Dio Cassius, Histories

§ 52.31.5 ”These suggestions have to do only with those offences regarding which laws have been established and judgments are rendered in accordance with these laws. For as to a charge that some one has vilified you or in some other way has used unseemly language regarding you, I would have you neither listen to the accuser nor follow up the accusation. 6 For it is disgraceful for you to believe that any one has wantonly insulted you if you are indeed doing no wrong and are but conferring benefits upon all, and it is only those who are ruling badly who believe such things; for they draw evidence from their own conscience of the credibility of the alleged slanders.

§ 52.31.7 And it is, furthermore, a dangerous thing even to show anger at such imputations (for if they are true, it were better not to be angry, and if they are false, it were better to pretend not to be angry), since many a man in times past has, by adopting this course, caused to be circulated against himself scandals far more numerous and more difficult to bear. 8 This, then, is my advice concerning those who are accused of calumniating you; for you should be superior to any insult and too exalted to be reached by it, and you should never allow yourself even to imagine, or lead others to imagine, that it is possible for any one to treat you with contumely, since you desire that men shall think of you, as they do of the gods, that your sanctity is inviolable.

§ 52.31.9 If, however, any one is accused of plotting against you (and such a thing might also happen), refrain, in his case also, from either giving judgment yourself or prejudging the charge (for it is absurd that the same man should be both accuser and judge), but bring him before the senate and let him plead his defence there, and if he is convicted, punish him, moderating the sentence as far as possible, in order that belief in his guilt may be fostered. 10 For most men are very reluctant to believe that an unarmed man is plotting against one who is armed; and the only way you can win them to the belief is by showing, so far as possible, neither resentment nor the desire to exact the utmost when you inflict the penalty. But I make an exception to this rule in the case of a commander of an army who openly revolts; for of course it is fitting that such an one should not be tried at all, but chastised as a public enemy.

§ 52.32.1 “These matters, then, should be referred by you to the senate, and also those others which are of the greatest importance to the state. For interests which are shared in common should be administered in common. Besides, it is doubtless a quality implanted by nature in all men that they take delight in any marks of esteem received from a superior which imply that they are his equals, and that they not only approve of all decisions made by another in consultation with themselves, as being their own decisions, but also submit to them as having been imposed by their own free choice. 2 Therefore I say that such business ought to be brought before the senate. Furthermore, all the senators alike, that is, all who are present, should vote on all other matters: but when one of their own number is accused, not all of them should do so, unless the one who is on trial is not yet sitting as a senator or is still in the ranks of the ex-quaestors.

§ 52.32.3 For it is absurd that one who has not yet been a tribune or an aedile should cast a vote against men who have held those offices, or, worse yet, that any one of the latter should vote against men who have been praetors, or one of these last against men who have been consuls. Rather, let the ex-consuls alone have authority to render decisions in the case of all senators, and let the rest of the senators vote only in the cases of senators of a rank equal or inferior to their own.

§ 52.33.1 ”But do you judge by yourself alone the cases which come to you on appeal or reference from the higher officials and the procurators, from the prefect of the city, the sub-censor, and from the prefects in charge respectively of the grain-supply and the night-watch. For none of these should have such absolute jurisdiction and final authority that an appeal cannot be made from him. 2 Do you, therefore, pass upon these cases and those which involve knights and centurions recruited from the levies and the foremost private citizens, when they are defendants on a charge punishable by death or disfranchisement. For such cases should be committed to you alone, and for the reasons mentioned no one else should judge them solely upon his own responsibility.

§ 52.33.3 Indeed, in the rendering of decisions generally you should be brought into consultation, invariably by the senators and knights of highest rank and also, as occasion calls for one or another, by the other senators who are ex-consuls and ex-praetors, the object being twofold: that you on your part may first become more intimately acquainted with their characters and may then be able to put them to the right kind of employment, and that they, on their part, may first become familiar with our habits of mind and your plans before they go out to govern the provinces. 4 Do not, however, ask for a public expression of their opinion on any matter that requires an unusually careful consideration, lest they hesitate to speak freely, since in giving their opinions they follow their superiors in rank; make them, rather, write their opinions on tablets. These you should read in private, that they may become known to no one else, and should then order the writing to be erased forthwith. For the best way for you to get at each man's precise opinion would be to give him the certainty that his vote cannot be detected among the rest.

§ 52.33.5 “Moreover, for your judicial work and your correspondence, to help you attend to the decrees of the states and the petitions of private individuals, and for all other business which belongs to the administration of the empire, you must have men chosen from the knights to be your helpers and assistants. For all the details of administration will move along more easily in this way, and you will neither err through relying upon your own judgment nor become exhausted through relying upon your own efforts. 6 Grant to every one who wishes to offer you advice, on any matter whatever, the right to speak freely and without fear of the consequences; for if you are pleased with what he says you will be greatly benefited, and if you are not convinced it will do you no harm.

§ 52.33.7 Those who win your favourable opinion for their suggestions you should both commend and honour, since you yourself will gain credit through their discoveries; but do not treat with disrespect or criticise those who fail of your approval, since it is their intentions that you should consider, and their lack of success should not call forth your censure. 8 Guard against this same mistake in matters of warfare, also; give way neither to anger against a man for an unintentional misfortune nor to jealousy for a piece of good fortune, that all may zealously and gladly incur danger for your sake, confident that if they meet with any reverse they will not be punished for it and if they gain success they will not have snares laid for them.

§ 52.33.9 There have been many, at any rate, who through fear of jealousy on the part of those in power have chosen to accept defeat rather than achieve success, and as a result have gained safety for themselves while inflicting the loss upon their rulers. Therefore, since you yourself stand to reap the major part of the fruits of both outcomes, the failures as well as the successes, you should never consent to become jealous, nominally of others, but really of yourself.

§ 52.34.1 ”Whatever you wish your subjects to think and do, this you should always say and do yourself. In this way you will be educating them, rather than intimidating them through the punishments prescribed by the laws. The former policy inspires zeal, the latter fear; and one finds it easier to imitate that which is good when he sees it actually practised than to avoid that which is evil when he hears it forbidden by mere words. 2 Be scrupulous yourself in all your actions, showing no mercy to yourself, in the full assurance that all men will forthwith learn of whatever you say or do. For you will live as it were in a theatre in which the spectators are the whole world; and it will not be possible for you to escape detection if you make even the most trivial mistake.

