Dio Chrysostom, Speeches

§ 12.74 But our god is peaceful and altogether gentle, such as befits the guardian of a faction-free and concordant Hellas; and this I, with the aid of my art and of the counsel of the wise and good city of the Eleans have set up — a mild and majestic god in pleasing guise, the Giver of our material and our physical life and of all our blessings, the common Father and Saviour and Guardian of mankind, in so far as it was possible for a mortal man to frame in his mind and to represent the divine and inimitable nature.

§ 12.75 ”And consider whether you will not find that the statue is in keeping with all the titles by which Zeus is known. For he alone of the gods is entitled'Father and King,'' Polieus,'' Philios [of friendship],' and' Hetaireios' [of Comradeship], Homognios and also' Hikesios' [of suppliants], and' Xenios'[of hospitality],''Giver of Increase,' and has countless other titles, all indicative of goodness: he is addressed as'King' because of his dominion and power; as'Father,' I think, on account of his solicitude for us and his kindness: as'Protector of Cities' in that he upholds the law and the common weal; as' Homognios' on account of the tie of kinship which unites gods and men;

§ 12.76 as'God of Friendship' and'God of Comradeship' because he brings all men together and wills that they be friends of one another and never enemy or foe; as'Protector of Suppliants' since he inclines his ear and is gracious to men when they pray; as' Phyxios' because he gives refuge from evils; as'God of Hospitality' because we should not be unmindful even of strangers, nor regard any human being as an alien; as' Ktesios and Epikarpios' since he is the cause of all crops and is the giver of wealth and power.

§ 12.77 “And so far as it was possible to reveal these attributes without the help of words, is the god not adequately represented from the point of view of art? For his sovereignty and kingship are intended to be shown by the strength in the image and its grandeur; his fatherhood and his solicitude by its gentleness and kindliness; the'Protector of Cities' and'Upholder of the Law' by its majesty and severity; the kinship between gods and men, I presume, by the mere similarity in shape, being already in use as a symbol; the'God of Friends, Suppliants, Strangers, Refugees,' and all such qualities in short, by the benevolence and gentleness and goodness appearing in his countenance. The'God of Wealth' and the ”Giver of Increase' are represented by the simplicity and grandeur shown by the figure, for the god does in very truth seem like one who is giving and bestowing blessings.

§ 12.78 “As for these attributes, then, I have represented them in so far as it was possible to do so, since I was not able to name them. But the god who continually sends the lightning's flash, portending war and the destruction of many or a mighty downpour of rain, or of hail or of snow, or who stretches the dark blue rainbow across the sky, the symbol of war, or who sends a shooting star, which hurls forth a stream of sparks, a dread portent to sailors or soldiers, or who sends grievous strife upon Greeks and barbarians so as to inspire tired and despairing men with unceasing love for war and battle, and the god who weighed in the balance the fates of the godlike men or of whole armies to be decided by its spontaneous inclination — that god, I say, it was not possible to represent by my art; nor assuredly should I ever have desired to do so even had it been possible.

§ 12.79 For of thunder what sort of soundless image, or of lightning and of the thunderbolt what kind of a likeness without the lightning's flash could by any possibility be made from the metals taken from the subterranean workings of this land at least? Then when the earth was shaken and Olympus was moved by a slight inclination of the eyebrows, or a crown of cloud was about his head, it was easy enough for Homer to describe them, and great was the freedom he enjoyed for all such things; but for our art it is absolutely impossible, for it permits the observer to test it with his eyes from close at hand and in full view.

§ 12.80 ”But if, again, anyone thinks that the material used is too lacking in distinction to be in keeping with the god, his belief is true and correct. But neither those who furnished it, nor the man who selected and approved it, has he any right to criticize. For there was no other substance better or more radiant to the sight that could have come into the hands of man and have received artistic treatment. To work up air, at any rate, or fire, or'the copious source of water,' what tools possessed by mortal men can do that?

