Appian, Civil Wars

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§ 5.10.92 Less than half of Octavius' ships were saved, and these badly damaged. He left certain officers in charge of them and proceeded to Campania much cast down, for he had no other ships and he needed many; nor did he have time to build them, pressed as he was by the famine and by the people, who were again harassing him about a new treaty and mocking at the war as being in violation of the old one. He needed money, but had none. The Romans were not paying the taxes, nor would they allow the use of the revenues that he had devised. But he was always clever at discovering what was for his advantage. He sent Maecenas to Antony to change the mind of the latter respecting the things about which they had lately had some bickering, and to bring him to an alliance. If Maecenas should not succeed, he intended to embark his infantry on merchant vessels, cross over to Sicily, abandon the sea, and wage war on land. While in this state of dejection the news reached him that Antony had agreed to the alliance, and he heard of a splendid victory over the Gauls of Aquitania, gained under the leadership of Agrippa. His friends and certain cities also promised him ships, and built them. Accordingly, Octavius cast off his despondency, and made more formidable preparations than his previous ones.
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§ 5.10.93 At the beginning of spring, Antony set sail from Athens to Tarentum with 300 ships to assist Octavius as he had promised. But the latter had changed his mind and postponed his movement until his own ships should be finished. When called upon again and told that Antony's forces were ready and sufficient, he advanced other reasons for delay. It was evident that he was again offended with Antony about something, or that he disdained his assistance because his own resources were abundant. Antony was vexed, but he remained, nevertheless, and communicated with Octavius again, because the expense of his fleet was burdensome. Moreover, he needed Italian soldiers for his war against the Parthians, and he contemplated exchanging his fleet for a part of Octavius' army; for, although it was provided in their treaty that each of them might recruit soldiers in Italy, it would be difficult for him to do so when Italy had fallen to the lot of Octavius. Accordingly, Octavia betook herself to her brother to act as mediator between them. Octavius complained that he had been abandoned by Antony when he was overtaken by danger in the straits. She replied that that had been explained through Maecenas. Octavius said that Antony had sent his freedman Callias to Lepidus in Africa to induce the latter to make an alliance against him. She replied that she knew that Callias had been sent to make arrangements about a marriage, because Antony desired, before setting out on his Parthian expedition, to marry his daughter to the son of Lepidus, as had been agreed. After Octavia had made this statement Antony sent Callias to Octavius with permission to put him to torture [in order to learn the truth]. Octavius would not receive him, but said that he would go and have an interview with Antony between Metapontum and Tarentum, at a place where there is a river of the latter name between them.
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§ 5.10.94 They both chanced to reach the river at the same time. Antony sprang down from his chariot and leaped alone into one of the skiffs moored near by, and rowed toward Octavius, showing confidence in him as a friend. When Octavius saw this he followed the example. So they met in the stream and contended with each other which of them should disembark on the other's bank. Octavius prevailed because he was going to make a visit to Octavia at Tarentum. He took a seat with Antony in the latter's chariot, and proceeded to his lodgings at Tarentum unprotected, and passed the night there without guards. On the following day Antony made the same exhibition of trust. Thus they were continually changing from suspicion born of rivalry to confidence due to their mutual needs.
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§ 5.10.95 However, Octavius postponed his expedition against Pompeius till the following year. On account of the Parthian war Antony was not able to wait. Nevertheless, they made an exchange with each other, Antony giving to Octavius 120 ships, which he sent at once and delivered at Tarentum, in return for which Octavius promised to send him 20,000 Italian legionaries. Octavia, begging the favor from Antony, made her brother a present of ten three-banked phaseli — a combination of war-ship and merchant vessel — and Octavius gave her in return 1000 picked men as a body-guard, to be selected by Antony. As the term of the triumvirate voted to them was about expiring, they renewed it for five years without again asking the people. And so they separated, Antony proceeding straightway to Syria and leaving Octavia with her brother, and also a daughter already born to them.
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§ 5.10.96 But Menodorus, — either because he was an habitual traitor, or because he feared the former threat of Antony, who had said that he would punish him as a rebellious slave, or because he had received less consideration than he had expected, or because the other freedmen of Pompeius were continually reproaching him for unfaithfulness to his master and urging him to return, — now that Menecrates was dead, asked forgiveness, and, having obtained it, deserted to Pompeius with seven ships, without the knowledge of Octavius' admiral, Calvisius. For this reason Octavius dismissed the latter from his command and appointed Agrippa in his place. When the fleet was ready, Octavius performed a lustration for it in the following manner. Altars were erected on the margin of the sea, and the multitude were ranged around them in ships, observing the most profound silence. The priests who performed the ceremony offered the sacrifice while standing at the water's edge, and carried the expiatory offerings in skiffs three times around the fleet, the general sailing with them, beseeching the gods to turn the bad omens against the victims instead of the fleet. Then, dividing the entrails, they cast a part of them into the sea, and put the remainder on the altars and burned them, while the multitude chanted in unison. In this way the Romans perform lustrations of the fleet.
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§ 5.11.97 It was intended that Octavius should set sail from Puteoli, Lepidus from Africa, and Taurus from Tarentum, to Sicily, in order to surround the enemy at once, from the east, the west, and the south. The day of Octavius' sailing had been previously communicated to all. It was the tenth day after the summer solstice. This, in the Roman calendar, was the calends of the month which, in honor of the first Caesar, they call July instead of Quintilis. Octavius fixed on this day, perhaps because he considered it propitious on account of his father, who was always victorious. Pompeius stationed Plennius at Lilybaeum with one legion and a considerable body of light-armed troops, to oppose Lepidus. He guarded the whole coast of Sicily, both east and west, and especially the islands of Lipara and Cossyra, lest they should become convenient harbors and naval stations for Octavius and Lepidus against Sicily. The best part of his naval force he kept together at Messana watching its chances. In this way they made their preparations on either side.
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§ 5.11.98 When the calends came they all set sail at daybreak, Lepidus from Africa with 1000 ships of burden, seventy war vessels, twelve legions of soldiers, 500 Numidian horse, and a great quantity of apparatus; Taurus from Tarentum with only 102 of the 130 ships that Antony had left, since the oarsmen of the remainder had perished during the winter. Octavius sailed from Puteoli, offering sacrifices and pouring out libations from the admiral's ship into the water to the propitious winds, and to Neptune, the guardian, and to the tranquil sea, that they should be his assistants against his father's enemies. Certain ships sent in advance made examination of the bays, and Appius with a large squadron followed as a rear guard. On the third day after their departure a south wind blew with violence and capsized a large number of ships of burden belonging to Lepidus. Nevertheless, he reached the Sicilian coast, laid siege to Plennius in Lilybaeum, and got possession of some towns by persuasion and others by force. When the wind began to blow Taurus returned to Tarentum. While Appius was doubling the promontory of Minerva, some of his ships were shattered against the rocks, others ran with violence on the shoals, and the rest were dispersed, not without injury. At the beginning of the storm, Octavius took refuge in the sheltered bay of Elea, except one six-banked ship, which was wrecked on the promontory. The south wind was succeeded by a southwester, which threw the bay into commotion, as it opened toward the west. It was impossible to sail out of the bay with the wind still ahead, nor could the ships be held by oars or anchors. They crashed against each other or against the rocks, and the confusion became worse confounded by night.