§ 52.34.3 Indeed, you will never be alone, but always in the company of many when you do anything; and since the remainder of mankind somehow take the keenest delight in prying into the conduct of their rulers, if once they ascertain that you are recommending to them one course but are yourself taking another, instead of fearing your threats they will imitate your actions.

§ 52.34.4 “You should, of course, supervise the lives of your subjects, but do not scrutinise them with too much rigour. Sit in judgment upon all offences reported to you by others, but act as if you were not even aware of offences concerning which no one has made accusation — except in the case of trespasses against the public interest.

§ 52.34.5 These ought, of course, to receive proper attention, even if no one files a charge; but as to private shortcomings, while you should indeed have knowledge of them, in order that you may avoid making a mistake some day by employing an unsuitable person as your agent in some matter, yet you shouldn't go so far as to convict those who are guilty of them. 6 For human nature often tempts men to commit many a violation of the law, and if you were to prosecute such offences rigorously, you would leave unpunished few or none of the offenders; but if in a kindly spirit you mix reasonableness with the prescriptions of the law, you may succeed in bringing the offenders to their senses.

§ 52.34.7 The law, you know, though it of necessity makes its punishments severe, cannot always conquer nature. And so in the case of some men, if they think that their sins have not been discovered, or if they have been reproved but not unduly, they reform, either because they feel disgraced at having been found out, or because their self-respect keeps them from falling again; 8 whereas, if they have been publicly exposed and have lost all sense of shame, or have been chastised unduly, they overturn and trample under foot all the conventions of the law and become wholly slaves to the impulses of nature. Therefore it is neither easy to punish offenders invariably in all cases nor is it seemly to allow them in particular cases to flaunt their wickedness openly.

§ 52.34.9 ”Now this is the way I advise you to deal with men's shortcomings, with the exception of those persons who are utterly incorrigible; and you should honour their good actions even beyond the merits of the deeds themselves. For you can best induce men to refrain from evil ways by kindness, and to desire better ways by liberality. 10 You need have no fear that you will ever lack either money or the other means of rewarding those who do good deeds. On the contrary, I fancy that those who will deserve your favours will prove far too few, seeing that you hold empire over so vast an extent of land and sea. Nor need you fear that any who have received your benefactions will ever act ungratefully;

§ 52.34.11 for nothing so captivates and conciliates a man, be he foreigner or foe, as being not only the object of no wrongs but, in addition, the recipient of kindness.

§ 52.35.1 “As regards your subjects, then, you should so conduct yourself, in my opinion. So far as you yourself are concerned, permit no exceptional or prodigal distinction to be given you, through word or deed, either by the senate or by any one else. 2 For whereas the honour which you confer upon others lends glory to them, yet nothing can be given to you that is greater than what you already possess, and, besides, no little suspicion of insincerity would attach to its giving. No subject, you see, is ever supposed to vote any such distinction to his ruler of his free will, and since all such honours as a ruler receives he must receive from himself, he not only wins no commendation for the honour but becomes a laughing-stock besides.

§ 52.35.3 You must therefore depend upon your good deeds to provide for you any additional splendour. And you should never permit gold or silver images of yourself to be made, for they are not only costly but also invite destruction and last only a brief time; but rather by your benefactions fashion other images in the hearts of your people, images which will never tarnish or perish. 4 Neither should you ever permit the raising of a temple to you; for the expenditure of vast sums of money on such objects is sheer waste. This money would better be used for necessary objects; for wealth which is really wealth is gathered, not so much by getting largely, as by saving largely. Then, again, from temples comes no enhancement of one's glory.

§ 52.35.5 For it is virtue that raises many men to the level of gods, and no man ever became a god by popular vote. Hence, if you are upright as a man and honourable as a ruler, the whole earth will be your hallowed precinct, all cities your temples, and all men your statues, since within their thoughts you will ever be enshrined and glorified. 6 As for those, on the contrary, who administer their realms in any other way, such honours not only do not lend holiness to them, even though shrines are set apart for them in all their cities, but even bring a greater reproach upon them, becoming, as it were, trophies of their baseness and memorials of their injustice; for the longer these temples last, the longer abides the memory of their infamy.

§ 52.36.1 Therefore, if you desire to become in very truth immortal, act as I advise; and, furthermore, do you not only yourself worship the divine Power everywhere and in every way in accordance with the traditions of our fathers, but compel all others to honour it. 2 Those who attempt to distort our religion with strange rites you should abhor and punish, not merely for the sake of the gods (since if a man despises these he will not pay honour to any other being), but because such men, by bringing in new divinities in place of the old, persuade many to adopt foreign practices, from which spring up conspiracies, factions, and cabals, which are far from profitable to a monarchy. Do not, therefore, permit anybody to be an atheist or a sorcerer.

§ 52.36.3 Soothsaying, to be sure, is a necessary art, and you should by all means appoint some men to be diviners and augurs, to whom those will resort who wish to consult them on any matter; that there ought to be no workers in magic at all. For such men, by speaking the truth sometimes, but generally falsehood, often encourage a great many to attempt revolutions. 4 The same thing is done also by many who pretend to be philosophers; hence I advise you to be on your guard against them, too. Do not, because you have had experience of good and honourable men like Areius and Athenodorus, believe that all the rest who claim to be philosophers are like them; for infinite harm, both to communities and to individuals, is worked by certain men who but use this profession as a screen.

§ 52.37.1 ”Now you should be wholly inclined to peace, so far as your purpose is concerned and your desire for nothing more than you now possess, but as regards your military preparations you should be distinctly warlike, in order that, if possible, no one may either wish or attempt to wrong you, but if he should, that he may be punished easily and instantly. 2 And inasmuch as it is necessary, for these and other reasons, that there should be persons who are to keep eyes and ears open to anything which affects your imperial position, in order that you may not be unaware of any situation that requires measures of precaution or correction, you should have such agents, but remember that you should not believe absolutely everything they say, but should carefully investigate their reports.

§ 52.37.3 For there are many who, from various motives, — either because they hate others or covet their possessions, or because they want to do a favour to some one else, or because they have demanded money from some one and have not obtained it, — bring false charges against the persons concerned, pretending that they are engaged in sedition or are planning or saying something prejudicial to the ruler. 4 Therefore one ought not to give heed to them forthwith or readily, but rather should prove everything they say. For if you are too slow in placing your trust in one of these men, you will suffer no great harm, but if you are too hasty you may possibly make a mistake which you cannot repair.

