.]
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§ 2.114 “But to return to my own method. When, after hearing and understanding the nature of a cause, I proceed to examine the subject matter of it, I settle nothing until I have ascertained to what point my whole speech, bearing immediately on the question and case, must be directed. I then very diligently consider two other points; the one, how to recommend myself, or those for whom I plead; the other, how to sway the minds of those before whom I speak to that which I desire.
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§ 2.115 Thus the whole business of speaking rests upon three things for success in persuasion; that we prove what we maintain to be true; that we conciliate those who hear; that we produce in their minds whatever feeling our cause may require.
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§ 2.116 For the purpose of proof, two kinds of matter present themselves to the orator; one, consisting of such things as are not invented by him, but, as appertaining to the cause, are judiciously treated by him, as deeds, testimonies, covenants, contracts, examinations, laws, acts of the senate, precedents, decrees, opinions of lawyers, and whatever else is not found out by the orator, but brought under his notice by the cause and by his clients; the other, consisting entirely in the orator’s own reasoning and arguments:
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§ 2.117 so that, as to the former head, he has only to handle the arguments with which he is furnished; as to the latter, to invent arguments likewise. Those who profess to teach eloquence, after dividing causes into several kinds, suggest a number of arguments for each kind; which method, though it may be better adapted to the instruction of youth, in order that when a case is proposed to them they may have something to which they may refer, and from whence they may draw forth arguments ready prepared; yet it shows a slowness of mind to pursue the rivulets, instead of seeking for the fountain-head; and it becomes our age and experience to derive what we want to know from the source, and to ascertain the spring from which everything proceeds.
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§ 2.118 “But that first kind of matters which are brought before the orator, ought to be the constant subject of our contemplation for general practice in affairs of that nature. For in support of deeds and against them, for and against evidence, for and against examinations by torture, and in other subjects of that sort, we usually speak either of each kind in general and abstractedly, or as confined to particular occasions, persons, and causes; and such commonplaces (I speak to you, Cotta and Sulpicius ) you ought to keep ready and prepared with much study and meditation.
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§ 2.119 It would occupy too much time at present to show by what means we should confirm or invalidate testimony, deeds, and examinations. These matters are all to be attained with a moderate share of capacity, though with very great practice; and they require art and instruction only so far, as they should be illustrated with certain embellishments of language.
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§ 2.120 So also those which are of the other kind, and which proceed wholly from the orator, are not difficult of invention, but require perspicuous and correct exposition. As these two things, therefore, are the objects of our inquiry in causes, first, what we shall say, and next, how we shall say it; the former, which seems to be wholly concerned with art, though it does indeed require some art, is yet an affair of but ordinary understanding, namely, to see what ought to be said; the latter is the department in which the divine power and excellence of the orator is seen; I mean in delivering what is to be said with elegance, copiousness, and variety of language. [XXVIII.]
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§ 2.121 “The former part, then, since you have once declared it to be your pleasure, I will not refuse to finish off and complete, (how far I shall succeed you will best judge,) and shall show from what topics a speech must be furnished in order to effect these three objects which alone have power to persuade; namely, that the minds of the audience be conciliated, informed, and moved, for these are the three; but how they should be illustrated, there is one present who can instruct us all; one who first introduced this excellence into our practice, who principally improved it, who alone has brought it to perfection.
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§ 2.122 For I think, Catulus, (and I will say this without any dread of a suspicion of flattery,) that there is no orator, at all more eminent than ordinary, either Grecian, or Roman, that our age ha-s produced, whom I have not heard often and attentively; and, therefore, if there is any ability in me, (as I may now presume to hope, since you, men of such talents, take so much trouble in giving me audience,) it arises from this, that no orator ever delivered anything in my hearing, which did not sink deeply into my memory; and I, such as I am, and as far as I have capacity to form a judgment, having heard all orators, without any hesitation decide and pronounce this, That none of them all had so many and such excellent accomplishments in speaking as are in Crassus.
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§ 2.123 On which account, if you also are of the same opinion, it will not, as I think, be an unjust partition, if, when I shall have given birth and education and strength to this orator whom I am forming, as is my design, I deliver him to Crassus to be furnished with apparel and ornaments.”
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§ 2.124 Crassus then said, “Do you rather, Antonius, go on as you have commenced; for it is not the part of a good or liberal parent not to clothe and adorn him whom he has engendered and brought up especially as you cannot deny that you are wealthy enough. For what grace, what power, what spirit, what dignity was wanting to that orator, who at the close of a speech did not hesitate to call forth his accused client, though of consular rank, and to tear open his garment, and to expose to the judges the scars on the breast of the old commander? who also, when he defended a seditious madman, Sulpicius here being the accuser, did not hesitate to speak in favour of sedition itself, and to demonstrate, with the utmost power of language, that many popular insurrections are just, for which nobody could be accountable? adding that many seditions had occurred to the benefit of the commonwealth, as when the kings were expelled, and when the power of the tribunes was established; and that the sedition of Norbanus, proceeding from the grief of the citizens, and their hatred to Caepio, who had lost the army, could not possibly be restrained, and was blown up into a flame by a just indignation.
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§ 2.125 Could this, so hazardous a topic, so unprecedented, so delicate, so new, be handled without an incredible force and power of eloquence? What shall I say of the compassion excited for Cneius Manlius, or that in favour of Quintus Rex? What of other innumerable instances, in which it was not that extraordinary acuteness, which everybody allows you, that was most conspicuous, but it was those very qualities which you now ascribe to me, that were always eminent and excellent in you.” [XXIX.]
