Dio Chrysostom, Speeches

§ 37.45 However, O ye Egyptians and Cambyses too, no matter whether it was some one else who suffered this treatment or Amasis himself, at all events it was a form sans blood, sans flesh, sans soul. This, so please you, you may drag, you may rend, you may stab, yet real Amasis you have failed to catch. Again, another man who was endowed with life and breath and feeling exclaimed, “Grind, grind the sack of Anaxarchus; for the real Anaxarchus you do not grind!” You see, this man, having been thrown into a mortar and being pounded by the pestles, declared that he himself was not being ground, but only that thing of his in which, as it chanced, he had been enclosed — just as we are told that the peers of the realm in Persia are beaten — their cloak instead of their body.

§ 37.46 Well then, though Persians may resent so slight a chastisement, a Greek allowed his body to be pounded as if it were a cloak; and shall not I allow my statue to go to the melting-pot, even supposing it to have sensation? But as matters stand, while Anaxarchus was superior to sensation, I, in the language of Euripides' Laodameia, Would not desert a friend, though void of life. Accordingly I wish to speak words of comfort to my friend, my statue, as to one possessing sensation: O thou mute semblance of my eloquence, art thou not visible? No more was Aristeas visible, who lived before thee. For he too had this experience, as I conjecture, the experience of being raised up by the men of Proconnesus and then being spirited away by his foes, and of having a tale disseminated by these same men to the effect that Aristeas was not to be seen, either living or dead. However, Aristeas was alive then, lives now, and will live always.

§ 37.47 Some one, I ween, will yet remember me, as Sappho very beautifully says; and far more beautifully Hesiod: But fame is never utterly destroyed Which many people voice; a goddess she. I myself will raise thee up and place thee in the precinct of the goddess, whence naught shall tear thee down — not earthquake or wind or snow or rain or jealousy or foe; but lo! e'en now I find thee in thy station! Aye, ere now forgetfulness hath tripped and cheated sundry others too, but judgement plays no tricks on any man of worth, and'tis because of this that thou standest upright for me like a man.

§ 38.01 The Thirty-eighth Discourse: To the Nicomedians on Concord with the Nicaeans

§ 38.1 Men of Nicomedia, when I undertake to compute the reasons why you gave me citizenship, I am at a loss; for I do not see that I have great wealth such as to warrant my believing that I have been sought after by you for mercenary reasons, nor am I conscious of having an attitude for flattering the masses; so you do not seem to want me even for the purpose of readily serving your every whim. No, the fact is that I am not even good company at a banquet or a sociable person at gatherings of that sort, so as to be able at least to afford pleasure for the populace from that quality. However, if I do not wholly mistake your purpose regarding me, and also if I am cognizant of all the matters in which I am capable of serving you, the only thing left to account for my having been made a citizen by you is naught else than that, perhaps to a greater degree than others, I have both the desire and the ability to give advice on the interests of the commonwealth.

§ 38.2 However, if such is not the case, then not only have you been misguided in your interest in me but I too, it would appear, was rash in heeding your call in the hope of proving useful to your city in the future, since you are not making that use of me for which alone I am adapted. If, on the other hand, all cities, or rather the great cities, need not only the men of wealth, both to finance the public spectacles and liberally to provide such customary expenses, and flatterers to afford pleasure by their demagogic clap-trap, but also counsellors to provide safety by their policies, I myself shall not shrink from aiding the city to the best of my ability by giving advice on matters of greatest importance.

§ 38.3 Well now, there are indeed some other things in your city which deserve correction, and one after the other I shall apply my treatment to them, provided I win your confidence by speaking the truth about the greater matters. But for what strange reason or with what purpose do I not first give advice about the smaller matters and in those matters test the willingness of the people to be persuaded, instead of choosing to jeopardize my reputation at the start by offering advice on the weightiest matter of all? It is because it seems to me far easier to persuade men concerning the weightiest matters than concerning those which are slighter or trivial. For while one may actually scorn the harm resulting from these minor matters, a man who, when it is a question of policies apart from which it is impossible for him to be saved, has refused to be persuaded regarding these things is clearly a man who will not even listen concerning the minor matters.

§ 38.4 So then, if you will endure my advice with patience, I am indeed very confident you will be persuaded by me in the matters about which I am here to advise you. What then? It is a hard task to get you to view my remarks upon the subject which I have in mind as neither tiresome nor superfluous nor untimely. In order, therefore, that I may not at the outset encounter such objections on your part as: “But why do you offer advice in matters about which, to begin with, we are not even deliberating?” “But why do you accord yourself the privilege of the floor, when we have not bestowed it on you?” “But for what reason, when so many have been active in politics in our city, native-born and adopted, orators and philosophers, old and young, has no one ever presumed to give us this advice?” — to forestall all such objections,

§ 38.5 I wish to make this very special request of you, men of Nicomedia — and do me the favour of being patient — that you listen to a speech which is superfluous and untimely and which may not convince you. Moreover, I do not consider it a great favour I am asking either; for if you are persuaded by my words, it is worth your while to have listened to one who tells you what is to your advantage; while, on the other hand, if you reserve your acquiescence, what is there unpleasant in having allowed a friend to take the floor who is willing to speak to no avail?" Very well, what is this subject on which I am about to offer advice, and yet am reluctant to name it? The word, men of Nicomedia, is not distasteful whether in the home or the clan or in friendly circles or cities or nations;

§ 38.6 for concord is what I am going to talk about, a fine word and a fine thing; but if I proceed to add forthwith concord with whom, I fear lest, while you may be convinced that concord of and by itself is fine, you may believe that being concordant with those persons with whom I claim you should be concordant is impossible. For what till now has set you at your present enmity one toward another, and has prevented the establishment of friendship, is the unreasoning conviction that concord is impossible for your cities. Nay, don't raise an outcry when I make a fresh start but bear with me.

§ 38.7 What I say, men of Nicomedia, is that you must achieve concord with the Nicaeans; but hear me out and don't get angry yet before I state my reasons. For neither is the sick man angry with his physician when he prescribes his treatment, but, though he dislikes to hear him say he must submit to surgery or cautery, still he obeys; for his life is at stake. And yet why have I said this? For my remedy, the one I offer your cities, is a most pleasant remedy, and one without which no man would wish to live, if he has good sense.

§ 38.8 But I want to break up my address, and first of all to speak about concord itself in general, telling both whence it comes and what it achieves, and then over against that to set off strife and hatred in contradistinction to friendship. For when concord has been proved to be beneficial to all mankind, the proof will naturally follow that this particular concord between these particular cities is both quite indispensable for you and quite profitable as well. I shall not, however, refrain from telling also how concord may endure when once achieved; for that problem, indeed, I see is bothering many.