§ 52.37.5 “Now it is both right and necessary for you to honour the good who are associated with you, both your freedmen and the rest; for this course will bring you credit and a large measure of security. They should not, however, acquire excessive power, but should all be rigorously kept under discipline, so that you shall never be brought into discredit by them. 6 For everything they do, whether good or ill, will be set to your account, and you will yourself be considered by the world to be of a character akin to the conduct which you do not object to in them. ”As regards the men of power and influence, then, you should not permit them to overreach the others, nor yet, on the other hand, to be blackmailed by others; neither let the mere fact that a man possesses power be imputed to him as a crime even though he commit no offence.

§ 52.37.7 But in the case of the masses, vindicate them vigorously when they are wronged and be not too ready to give heed to accusations against them; but make the accused persons' actions alone and by themselves the object of your scrutiny, neither harbouring suspicion against whatever is superior nor placing your trust in whatever is inferior. 8 Honour those who are diligent and those who by their skill devise something useful, but abhor those who are slothful or who busy themselves with trivial things, in order that your subjects, cleaving to the former by reason of your emoluments and holding themselves aloof from the latter by reason of your punishments, may become, as you desire, more competent in respect to their private affairs and more serviceable in respect to the interests of the state.

§ 52.37.9 “It is well to make the number of disputes on the part of private citizens as few as possible and to render as expeditious as possible their settlement; but it is most important to restrain the rash enterprises of communities, and if they are attempting to coerce others or to go beyond their capacity or means in any undertaking or expenditure, 10 to forbid it, even though in their petitions they invoke blessings upon the empire and pray for your welfare and good fortune. It is important also to eradicate their mutual enmities and rivalries, and not permit them to assume empty titles or to do anything else that will bring them into strife with others. And all will readily yield obedience to you, both individuals and communities, in this and in every other matter, provided that you make no exceptions whatever to this rule as a concession to anybody; for the uneven application of laws nullifies even those which are well established.

§ 52.37.11 Consequently you ought not to allow your subjects even to ask you, in the first place, for what you are not going to give them, but should compel them strenuously to avoid at the outset this very practice of petitioning for what is prohibited.

§ 52.38.1 ”So much for these things. And I counsel you never to make full use of your power against your subjects as a body, nor to consider it any curtailment of your power if you do not actually put into effect all the measures you are in a position to enforce; but the greater your ability to do all you desire, the more eager you should be to desire in all things only what is fitting you should desire. 2 Always question your own heart in private whether it is right or not to do a given thing, and what you should do or refrain from doing to cause men to love you, with the purpose of doing the one and avoiding the other. For do not imagine that men will think you are doing your duty if only you hear no word of censure passed upon you; neither must you expect that any man will so abandon his senses as to reproach you openly for anything you do.

§ 52.38.3 No one will do this, no matter how flagrantly he has been wronged; on the contrary, many are compelled even to commend their oppressors in public, though they must struggle to keep from showing their resentment. But the ruler must get at the disposition of his subjects, not by what they say, but by what they in all likelihood think.

§ 52.39.1 “These are the things I would have you do — these and others of like nature; for there are many which I must pass over, since it is impossible to include them all in a single discussion. There is, however, one statement which will serve as a summary with respect both to what has been said and to what has been left unsaid: 2 if you of your own accord do all that you would wish another to do if he became your ruler, you will err in nothing and succeed in everything, and in consequence you will find your life most happy and utterly free from danger.

§ 52.39.3 For how can men help regarding you with affection as father and saviour, when they see that you are orderly and upright in your life, successful in war though inclined to peace; when you refrain from insolence and greed; when you meet them on a footing of equality, 4 do not grow rich yourself while levying tribute on them, do not live in luxury yourself while imposing hardships upon them, are not licentious yourself while reproving licentiousness in them, — when, instead of all this, your life is in every way and manner precisely like theirs? Therefore, since you have in your own hands a mighty means of protection, — that you never do wrong to another, — be of good courage and believe me when I tell you that you will never become the object of hatred or of conspiracy.

§ 52.39.5 And since this is so, it follows of necessity that you will also lead a happy life; for what condition is happier, what more blissful, when, possessing virtue, to enjoy all the blessing which men can know and to be able to bestow them upon others?

§ 52.40 ”Think upon these things and upon all that I have told you, and be persuaded of me, and let not this fortune slip which has chosen you from all mankind and has set you up as their ruler. For, if you prefer the monarchy in fact but fear the title of'king' as being accursed, you have but to decline this title and still be sole ruler under the appellation of' Caesar.' 2 And if you require still other epithets, your people will give you that of'imperator' as they gave it to your father; and they will pay reverence to your august position by still another term of address, so that you will enjoy fully the reality of the kingship without the odium which attaches to the name of'king.' "

§ 52.41.1 Maecenas thus brought his speech to an end. And Caesar heartily commended both him and Agrippa for the wealth of their ideas and of their arguments and also for their frankness in expressing them; but he preferred to adopt the advice of Maecenas. He did not, however, immediately put into effect all his suggestions, fearing to meet with failure at some point if he purposed to change the ways of all mankind at a stroke; 2 but he introduced some reforms at the moment and some at a later time, leaving still others for those to effect who should subsequently hold the principate, in the belief that as time passed a better opportunity would be found to put these last into operation. And Agrippa, also, although he had advised against these policies, coöperated with Caesar most zealously in respect to all of them, just as if he had himself proposed them.

§ 52.41.3 These and all the rest that I have recorded earlier in this narrative were the acts of Caesar in the year in which he was consul for the fifth time; and he assumed the title of imperator. I do not here refer to the title which had occasionally been bestowed, in accordance with the ancient custom, upon generals in recognition of their victories, — for he had received that many times before this and received it many times afterwards in honour merely of his achievements, 4 so that he won the name of imperator twenty-one times, — but rather the title in its other use, which signifies the possession of the supreme power, in which sense it had been voted to his father Caesar and to the children and descendants of Caesar.

§ 52.42.1 After this he became censor with Agrippa as his colleague, and in addition to other reforms which he instituted, he purged the senate. For as a result of the civil wars a large number of knights and even of foot-soldiers were in the senate without justification in merit, so that the membership of that body had swollen to a thousand. 2 Now though it was his wish to remove these men, he did not erase any of their names himself, but urged them rather, on the strength of their own knowledge of their families and their lives, to become their own judges; he first persuaded some fifty of them to withdraw from the senate voluntarily, and then compelled one hundred and forty others to imitate their example.