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§ 5.11.99 When the tempest had subsided, Octavius buried the dead, cared for the wounded, clothed those who had swum ashore and furnished them with new weapons, and repaired his whole fleet with the means at his command. Six of his heavy ships, twenty-six lighter ones, and a still larger number of liburnicas had been destroyed. He was likely to consume nearly thirty days in these repairs; and now the end of summer was approaching, for which reason he deemed it best to postpone the war till the following summer, but as the people were suffering from scarcity he drew his ships upon the land and made his preparations rapidly, and sent the crews of the ships that he had lost to fill the empty ones in the fleet of Taurus. In anticipation of more serious misfortune he sent Maecenas to Rome on account of those who were still under the spell of the memory of Pompey the Great, for the fame of that man had not yet lost its influence over them. Octavius himself visited the new colonies throughout Italy and dispelled their fears, which had been excited by the recent events. He also went to Tarentum and inspected the naval force under Taurus. Thence he proceeded to Vibo, where he encouraged his infantry and hastened the preparations of his fleet, the time for his second invasion of Sicily being near at hand.
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§ 5.11.100 Pompeius did not deign to seize the fine opportunity presented to him by so many shipwrecks. He merely offered sacrifice to the sea and to Neptune, assuming to call himself their son, and persuading himself that it was not without the special act of Providence that his enemies had been twice overwhelmed in this way in the summer months. It is said that he was so much puffed up by these circumstances that he exchanged the purple cloak customary to Roman commanders for a dark blue one, to signify that he was the adopted son of Neptune. He hoped that Octavius would now desist from his undertaking, but when he learned that the latter was building ships and was about to renew the expedition against him that summer, he became alarmed at finding himself at war with a man of such indomitable spirit and such formidable preparations. He sent Menodorus, with the seven ships he had brought, to reconnoitre the dockyards of Octavius and to do whatever damage he could. Menodorus had been vexed for some time past because the naval command had not been given to him, and he now perceived that he was intrusted with only the ships that he had brought, because he was under suspicion. So he plotted a new desertion.
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§ 5.11.101 Conceiving that, however matters might turn out, he should first signalize himself by some act of valor, he distributed among his companions all the gold he had, and sailed, by rowing three days, accomplishing a distance of 1500 stades, and fell like a thunderbolt, unperceived, on the vessels that were guarding Octavius' shipyards, and darted away to an unseen place carrying off the guard-ships by twos and threes. He also sunk, or captured, or burned some merchant vessels, laden with corn, that were moored there or sailing along the coast. Everything was thrown into confusion by this raid of Menodorus, both Octavius and Agrippa being absent. The latter had gone away to procure timber. In a spirit of bravado Menodorus ran his ship upon the soft ground, voluntarily and contemptuously, and pretended to be stuck in the mud, until his enemies dashed down from the mountains as to a certain prey, when he backed away, laughing, and left the soldiers of Octavius the victims of both chagrin and astonishment. When he had sufficiently shown what he was capable of, as enemy or friend, he dismissed a senator whom he had taken prisoner, named Rebillus, having a view already to the future.
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§ 5.11.102 During his former desertion he had been a friend of Mindius Marcellus, one of the companions of Octavius, and he now told his own men that Mindius had the intention of betraying his party and deserting to that of Pompeius. Then he drew near to the enemy and invited Mindius to go with him to a small island in order to have a conference. When the latter came, and there was nobody else within earshot, Menodorus said that he had gone back to Pompeius because he was ill-treated by the admiral of those days, Calvisius, but that since Agrippa had been appointed to the command of the fleet he would come back to Octavius, who had done him no wrong, if Mindius would bring him a safe-conduct from Messala, who was commanding in Agrippa's absence. He said that on his return he would make amends for his fault by brilliant exploits, but that until the safe-conduct arrived he should be obliged to harass the forces of Octavius as before in order to avoid suspicion; and this he did. Messala hesitated on account of the baseness of the transaction, but he nevertheless yielded, either because he considered such things necessary in war, or because he had learned beforehand, or conjectured, the mind of Octavius. Menodorus at once deserted, and, upon the approach of Octavius, threw himself at his feet and begged that he would pardon him without asking for the reasons for his flight. Octavius conceded his safety on account of the pledges made, but had him secretly watched. He dismissed the captains of his triremes and allowed them to go wherever they pleased.
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§ 5.11.103 When the fleet was ready Octavius set sail again. He landed at Vibo and ordered Messala, who had two legions of infantry, to cross over to Sicily, join the army of Lepidus, pass through to the bay in front of Tauromenium, and station himself there. He sent three legions to Stylis and the extremity of the straits, to await events. He ordered Taurus to sail around from Tarentum to Mount Scylacium, which is opposite Tauromenium. Taurus did so, having prepared himself for fighting as well as for rowing. His infantry kept even pace with him, the cavalry reconnoitring by land and the liburnicas by sea. While he was making this movement Octavius, who had advanced from Vibo, made his appearance near Scylacium, and, after giving his approval to the good order of the forces, returned to Vibo. Pompeius, as I have already said, guarded all the landing-places on the island and retained his fleet at Messana, in order to send aid where it might be needed.
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§ 5.11.104 Such were the preparations of Octavius and Pompeius in this quarter. Meanwhile four more legions were en route to Lepidus from Africa in merchant ships, being the remainder of his army. Papias, one of Pompeius' captains, threw himself in their way on the sea, and, after they had received him as a friend (for they thought that these were ships sent by Lepidus to meet them), destroyed them. Some ships were despatched by Lepidus later, and when these were approaching, the merchant ships that had escaped mistook them for other enemies and fled. So some of them were burned, some captured, some upset, and the rest returned to Africa. Two legions perished in the sea, or, if any of them could swim, Tisienus, the lieutenant of Pompeius, slew them when they reached the land. The other legions reembarked and joined Lepidus, some sooner and some later. Papias sailed back to Pompeius.
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§ 5.11.105 Octavius crossed from Vibo with his whole fleet to Strongyle, one of the five Aeolian islands, having made a reconnoissance of the sea beforehand. Seeing large forces in front of him on the Sicilian shore at Pelorum, Mylae, and Tyndaris, he conjectured that Pompeius himself was there. So he left Agrippa in command and returned again to Vibo, and thence hastened with Messala and three legions to the camp of Taurus, intending to seize Tauromenium while Pompeius was still absent, and thus threaten him on two sides at once. In pursuance of this plan Agrippa moved forward from Strongyle to the island of Hiera, and as Pompeius' garrison made no resistance he occupied it and intended on the following day to attack, at Mylae, Demochares, the lieutenant of Pompeius, who had forty ships. Pompeius observed the menacing attitude of Agrippa, and sent to Demochares from Messana forty-five ships, under the command of his freedman Apollophanes, and followed in person with seventy others.