§ 12.81 These can work upon nothing but whatever hard residuary substance is held bound within all these elements. I do not mean gold or silver, for these are trivial and worthless things, but the essential substance, tough all through and heavy; and to select each kind of material and entwining them together to compose every species, both of animals and of plants — this is a thing which is impossible for even the gods, all except this God alone, one may almost say, whom another poet quite beautifully has addressed as follows: Lord of Dodona, father almighty, consummate artist.

§ 12.82 For he is indeed the first and most perfect artificer, who has taken as his coadjutor in his art, not the city of Elis, but the entire material of the entire universe. But of a Pheidias or of a Polycleitus you could not reasonably demand more than they have done; nay, even what they essayed is too great and august for our handiwork.

§ 12.83 Indeed, not even Hephaestus did Homer represent as showing his skill in other materials, but while he furnished a god as the craftsman for the making of the shield, he did not succeed in finding any different sort of material for it. For he speaks as follows: The stubborn brass, and tin, and precious gold, And silver, first he melted in the fire; Nay, I will not concede to any man that there ever has been a better sculptor than I, but to Zeus, who fashioned the whole universe, it is not right to compare any mortal."

§ 12.84 So if Pheidias had said these things in his defence, I believe that the assembled Hellenes would have been justified in conferring a crown upon him. But perhaps the majority of my hearers have failed to notice the several topics of my address, although, in my opinion, it has been quite as suitable for the multitude as for the philosophers to hear. It has dealt with the dedication of statues, how it should best be done, and with the poets, as to whether their conceptions of the gods are better or inferior, and also with the first conception of God, what it was and how it came into existence among men. And much too, I believe, was said about the power of Zeus and about his titles. If this was accompanied by a eulogy of the statue and of those who dedicated it, so much the better.

§ 12.85 For in reality the god now seems to us to have such an expression, altogether benevolent and solicitous, that I at least can almost fancy that he is speaking like this: “All this rite, you Eleans and all Hellas, you are carrying out, as one may see, very beautifully and fittingly, by offering sacrifices of a magnificence in keeping with your means, and, above all, by holding as from the beginning this most renowned contest of physical condition, strength, and speed, and lastly, because you are preserving in regard to festive occasions and secret rites all the customs which you have inherited. But with deep concern I observe that Yourself untended seem, and wretched age With mean attire and squalor is your lot.”

§ 13.01 The Thirteenth Discourse: In Athens, about his Banishment A.D.

§ 13.1 When it fell to my lot to be exiled on account of my reputed friendship with a man of good character and very closely connected with those who at that time were Fortune's favourites and indeed high officials, a man who lost his life on account of the very things which made him seem fortunate to many men, and indeed to practically everyone, I mean his connection by marriage and blood with these officials; the charge brought against me being that I was that man's friend and adviser — for just as among the Scythians it is the practice to bury cupbearers and cooks and concubines with their kings, so it is the custom of despots to throw in several others for no reason whatever with those who are being executed by them -

§ 13.2 so I began to consider whether this matter of banishment was really a grievous thing and a misfortune, as it is in the view of the majority, or whether such experiences merely furnish another instance of what we are told happens in connection with the divinations of the women in the sacred places. For they pick up a chance clod of earth or a stone, and try to see in it the answer to their enquiry. And, so the story goes, some find their clod light, while others find theirs so heavy that they are not able even to move it easily.

§ 13.3 “May not exile after all,” I thought, “and poverty, yes, and old age too and sickness, and all such things, appear heavy to some and grievous, but to others light and easy? For in the first case perhaps God lightens the weight according to the importance of the matter in question, and in the second case, I imagine, to suit the strength and will-power of the afflicted one.”

§ 13.4 And then I recalled Homer's Odysseus, who is always bewailing his lot, although he was a hero and quite able to endure. Yet he for all that says many unworthy things, and forever sits lamenting on the shore of the sea because he yearns for his native land; and finally, so the poet says, the longing came upon him to see smoke ascending from his own country, even if he should have to die straightway, and neither his former exploits could solace him nor a goddess very beautiful and good who cherished him, going so far as to promise to make him immortal; but all these things were outweighed by his yearning and love for his native land.