§ 52.42.3 He disfranchised none of them, but posted the names of the second group only for he spared the members of the first group the reproach of the publication of their names, because they had not delayed but had straightway obeyed him. So all these men returned to private life of their own free will, so far as appearances were concerned; but Quintus Statilius was deposed, decidedly against his will, from the tribuneship, to which he had been appointed. 4 And Caesar caused some other men to become senators, and he enrolled among the ex-consuls two men of the senatorial class, a certain Gaius Cluvius and Gaius Furnius, because, after they had already been elected consuls, they had been unable to serve, since others had occupied their offices first.

§ 52.42.5 And at the same time he increased the number of patrician families, ostensibly with senate's permission, inasmuch as the greater part of the patricians had perished (indeed no class is so wasted in our civil wars as the nobility), and because the patricians are always regarded as indispensable for the perpetuation of our traditional institutions. 6 In addition to these measures he forbade all members of the senate to go outside of Italy, unless he himself should command or permit them to do so. This restriction is still observed down to the present day; for no senator is allowed to leave the country for the purpose of visiting any place except Sicily and Gallia Narbonensis.

§ 52.42.7 But in the case of these regions, since they are close at hand and the inhabitants are unarmed and peaceful, those who have any possessions there are conceded the right to repair to them as often as they like without asking permission. 8 And since he saw that many of the senators and others who had been partisans of Antony were still inclined to be suspicious of him, and was fearful lest they might set a revolution on foot, he announced that all the letters that had been found in Antony's strong boxes had been burned. And it is quite true that he had destroyed some of them, but he was very careful to keep the larger part, and afterwards he did not scruple to make use of them, either.

§ 52.43 So much for these matters. Caesar also settled Carthage anew, because Lepidus had laid waste a part of it and by this act, it was held, had abrogated the rights of the earlier colonists. And he sent a summons to Antiochus of Commagene, because he had treacherously murdered an envoy who had been despatched to Rome by his brother, who was at variance with him. Caesar brought him before the senate, and when judgment had been passed against him, put him to death. 2 He also obtained Capreae from the Neapolitans, to whom it originally belonged, giving other territory in exchange. It lies not far from the mainland in the region of Surrentum and is good for nothing, but is renowned even to the present day because Tiberius had a residence there.

§ 53.1.1 These were the occurrences at that time. The following year Caesar held office for the sixth time and confirmed in all other respects to the usages handed down from the earliest times, and, in particular, he delivered to Agrippa, his colleague, the bundles of rods as it was incumbent upon him to do, while he himself used the other set, and on completing his term of office he took the oath according to ancestral custom. 2 Whether he ever did this again, I do not know, for he always paid exceptional honour to Agrippa; thus he gave him his niece in marriage, and provided him with a tent similar to his own whenever they were campaigning together, and the watchword was given out by both of them.

§ 53.1.3 At this particular time, now, besides attending to his other duties as usual, he completed the taking of the census, in connection with which his title was princeps senatus, as had been the practice when Rome was truly a republic. Moreover, he completed and dedicated the temple of Apollo on the Palatine, the precinct surrounding it, and the libraries. 4 He also celebrated in company with Agrippa the festival which had been voted in honour of the victory won at Actium; and during this celebration he caused the boys and men of the nobility to take part in the Circensian Games.

§ 53.1.5 This festival was held for a time every four years and was in charge of the four priesthoods in succession — I mean the pontifices, the augurs, and the septemviri and quindecemviri, as they were called. On the present occasion, moreover, a gymnastic contest was held, a wooden stadium having been constructed in the Campus Martius, and there was a gladiatorial combat between captives. 6 These events continued for several days and were not interrupted even when Caesar fell ill; but Agrippa went on with them even so, discharging Caesar's duties as well as his own.

§ 53.2.1 Now Caesar allowed it to be understood that he was spending his private means upon these festivals, and when money was needed for the public treasury, he borrowed some and supplied the want; and for the management of the funds he ordered two annual magistrates to be chosen from among the ex-praetors. 2 To the populace he distributed a quadruple allowance of grain and to some of the senators he made presents of money. For so many of them had become impoverished that none was willing to hold even the office of aedile because of the magnitude of the expenditures involved; indeed, the functions which belonged to that office, and particularly the judicial functions, were assigned to the praetors, as had been the custom, the more important to the praetor urbanus and the rest to the praetor peregrinus.

§ 53.2.3 In addition to all this, Caesar himself appointed the praetor urbanus, as, indeed, he often did subsequently. He cancelled all obligations which had been given to the public treasury previous to the battle of Actium, except those secured by buildings, and he burned the old notes of those who were indebted to the state. 4 As for religious matters, he did not allow the Egyptian rites to be celebrated inside the pomerium, but made provision for the temples; those which had been built by private individuals he ordered their sons and descendants, if any survived, to repair, and the rest he restored himself.

§ 53.2.5 He did not, however, appropriate to himself the credit for their erection, but allowed it to go as before to the original builders. And inasmuch as he had put into effect very many illegal and unjust regulations during the factional strife and the wars, especially in the period of his joint rule with Antony and Lepidus, he abolished them all by a single decree, setting the end of his sixth consulship as the time for their expiration. 6 When, now, he obtained approbation and praise for this act, he desired to exhibit another instance of magnanimity, that by such a policy he might be honoured all the more and might have his sovereignty voluntarily confirmed by the people, so as to avoid the appearance of having forced them against their will.

§ 53.2.7 Therefore, having first primed his most intimate friends among the senators, he entered the senate in his seventh consulship and read the following address:

§ 53.3 "I am sure that I shall seem to some of you, Conscript Fathers, to have made an incredible choice. For what each one of my hearers would not wish to do himself, he does not like to believe, either, when another claims to have done it, especially as everyone is jealous of anybody who is superior to him and so is more prone to disbelieve any utterance that is above his own standard. 2 Besides, I know this, that those who say what appears to be incredible not only fail to persuade others but also appear to be impostors. And indeed, if it were a question of my promising something that I was not intending to put into effect immediately, I should have been exceedingly loath to proclaim it, for fear of gaining, instead of gratitude, some grievous imputation. But as it is, when the performance will follow the promise this very day, I feel quite confident, not only that I shall incur no reproach of falsehood, but that I shall surpass all mankind of good repute.

§ 53.4.1 You see for yourselves, of course, that it is in my power to rule over you for life; for every factious element has either been put down through the application of justice or brought to its sense by receiving mercy, while those who were on my side have been made devoted by my reciprocating their friendly services and bound fast by having a share in the government. 2 Therefore none of them desires a revolution, and if anything of the sort should take place, at least the party which will stand by me is even more ready than it was before. My military is in the finest condition as regards both loyalty and strength; there is money and there are allies; and, most important of all, you and the people are so disposed toward me that you would distinctly wish to have me at your head.