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§ 5.11.106 Agrippa, with half of his ships, sailed out of Hiera before daylight in order to have a naval engagement with Papias only. When he saw the fleet of Apollophanes also, and seventy ships on the other wing, he sent word to Octavius at once that Pompeius was at Mylae with the greater part of his naval forces. Then he placed himself with his heavy ships in the centre, and summoned the remainder of his fleet from Hiera in all haste. The preparations on both sides were superb. The ships had towers on both stem and stern. When the usual exhortation had been given and the standards raised, they rushed against each other, some coming bow on, others making flank attacks, the shouts of the men and the spray from the ships adding terror to the scene. The Pompeian ships were shorter and lighter, and better adapted to blockading and darting about. Those of Octavius were larger and heavier, and, consequently, slower, yet stronger to give blows and not so easily damaged. The Pompeian crews were better sailors than those of Octavius, but the latter were stronger. Accordingly, the former excelled not so much in close fighting as in the nimbleness of their movements, in breaking oar blades and rudders, cutting off oar handles, or separating the enemy's ships entirely, doing them no less harm than by ramming. Those of Octavius sought to cut down with their beaks the hostile ships, which were smaller in size, or shatter them, or break through them. When they came to close quarters, being higher, they could hurl missiles down upon the enemy, and more easily throw the corvus and the grappling-irons. The Pompeians, whenever they were overpowered in this manner, leaped into the sea and were picked up by their small boats, which were hovering around for this purpose.
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§ 5.11.107 Agrippa bore down directly upon Papias and struck his ship under the bow, shattering it and breaking a hole in the keel. The men in the towers were shaken down, the water rushed into the ship, and all the oarsmen on the lower benches were cut off. The others broke through the deck and escaped by swimming. Papias escaped to a ship alongside of his own, and returned to the battle. Pompeius, who observed from a mountain that his ships were making little headway, and that whenever they came to close quarters with the enemy they were denuded of fighting men, and that reinforcements were coming to Agrippa from Hiera, gave the signal to retire in good order. This they did, advancing and retreating little by little. Agrippa continued to bear down upon them, and they took refuge, not on the beach, but among the shoals formed in the sea by river deposits.
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§ 5.11.108 Agrippa's pilots prevented him from running his large ships on the shoals. He cast anchor in the open sea, intending to blockade the enemy and to fight a battle by night if necessary; but his friends advised him not to be carried away by rashness and not to wear out his soldiers with excessive toil and want of sleep, and not to trust to that tempestuous sea. So in the evening he reluctantly withdrew. The Pompeians made sail to their harbors, having lost thirty of their ships, and sunk five of the enemy's, and having inflicted considerable other damage and suffered as much in return. Pompeius praised his own men because they had resisted such formidable vessels, saying they had fought against walls rather than against ships; and he rewarded them as though they had been victorious. He encouraged them to believe that, as they were lighter, they would prevail over the enemy in the straits on account of the current. He said also that he would make some addition to the height of his ships. Such was the result of the naval battle at Mylae between Agrippa and Papias.
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§ 5.12.109 Pompeius suspected that Octavius had gone to the camp of Taurus for the purpose of attacking Tauromenium, which was the fact. So, directly after supper, he sailed to Messana, leaving a part of his forces at Mylae so that Agrippa might think that he was still there. Agrippa, as soon as his army was sufficiently rested, bestirred himself and set sail for Tyndaris, which had offered to surrender. He entered the town, but the garrison fought valiantly and drove him out. Some other towns espoused his cause and received his garrisons, and he returned that evening. In the meantime, Octavius had sailed from Scylacium to Leucopetra, having learned for a certainty that Pompeius had gone from Messana to Mylae on account of Agrippa. He was about to cross the straits from Leucopetra to Tauromenium by night, but learning of the sea-fight he changed his mind, thinking that a victor ought not to steal his passage, but to cross with his army boldly by daylight; for he was fully convinced that Pompeius was still confronting Agrippa. Looking down from the mountains upon the sea at daybreak and finding that it was clear of enemies, he set sail with as many troops as the ships could carry, leaving the rest with Messala until the fleet could return to him. Arriving at Tauromenium, he sent messengers to demand its surrender. As his guards were not admitted, he made sail to the river Onobalas and the temple of Venus, and moored his fleet at the shrine of the Archegetes, the god of the Naxians, intending to pitch his camp there and attack Tauromenium. The Archegetes is a small statue of Apollo, erected by the Naxians when they first migrated to Sicily.
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§ 5.12.110 When Octavius disembarked from his ship he slipped and fell, but arose without assistance. While he was yet laying out his camp, Pompeius made his appearance with a large fleet — an astounding spectacle, since Octavius believed that he had been beaten by Agrippa. Pompeius' cavalry advanced at the same time, rivalling the fleet in rapidity of movement, and his infantry was seen on the other side. The forces of Octavius were terrified at finding themselves surrounded by enemies on three sides, and Octavius himself was alarmed because Messala could not join him. The cavalry of Pompeius assailed Octavius' men while they were still fortifying their camp. If his infantry and his naval force had attacked simultaneously with the cavalry, Pompeius might have accomplished greater results, but, being inexperienced in war and ignorant of the panic among the troops of Octavius, and hesitating to begin a battle at the approach of nightfall, one part of his forces stationed themselves at the promontory of Coccynus, while his infantry, deeming it unwise to encamp near the enemy, withdrew to the town of Phoenix. Night coming on they went to rest, and Octavius' soldiers finished their camp, but were incapacitated for battle by toil and want of sleep. They consisted of three legions, and 500 cavalry without horses, 1000 light-armed, and 2000 colonists serving as allies, but not enrolled, besides his fleet.
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§ 5.12.111 Octavius placed all of his infantry under charge of Cornificius, and ordered him to drive back the enemy and do whatever the exigency required. He took ship before daylight and went seaward lest the enemy should enclose him on this side also, giving the right wing of the fleet to Titinius and the left to Carcius, and embarking himself on a liburnica, with which he sailed around the whole fleet, exhorting them to have courage. Having done this he lowered the general's ensign, as is customary in times of extreme danger. Pompeius put to sea against him, and they encountered each other twice, the battle ending with the night. Some of Octavius' ships were captured and burned; others spread their small sails and made for the Italian coast, contrary to orders. Those of Pompeius followed them a short distance and then turned against the remainder, capturing some and burning others. Some of the crews swam ashore, most of whom were slaughtered or taken prisoners by Pompeius' cavalry. Some of them set out to reach the camp of Cornificius, who sent only his light-armed troops to assist them as they came near, because he did not consider it prudent to move his disheartened legionaries against the enemy's infantry, who were naturally much encouraged by their victory.