§ 13.5 And then again I recalled how in one of the later poets Electra, when enquiring about her brother in mournful fashion and pitying him for his exile, asks in somewhat the following fashion, Where does the wretched man his wretched exile spend? And he replies no less piteously, In no one settled region doth he so waste away. Then she again asks, Does he perchance live scant of daily bread? And he replies thus, Nay, bread he hath, but strengthless, exile's fare.

§ 13.6 And in addition to all this I recalled countless deeds of valour performed and wars waged by exiles seeking thus to be restored to their homes, wars waged beyond their strength against the popular governments and despotisms by which they had been driven out, for they counted it a great achievement to fight on their own soil even if it meant their death. All these recollections frightened me and forced me to consider what had happened to me a terrible and onerous thing. But again, I reflected that Croesus, the king of the Lydians, was advised by Apollo, when a certain mischance fell, to leave his kingdom and go voluntarily into exile, and not to feel himself disgraced if he should be looked upon by men as a coward, the oracle running somewhat as follows:

§ 13.7 Wait till the time shall come when a mule is monarch of Media: Then, thou delicate Lydian, away to the pebbles of Hermus; Haste thee and no longer stay, nor have awe of being a coward. It is evident that the poet uses'awe' instead of'shame' as is the custom the poets have, and'being a coward' in place of'being thought so by the many.'

§ 13.8 Then next the thought came to me that exile is not altogether injurious or unprofitable, nor staying at home a good and praiseworthy thing. For Apollo would not have urged and advised the one course, to wit, going into exile, and have expressly forbidden the other course, staying, especially when prophesying to a man who had been most careful about divine observances and had offered the most sacrifices and sent to Delphi the largest votive offerings ever set up there.

§ 13.9 Bearing in mind all these things I decided to go to the god's temple myself and consult him, as a competent adviser, according to the ancient custom of the Greeks. For surely, thought I, if he gives competent advice about sickness and, if children are not born to a man, about childlessness, and about harvests, he will not show any less ability about such a case as mine. And then when I consulted him, he gave me a strange sort of reply and one not easy to interpret. For he bade me to keep on doing with all zeal the very thing wherein I am engaged, as being a most honourable and useful activity, “until thou comest,” said he, “to the uttermost parts of the earth.” And yet lying is a harsh thing to impute and not consistent with even a man's standards, to say nothing of a god's.

§ 13.10 Accordingly I reflected that Odysseus after all his wanderings did not hesitate to roam once more, when he carried an oar as Teiresias, a man dead and gone, had advised him, until he should fall in with people who knew not the sea, even by hearsay; and should not I follow his example if God so bade? So after exhorting myself in this way neither to fear or be ashamed of my action, and putting on humble attire and otherwise chastening myself, I proceeded to roam everywhere.

§ 13.11 And the men whom I met, on catching sight of me, would sometimes call me a tramp and sometimes a beggar, though some did call me a philosopher. From this it came about gradually and without any planning or any self-conceit on my part that I acquired this name. Now the great majority of those styled philosophers proclaim themselves such, just as the Olympian heralds proclaim the victors; but in my case, when the other folk applied this name to me, I was not able always and in all instances to have the matter out with them.

§ 13.12 And very likely, as it turned out, I did profit somewhat by the general report about me. For many would approach me and ask what was my opinion about good and evil. As a result I was forced to think about these matters that I might be able to answer my questioners. Furthermore, they would invite me to come before the public and speak.

§ 13.13 Consequently it became necessary for me to speak also about the duties of man and about the things that were likely, in my opinion, to profit him. And the opinion I had was that pretty well all men are fools, and that no one does any of the things he should do, or considers how to rid himself of the evils that beset him and of his great ignorance and confusion of mind, so as to live a more virtuous and a better life; but that they all are being thrown into confusion and are swept round and round in the same place and about practically the same objects, to wit, money and reputation and certain pleasures of the body, while no one is able to rid himself of these and set his own soul free; just as, I fancy, things that get into a whirlpool are tossed and rolled without being able to free themselves from the whirling.