§ 38.9 But I pray to all the gods, both yours and theirs, that if what I now say is said because of goodwill to you alone and not in pursuit of any personal glory or advantage to be devoted from your reconciliation, and above all if it is destined to be of advantage to the state — if this is true, I pray that the gods may not only grant me such eloquence as is worthy of my cause, but that they may also make you willing to take my advice in the matters which are to your advantage.

§ 38.10 Well then, concord has been lauded by all men always in both speech and writing. Not only are the works of poets and philosophers alike full of its praises, but also all who have published their histories to provide a pattern for practical application have shown concord to be the greatest of human blessings, and, furthermore, although many of the sophists have in the past ventured to make paradoxical statements, this is the only one it has not occurred to them to publish — that concord is not a fine and salutary thing. Therefore, not only for those who now desire to sing its praises, but also for those who at any time would do so, the material for their use is abundant, and it will ever be possible to say more and finer things about it.

§ 38.11 For example, if a man should wish to delve into its origin, he must trace its very beginning to the greatest of divine things. For the same manifestation is both friendship and reconciliation and kinship, and it embraces all these. Furthermore, what but concord unites the elements? Again, that through which all the greatest things are preserved is concord, while that through which everything is destroyed is its opposite. If, then, we human beings were not by nature a race of mortals, and if the forces which destroy us were not bound to be numerous, there would not be strife even in human affairs, just as also still not in things divine. However, the only respect in which we fall short of the blessedness of the gods and of their indestructible permanence is this — that we are not all sensitive to concord, but, on the contrary, there are those who actually love its opposite, strife, of which wars and battles constitute departments and subsidiary activities, and these things are continually at work in communities and in nations, just like the diseases in our bodies.

§ 38.12 For in fact, though we know full well that health is the greatest of human blessings, still many times we ourselves plot against it to our own undoing, some yielding to the seduction of pleasures and some shirking labours which are healthful and habits which are prudent. On the other hand, if the greatest of our evils did not have for their support the pleasure of the moment, they would have no power at all to harm us; yet as it is, Nature has given that to them, and so they can deceive and delight their victims.

§ 38.13 Moreover, what might actually make one most indignant toward mankind is this — that all the evils afflict them though knowing well their nature. At any rate, if one were to question a single person, or a company of persons, about the terms themselves, asking in what category are to be placed such terms as wars, factions, diseases, and the like, no one would hesitate a moment to reply that these are classed among the evils, and that they not only are so but have been so considered and are called evils.

§ 38.14 And as for their opposites, peace and concord and health, no one would deny that they likewise both are and are called goods. But though the conflict between with the evil things and the good is so manifest, yet there are some among us — or rather a good many — who delight in the things which are admittedly evil. And take, for example, a ship — though all on board are well aware that the one hope of reaching port in safety lies in having the sailors on good terms with one another and obedient to the skipper, but that when strife and mutiny arise in it, even the favourable winds often veer round to oppose the ship's course and they fail to make their harbours, even when close at hand, still the sailors sometimes foolishly quarrel, and this works their ruin, though they know the cause of their destruction.

§ 38.15 Again, take our households — although their safety depends not only on the like-mindedness of master and mistress but also on the obedience of the servants, yet both the bickering of master and mistress and the wickedness of the servants have wrecked many households. Why, what safety remains for the chariot, if the horses refuse to run as a team? For when they begin to separate and to pull one this way and one that, the driver is inevitably in danger. And the good marriage, what else is it save concord between man and wife? And the bad marriage, what is it save their discord? Moreover, what benefit are children to parents, when through folly they begin to rebel against them? And what is fraternity save concord of brothers? And was is friendship save concord among friends?

§ 38.16 Besides, all these things are not only good and noble but also very pleasant, whereas their opposites are not only evil but also unpleasant; and yet we often prefer them instead of the most pleasant goods. For example, there have been times when people have chosen wars instead of peace, despite the great differences between the two, not under the delusion that fighting is better or more pleasant and more righteous than keeping the peace, but because some were striving for kingly power, some for liberty, some for territory they did not have, and some for control of the sea. And yet, though the prizes await the victor are so rich, many have laid war aside as an evil thing and not fit to be chosen by them in preference to the things of highest value.

§ 38.17 But, the waging of war and fighting even without occasion, what is that but utter madness and a craving for evils which is occasioned by madness? Now the chief reason why we human beings hate wild beasts is that remorseless warfare exists between them and us for ever; yet many even of us treat human beings too as wild beasts and take pleasure in the conflict waged with those of our own kind.

§ 38.18 What is more, we take no notice of the signs sent by the gods, all those signs and omens by which they try to teach us to live on good terms with one another. Indeed they are said to be, as it were, heralds sent by the gods, and for that reason among ourselves also, while peace is proclaimed by heralds, wars for the most part take place unheralded. Furthermore, men go unarmed into an armed camp as envoys to sue for peace and it is not permitted to wrong any of them, the belief that all messengers in behalf of friendship are servants of the gods. Again, whenever, as armies come together for battle, there suddenly appears an omen from heaven or there occurs a quaking of the earth, immediately the men wheel about and withdraw from one another, believing the gods do not wish them to fight;

§ 38.19 but no divine portent is deemed a signal for war. And furthermore, when peace is brought about, we do all those things which are not only most pleasant for mortals but also tokens of happiness — we bedeck ourselves with garlands, offer sacrifice, and hold high festival; but we do quite the opposite in time of war, just as in time of mourning — we shut ourselves within the gates, live in dread of every thing, and abandon ourselves to despair. Moreover, at such times the women wail for their husbands and the children for their fathers, as they would over the greatest calamities.

§ 38.20 Again, whenever there comes a pestilence or an earthquake, we blame the gods, in the belief that they cause misery for mankind, and we claim they are not righteous or benevolent, not even if they are punishing us justly for most grievous sins; so great is our hatred of those evils which occur through chance. Yet war, which is no less destructive than an earthquake, we choose of our own volition; and we do not blame at all the human beings who are responsible for these evils, as we blame the gods for earthquake or pestilence, but we even think them patriotic and we listen to them with delight when they speak, we follow their advice, and in payment for the evils they occasion we give them every kind of — I won't say return, for return would mean evil for evil — but rather thanks and honours and words of praise; and so they would be very witless indeed if they spared those who are even grateful for their evils.