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§ 5.12.112 Octavius spent the greater part of the night among his small boats, in doubt whether he should go back to Cornificius through the scattered remains of his fleet, or take refuge with Messala. Providence brought him to the harbor of Abala with a single armor-bearer, without friends, attendants, or slaves. Certain persons, who had come down from the mountain to learn the news, found him suffering in body and mind and brought him in rowboats (changing from one to another for the purpose of concealment) to the camp of Messala, which was not far distant. Straightway, and before he had attended to his bodily wants, he despatched a liburnica to Cornificius, and sent word throughout the mountains that he was safe, and ordered all his forces to help Cornificius, and wrote to him that he would send him aid forthwith. After attending to his own person and taking a little rest, he set forth by night, accompanied by Messala, to Stylis, where Carinas was stationed with three legions ready to embark, and ordered him to set sail for Lipara, to which place he would shortly follow. He wrote to Agrippa and urged him to send Laronius with an army to the rescue of Cornificius with all speed. He sent Maecenas again to Rome on account of the revolutionists; and some of these, who were stirring up disorder, were punished. He also sent Messala to Puteoli to bring the so-called first legion to Vibo.
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§ 5.12.113 This was the same Messala whom the triumvirs proscribed at Rome, and for the killing of whom money and freedom were offered as rewards. He had fled to Cassius and Brutus, and after their death had delivered his fleet to Antony, in pursuance of an agreement made between them. It seems fitting to recall this fact in honor of Roman magnanimity, inasmuch as Messala, when he had in his power, overwhelmed with misfortune, the man who had proscribed him, saved him and cared for him as his commander. Cornificius was able easily to defend his camp against attack; but, being in danger from want of supplies, he drew his men out for battle and challenged the enemy. But Pompeius did not care to come to an engagement with men whose only hope rested in battle and whom he expected to subdue by famine. Cornificius, having placed in the centre the unarmed men who had escaped to him from the ships, took to the road, grievously exposed to missiles in the open plains from the enemy's horsemen and in the broken country from the light-armed troops from Numidia in Africa, who hurled darts from long distances and made their escape when charged by their enemies.
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§ 5.12.114 On the fourth day, with difficulty, they arrived at the waterless region which they say was formerly inundated by a stream of fire that ran down as far as the sea and dried up all the streams in the district. The inhabitants of the country traverse it only by night, on account of the stifling heat and the dust and ashes with which it abounds. Being ignorant of the roads and fearing ambush, Cornificius and his men did not dare to march through it by night, especially as there was no moon, nor could they endure the daytime, because of suffocation. Moreover, the bottoms of their feet were burned (especially those who had no shoes), as it was now the hottest part of the summer. On account of the tormenting thirst they could not delay. They could no longer charge upon their assailants, but received wounds without any means of defence. When they saw the place of exit from this burned district occupied by enemies, the able-bodied ones, heedless of their sick and barefooted companions, dashed at the defiles with amazing courage and overpowered the enemy with all their remaining strength. When they found the next defiles occupied by hostile forces they gave way to despair and succumbed to thirst and heat. Cornificius aroused them by showing them a spring of water near by; and again they overpowered the enemy, but with heavy loss to themselves. Another body of enemies held possession of the fountain, and now Cornificius' men lost all courage and gave way completely.
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§ 5.12.115 While they were in this state Laronius, who had been sent by Agrippa with three legions, made his appearance a long way off. Although it was not yet plain that he was a friend, still, as they had been all the time hoping for something of this kind, they once more recovered their spirits. When they saw the enemy abandon the water in order not to be exposed to attack on both sides, they shouted for joy with all their strength. When the troops of Laronius shouted in return, they ran and seized the fountain. The leaders forbade the men to drink to excess. Some who neglected this advice died while drinking. In this unexpected manner did Cornificius, and what was left of his army, escape to Agrippa at Mylae.
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§ 5.12.116 Agrippa had just taken Tyndaris, a stronghold full of provisions and admirably situated for naval warfare. Thither Octavius transported his infantry and cavalry. He had in Sicily all together twenty-one legions of the former, 20,000 of the latter, and more than 5000 light-armed troops. The garrison of Pompeius still held Mylae, and all the places from Mylae to Naulochi and Pelorus, and all the coast. These garrisons, in fear of Agrippa, kept fires burning continually, signifying that they would set fire to any ships that should sail against them. Pompeius was also master of the defiles on both sides of the island. The mountain passes in the neighborhood of Tauromenium and around Mylae were fortified by him, and he harassed Octavius when the latter was making a forward movement from Tyndaris, but not coming to an engagement. Believing that Agrippa was moving his fleet against him, Pompeius changed his position to Pelorus, abandoning the defiles around Mylae; and Octavius occupied them and also Mylae and Artemisium, a very small town, in which, they say, were the cattle of the Sun and where Ulysses fell asleep.
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§ 5.12.117 When the report of Agrippa's movement turned out to be false, Pompeius was troubled that he had lost the defiles, and he called to his assistance Tisienus with his army. Octavius sought to intercept Tisienus, but lost his way around Mount Myconium. He passed the night there without tents. There was a heavy rainfall, as often occurs in the autumn, and some of his armor-bearers held a Gallic shield over his head the whole night. Harsh mutterings and prolonged roars from Mount Etna were heard, accompanied by flames which lighted up the camp, so that the Germans sprang from their beds in fear. Others, who had heard what had been related of Mount Etna, would not have been surprised, in presence of these remarkable phenomena, if a torrent of fire had rolled upon them. After this Octavius ravaged the territory of the Abacaenians, where Lepidus, who was foraging, met him, and they both encamped near Messana.
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§ 5.12.118 As there had been many skirmishes throughout Sicily, but no general engagement, Octavius sent Taurus to cut off Pompeius' supplies by first capturing the towns that furnished them. Pompeius was so much inconvenienced by this that he decided to stake everything on a great battle. Since he feared the enemy's infantry, but had confidence in his own ships, he sent and asked Octavius if he would allow the war to be decided by a naval engagement. Octavius, although he dreaded all naval encounters, which until now had turned out badly for him, considered it base to refuse, and, accordingly, accepted the challenge. A day was fixed by them, for which 300 ships were put in readiness on either side, provided with missiles of all kinds, with towers and whatever machines they could think of. Agrippa devised one called the harpago, a piece of wood five cubits long bound with iron and having rings at the extremities. To one of these rings was attached the harpago, an iron claw, to the other numerous ropes, which drew the harpago by machine power after it had been thrown by a catapult and had seized the enemy's ships.