§ 53.4.3 However, I shall lead you no longer, and no one will be able to say that it was to win absolute power that I did whatever has hitherto been done. Nay, I give up my office completely, and restore to you absolutely everything, — the army, the laws, and the provinces, — not only those which you committed to me, 4 but also those which I myself later acquired for you. Thus my very deeds also will prove to you that even at the outset I desired no position of power, but in very truth wished to avenge my father, cruelly murdered, and to extricate the city from great evils that came on unceasingly.

§ 53.5.1 Indeed, I would that I had not gone so far as to assume charge of affairs as I did; that is, I would that the city had not required me for any such task, but that we of this generation also might have lived from the beginning in peace and harmony, as our fathers lived of yore. 2 But since some destiny, as it appears, brought you to a position where you had need even of me, young as I still was at the time, and put me to the test, I did everything with a zeal even beyond my years and accomplished everything with a good fortune even beyond my powers, so long as the situation demanded my help.

§ 53.5.3 And nothing in the world could deter me from aiding you when you were in danger, — neither toil, nor fear, nor threats of foes, nor prayers of friends, nor the multitude of the conspirators, nor the desperation of our adversaries; nay, I gave myself to you unstintingly for any and all the exigencies which have arisen, and what I did and suffered, you know. 4 From all this I have derived no gain for myself except that I have kept my country from perishing; but as for you, you are enjoying both safety and tranquillity. Since, then, Fortune, by using me, has graciously restored to you peace without treachery and harmony without faction, receive back also your liberty and the republic; take over the army and the subject provinces, and govern yourselves as has been your wont.

§ 53.6.1 “You should not be surprised at this purpose of mine, when you see my reasonableness in other respects, my mildness, and my love of quiet, and when you reflect, moreover, that I have never accepted any extraordinary privilege nor anything beyond what the many might gain, though you have often voted many of them to me. 2 Do not, on the other hand, condemn me as foolish because, when it is in my power to rule over you and to hold so great a sovereignty over this vast world, I do not wish it. For, if one looks into the merits of the case from the point of view of justice, I regard it as most just for you to manage your own affairs; if from the point of view of expediency, I consider it most expedient, both that I should be free from trouble and not be the object of jealousy and intrigue, and that you should have a government based upon liberty and conducted with moderation and friendly feeling;

§ 53.6.3 and if, finally, from the point of view of glory, to win which many men are often found ready to choose war and personal risk, will it not add most to my renown to resign so great an empire, will it not add most to my glory to leave so exalted a sovereignty and voluntarily become a private citizen? Therefore, if there is any one of you who believes that no man except me can really and sincerely hold to such ideals and give them utterance, at least let him believe it of me. 4 For, though I could recite many great benefits conferred upon you both by me and by my father, for which we beyond all other men could reasonably claim your affection and your honour, I could single out no other act in preference to this, nor could I feel a greater pride in any other thing than this, — that he refused the monarchy although you offered it to him, and that I, when I hold it, lay it aside.

§ 53.7.1 ”What achievement, indeed, could one compare with these acts of ours? The conquest of Gaul, the enslavement of Pannonia, the subjugation of Moesia, the overthrow of Egypt? Or Pharnaces, or Juba, or Phraates, or the campaign against the Britons, or the crossing of the Rhine? Yet these are greater and more important deeds than even all our forefathers together performed in all previous time. 2 Nevertheless, no one of these exploits deserves a place beside my present act, to say nothing of our civil wars, of all which have ever occurred the greatest and most varied in its changing fortunes, which we fought to an honourable conclusion and brought to a humane settlement, overpowering as enemies all who resisted, but sparing as friends all who yielded; therein setting an example, so that if it should be fated that our city should ever again be afflicted, one might pray that it should conduct its quarrel in the same way.

§ 53.7.3 Indeed, I will go further: that we, when we possessed a strength so great, and when we so clearly stood at the summit of prowess and good fortune, that we could exercise over you, with or without your consent, our arbitrary rule, did not lose our sense or conceive the desire for sole supremacy, but that he thrust that supremacy aside when it was offered him and that I return it after it has been given to me, — that, I say, transcends the deeds of a man! 4 I say this, not by way of idle boasting, — indeed, I should not have said it at all, if I were going to derive any advantage whatever from it, — but in order that you may see that, although we can point to many benefits conferred upon the state at large and to many services rendered to individuals of which we might boast, yet we take the greatest pride in this, that what others so desire that they are even willing to do violence to gain it, this we do not accept even under compulsion.

§ 53.8.1 Who could be found more magnanimous than I, — not to mention again my deceased father, — who more nearly divine? For I, — the gods be my witnesses! — who have so many gallant soldiers, both Romans and allies, who are devoted to me, I, who am supreme over the entire sea within the Pillars of Hercules except for a few tribes, I who possess both cities and provinces in every continent, 2 at a time when there is no longer any foreign enemy making war upon me and no one at home is engaged in sedition, but when you are all at peace, are harmonious and strong, and, greatest of all, are content to yield obedience, I, in spite of all this, voluntarily and of my own motion resign so great a dominion and give up so vast a possession.

§ 53.8.3 So then, if Horatius, Mucius, Curtius, Regulus, and the Decii were willing to encounter danger and to die to win the fame of having done a great and noble deed, why should not I desire even more to do this thing, whereby, without losing my life, I shall excel both them and all the rest of mankind in glory? 4 In truth no one of you should think that the ancient Romans sought to win fair fame and reputation for valour, but that in these days every manly virtue has become extinct in the state. And further, let no one suspect that I wish to betray you by delivering you into the hands of a group of wicked men, or by giving you over to government by the mob, from which nothing good ever comes, but rather in all cases and for all mankind nothing but the most terrible evils.

§ 53.8.5 Nay, it is to you senators, to you who are the best and wisest, that I restore the entire administration of the state. The other course I should never have followed, even had it been necessary for me to die a thousand deaths, or even to assume the sole rule; but this policy I adopt both for my own good and for that of the city. 6 For I myself have undergone both labours and hardships and am no longer able to stand the strain, either in mind or in body. Furthermore, I foresee the jealousy and hatred which are engendered in certain persons against even the best men and the plots which arise therefrom.

§ 53.8.7 It is for these reasons that I choose the life of a private citizen and fair fame rather than that of a sovereign and constant peril. And as for the business of the commonwealth, it would be carried on far better by all in common, inasmuch as it would be transacted by many men together instead of being dependent upon some one man.