§ 38.21 First of all, then, men of Nicomedia, let us inspect the reasons for your strife. For if the issues are so great that it is fitting to wage a war that is no short one, such as could be waged by force of arms and have as its consolation the speed of its decision, but instead a long war without cessation, one to be handed on to our children and our children's children and never achieve the hope of settlement, then let us engage in the struggle, maintain the strife, and make all the trouble we can for one another, being vexed that our powers are not even greater. But if at best the prize for which this evil is endured is a mere nothing and the supposed issues are both small and trifling and it is not fitting even for private persons to squabble over them, much less cities of such importance, then let us not behave at all like foolish children who, ashamed lest they may seem to their fathers or their mothers to be enraged without a cause, do not wish to make it up with one another lightly.

§ 38.22 Well now, surely we are not fighting for land or sea; on the contrary, the Nicaeans do not even present counterclaims against you for the sea, but they have gladly withdrawn from competition so as to afford no cause for conflict. And what is more, we are not contending for revenues either, but each side is content with what is its own; moreover, these matters, as it happens, have been clearly delimited — and so indeed is all else besides — just as if in peace and friendship. Furthermore, there is interchange of produce between the two cities, as well as intermarriage, and in consequence already there have come to be many family ties between us; yes, and we have proxenies and ties of personal friendship to unite us. Besides, you worship the same gods as they do, and in most cases you conduct their festivals as they do. In fact you have no quarrel as to your customs either. Yet, though all these things afford no occasion for hostility, but rather for friendship and concord, still we fight.

§ 38.23 And if some one comes up and asks you, “But how are the Nicaeans wronging you?” you will have nothing to reply. And if he asks them in turn, “But how are the men of Nicomedia wronging you?” they too will not have a single thing to say. However, there is a prize at stake between you, one over which you are at odds. And what is this prize? It is none of those things which are fit to name or to acknowledge, and the competitors for which one might even pardon, nay, its constituent elements it is not well even to mention or acknowledge; they are of such a nature, so petty, so commonplace, things upon which fools perhaps might pride themselves, but not any man of good sense.

§ 38.24 For those who summon you to the contest — but their motives it is perhaps not for me to scrutinize — however that may be, those who delight in it prate of naught but this: “We are contending for primacy.” Very well, I will reply to these same persons with the query: “What primacy? And is it a primacy to be actually and in fact conceded to you, or is your battle for a name and nothing more?” Yes, I hear that this is not the first time this same thing has served as the cause of strife among the Greeks — that the Athenians and the Spartans went to war for the primacy.

§ 38.25 Moreover, that strife and warfare were not profitable in their case either, but in struggling with one another for the primacy they both lost it, you all know and I myself may possibly mention a bit later. What then? In proposing this struggle of yours do they speak of it as similar to that of the Athenians and the Spartans? The Athenians waged war that they might continue to receive tribute from the islanders, and they and their opponents fought each other over the right of every man to have his lawsuits tried in his own home city, and, broadly speaking, the war between those states was for the prize of empire.

§ 38.26 But if we recover the primacy, the Nicaeans relinquishing it without a fight, shall we receive the tribute they get now? Shall we summon for trial here the cities which now are subject to their jurisdiction? Shall we send them military governors? Shall we any the less permit them to have the tithes from Bithynia? Or what will be the situation? And what benefit will accrue to us? For I believe that in all their undertakings men do not exert themselves idly or at random, but that their struggle is always for some end.

§ 38.27 For example, the man who goes to war fights either for liberty — in which case others are trying to enslave him — or for sovereignty — in which case he himself is trying to enslave the others. Similarly the man who goes to sea does not undertake an aimless roving, for surely the risks he takes are either for the purpose of reaching some destination or else for trafficking. But, not to present all the various illustrations, in a word we human beings not only do all we do because of an end that is good, but we also avoid the opposite activities because of an end that is evil. On the other hand, to exert oneself or toil without a reason

§ 38.28 is appropriate for fools alone. If, for example, a man should entertain a serious purpose to be called King when he is merely a private citizen — and when, moreover, he knows that fact about himself perfectly well — quite contrary to his fond imagining, he would become a laughing-stock, inasmuch as he would be using a false title devoid of reality. And it is much the same in all the other matters too, whether a man wishes to be thought a flautist when he doesn't know how to blow the pipes, or musical when he knows nothing of the art of music, or a player of the cithara when he cannot even touch the harp intelligently. While, therefore, there will be nothing to prevent men like that from being deemed actually crazy, do we imagine that, provided we are somewhat registered as “first,” we shall actually have the primacy?

§ 38.29 What kind of primacy, men of Nicomedia? You see, I am going to ask you a second time, and even a third time. A primacy whose utility is what? Whose function is what? One by reason of which we shall become wealthier or greater or more powerful? Vainglory has come to be regarded as a foolish thing even in private individuals, and we ourselves deride and loathe, and end by pitying, those persons above all who do not know wherein false glory differs from the genuine; besides, no educated man has such a feeling about glory as to desire a foolish thing. Shall we say, then, that all these things befit our cities as communities which do not befit even persons in private life who are men of breeding and cultivation?

§ 38.30 But, speaking generally, if some one were to question you and say, “Men of Nicomedia, what do you want? To be first in very truth, or to be called first when you are not?” Surely you would admit that you prefer to be first rather than to be called first to no purpose. For names have not the force of facts; whereas things that are in very truth of a given nature must also of necessity be so named.

§ 38.31 Try, therefore, to hold first place among our cities primarily on the strength of your solicitude for them — for since you are a metropolis, such indeed is your special function — and then too by showing yourselves fair and moderate toward all, by not being grasping in any matter or trying to gain your end by force. For greed and violence necessarily stir up hatreds and disagreements, since it is natural that the weaker party should be disposed to look with suspicion on the stronger, believing they are due to be overreached in every matter, and when that does actually take place, their hostility is still more justly aroused.

§ 38.32 On the other hand, you have it in your power to benefit the cities more fully and more effectively than the Nicaeans, first and foremost because of the sea, all the revenue of which the cities share even now, partly as a favour — though your city should grant favours officially and not to certain persons privately — partly also through their own smuggling operations, and partly on application in each separate case; and while you never refuse such applicants, still the very necessity of making application is irksome. If, however, you will actually allow the communities who day by day petition for what is urgent for their need the privilege in sharing in all these rights, is it not reasonable to suppose that you will stand higher in their estimation when you become their benefactors? And at the same time you will also increase the concord which will spread everywhere.

§ 38.33 But you must also strive to give the provincial governors occasion to respect you, by continually making it manifest that you are not content with merely being well governed yourselves, but that you are concerned for the welfare of the whole Bithynian people, and that you are no less displeased over the wrongs inflicted upon the others than you are over those inflicted upon yourselves; moreover, that if any persons flee to you for succour, you aid them promptly and impartially. This line of conduct is what will yield you that primacy which is genuine, and not your squabble with Nicaeans over titles.