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§ 5.12.119 When the appointed day came the rival shouts of the oarsmen were first heard, accompanied by missiles thrown by machines and by hand, such as stones, firebrands, and arrows. Then the ships dashed against each other, some striking amidships, others on the prows, others on the beaks, where the blows are most effectual in discomposing the crew and rendering the vessel useless. Others broke the opposing line by sailing through it, at the same time discharging arrows and javelins; and the small boats picked up those who fell overboard. There was a struggle of soldiers while the sailors put forth their strength and the pilots their skill and their lung-power. The generals cheered their men, and all the machines were brought into requisition. The harpago achieved the greatest success. Thrown from a long distance upon the ships, as it could be by reason of its lightness, it clutched them, especially when the ropes pulled on it from behind. On account of the iron bands it could not be easily cut by the men whom it attacked, and those who tried to cut the ropes were prevented from reaching them by its length. As this apparatus had never been known before, the enemy had not provided themselves with scythe-mounted poles. One thing seemed advisable in this unexpected emergency, and that was, to back water and draw the ship away; but as the enemy did the same the force exerted by the men was equal on both sides, and the harpago did its work.
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§ 5.12.120 Accordingly, when the ships were drawn together, there was every kind of fighting, the men leaping upon each other's decks. It was no longer easy to distinguish an enemy from a friend, as they used the same weapons for the most part, and nearly all spoke the Latin tongue, and the watchwords of each side were divulged to the other while they were mingled together. Hence arose many and divers frauds and lack of confidence on both sides on the part of those using the same watchword. They failed to recognize each other completely, and meanwhile the fighting and the sea were a confused medley of corpses, clashing arms, and crashing ships. They left nothing untried except fire. This they abstained from, after their first onset, because they were locked together. The foot-soldiers of each army on the land beheld this sea-fight with apprehension and eagerness, believing that their own hope of safety was bound up in it. They could not distinguish anything, however sharply they might look, but merely a long-drawn-out line of 600 ships, and an alternation of cries and groans now on one side and now on the other.
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§ 5.12.121 Judging from the colors of the towers, which constituted the only difference between them, Agrippa with difficulty made out that Pompeius' ships had sustained the greater loss, and he cheered on those who were close to him as though they were already victors. Then he drove at the enemy and pressed upon them without ceasing, until he overpowered those nearest him. They then lowered their towers and turned their ships in flight toward the straits. Seventeen of them, which were in advance, made their escape thither. The rest were cut off by Agrippa and some were pursued and driven aground. The pursuers ran aground with them in the rush, and either pulled off those that had come to a standstill or set fire to them. When the Pompeian ships that were still fighting saw what had befallen these, they surrendered to their enemies. Then the soldiers of Octavius who were in the ships raised a shout of victory and those on the land gave an answering shout. Those of Pompeius groaned. Pompeius himself, darting away from Naulochi, hastened to Messana, giving no orders to his infantry in his panic. Accordingly Octavius received the surrender of Tisienus on terms agreed upon, and of the cavalry besides, who were surrendered by their officers. Three of Octavius' ships were sunk in the fight. Pompeius lost twenty-eight in this way, and the remainder were burned, or captured, or run aground, and stove in pieces, except the seventeen that escaped.
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§ 5.12.122 Pompeius learned of the defection of his infantry while on the road, and changed his costume from that of a commander to that of a private citizen, and sent orders to Messana to put on shipboard everything possible. All preparations to this end had been made long before. He summoned Plennius from Lilybaeum in haste, with the eight legions he had, intending to take flight with them. Plennius hastened to comply with this order, but as other friends, garrisons, and soldiers were deserting, and the enemy's fleet was moving into the straits, Pompeius did not wait for Plennius in his well-fortified city, but fled, with his seventeen ships, from Messana to Antony, whose mother he had saved in similar circumstances. After his departure Plennius arrived at Messana and occupied the place. Octavius himself remained in the camp at Naulochi, but he ordered Agrippa to lay siege to Messana, which the latter did, in conjunction with Lepidus. Plennius sent envoys to treat for peace. Agrippa wanted to wait till morning for the arrival of Octavius, but Lepidus granted terms, and, in order to conciliate the soldiers of Plennius to himself, allowed them to join the rest of the army in plundering the city. They had asked for nothing but safety, and now, finding unexpected gain in addition, they plundered Messana the whole night, in conjunction with the soldiers of Lepidus, and then ranged themselves under his standards.
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§ 5.13.123 Including this new accession, Lepidus now had twenty-two legions of infantry and a large body of cavalry. He was elated, and thought to make himself master of Sicily, using the pretext that he was the first to invade the island and that he had induced many cities to join the triumvirs. He sent word to the garrisons of these places that they should not admit the emissaries of Octavius, and he seized all the defiles. Octavius arrived on the following day, and reproached Lepidus through friends, who reminded him that he had come into Sicily as an ally of Octavius, not to acquire it for himself. Lepidus replied that he had been despoiled of his former allotment, which was now in the exclusive possession of Octavius, and that, if the latter pleased, he would now exchange Africa and Sicily for that former allotment. Octavius was exasperated. He came to Lepidus in anger and heaped reproaches on him for ingratitude. They separated, indulging in mutual threats. They forthwith surrounded themselves with guards, and the ships of Octavius were anchored away from the shore, as it was said that Lepidus intended to set fire to them.
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§ 5.13.124 The soldiers were angry at the thought of engaging in another civil war, and that there was never to be an end of sedition. They did not, however, seek to compare Octavius and Lepidus; not even the army of Lepidus did that. They admired the energy of Octavius, and.they were aware of the indolence of Lepidus. They also blamed him for admitting the defeated enemy to an equal share of the plunder. When Octavius learned their state of mind, he sent emissaries among them to advise them secretly of their individual interests. Many of them he tampered with, especially those who had served under Pompeius, who feared lest the terms of their capitulation should not be valid if Octavius did not ratify them. While Lepidus, by reason of his ineptitude, remained ignorant of these things Octavius came to his camp with a large body of horse, whom he left at the entrance, and himself went in with a few. Coming forward, he declared to those whom he met that he was drawn into war unwillingly. Those who saw him saluted him as imperator. First of all the Pompeians, who had been tampered with, collected together and asked his forgiveness. He said that he was astonished that persons asking forgiveness should not do what their own interests demanded. They understood his meaning, and forthwith seized their standards and went over to him, while others began to take down their tents.
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§ 5.13.125 When Lepidus became aware of this tumult he sprang from his tent to arms. Blows were exchanged and one of Octavius' armor-bearers was killed. Octavius himself was struck by a weapon on his breastplate, but it did not penetrate the flesh, and he ran and took refuge with his horsemen. A detachment of guards belonging to Lepidus jeered at him as he ran. Octavius was so angry that he could not restrain himself from dashing upon them with his horsemen and destroying them. The officers of the other guards transferred their allegiance from Lepidus to Octavius, some immediately, others during the night; some without solicitation, others pretending to be coerced more or less by the cavalry. There were some who still resisted the assault and beat off the assailants, for Lepidus sent reenforcements in all directions; but when these very reinforcements went over, the remainder of his army, even those who were yet well disposed toward him, changed their opinion. Again the first to move were those Pompeians who still remained with him. They transferred themselves by detachments, one after another. Lepidus armed others to prevent them from going, but the very ones who were armed for this purpose seized their standards and went over to Octavius with the rest. Lepidus threatened and besought them as they took their departure. He held fast to the standards, and said he would not give them up, until one of the standard-bearers said to him, “Let go, or you are a dead man.” Then he was afraid and let go.