§ 13.14 While I was uttering these and similar upbraidings of all others, but first and foremost of myself, at times, when at a loss, I would have recourse to an ancient appeal made by a certain Socrates, one that he never ceased making, everywhere and to everyone, crying out and declaiming earnestly, in the wrestling schools and in the Lyceum and at the workshops and up and down the Agora, like a god swung into view by the machine, as someone has said. By no means, however, did I pretend that the appeal was mine,

§ 13.15 but gave the credit where it was due, and requested them, in case I were unable to recall accurately all the phrases, or even not all the thought, but should add or subtract anything, to grant me their indulgence and not to pay any the less attention to me just because I was repeating what happened to have been said many years before. “For perhaps,” said I, “you will in this way derive the greatest benefit. For in truth,” I added, “it is not at all probable that the words of old have evaporated like drugs and lost their power.”

§ 13.16 Now Socrates, whenever he saw several persons assembled, would cry out most bravely and frankly with indignant rebuke and censure, “Whither are you drifting, men? Are you quite unaware that you are doing none of the things that you should do, in concerning yourselves with money and trying to get it in any way and every way, in order that you may not only have it in abundance yourselves, but may bequeath still more of it to your children? Yet the children themselves — aye, and earlier, yourselves, their fathers — you have all alike neglected, since you have found no education and no mode of life that is satisfactory, or even profitable, for man, which, if acquired, will enable you to use your money rightly and justly, instead of harmfully and unjustly, and to treat without hurt, not only yourselves, whom you should have considered of more value than wealth, but also your sons and daughters and wives and brothers and friends, even as they should treat you.

§ 13.17 ”But, pray, is it by learning from your parents to play the lyre and to wrestle, to read and write, and by teaching your sons these things that you think that your city will be inhabited by more disciplined and better citizens? And yet if one were to bring together all the cithara players and gymnastic masters and schoolmasters who have the best knowledge of their respective subjects, and, if you should found a city with them or even a nation, just as you at one time colonized Ionia, what sort of a city do you think it would be, and what the character of its citizens? Would not life be much worse and viler than it is in that city of shopkeepers in Egypt, where all shopkeepers settle, both men and women alike? Will not a much more ridiculous society be made by these teachers of your children of whom I speak — I mean the gymnastic masters, the cithara players, and the schoolmasters, including the rhapsodists and the actors?

§ 13.18 “For mark you, everything that people learn, they learn simply in order that when the need arises for the things which each man has learned, he may do the work of his profession, the pilot, for instance, guiding the ship with the rudder as soon as he steps on board — for this is why he studied piloting — and the physician healing with his drugs and dietary regulations when he takes charge of his patient — the purpose for which he acquired his skill.

§ 13.19 And so, to take your own case,” he continued, “when there is need of any deliberation concerning the welfare of your city and you have come together in the Assembly, do some of you get up and play the cithara, and certain other individuals wrestle, and yet others of you take something of Homer's or Hesiod's and proceed to read it? For these are the things that you know better than the others, and these are the things which you think will make you good men and enable you to conduct your public affairs properly and your private concerns likewise. And now, these are the hopes which inspire you when you direct your city and prepare your sons, working to qualify them to handle both their own and the public's interests if only they can play satisfactorily Pallas, dread destroyer of cities, or'with eager foot' betake themselves to the lyre. But as to how you are to learn what is to your own advantage and that of your native city, and to live lawfully and justly and harmoniously in your social and political relations without wronging or plotting against one another, this you never learned nor has this problem ever yet given you any concern, nor even at this moment does it trouble you at all.