§ 38.34 And I should like the Nicaeans also to pursue the same course, and they will do so if you come to terms with them, and the power of each will become greater through union. For by joining forces you will control all the cities, and, what is more, the provincial governors will feel greater reluctance and fear with regard to you, in case they wish to commit a wrong. But as things are now, the other cities are elated by the quarrel between you; for you seem to have need of their assistance, and in fact you do have need of it because of your struggle with each other, and you are in the predicament of two men, both equally distinguished, when they become rivals over politics — of necessity they court the favour of everybody, even of those who are ever so far beneath them.

§ 38.35 And so while you are fighting for primacy, the chances are that the primacy really is in the hands of those who are courted by you. For it is impossible that people should not be thought to possess that which you expect to obtain from these same people. And so it is going to be absolutely necessary that the cities should resume their proper status, and, as is reasonable and right, that they should stand in need of you, not you of them. And applying this principle I shall expect you to behave toward them, not like tyrants, but with kindness and moderation, just as I suggested a little while ago, to the end that your position as leaders may not be obnoxious to them, but that it may be not only leadership but a welcome thing as well.

§ 38.36 Again, what need is there to discuss the present situation of your governors in the presence of you who are informed? Or is it possible you are not aware of the tyrannical power your own strife offers those who govern you? For at once whoever wishes to mistreat your people comes armed with the knowledge of what he must do to escape the penalty. For either he allies himself with the Nicaean party and has their group for his support, or else by choosing the party of Nicomedia he is protected by you. Moreover, while he has no love for either side, he appears to love one of the two; yet all the while he is wronging them all. Still, despite the wrongs he commits, he is protected by those who believe they alone are loved by him.

§ 38.37 Yet by their public acts they have branded you as a pack of fools, yes, they treat you just like children, for we often offer children the most trivial things in place of things of greatest worth; moreover, those children, in their ignorance of what is truly valuable and in their pleasure over what is of least account, delight in what is a mere nothing. So also in your case, in place of justice, in place of the freedom of the cities from spoliation or from the seizure of the private possessions of their inhabitants, in place of their refraining from insulting you, in place of their refraining from drunken violence, your governors hand you titles, and call you “first” either by word of mouth or in writing; that done, they may thenceforth with impunity treat you as being the very last!

§ 38.38 In truth such marks of distinction, on which you plume yourselves, not only are objects of utter contempt in the eyes of all persons of discernment, but especially in Rome they excite laughter and, what is still more humiliating, are called “Greek failings!” And failings they are indeed, men of Nicomedia, though not Greek, unless some one will claim that in this special particular they are Greek, namely, that those Greeks of old, both Athenians and Spartans, once laid counterclaims to glory. However, I may have said already that their doings were not mere vain conceit but a struggle for real empire — though nowadays you may fancy somehow that they were making a valiant struggle for the right to lead the procession, like persons in some mystic celebration putting up a sham battle over something not really theirs.

§ 38.39 But if, while the title “metropolis” is your special prerogative, that of leader is shared with others, what do you lose thereby? For I would venture to assert that, even if you lose all your titles, you are losing nothing real. Or what do you expect to be the consequence of that? That the sea will retreat from your shores, or your territory be smaller, or your revenues less? Have you ever yet been present at a play? More properly speaking, almost every day you behold not only tragic actors but the other sort too, the various actors who appear to come upon the scene to give pleasure and enjoyment, but who really benefit those who are sensitive to the action of the play. Well then, does any one in the cast appear to you to be really king or prince or god?

§ 38.40 And yet they are called by all these titles, as well as by the names Menelaus and Agamemnon, and they have not only names of gods and heroes, but their features and robes as well, and they issue many orders, just as would the characters they represent; however, when the play is over, they take their departure as mere nonentities. A person wishes to be dubbed “first”; very good. Some one really is first, and no matter if another wears the title, first he is. For titles are not guarantees of facts, but facts of titles.

§ 38.41 Well, here is another outcome of concord for you to take into account. At present you two cities have each your own men; but if you come to terms, you will each have the other's too; and as for honours — for a city needs these too — set them down as doubled, and likewise the services. Some one in your city is gifted as a speaker; he will aid the Nicaeans too. There is a rich man in Nicaea: he will defray public expenses in your city too. And in general, neither will any man who is unworthy of first place in a city achieve fame with you by assailing the Nicaeans, or with the Nicaeans by assailing you; nor, in case a man is found to be a low fellow and deserving of punishment, will he escape his just deserts by migrating from Nicomedia to Nicaea or from Nicaea to Nicomedia.

§ 38.42 Yet as things are now, you two cities, as it were, are lying in wait for each other at your moorings, and men who have wronged the one can find refuge with the other. But once concord is achieved, persons must be men of honour and justice or else get out of Bithynia. You are proud of your superiority in population; you will be still more populous. You think you have sufficient territory; you will have more than sufficient. In fine, when all resources have been united — crops, money, official dignities for men, and military forces — the resources of both cities are doubled.

§ 38.43 Furthermore, that which is the aim of all human action, pleasure, becomes greater than tongue can tell. For to achieve, on the one hand, the elimination of the things which cause you pain — envy and rivalry and the strife which is their outcome, your plotting against one another, your gloating over the misfortunes of your neighbours, your vexation at their good fortune — and, on the other hand, the introduction into your cities of their opposites — sharing in things which are good, unity of heart and mind, rejoicing of both peoples in the same things — does not all this resemble a public festival?

§ 38.44 But figure it this way. If some god, men of Nicomedia, had given you the option of having not merely your own city, but also that of the Nicaeans, would not that have seemed to you a boon of incredible magnitude, and would you not have made all sorts of vows in the hope of obtaining it? Well, this thing which seems incredible can take place at once — Nicaea can be yours and your possessions theirs.

§ 38.45 Or, since we admire those brothers who share completely a common estate and have not because of stinginess divided their patrimony; whose wealth, moreover, is even more admired, since it is greater for the very reason that it has not been divided and half of everything is thought to belong to both; and whom, furthermore, all men regard as good and just and really brothers — since this is true, if this spirit of brotherhood is achieved in your cities, will it not be an even greater blessing, more beautiful and richer?