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§ 5.13.126 The last to come over were the cavalry. They sent a messenger to Octavius to ask if they should kill Lepidus, who was no longer a commander. He replied in the negative. Thus was Lepidus deserted by all and bereft, in a moment of time, of so exalted a station and so great an army. He changed his costume and hastened to Octavius, all the spectators running with him to enjoy the spectacle. Octavius started up as he approached, and prevented him from throwing himself at his feet, and sent him to Rome in the garb of a private citizen, which he was wearing, deprived of his command, but not of the priesthood, which he held. And so this man, who had often been a commander and once a triumvir, who had appointed magistrates and had proscribed so many men of his own rank, passed his life as a private citizen, asking favors of some of the proscribed, who were magistrates at a later period.
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§ 5.13.127 Octavius neither pursued Pompeius nor allowed others to do so; either because he refrained from encroaching on Antony's dominions, or because he preferred to wait and see what Antony would do to Pompeius and make that a pretext for a quarrel if he should do wrong (for they had long entertained the suspicion that ambition would bring them into mutual conflict when other rivals were out of the way), or, as Octavius said later, because Pompeius was not one of his father's murderers. He now brought his forces together, and they amounted to forty-five legions of infantry, 25,000 horse, and some 40,000 light-armed troops. He also had 600 war-ships and an immense number of merchant vessels, which he sent back to their owners. To the soldiers he awarded the prizes of victory, paying a part down and promising the rest later. He distributed crowns and other honors to all, and granted pardon to the Pompeian leaders.
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§ 5.13.128 Fortune became jealous of his great prosperity. His army revolted, especially his own troops. They demanded to be discharged from the service and that rewards should be given them equal to those given to the men who fought at Philippi. Octavius knew that the present war had not been of the same grade as that one. He promised nevertheless to pay what their services were worth, and to include the soldiers serving under Antony when the latter should return. As to their breach of discipline, he reminded them, in a threatening tone, of the laws of their ancestors, of their oaths and of the punishments. As they gave little heed to what he said, he abandoned his threatening tone lest the spirit of mutiny should extend to his newly acquired troops, and said that he would discharge them at the proper time in conjunction with Antony. He said, also, that he would not engage them in any more civil wars, which had fortunately come to an end, but in war against the Illyrians and other barbarous tribes, who were disturbing the peace which had been gained with so much difficulty; from which war the soldiers would acquire great riches. They said that they would not go to war again until they had received the prizes and honors of the previous wars. He said that he would not postpone the honors. So he distributed many prizes, and gave to the legions additional crowns, and to the centurions and tribunes purple-bordered garments and the dignity of chief councillors in their native towns. While he was distributing other awards of this kind, the tribune Ofilius exclaimed that crowns and purple garments were playthings for boys, that the rewards for soldiers were lands and money. The multitude cried out, “Well said”; whereupon Octavius descended from the platform in anger. The soldiers gathered around the tribune, praising him and railing at those who did not join with them. Ofilius said that he alone would suffice to defend so just a cause, but after saying this he disappeared the following day, and it was never known what became of him.
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§ 5.13.129 The soldiers no longer dared to give utterance to their complaints singly, but they joined together in groups and called for their discharge in common. Octavius conciliated their leaders in various ways. He released those who had served at Philippi and Mutina, and who wished to be discharged, as their time had expired. These, to the number of 20,000, he dismissed and sent out of the island at once, lest they should seduce the others. To those only who had served at Mutina he added, that, although they were discharged in this way, he would fulfil the promises made to them at that time. He came before the rest of the army and called upon them to bear witness to the perjury of the revolters, who had been dismissed contrary to the wish of their military commander. He praised those who remained with him, and encouraged them to expect a speedy release, saying that nobody would be sorry, and that they would be discharged rich, and that he would give them 500 drachmas per man now. Having thus spoken, he exacted tribute from Sicily to the amount of 1600 talents, appointed propraetors for Africa and Sicily, and assigned a division of the army to each of these provinces. He sent back Antony's ships to Tarentum. A part of the army he sent in advance of himself to Italy in ships, and took the remainder with him when he departed from the island.
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§ 5.13.130 When he arrived at Rome the Senate voted him unbounded honors, giving him the privilege of accepting all, or such as he chose. They and the people went out a long distance to meet him, wearing garlands on their heads, and escorted him, when he arrived, first to the temples, and then from the temples to his house. The next day he made speeches to the Senate and to the people, recounting his exploits and his policy from the beginning to the present time. These speeches he wrote down and distributed in pamphlet form. He proclaimed peace and good-will, said that the civil wars were ended, remitted the unpaid taxes, and released the farmers of the revenue and the holders of public leases from what they owed. Of the honors voted to him, he accepted an ovation and annual solemnities on the days of his victories, and a golden image to be erected in the forum, with the garb he wore when he entered the city, to stand on a column surrounded by the beaks of captured ships. There the image was placed bearing the inscription: “PEACE, LONG DISTURBED, HE REESTABLISHED ON LAND AND SEA.”
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§ 5.13.131 When the people desired to transfer from Lepidus to himself the office of pontifex maximus, which the law bestowed upon one person for life, he would not accept it, and when they prayed that Lepidus might be put to death as a public enemy he would not allow it. He sent sealed letters to all the armies, with instructions to open them all on a designated day and to execute the orders contained therein. These orders related to the slaves who had run away during the civil dissensions and joined the armies, for whom Pompeius had asked freedom, which the Senate and the treaty had granted. These were all arrested on the same day and brought to Rome, and Octavius returned them to their Roman or Italian masters, or to the heirs of the same. He also gave back those belonging to Sicilian masters. Those whom nobody claimed he caused to be put to death in the cities from which they had absconded.
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§ 5.13.132 This seemed to be the end of the civil dissensions. Octavius was now twenty-eight years of age. Cities joined in placing him among their tutelary gods. At this time Italy and Rome itself were openly infested with bands of robbers, whose doings were more like barefaced plunder than secret theft. Sabinus was chosen by Octavius to correct this disorder. He executed many of the captured brigands, and within one year brought about a condition of absolute security. At that time, they say, originated the custom and system of cohorts of night watchmen still in force. Octavius excited astonishment by having put an end to this evil with such unexampled rapidity. He allowed the yearly magistrates to administer public affairs, in many particulars, according to the customs of the fathers. He burned the writings which contained evidence concerning the civil strife, and said that he would abdicate entirely when Antony should return from the Parthian war, for he was persuaded that Antony, too, would be willing to lay down the government, the civil wars being at an end. Thereupon he was chosen tribune for life by acclamation, the people urging him, by the offer of this perpetual magistracy, to give up his former one. This he accepted, and at the same time he wrote privately to Antony in reference to their government. Antony gave instructions to Bibulus, who was going away from him, to confer with Octavius. He sent governors to take charge of his provinces in like manner as Octavius had done, and he had thoughts of joining the latter in his expedition against the Illyrians.