§ 53.9.1 “For these reasons, then, I ask and implore you one and all both to approve my course and to coöperate heartily with me, reflecting upon all that I have done for you alike in war and in public life, and rendering me complete recompense for it all by this one favour, — by allowing me at last to be at peace as I live out my life. Thus you will come to know that I understand not only how to rule but also how to submit to rule, and that all the commands which I have laid upon others I can endure to have laid upon me. 2 I ask this because I expect to live in security, if that be possible, and to suffer no harm from anybody by either deed or word, — such is the confidence, based upon my own conscience, which I have in your good-will;

§ 53.9.3 but if some disaster should befall me, such as falls to the lot of many (for it is not possible for a man to please everybody, especially when he has been involved in wars of such magnitude, both foreign and civil, and has had affairs of such importance entrusted to him), with entire willingness I make my choice to die even before my appointed time as a private citizen, in preference to living forever as the occupant of a throne. 4 Indeed, this very choice will bring me renown, — that I not only did not deprive another of life in order to win that office, but went so far as even to give up my life in order to avoid being king; and the man who dares to slay me will certainly be punished, I am sure, both by Heaven and by you, as happened, methinks, in the case of my father.

§ 53.9.5 For he was declared to be the equal of the gods and obtained eternal honours, whereas those who slew him perished, miserable men, by a miserable death. As for immortality, we could not possibly achieve it; but by living nobly and by dying nobly we do in a sense gain even this boon. 6 Therefore, I, who already possess the first requisite and hope to possess the second, return to you the armies and the provinces, the revenues and the laws, adding only a few words of suggestion, to the end that you may not be afraid of the magnitude of the business of administration, or of the difficulty of handling it and so become discouraged, and that you may not, on the other hand, regard it with contempt, with the idea that it can easily be managed, and thus neglect it.

§ 53.10.1 ”And yet, after all, I feel no hesitancy about suggesting to you in a summary way what ought to be done in each of the leading departments of administration. And what are these suggestions? In the first place, guard vigilantly the established laws and change none of them; for what remains fixed, even though it be inferior, is more advantageous than what is always subject to innovations, even though it seems to be superior. 2 Next, pay strict heed to do whatever these laws enjoin upon you and to refrain from whatever they forbid, and do this not only in word but also in deed, not only in public but also in private, that you may obtain, not penalties, but honours.

§ 53.10.3 Entrust the offices both of peace and of war to those who are the most excellent and the most prudent, harbouring no jealousy of any man, and indulging in rivalry, not to advance the private interests of this or that man, but to keep the city safe and make it prosperous. 4 Honour men who show this spirit, but punish those who act otherwise in political life. Treat your private means as the common property of the state, but refrain from the public funds as belonging to others. Guard strictly what you already have, but never covet that which does not belong to you.

§ 53.10.5 Do not treat the allies and subject nations insolently nor exploit them for gain, and in dealing with the enemy, neither wrong him nor fear him. Have your arms always in hand, but do not use them either against one another or against those who keep the peace. 6 Maintain the soldiers adequately, so that they may not on account of want desire anything which belongs to others; keep them in hand and under discipline, that they may not become presumptuous and do harm.

§ 53.10.7 “But why make a long speech by going through everything in detail which it behooves you to do? For you may easily understand from these hints how all other matters should be handled. I will close with this one further remark, that if you will conduct the government in this manner, you will both enjoy prosperity yourselves and you will gratify me, who found you engaged in wretched strife and made you what you now are; 8 but if there is any part whatever of this programme that you shall prove unable to carry out, you will cause me to regret my action and you will at the same time cast the city again into many wars and grave dangers.”

§ 53.11.1 While Caesar was reading this address, varied feelings took possession of the senators. A few of them knew his real intention and consequently kept applauding him enthusiastically; of the rest, some were suspicious of his words, while others believed them, and therefore both classes marvelled equally, the one at his cunning and the other at his decision, and both were displeased, the former at his scheming and the latter at his change of mind. 2 For already there were some who abhorred the democratic constitution as a breeder of strife, were pleased at the change in government, and took delight in Caesar. Consequently, though they were variously affected by his announcement, their views were the same.

§ 53.11.3 For, on the one hand, those who believed he had spoken the truth could not show their pleasure, — those who wished to do so being restrained by their fear and the others by their hopes, — and those, on the other hand, who did not believe it did not dare accuse him and expose his insincerity, some because they were afraid and others because they did not care to do so. 4 Hence all the doubters either were compelled to believe him or else pretended that they did. As for praising him, some had not the courage and others were unwilling; on the contrary, but while he was reading and afterwards, they kept shouting out, begging for a monarchical government and urging every argument in its favour, until they forced him as it was made to appear, to assume autocratic power.

§ 53.11.5 His very first act was to secure a decree granting to the men who should compose his bodyguard double the pay that was given to the rest of the soldiers, so that he might be strictly guarded. When this was done, he was eager to establish the monarchy in very truth.

§ 53.12.1 In this way he had his supremacy ratified by the senate and by the people as well. But as he wished even so to be thought democratic, while he accepted all the care and oversight of the public business, on the ground that it required some attention on his part, 1 yet he declared he would not personally govern all the provinces, and that in the case of such provinces as he should govern he would not do so indefinitely; and he did, in fact, restore to the senate the weaker provinces, on the ground that they were peaceful and free from war, while he retained the more powerful, alleging that they were insecure and precarious and either had enemies on their borders or were able on their own account to begin a serious revolt.

§ 53.12.3 His professed motive in this was that the senate might fearlessly enjoy the finest portion of the empire, while he himself had the hardships and the dangers; but his real purpose was that by this arrangement the senators will be unarmed and unprepared for battle, while he alone had arms and maintained soldiers. 4 Africa, Numidia, Asia, Greece with Epirus, the Dalmatian and Macedonian districts, Sicily, Crete and the Cyrenaic portion of Libya, Bithynia with Pontus which adjoined it, Sardinia and Baetica were held to belong to the people and the senate;

§ 53.12.5 while to Caesar belonged the remainder of Spain, — that is, the district of Tarraco and Lusitania, — and all the Gauls, — that is, Gallia Narbonensis, Gallia Lugdunensis, Aquitania, and Belgica, both the natives themselves and the aliens among them. 6 For some of the Celts, whom we call Germans, had occupied all the Belgic territory along the Rhine and caused it to be called Germania, the upper portion extending to the sources of that river, and the lower portion reaching to the British Ocean.