§ 38.46 Moreover, it deserves to be achieved, not alone because of the ancestors which both cities have in common, but also because of the gods, whose rites are alike both in their city and in yours. For this is a fact which might cause one even greater sorrow, that though we have everything in common — ancestors, gods, customs, festivals, and, in the case of most of us, personal ties of blood and found, still we fight like Greeks against barbarians, or, what is still more like your conduct than that, like human beings against wild beasts!

§ 38.47 Will you not look each other in the face? Will you not listen to each other? Will your two cities not clasp hands together, you being the first to extend your hand? Will you not by making peace acquire for yourselves all the good things both possess? Will you not enjoy them eagerly? Oh that it were possible for you to make even the Ephesians your brothers! Oh that the edifices of Smyrna too might have been shared by you!

§ 38.48 But all these things, mighty blessings that they are — are you forfeiting them for lack of one single word, gains so rich, pleasure so great? However, that the reconciliation will be profitable to you two cities when it is achieved, and that the strife still going on has not been profitable for you down to the present moment, that so many blessings will be yours as a result of concord, and that so many evils now are yours because of enmity — all this has been treated by me at sufficient length.

§ 38.49 But it remains for me to add that these advantages will be permanent when you have made peace with one another. For already there are some who have fears on this score too, men whose reasons for fear I understand, at least if they give utterance to it from a genuine desire for concord and a fear that concord may be destroyed, and if they are not, instead, putting forth this idea for the very purpose of preventing any reconciliation at all. Well, let the greatest and most trustworthy guarantee that your concord will be permanent by its expediency. For if the mere recital of the reasons which show that it will be advantageous apparently is already convincing you, why should not these reasons when supported by experience have a persuasiveness even more unshakable?

§ 38.50 But what is more, I am hopeful also because of your being difficult to dislodge from accustomed habit. For instance, if strife, which is so great an evil, has remained among you so long merely through force of habit, why is it not reasonable to expect that your reconciliation, since it is more pleasant and more righteous, will make that habit also more potent? But you will need also to be watchful of little matters, and above all to be watchful of the men of no reputation, in case they ever malign you to each other — for you must not listen to them when they pursue some selfish purpose, in case they with again to secure for themselves a kind of pleasure — and you will need also to avoid becoming irritated for petty reasons.

§ 38.51 A further reason for my optimism is that it is likely the gods will make it their prime concern that concord shall endure. In fact, I feel that even this beginning is due to them, and that otherwise it would not have occurred to me to dare to speak in your presence on so great a topic, a topic on which no one previously, whether old or young, has ever spoken. And it is even fitting that I pray to them once more. You remember that in the beginning I prayed them to make you heed my words; but now that you evidently are doing this already, it remains for me to pray that they may preserve for ever your admirable resolutions.

§ 39.01 The Thirty-ninth Discourse: On Concord in Nicaea upon the Cessation of Civil Strife

§ 39.1 I am delighted at being honoured by you, as indeed it is to be expected that a man of sound judgment would be when honoured by a city which is noble and worthy of renown, as is the case with your city in regard to both power and grandeur, for it is inferior to no city of distinction anywhere, whether in nobility of lineage or in composition of population, comprising, as it does, the most illustrious families, not small groups of sorry specimens who came together from this place and from that, but the leaders among both Greeks and Macedonians, and, what is most significant, having had as founders both heroes and gods.

§ 39.2 But it is fitting that those whose city was founded by gods should maintain peace and concord and friendship toward one another. For it is disgraceful if they do not prove to be extremely lucky and blessed of heaven and to some extent superior to the others in good fortune, desiring, as they must, to show birth to be something real and not merely a sham and empty term. For founders, kinsmen, and progenitors who are gods desire their own people to possess nothing — neither beauty of country nor abundance of crops nor multitude of inhabitants — so much as sobriety, virtue, orderly government, honour for the good citizens and dishonour for the base.

§ 39.3 Even as I myself rejoice at the present moment to find you wearing the same costume, speaking the same language, and desiring the same things. Indeed what spectacle is more enchanting than a city with singleness of purpose, and what sound is more awe-inspiring than its harmonious voice? What city is wiser in council than that which takes council together? What city acts more smooth than that which acts together? What city is less liable to failure than that which favours the same policies? To whom are blessings sweeter than to those who are of one heart and mind? To whom are afflictions lighter than to those who bear them together, like a heavy load? To whom do difficulties occur more rarely than to those who defend each other?

§ 39.4 What city is dearer to its people, more honoured by the stranger, more useful to its friends, more formidable to its foes? Whose praise is held more trustworthy, whose censure more truthful? Who are more nearly equal in honour to their rulers, and whom do the rulers more respect? Whom do good rulers so admire, and bad rulers less despise? Why, is it not manifest that not merely the rulers, but even the gods, pay heed to men who live in concord, while men who are torn by civil strife do not even hear one another? For no one readily hears the words either when choruses do not keep together or when cities are at variance.

§ 39.5 Again, what sort of edifices, what size of territory, what magnitude of population render a community stronger than does its domestic concord? For example, when a city has concord, as many citizens as there are, so many are the eyes with which to see that city's interest, so many the ears with which to hear, so many the tongues to give advice, so many the minds concerned in its behalf; why, it is just as if some god had made a single soul for so great and populous a city. Conversely, neither abundance of riches nor number of men nor any other element of strength is of advantage to those who are divided, but all these things are rather on the side of loss, and the more abundant they are, so much the greater and more grievous the loss. Just so too, methinks, it is with human bodies — that body which is in sound health finds advantage in its height and bulk, while the body which is diseased and in poor condition finds a physical state of that kind to be most perilous and productive of severest risk.

§ 39.6 Similarly too any ship which sails the sea with concord existing between the skipper and his crew not only is safe itself but also maintains in safety those on board; otherwise the more numerous the sails so much the more violent must be the impact of the storm and so much greater the confusion. This same thing is true in the case of a chariot — if the driver knows how to exercise proper control, and if at the same time the horses are not only in agreement with one another but also obedient to the driver, there is hope that in a race such a chariot will win the prize and in a war emerge in safety; but on the other hand, if strife and confusion are present, the danger increases in proportion to the strength and speed of the horses.

§ 39.7 In much the same way also when a city enjoys concord, all such things are useful — abundance of riches, size of population, honours, fame, and power; but otherwise they are hard to use well and vexatious, just as when, for example, many wild animals or cattle are kept in the same enclosure, penned within a single stockade, they go butting and trampling and leaping upon one another. Well now, if I were blessed with robust health, I should not have abandoned my theme before discussing it adequately to the best of my ability; but as it is, not only are you perhaps more intent upon other matters, but I myself am far too frail to match the importance of the occasion.