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§ 5.14.133 Pompeius, fleeing from Sicily to Antony, stopped at the Lacinian promontory and robbed the rich temple of Juno of its gifts. He landed at Mitylene and spent some time at that place, where his father, when at war with Caesar, had bestowed him with his mother, when he was still a boy, and where his father had recovered him after his defeat. As Antony was now waging war in Media against the Medes and the Parthians, Pompeius decided to intrust himself to Antony on his return. When he heard that Antony had been worsted, and this result was confirmed by the reports, his hopes once more revived, and he fancied that he might succeed Antony if the latter were dead, or share his power if he returned. He was continually thinking of Labienus, who had overrun Asia not long before. While he was in this frame of mind the news reached him that Antony had returned to Alexandria. Scheming with both projects, he sent ambassadors to Antony ostensibly to place himself at the latter's disposal and to offer himself as a friend and ally, but really to get accurate information about Antony's affairs. At the same time he sent others secretly to the princes of Thrace and Pontus, intending, if he should not obtain what he desired from Antony, to take flight through Pontus to Armenia. He sent also to the Parthians, hoping that, for the remainder of their war against Antony, they would be eager to receive him as a general, because he was a Roman, and especially because he was the son of Pompey the Great. He refitted his ships and drilled the soldiers he had brought in them, pretending at one time that he was in fear of Octavius, and at another that he was getting ready to assist Antony.
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§ 5.14.134 As soon as Antony heard of the coming of Pompeius he designated Titius to take the field against him. He ordered the latter to take ships and soldiers from Syria and to wage war vigorously against Pompeius if he showed himself hostile, but to treat him with honor if he submitted himself to Antony. Then he gave audience to the ambassadors who had arrived, and who addressed him as follows: " Pompeius has sent us to you, not because he was without a place of refuge (if he were minded to continue the war) in Spain, a country friendly to him on his father's account and which espoused his own cause when he was younger, and even now calls upon him for that purpose, but because he prefers to enjoy peace with you, or, if need be, to fight under your orders. He makes these advances now not for the first time, but did so while he was master of Sicily and was ravaging Italy, and when he rescued your mother and sent her to you. If you had accepted these advances, Pompeius would not have been driven out of Sicily (for you would not have provided Octavius with ships against him), nor would you have been defeated in Parthia, in consequence of Octavius, not sending you the soldiers he agreed to send. In fact, you would now be in possession of Italy in addition to your other dominions. As you did not accept the offer at the time when it would have been most advantageous to you, he repeats it now in order that you may not be so often ensnared by Octavius' words and by the marriage relationship existing between you; for you will remember that, although he is connected by marriage with Pompeius, he declared war against the latter after the treaty had been made, and without excuse. He also deprived Lepidus, his partner in the government, of his share, and divided no part of it with you.
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§ 5.14.135 “You are now the only remaining one who stands between him and the monarchy that he longs for. He would already have been at blows with you, had not Pompeius stood in the way. Although you ought to have foreseen these things for yourself, Pompeius calls your attention to them out of good-will, because he prefers a candid and magnanimous man to a deceitful, treacherous, and artful one. He does not blame you for the gift of ships which you made to Octavius against him as a matter of necessity, in order to procure soldiers for the Parthian war in exchange, but he reminds you that those soldiers were not sent. In short, Pompeius delivers himself to you with the ships which he still has and his most faithful soldiers, who have not abandoned him even in his flight. If peace is maintained, it will be a great glory to you to have saved the son of Pompey the Great. In case of war, he will be a considerable help to your party in the conflict which is coming, unless, to be sure, it has already come.”
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§ 5.14.136 When the ambassadors had thus spoken, Antony showed them the orders he had sent to Titius, and said that if Pompeius was truly in this frame of mind he should come in person under the escort of Titius. In the meantime, the messengers who had been sent by Pompeius to the Parthians were captured by Antony's generals and brought to Alexandria. After Antony had examined each of them he summoned the ambassadors of Pompeius and showed the captives to them. They made excuses for Pompeius even then as a young man in a desperate plight, fearful lest Antony should not treat him kindly, and driven by necessity to make trial even of the bitterest enemies of Rome. They said that he would show his true disposition as soon as he should learn Antony's, and would then need no other attempt or devices. Antony believed them, being in other respects and at all times of a frank, magnanimous, and unsuspecting nature.
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§ 5.14.137 In the meantime Furnius, who was governing the province of Asia for Antony, had received Pompeius when he arrived, as he was behaving quietly; since Furnius had not sufficient force to prevent him and did not yet know Antony's mind. Seeing Pompeius drilling his troops, he mustered a force from the provincials and hastily summoned Ahenobarbus, who had command of an army in the vicinity, and also Amyntas from the other side. They responded promptly, and Pompeius complained against Furnius for regarding him in the light of an enemy when he had sent ambassadors to Antony and was waiting for an answer from him. While he was saying this he was meditating the project of seizing Ahenobarbus, with the connivance of Curius, one of Ahenobarbus' officers, intending to hold that general as a valuable hostage to exchange for himself in case of need. The treachery was discovered and Curius was convicted before the Romans present and put to death. Pompeius put to death his freedman Theodorus, the only person who was privy to the plan, believing that he had divulged it. As he no longer expected to conceal his projects from Furnius, he possessed himself of Lampsacus by treachery, a city which contained many Italians, colonized there by Gaius Caesar. These Italians he induced to enter his military service by large bounties. Having now 200 horse and three legions of infantry, he attacked Cyzicus by land and sea. He was repulsed on both sides, because there was a force, although not a large one, in Cyzicus, that was guarding some gladiators whom Antony supported there. So Pompeius retired to the harbor of the Achaeans and collected provisions.
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§ 5.14.138 Furnius did not begin hostilities, but he continually camped alongside of Pompeius with a large body of horse and prevented his foe from foraging or winning the cities to his side. As Pompeius had no cavalry, he assaulted the camp of Furnius in front and, at the same time, sent a force secretly around to his rear. Furnius accordingly directed his forces against Pompeius' front attack, but he was driven out of his camp by the force in his rear. Pompeius pursued his men and killed many as they fled over the Scamandrian plain, which was saturated with recent rains. Those who were saved withdrew to a place of safety, as they were not fit for battle. While they were waiting for assistance from Mysia, the Propontis, and elsewhere, the inhabitants, who were distressed by continual exactions, enlisted gladly under Pompeius, especially on account of the reputation he had gained by his victory at the harbor of the Achaeans. While Pompeius was deficient in cavalry, and was thus crippled in procuring supplies, he learned that a troop of Italian horse was coming to Antony, sent by Octavia, who was passing the winter in Athens. So he sent emissaries with gold to corrupt this troop, but Antony's governor of Macedonia caught these men and distributed their gold to the cavalry.