§ 53.12.7 These provinces, then, together with Coele-Syria, as it is called, Phoenicia, Cilicia, Cyprus and Egypt, fell at that time to Caesar's share; for afterwards he gave Cyprus and Gallia Narbonensis back to the people, and for himself took Dalmatia instead. 8 This same course was followed subsequently in the case of other provinces also, as the progress of my narrative will show; but I have enumerated these provinces in this way because at the present time each one of them is governed separately, whereas in the beginning and for a long period thereafter they were administered two and three together.

§ 53.12.9 The others I have not mentioned because some of them were acquired later, and the rest, even if they were already subjugated, were not being governed by the Romans, but either had been left autonomous or had been attached to some kingdom or other. All of them which came into the Roman empire after this period were added to the provinces of the one who was emperor at the time.

§ 53.13.1 Such, then, was the apportionment of the provinces. And wishing, even then, to lead the Romans a long way from the idea that he was at all monarchical in his purposes, Caesar undertook for only ten years the government of the provinces assigned him; for he promised to reduce them to order within this period, and boastfully added that, if they should be pacified sooner, he would the sooner restore them, to the senate. 2 Thereupon he first appointed the senators themselves to govern both classes of provinces, except Egypt. This province alone he assigned to a knight, the one we have already named, for the reasons mentioned there. Next he ordained that the governors of senatorial provinces should be annual magistrates, chosen by lot, except when a senator enjoyed a special privilege because of the large number of his children or because of his marriage.

§ 53.13.3 These governors were to be sent out by vote of the senate in public meeting; they were to carry no sword at their belt nor to wear military uniform; 4 the name of proconsul was to belong not only to the two ex-consuls but also to the others who had merely served as praetors or who held at least the rank of ex-praetors; both classes were to employ as many lictors as were usual in the capital; and they were to assume the insignia of their office immediately upon leaving the pomerium and were to wear them constantly until they returned.

§ 53.13.5 The other governors, on the other hand, were to be chosen by the emperor himself and were to be called his envoys and propraetors, even if the men selected were ex-consuls. Thus, of these two titles which had been in vogue so long under the republic, he gave that of praetor to the men chosen by him, on the ground that from very early times it had been associated with warfare, calling them propraetors; and he gave the name of consul to the others, on the ground that their duties were more peaceful, styling them proconsuls. 6 For he reserved the full titles of consul and praetor for Italy, and designated all the governors outside of Italy as acting in their stead. So, then, he caused the appointed governors to be known as propraetors and to hold office for as much longer than a year as should please him; he made them wear the military uniform, and a sword, with which they are permitted to execute even soldiers.

§ 53.13.7 For no one else, whether proconsul, propraetor, or procurator, has been given the privilege of wearing a sword without also having been accorded the right to put a soldier to death; indeed, this right has been granted, not only to the senators, but also to the knights who are entitled to wear a sword. 8 So much for this. All the propraetors alike employ five lictors, and, indeed, all of them except those who were ex-consuls at the time of appointment to governorships receive their title from this very number. Both classes alike assume the decorations of their position of authority when they enter their appointed province and lay them aside immediately upon completing their term of office.

§ 53.14.1 It was thus and on these conditions that the custom was established of sending out ex-praetors and ex-consuls respectively as governors of the two classes of provinces. In the one case, the emperor would commission a governor to any province he wished and when he wished, and many secured provincial commands while still praetors or consuls, as sometimes happens even at the present day. 2 In the case of the senatorial provinces, he assigned Asia and Africa on his own responsibility to the ex-consuls, and all the other provinces to the ex-praetors; but by public decree, applicable to all the senatorial governors, he forbade the allotment of any senator to a governorship before the expiration of five years from the time he had held office in the city.

§ 53.14.3 For a time all who fulfilled these requirements, even if they exceeded the number of the provinces, were allotted to governorships; but later, inasmuch as some of them did not govern well, the appointment of these officials, too, was put in the emperor's hands. And thus it is, in a manner of speaking, the emperor who assigns these governors also to their commands; 4 for he always orders the allotment of precisely the number of governors that there are provinces, and orders to be drawn whomsoever he pleases. Some emperors have sent men of their own choosing to these provinces also, and have allowed certain of them to hold office for more than a year; and some have assigned certain provinces to knights instead of to senators.

§ 53.14.5 These were the principles established at that time in regard to the particular class of senators who had the right to inflict the death penalty upon their subjects in the provinces. For it should be stated that there is a class who have not this right, — those, namely, who are sent to the provinces styled the “provinces of the senate and people,” — I mean those who serve either as quaestors, being designated by lot to this office, or as assessors to those who hold the actual authority. 6 For this would be the correct way for me to style these officials, having regard not to their name, but to their duties as just described, although others in hellenizing their title call these also “envoys.” Concerning this title, however enough has been said in what precedes.

§ 53.14.7 As to assessors in general, each governor chooses his own, the ex-praetors selecting one from their peers or even from their inferiors, and the ex-consuls three from among those of equal rank, subject to the emperor's approval. For, although a certain change was made in regard to these men also, yet it soon lapsed and it will be sufficient to mention it at the proper time.

§ 53.15.1 This is the system followed in the case of the provinces of the people. To the others, which are called the imperial provinces and have more than one citizen-legion, are sent officials who are to govern them as lieutenants; these are appointed by the emperor himself, generally from the ex-praetors, though also from the ex-quaestors, or men who have held an office between the praetorship and the quaestorship. 2 These positions, then, appertain to the senators. Passing now to the knights, the emperor himself selects knights to be sent out as military tribunes (both those who are prospective senators and the others; concerning their difference in rank I have already spoken), despatching some of them to take command of the garrisons of purely citizen-legions, and others of the foreign legions as well. In this matter he follows the custom then instituted by Caesar.

§ 53.15.3 The procurators (for this is the name we give to the men who collect the public revenues and make disbursement according to the instructions given them) he sends out to all the provinces alike, to those of the people as well as to his own, and to this office knights are sometimes appointed and sometimes even freedmen; but the proconsuls may exact the tribute from the people they govern. 4 The emperor gives instructions to the procurators, the proconsuls, and the propraetors, in order that they may be under definite orders when they go out to their provinces. For both this practice and the giving of salaries to them and to the other officials was established at this time.