§ 39.8 Therefore, all that remains for me to do is to make the briefest and most efficacious appeal, I mean the appeal to the gods. For the gods know what men mean to say even when they speak in whispers. After all, possibly this too is typical of one who is especially well-intentioned; for instance, good fathers use admonition with their children where they can, but where persuasion fails they pray the gods on their behalf. Accordingly I pray to Dionysus the progenitor of this city, to Heracles its founder, to Zeus Polieus, to Athena, to Aphrodite Philia [of friendship], to Homonoia [concord], and Nemesis, and all the other gods, that from this day forth they may implant in this city a yearning for itself, a passionate love, a singleness of purpose, a unity of wish and thought; and, on the other hand, that they may cast out strife and contentiousness and jealousy, so that this city may be numbered among the most prosperous and the noblest for all time to come.

§ 40.01 The Fortieth Discourse: Delivered in his Native City on Concord with the Apameians

§ 40.1 I used to think, fellow citizens, that now at least, if not before — now that I am home again — I could look forward to enjoying complete leisure, and that I was not going to engage in any public business, either voluntarily or otherwise. One reason was because I see that many older men, by the grace of God, and many younger men as well, are ever ready and able to direct the city and to defend your interests rightly, being deficient in neither speech nor action, and what is more, being thoroughly acquainted with your form of government, while, on the other hand, I suspected — for the truth will out — that some were vexed with me as being an outsider and a nuisance.

§ 40.2 A second reason is that, in my opinion, I should take some thought, not only for my body, exhausted as it is from great and unremitting hardship, but also for my domestic affairs, now in thoroughly bad condition, affairs which, though so long in ruinous state, have met with no improvement. For when a proprietor's absence from home, if protracted, suffices to ruin even the greatest estate, what should one expect in the course of so many years of exile? From such an exile no one could have expected me to come home safe except yourselves — because of your extreme partiality for me. And yet as long as poverty was the only risk confronting me, that was nothing to be afraid of. For I am not unprepared, I may say, to cope with that, having wandered so long, not only without hearth and home, but even without a single servant to bear me company. Furthermore, I did not expect my son to find poverty a grievous thing to bear either, since his nature is not inferior to my own.

§ 40.3 But since the question before us concerns my not proving false toward my native land and not defrauding you of the promise I made under no compulsion, a promise by no means easy to make good and involving no small outlay of money, this I conceive to be a difficult matter and one calling for much serious cogitation. For there is nothing more weighty, no debt bearing higher interest, than a favour promised. Moreover, this is the shameful and bitter kind of loan, when, as one might say, because of tardy payment the favour turns into an obligation, an obligation the settlement of which those who keep silent demand altogether more sternly than those who cry aloud.

§ 40.4 For nothing has such power to remind those who owe you such obligations as your having utterly forgotten them. For these reasons, therefore, I felt it had become necessary for me to devote myself to my own affairs and not to any public business, not even to the extent of making a speech, until, as the poet says, I shall perceive What ill or good has happened in my halls.

§ 40.5 The fact is that hitherto I had not had even a moment's leisure, possibly because of my own officiousness, when I ought merely to have met you and given you friendly greetings and sacrificed to the gods, and, of course, read the letter from the Emperor, since that was a matter of necessity, and then to have retired immediately and turned to my own affairs, instead I made a speech in behalf of a certain undertaking, not on my own responsibility alone, but with the backing of the proconsuls as well, who possibly were minded to do you a favour, and perhaps me as well, and also to put the city into better shape and make it more impressive as a whole. For formerly, as you doubtless are aware, we were behind even our neighbours in such matters.

§ 40.6 Well, when I made that speech on the occasion referred to, not only was the Assembly aroused with enthusiasm for it — for you are not illiberal or insensible in your nature — but also many of the citizens were even moved to patriotic fervour in its support. And again, when later on I repeatedly laid the matter before you, now in the council chamber and now in the theatre, to make sure that I should not offend anyone in case you did not approve or desire the project — for I had my misgivings as to the hard work which would be connected with the enterprise — the proposal was repeatedly sanctioned by you and by the proconsuls too with not a dissenting voice.

§ 40.7 However, when the work was started, all the trouble to which I myself was put in taking measurements and allotting space and making computations, to insure that the project should not be unbecoming or useless — as in other cities many public works have been ruined for lack of planning — and finally in making a cursed excursion to the mountains, though I was not at all experienced in such matters and did not lack for something to do either, but might rather have occupied myself with other activities, possibly more important, from which I was likely to enjoy renown with others besides yourselves — all this I now refrain from narrating in detail; for nothing was too burdensome for me, seeing that I bore it for your sake.

§ 40.8 But there was a lot of talk — though not on the part of many persons — and very unpleasant talk too, to the effect that I am dismantling the city; that I have laid it waste, virtually banishing the inhabitants; that everything has been destroyed, obliterated, nothing left. And there were some who were violent in their lamentations over the smithy of So-and so, feeling bitter that these memorials of the good old days were not to be preserved. One might have supposed that the Propylaea at Athens were being tampered with, or the Parthenon, or that we were wrecking the Heraion of the Samians, or the Didymeium of the Milesians, or the temple of Artemis at Ephesus,

§ 40.9 instead of disgraceful, ridiculous ruins, much more lowly than the shed under which the flocks take shelter, but which no shepherd could enter nor any of the nobler breeds of dogs, structures that used to make you blush, aye, be utterly confounded when the proconsuls essayed to enter, while men who bore you malice would gloat over you and laugh at your discomfiture — hovels where even the blacksmiths were scarcely able to stand erect but worked with bowed head; shanties, moreover, in tumbledown condition, held up by props, so that at the stroke of the hammer they quivered and threatened to fall apart. And yet there were some who were distressed to see the signs of their former poverty and ill-repute disappearing, who, far from being interested in the columns which were rising, or in the eaves of the roof, or in the shops under construction in a different quarter, were interested only in preventing your ever feeling superior to that crew.

§ 40.10 For, let me assure you, buildings and festivals and independence in the administration of justice and exemption from standing trial away from home or from being grouped together with other communities like some village, if you will pardon the expression — all these things, I say, make it natural for the pride of the cities to be enhanced and the dignity of the community to be increased and for it to receive fuller honour both from the strangers within their gates and from the proconsuls as well. But while these things possess a wondrous degree of pleasure for those who love the city of their birth and are not afraid lest some day they may be found to be not good enough for it, to those who take the opposite stand and wish to wield authority over weak men and who deem the glory of the city to be their own ignominy, these things necessarily bring pain and jealousy.