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§ 2.126 “For my part,” said Catulus, “what I am accustomed most to admire in you both, is, that while you are totally unlike each other in your manner of speaking, yet each of you speaks so well, that nothing seems either to have been denied you by nature, or not to have been bestowed on you by learning. You, therefore, Crassus, from your obliging disposition, will neither withhold from us the illustration of whatever may have been inadvertently or purposely omitted by Antonius; nor if you, Antonius, do not speak on every point, we shall think, not that you could not speak on it, but that you preferred that it should be treated by Crassus.”
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§ 2.127 Here Crassus said, “Do you rather, Antonius, omit those particulars which you have proposed to treat, and which no one here needs, namely, from what topics the statements made in pleadings are to be derived, which, though they would be treated by you in a new and excellent way, are in their nature very easy, and commonly set forth in books of rules; but show us those resources whence you draw that eloquence which you frequently exert, and always divinely.”
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§ 2.128 “I will indeed show you them,” said Antonius; “and that I may the more easily obtain from you what I require, I will refuse you nothing that you ask. The supports of my whole eloquence, and that power of speaking which Crassus just now extolled to the skies, are, as I observed before, three processes; the first, that of conciliating my hearers; the second, that of instructing them; and the third, that of moving them.
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§ 2.129 The first of these divisions requires mildness of address; the second penetration; the third energy; for it is impossible but that he, who is to determine a cause in our favour, must either lean to our side from propensity of feeling, or be swayed by the arguments of our defence, or be forced by action upon his mind. Bat since that part, in which the opening of the case itself and the defence lie, seems to comprehend all that is laid down as doctrine on this head, I shall speak on that first, and say but few words; for I seem to have but few observations gained from experience, and imprinted as it were on ray memory. [XXX.]
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§ 2.130 “We shall willingly consent to your judicious proposal, Crassus, to omit those defences for every sort of causes which the masters of rhetoric are accustomed to teach boys; and to open those sources whence all arguments for every cause and speech are derived. For neither, as often as we have occasion to write any word, need the letters of that word be so often collected in our thoughts; nor, as often as we are to plead a cause, need we turn to the separate arguments for that cause; but we should have certain commonplaces which, like letters for forming a word, immediately occur to us to aid in stating a cause.
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§ 2.131 But these commonplaces can be of advantage only to that orator who is conversant in business, and has that experience which age at length brings with it: or one who has so much attention and power of thought as to anticipate age by study and diligence. For if you bring to me a man of ever so deep erudition, of ever so acute and subtile an intellect, or ever so ready an elocution, if he be a stranger to the customs of civil communities, to the examples, to the institutions, to the manners and inclinations of his fellow-citizens, the common-places from which arguments are drawn will be of little benefit to him. I must have a well-cultivated genius, like a field not once ploughed only, but again and again, with renewed and repeated tillage, that it may produce better and larger crops; and the cultivation here required is experience, attentive hearing of other orators, reading, and writing.
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§ 2.132 “First, then, let him examine the nature of his cause, which is never obscure so far as the inquiry ‘whether a thing has been done or not;’ or ‘of what nature it is;’ or ‘what name it should receive;’ and when this is ascertained, it immediately occurs, with the aid of natural good sense, and not of those artifices which teachers of rhetoric inculcate, ‘what constitutes the cause,’ that is, the point without which there would be no controversy; then, ‘what is the matter for trial,’ which they direct you to ascertain in this manner: Opimius slew Gracchus: what constitutes the cause? ‘That he slew him for the good of the republic, when he had called the people to arms, in consequence of a decree of the senate.’ Set this point aside, and there will be no question for trial. But Decius denies that such a deed could be authorized contrary to the laws. The point therefore to be tried will be, ‘whether Opimius had authority to do so from the decree of the senate, for the good of the commonwealth.’ These matters are indeed clear, and may be settled by common sense; but it remains to be considered what arguments, relative to the point for trial, ought to be advanced, as well by the accuser as by him who has undertaken the defence. [XXXI.]
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§ 2.133 “Here we must notice a capital error in those masters to whom we send our children; not that it has much to do with speaking, but that you may see how stupid and unpolished a set of men they are who imagine themselves learned. For, in distinguishing the different kinds of speaking, they make two species of causes. One they call, ‘that in which the question is about a general proposition, without reference to persons and times;’ the other, ‘that which is confined to certain persons and times;’ being ignorant that all controversies must have relation to the force and nature of the general position;
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§ 2.134 for in that very cause which I mentioned, the person of Opimius or Decius has nothing to do with the common arguments of the orator; since the inquiry has unrestricted reference to the question in general, ‘whether he seems deserving of punishment who has slain a citizen under a decree of the senate for the preservation of his country, when such a deed was not permitted by the laws.’ There is indeed no cause in which the point that falls under dispute is considered with reference to the parties to the suit, and not from arguments relating to such questions in general.
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§ 2.135 But even in those very cases where the dispute is about a fact, as ‘whether Publius Decius has taken money contrary to law, the arguments both for the accusation and for the defence must have reference to the general question, and the general nature of the case; as, to show that the defendant is expensive, the arguments must refer to luxury; that he is covetous of another’s property, to avarice; that he is seditious, to turbulent and ill-designing citizens in general; that he is convicted by many proofs, to the general nature of evidence: and, on the other side, whatever is said for the defendant, must of necessity be abstracted from the occasion and individual, and referred to the general notions of things and questions of the kind.
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§ 2.136 These, perhaps, to a man who cannot readily comprehend in his mind all that is in the nature of things, may seem extremely numerous to come under consideration when the question is about a single fact; but it is the number of charges, and not of modes of defence, or topics for them, that is infinite. [XXXII.]

Via ToposText (topostext.org), a project of the Aikaterini Laskaridis Foundation created by Brady Kiesling. Translated by John Selby Watson (1804-84). Composed ca. 55 BCE. Licence: public domain. Source.