§ 53.15.5 In former times, of course, certain persons had made a business of furnishing the officials with all they needed for the conduct of their office, drawing upon the treasury for the money; but under Caesar these officials now for the first time began to receive a fixed salary. This was not assigned to them all on the same basis, but approximately as their needs required; and the procurators, indeed, get the very title of their rank from the amount of the salaries assigned to them. The following regulations were laid down for them all alike: they were not to raise levies of soldiers or to exact money beyond the amount appointed, unless the senate should so vote or the emperor so order; and when their successors arrived, they were to leave the province at once, and not to delay on the return journey, but to get back within three months.

§ 53.16.1 These regulations were established at that time, to speak generally; for in reality Caesar himself was destined to have absolute control of all matters for all time, because he was not only master of the funds (nominally, to be sure, he had separated the public funds from his own, but as a matter of fact, he always spent the former also as he saw fit), but also commanded the soldiers. 2 At all events, when his ten-year period came to an end, there was voted to him another five years, then five more, after that ten, and again another ten, and then ten for the fifth time, so that by the succession of ten-year periods he continued to be sole ruler for life.

§ 53.16.3 And it is for this reason that the subsequent emperors, though no longer appointed for a specified period, but for their whole life once for all, nevertheless always held a celebration every ten years, as if then renewing their sovereignty once more; and this is done even at the present day. 4 Now Caesar had received many privileges and honours even previously, when the question of declining the sovereignty and that of apportioning the provinces were under discussion. For the right to place the laurel trees in front of the royal residence and to hang the crown of oak above them was then voted him to symbolise that he was always victor over his enemies and the saviour of the citizens.

§ 53.16.5 The royal residence is called Palatium, not because it was ever decreed that this should be its name, but because Caesar dwelt on the Palatine and had his military headquarters there, though his residence gained a certain degree of fame from the mount as a whole also, because Romulus had once lived there. 6 Hence, even if the emperor resides somewhere else, his dwelling retains the name of Palatium. And when Caesar had actually carried out his promises, the name Augustus was at length bestowed upon him by the senate and by the people.

§ 53.16.7 For when they wished to call him by some distinctive title, and men were proposing one title and another and urging its selection, Caesar was exceedingly desirous of being called Romulus, but when he perceived that this caused him to be suspected of desiring the kingship, 8 he desisted from his efforts to obtain it, and took the title of “ Augustus,” signifying that he was more than human; for all the most precious and sacred objects are termed augusta. Therefore they addressed him also in Greek as Sebastos, meaning an august personage, from the passive of the verb sebazo, “to revere.”

§ 53.17.1 In this way the power of both people and senate passed entirely into the hands of Augustus, and from his time there was, strictly speaking, a monarch; for monarchy would be the truest name for it, no matter if two or three men did later hold the power at the same time. 2 The name of monarchy, to be sure, the Romans so detested that they called their emperors neither dictators nor kings nor anything of the sort; yet since the final authority for the government devolves upon them, they must needs be kings.

§ 53.17.3 The offices established by the laws, it is true, are maintained even now, except that of censor; but the entire direction and administration is absolutely in accordance with the wishes of the one in power at the time. And yet, in order to preserve the appearance of having this power by virtue of the laws and not because of their own domination, the emperors have taken to themselves all the functions, including the titles, of the offices which under the republic and by the free gift of the people were powerful, with the single exception of the dictatorship. 4 Thus, they very often became consuls, and they are always styled proconsuls whenever they are outside the pomerium. The name of “imperator” is held by them all for life, not only by those who have won victories in battle, but also by those who have not, in token of their independent authority, and this has displaced the titles of “king” and “dictator.”

§ 53.17.5 These last titles they have never assumed since the time they first fell out of use in the conduct of the government, but the functions of these offices are secured to them under the appellation of “imperator.” By virtue of the titles named they secure the right to make levies, to collect funds, declare war, make peace, 6 rule foreigners and citizens alike everywhere and always, — even to the extent of being able to put to death both knights and senators inside the pomerium, — and all the other privileges once granted to the consuls and other officials possessing independent authority;

§ 53.17.7 and by virtue of holding the censorship they investigate our lives and morals as well as take the census, enrolling some in the equestrian and senatorial classes and erasing the names of others from these classes, according to their will. 8 By virtue of being consecrated in all the priesthoods and of their right to bestow most of these positions upon others, as well as from the fact that, even if two or three persons hold the imperial office at the same time, one of them is high priest, they hold in their own hands supreme authority over all matters both profane and sacred.

§ 53.17.9 The tribunician power, as it is called, which used to be conferred only upon men of the greatest influence, gives them the right to nullify the effects of measures taken by any other official, in case they do not approve it, and makes them immune from scurrilous abuse; and, if they appear to be wronged in even the slightest degree, not merely by deed, but even by word, they may destroy the guilty party, as one accursed, without a trial. 10 The emperors, it should be explained, do not think it right to be tribunes, inasmuch as they belong altogether to the patrician class, but they assume the power of the tribunes to its full extent, as it was when it was greatest; and in numbering the years they have held the imperial office they use the tribunician power to mark the stages, the theory being that they receive it year by year along with those who are regularly made tribunes.

§ 53.17.11 These are the institutions which they have taken over from the republic, essentially in the form in which they severally existed then, and also making use of these same names, their purpose being to create the impression that they possess no power that has not been granted them.

§ 53.18.1 And further, they have acquired also another prerogative which was given to none of the ancient Romans outright and unreservedly, and the possession of this alone would enable them to exercise the powers above named and the others besides. For they have been released from the laws, as the very words in Latin declare; that is, they are free from all compulsion of the laws and are bound by none of the written ordinances. 2 Thus by virtue of these democratic names they have clothed themselves with all the powers of the government, to such an extent that they actually possess all the prerogatives of kings except their paltry title. For the appellation “ Caesar ” or “ Augustus ” confers upon them no peculiar power, but merely shows in the one case that they are heirs of the family to which they belong, and in the other the splendour of their official position.

§ 53.18.3 The term “Father” perhaps gives them a certain authority over us all — the authority which fathers once had over their children; yet it did not signify this at first, but betokened honour, and served as an admonition both to them, that they should love their subjects as they would their children, and to their subjects, that they should revere them as they would their fathers. 4 Such is the number and nature of the appellations which those who possess the imperial power employ in accordance with the laws and with what has now become tradition. At present all of them are, as a rule, bestowed upon the emperors at one and the same time, with the exception of the title of censor; but to the earlier emperors they were voted separately the different times.

§ 53.18.5 As regards the censorship, some of them took it in accordance with the ancient practice, and Domitian, in fact, took it for life, but this is no longer done at the present day; for, inasmuch as they possess its powers, they are not elected to the office and do not use the title except in connexion with the census.