§ 40.11 And yet, while it is true that the shoe must fit the wearer and his own special foot, and if the shoe is judged to be too large it must be trimmed down, one must never curtail a city or reduce it to one's own dimensions or measure it with regard to one's own spirit, if one happens to have a small and servile spirit, particularly in the light of existing precedents — I mean the activities of the men of Smyrna, of the men of Ephesus, of those men of Tarsus, of the men of Antioch. Again, I know perfectly that on former occasions too certain persons were ready to burst with rage on hearing me talk this way and were incensed that you were growing accustomed to listening to such words, and that any one should presume to name your city in company with such distinguished cities.

§ 40.12 But still, because of their angry protests at these proceedings, because of the things they say, because of their attempts to prevent any one's making a contribution, and because of their efforts to block operations, they have put me into such a frame of mind as almost to condemn myself to voluntary exile. For it really was ridiculous if, after having experienced so long an exile, so many tribulations, and so tyrannical a foe, after reaching home at last with the hope of finding respite and of being able to forget past hardships from then on — like a man who had through the kindness of some god unexpectedly and with difficulty been rescued from a dreadful, savage sea and tempest — I should then in port, so to speak, meet shipwreck here.

§ 40.13 But I am especially amazed at the malevolence of sundry persons — or rather at their folly — as I call to mind what sort of tales they invented, first of all in connexion with the mission of congratulation which you sent. For they claimed that he was not glad to receive your envoys, but was vexed, as if it were incumbent upon him to meet at the gate and there embrace all arrivals, or to speak the names of those who had not yet arrived, or to inquire about this one and that one, wanting to know how they were or why they had not all come.

§ 40.14 And others invented the tale that he gave the delegates from Smyrna very many presents, and that he sent untold riches along with the images of Nemesis, and, by Heaven, that after some one else had delivered an address he granted him ten thousand councillors and ordered a flood of gold to be turned in the direction of his city, and countless thousands of guineas were bestowed — not a word of which was true, though for my part I wish it were.

§ 40.15 For to see many people meeting with success and gaining great favours would never disturb a man of discernment, especially a man who had been the first to encounter such good fortune, and had possibly furnished the precedent for it. For it is quite as if a man were to demand that for him alone the sun should shine, or Zeus send his rain, or the winds blow, or that no one else should be permitted to drink from the springs. On the contrary, being at once most benevolent and most sagacious of all men, the Emperor not only gave me what I asked, but also gave others what they asked.

§ 40.16 Well, why have I made all this harangue, when you were considering other matters? Because previously I not only had touched upon this matter, but had also in this place made many speeches in behalf of concord, believing that this was advantageous for the city, and that it was better not to quarrel with any man at all, but least of all, in my opinion, with those who are so close, yes, real neighbours. However, I did not go to them or speak any word of human kindness in anticipation of the official reconciliation of the city and the establishment of your friendship with them. And yet at the very outset they sent me an official resolution expressing their friendship toward me and inviting me to pay them a visit. Furthermore, I had many obligations toward them, like any other citizen of Prusa; but still I did not undertake to show my goodwill toward them independently, but preferred rather to make friends with them along with you. So they looked upon me with distrust and were displeased.

§ 40.17 Besides, at the present moment, although I had heard of the breaking off of hostilities, and that this compact of friendship was being negotiated, and although you had voted to summon me, possibly even for this very business — for you may have expected that everything would be easier to achieve and surer if I participated in it; and in fact even now by their honouring, not only those who are already in Apameia, but me too along with the others, taking into account that I too am a citizen of yours, they may conceivably have become better disposed toward you — still, for all that, I was in no great haste to come before you, being wary lest my coming might prove a stumbling-block, not to the Apameians, but to some of the men from here. For, it is safe to say, many persons are wont to look with disfavour, not on the business under consideration, but rather on the negotiators.

§ 40.18 Why, even a year ago the leaders in Apameia were making these proposals to me, and you might at that time have been freed from trouble; yet I had misgivings lest the proposal might prove repugnant to some from here and they might be irritated if I acted in the matter. And so now too I have, as one might say, delayed intentionally. Accordingly, whatever can be accomplished for the city through others as well as through myself I ask to have entrusted to others preferably, so that no one may make opposition or be offended because of malice toward me. On the other hand, anything which cannot easily be achieved by any one else from here, but which is possibly very difficult to achieve at all, you may be sure always has my lively interest as long as I draw the breath of life.

§ 40.19 Nay more, whoever is enthusiastic in matters concerning the city and has the ability to accomplish anything to your advantage will find me the first to bear him witness and to lend a hand in his endeavour, and I would much more gladly, yes, more eagerly, praise the same enterprise, provided it be upright, if some one else were active in it than if I myself were its moving spirit. For it is not from a desire to be popular or because I lack men to praise me or because of a craving for notoriety, but rather because of my goodwill toward you, that I wish whatever is needful to come to pass, and I pray to all the gods that, as I grow old, I may behold the greatest possible number of men more competent than myself to benefit the city.

§ 40.20 And now in this enterprise I praise both the official in charge and the man who made the motion. For practically every enmity, every disagreement arising in connexion with any person at all, is a vexatious thing and unpleasant for both state and private citizen, no matter how they may be situated. For enmity can not only expose and humiliate the weak, to say nothing of the hardships they have already, but also annoy those who are prosperous and distress their spirits. Therefore sensible persons prefer to submit to defeat in ordinary matters and to be not too precise in defending their rights, rather than, by quarrelling over every matter and never making any concessions to any one, always to have persons plotting against them and making war on them, persons who feel resentment at their good fortune and, so far as they are able, try to stand in the way of it, and who, on the other hand, if any reverse should take place — and many are the reverses which do occur, as is natural among men -

§ 40.21 rejoice and seize the opportunity to attack. For there is no one so weak or impotent by nature, man for man, who does not chance upon some opportunity to display his malice and hatred, either alone or in conjunction with others, and to make some statement by which he is certain to cause pain, or to contrive some situation sure to cause injury. Similarly there is no disease so imperceptible to those afflicted with it as never to do harm or become a hindrance to some activity, but even if it does not greatly hamper the strength of a man while awake and walking, at least it confronts him when he goes to bed and causes him distraction and destroys his slumber.

§ 40.22 So I claim it is never profitable even for the greatest city to indulge in hostility and strife with the humblest village; but of course when the hostility is directed against men who occupy no small city, who have a superior form of government, and who, if they are prudent, enjoy a measure of distinction and influence with the proconsuls — for you must hear the truth and not be vexed if a man praises others in his desire to benefit you — men who, above all, share your borders, are neighbours to your city, and mingle with you almost every day, most of you being bound to them by ties of marriage, while some citizens, yes, virtually the most influential citizens among us, have obtained the honour of citizenship with them — how in these circumstances should we regard this hostility as causing no pain and doing no harm?