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§ 5.14.139 Pompeius took Nicaea and Nicomedia, from which he obtained large supplies of money, and his strength was augmented in all respects with a rapidity that exceeded his expectations. But Furnius, who was camping not far away from him, was reinforced, at the beginning of spring, first with seventy ships that had come from Sicily, which had been saved from those that Antony had lent to Octavius against Pompeius; for after the close of the war in Sicily Octavius had dismissed them. Then Titius arrived from Syria with 120 additional ships and a large army; and all these had landed at Proconnesus. Pompeius became alarmed and burned his own ships and armed his oarsmen, believing that he could fight to better advantage with all of his forces combined on land. Cassius of Parma, Nasidius, Saturninus, Thermus, Antistius, and the other distinguished men of his party who were still with him as friends, and Fannius, who held the highest rank of all, and Pompeius' father-in-law, Libo, when they saw that he did not desist from war against superior forces even after Titius, to whom Antony had given entire charge, had arrived, despaired of him, and, having made terms for themselves, went over to Antony.
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§ 5.14.140 Pompeius, now deserted by his friends, withdrew to the interior of Bithynia, being reported as making his way to Armenia. One night as he marched out of his camp quietly, Furnius and Titius followed him, and Amyntas joined in the pursuit. After a hot chase they came up with him toward evening, and each encamped by himself around a certain hill without ditch or palisade, as it was late and they were tired. While they were in this state, Pompeius made a night attack with 300 light troops and killed many who were still asleep or springing out of bed. The rest took to disgraceful flight in a state of nudity. It is evident that if Pompeius had made this night attack with his entire army, or if he had followed up energetically the victory he did win, he would have overcome them completely. But, misled by a god, he gave no heed to these opportunities, and he gained no other advantage from the affair than to penetrate farther into the interior of the country. His enemies, having formed a junction, followed him and cut off his supplies, until he was in danger from want. Then he sought an interview with Furnius, who had been a friend of Pompey the Great, and who was of higher rank and of a more trustworthy character than the others.
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§ 5.14.141 Taking a position where a river flowed between them, Pompeius said that he had sent ambassadors to Antony, and he added that, being in need of provisions meanwhile, and nobody supplying him, he had done what he had done. “If you have fought against me,” he continued, “by Antony's direction, Antony has misconceived his own interests in not foreseeing the coming war. If you are anticipating Antony's intentions, I protest and implore you to wait for the embassy that I sent to Antony or to take and bring me to him now. I will surrender myself to you alone, Furnius, asking merely your pledge that you will conduct me to him in safety.” He spoke thus because he had confidence in Antony as a man of generous nature, and he apprehended merely that something might happen to him on the journey. Furnius replied to him as follows: “If you wished to surrender yourself to Antony you ought to have done so in the beginning, or else have waited quietly at Mitylene for his answer. But if you desired the war you should have done as you have done. Why is it necessary to recount your deeds to one who knows them? If now you repent, do not bring us, generals, into collision with each other, but surrender yourself to Titius, to whom these matters have been intrusted by Antony. The pledge which you ask from me you can ask from him. He has been ordered by Antony to put you to death if you wage war, but, if you surrender yourself, to send you to him in an honorable manner.”
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§ 5.14.142 Pompeius was angry with Titius as an ingrate, in that he undertook to wage this war against him, for he had once been taken prisoner and spared by Pompeius. Besides being angry he considered it beneath his dignity to be in the power of Titius, who was not of noble birth. Moreover he suspected Titius, either because he was acquainted with his character and did not consider him trustworthy, or because he was conscious of some old injury done to him previous to the benefaction above mentioned. Again he offered to surrender himself to Furnius, and begged that he would receive him. When the latter refused he said that he would surrender to Amyntas. Furnius said that Amyntas would not receive him, because that would be an insult to the one whom Antony had intrusted with this whole business; and so the interview ended. The opinion prevailed in the camp of Furnius that, for want of other resources, Pompeius would deliver himself up to Titius on the following day. When night came Pompeius left the customary fires burning, and the trumpets giving the usual signal at intervals through the night, while he quietly withdrew from the camp with a well-prepared band, who had not been previously advised whither they were to go. He intended to go to the sea-shore and burn Titius' fleet, and perhaps would have done so had not Scaurus deserted from him and communicated the fact of his departure and the road he had taken, although ignorant of his design. Amyntas, with 1500 horse, pursued Pompeius, who had no cavalry. When Amyntas drew near, Pompeius' men passed over to him, some privately, others openly. Pompeius, being almost entirely deserted and afraid of his own men, surrendered himself to Amyntas without conditions, although he had scorned to surrender to Titius with conditions.
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§ 5.14.143 Thus was Sextus Pompeius captured. He was the last remaining son of Pompey the Great, and had been deprived of his father when very young and of his brother while still a stripling. After their death he concealed himself for a long time and practised robbery secretly in Spain until he had collected a large following, because he made himself known as Pompey's son. Then he practised more open robbery. After the death of Gaius Caesar he carried on war vigorously and collected a large army, together with ships and money, took islands, became master of the western sea, brought famine upon Italy, and compelled his enemies to make peace on such terms as he chose. Of most importance was the aid that he rendered to the proscribed in Rome exposed to utter destruction, rescuing many of the nobility who were, at this later time, safe at home by means of him. But stricken with mental aberration, he never pursued an aggressive policy against his foes, although fortune offered him many opportunities; he only defended himself. After such a career Pompeius was taken prisoner.
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§ 5.14.144 Titius brought Pompeius' soldiers into Antony's service and put Pompeius himself to death at Miletus in the fortieth year of his age. This he did either on his own account, angry at some former insult, and ungrateful for the subsequent kindness, or in pursuance of Antony's order. Some say that Plancus, not Antony, gave this order. They think that Plancus, while governing Syria, was authorized by letters to sign Antony's name in cases of urgency and to use his seal. Others think that it was written by Plancus with Antony's knowledge, but that the latter was ashamed to write it on account of the name Pompeius, and because Cleopatra was favorable to him on account of Pompey the Great. Still others think that Plancus, being cognizant of these facts, took it upon himself to give the order as a matter of precaution, lest Pompeius, with the cooperation of Cleopatra, should breed dissension between Antony and Octavius.
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§ 5.14.145 After the death of Pompeius Antony made a new expedition to Armenia, and Octavius made one against the Illyrians, who were plundering Italy, some of whom had never been subject to the Romans, while others had revolted during the civil wars. Since these Illyrian affairs are not very well known to me, and are not of sufficient length to make a book by themselves, and have no suitable place to be treated elsewhere, I have recorded them above (beginning with the time when Illyria was acquired by the Romans and bringing them down to the end), and added them to the history of the neighboring Macedonia.

Via ToposText (topostext.org), a project of the Aikaterini Laskaridis Foundation created by Brady Kiesling. Translated by Horace White (1834-1916). Composed ca. 165 CE. Licence: public domain. Source.