§ 40.23 And let no one imagine that I mean we should be wholly submissive, and that when they are not at all just or fair in their policies we should beg and entreat them; nay, but when they choose friendship and display an eagerness for it, to show ourselves more favourable to this policy and to transfer the rivalry growing out of our disagreement to this alternative course is far more creditable, a course whose aim is to make it plain that we ourselves are more reasonable and more scornful of wealth and personal advantage.

§ 40.24 For it is not so disgraceful to prove inferior in actions prompted by hatred and, by Heaven, in those which provoke enmity as it is in those which are inspired by a spirit of moderation and benevolence. For while he who is overcome in the one is likely to gain a reputation for mere weakness, in the other it will be for boorishness and contentiousness. Indeed, the better it is to be deemed weak rather than base, so much the more preferable is it to be tardy in making war rather than in making peace.

§ 40.25 Now there may be other grounds also on which you might with reason pay heed to me rather than to those others, but that is especially true because you observe that I have no private interest and am not disposed through any dread of annoyance or expense on my part to disregard the course which is becoming to you. For I know full well you will not trouble me against my wishes, or order me to go abroad as if I had already made too long a stay in Prusa — and besides, I do not believe I can assist you by sacrificing my leisure or by going abroad in this manner — however, as I was saying, I consider it better for men in general, and not merely for you, both to refrain from entering lightly into an enmity which is not extremely necessary and also by every means possible to put an end to enmities already existing, recognizing that the damage resulting from quarrelling with any people is greater than the loss incident to the reconciliation.

§ 40.26 For any peace, so they say, is better than war, and any friendship is far better and more profitable for men of right judgement than enmity, not only individually for our families, but also collectively for our cities. For peace and concord have never damaged at all those who have employed them, whereas it would be surprising if enmity and contentiousness were not very deadly, very mighty evils. Moreover, while concord is a word of good omen, and to make trial of it is most excellent and profitable for all, strife and discord are forbidding and unpleasant words even to utter, and much worse are their deeds and more forbidding. For the fact is, strife and discord involve saying and hearing said many things one might wish to avoid, and doing and experiencing them too.

§ 40.27 But the wrangling and hatred of men who are such near neighbours, yes, who share common borders, is like nothing else than insurrection in a single city, since many have ties both of marriage and of business, and there is almost daily visiting back and forth, and the inhabitants are all related and intimate and, as one might say, on terms of hospitality with one another. But a neighbouring city that is at enmity and ill disposed is a grievous thing in every way and hard to get along with, even as a city that is well disposed and friendly is beneficial and much to be desired.

§ 40.28 Furthermore, consider how much more pleasant it is to visit one's neighbours when they are on terms of intimacy and not of hostility, and how much better it is for those who are entertained away from home to be received without distrust, and how much better and more sensible it is at the common religious gatherings and festivals and spectacles to mingle together, joining with one another in common sacrifice and prayer, rather than the opposite, cursing and abusing one another.

§ 40.29 And how different are the shouts of the partisans of each of two cities in the stadium and the theatre, when uttered in praise and generous acclamation, from the cries which are uttered in hatred and abuse! For these outbreaks are not for reasonable men or well-behaved cities, but rather for indecent harlots, who are not at all ashamed to utter licentious phrases, each from her respective chamber, as Homer puts it, Who in a rage to mid-assembly go And bandy insults, so their choler bids.

§ 40.30 How much, then, is it worth to avoid experiencing these things? How much more to avoid inflicting them on others? What amount of money or extent of territory would be such as to warrant sensible men in bartering therefor the seemly language of their daily lives, their becoming conduct at spectacles, and their readiness to go abroad? Furthermore, the very land and sea and mountains in every way bring you people together and, even if you did not wish it, compel you to deal with one another. For not only do the Apameians need our timber and many other things as well, but we ourselves have no other harbour through which to import foreign goods or to export our own domestic products.

§ 40.31 Is it not, then, most unfortunate that each should have to buy from men who are not friends and sell to men who hate them, to enter the port of men who are irked at their presence, to afford hospitality to men who revile them, and at times to recline at a banquet next to men who are most hostile to them; if one takes passage on a ship, to know clearly that both the skipper and all his crew are muttering curses at him; and to have ever before one's eyes, whether sailing or walking, the most distasteful sight of all, that of enemies, and always to encounter such persons in greatest numbers on one's travels — an evil and disagreeable omen — as the result of which one is absolutely sure to have said something disagreeable or to have heard it said about himself as he passes by?

§ 40.32 So I have often reflected on the folly and the corruption of mankind, noting that men are spiritually inferior to the most despised and meanest creatures. For human beings often come to blows on meeting one another, and before they part they have exchanged abusive language; yet the ants, although they go about in such swarms, never bother one another, but quite amicably meet and pass and assist each other.

§ 40.33 Again, that which has now come to pass regarding our city in truth touches intimately many people and irritates without exception those who are not from Prusa, because it is you who hear their law-suits and it is in your city that they must stand trial; then you ought on that account to be the more gracious and not make yourselves obnoxious. For example, from what place will envoys chosen for this function set out? Will it not be from Apameia? Will they not set out on their voyage from the shores of their bitterest foes, and use the harbour of the enemy's city? Or will they make a detour around it, as if the sea at our doors were difficult and inaccessible? As for me, I believe that those also who in days gone by were at variance with their neighbours found such incidents harder to bear and more grievous than that people should take up arms and invade their country or attack their fortifications or cut down their trees or set fire to their crops.

§ 40.34 For although, in my opinion, such actions are hard to bear, altogether harder to bear are the passions of enmity and hatred which cause them. For from such activity as this nothing beneficial or useful can ever possibly come to pass. For the fruit of enmity is most bitter of all and most stinging, just as, methinks, its opposite, the fruit of goodwill, is most palatable and profitable. For the unwillingness ever to yield or make concessions to our neighbour — that is, without a feeling of humiliation — or while receiving some things ourselves, to concede some to the others, is not manly conduct, as some imagine, but, on the contrary, senseless and stupid.

§ 40.35 Do you not see in the heavens as a whole and in the divine and blessed beings that dwell therein an order and concord and self-control which is eternal, than which it is impossible to conceive of anything either more beautiful or more august? Furthermore, do you not see also the stable, righteous, everlasting concord of the elements, as they are called — air and earth and water and fire — with what reasonableness and moderation it is their nature to continue, not only to be preserved themselves, but also to preserve the entire universe?