§ 13.20 But although you every year see the tragic performances at the Dionysia and pity the misfortunes of the characters in the exhibitions of tragedies, yet in spite of this you have never reflected that it is not the illiterate or the singers who sing out of tune or those who do not know how to wrestle to whom these evils happen, nor has anyone ever brought out a tragedy about a man simply because he is poor. Quite the contrary! It is heroes like Atreus, Agamemnon, and Oidipus who form the subject of all the tragedies, as anyone may see, men who possessed a wealth of gold and silver and land and cattle and indeed, for the most unfortunate of them they say a golden sheep was born.

§ 13.21 And again, even Thamyris, who was very proficient in playing the cithara and strove with the Muses themselves for the prize in music, was blinded because of this and unlearned the art of playing the cithara in the bargain. And his invention of the letters of the alphabet availed Palamedes naught to save him from suffering injustice at the hands of the very Achaeans who had been instructed by him and from being put to death by stoning. But as long as they were unlettered and unacquainted with this special learning of his, they permitted him to live. When, however, he had taught the others to read and write, and the Atreidae of course first of all, and along with their letters had shown them how to raise bale-fires and how to count the host — for previously they had not known how to count the multitude properly, as shepherds do their shee — as soon as they had become more clever and proficient, then it was that they slew him.

§ 13.22 ”But if you really think," said he, “that the orators are qualified to deliberate and that their profession is competent to make men good, I am surprised that you have not entrusted the deciding of questions of state to them instead of to your own selves; and why, if you regard them as the best and most just of men, you have not allowed them to manage your finances also. No, for you would be acting just as if you were to appoint the marines or boatswains to be the helmsmen and captains of your triremes!”

§ 13.23 Then if one of the public men and orators said to him in reply: “Anyhow it was this education that the Athenians had received and were using at the time when the Persians came with so many myriads against their city twice in succession, and against the rest of Greece: on the first occasion when the Persian king sent an army and generals, and later when Xerxes came in person with all the hosts of Asia; but nevertheless they conquered all these, and everywhere proved superior to them both in planning and in fighting. And yet how would they have been able to prevail over so great an armament and over so mighty a host, if they had not been superior in the qualities of valour? Or how would they have been superior in such excellence, if they had not enjoyed the most excellent education, but a poor and useless one?”

§ 13.24 In answer to anyone using such arguments he would reply that neither had their enemies received any education before they came, nor did they know how to deliberate about affairs of state, but had simply been trained to shoot and ride and hunt, while they thought exposure of the body the most shameful thing, and spitting in public. “But those things,” he said, “were destined to avail them not at all; with the result that there was not even a general over them nor yet a king, but there were simply countless myriads of men, all foolish and doomed to an evil fate. However, there was one among them who had the right to wear his tiara upright and to sit upon a golden throne, by whom all were driven on by compulsion, as if by an evil spirit, some into the sea and some down from the hills; while scourged by the lash, in terror, and jostling one another and trembling, they were forced to die.

§ 13.25 Hence, just as if two men quite ignorant of wrestling were to wrestle together, one of them would sometimes throw the other, not because of his greater experience but by mere chance, and often the same man would even throw his opponent twice in succession; so too, when the Persians clashed with the Athenians, at one time the Athenians and at another time the Persians, as at a later time, when they were fighting the Athenians with the aid of the Lacedemonians, they even tore down the walls of their city.

§ 13.26 Yet would you be able to assert to me that at that time the Athenians had become less cultivated and more illiterate? Afterwards, again, in the time of Conon, when they won the naval engagement off Cnidos, were they more skilful at wrestling and singing odes?” This is the way, then, in which he would demonstrate that they were not receiving a useful education. And this, he said, had been the experience, not alone of the Athenians, but of practically all mankind, both in the past and in the present age.

§ 13.27 “Furthermore,” he would go on to say, “to be uneducated and to know none of the essential things, and to have no adequate preparation for life, and yet to go on living and to attempt while in that condition to carry on important matters of state — this cannot satisfy even the persons themselves; for they themselves criticize the ignorant and uneducated as not being able to live aright. And by the ignorant I mean, not those who do not know how to weave or how to make shoes, nor the people who cannot dance, but those who are ignorant of the things which one must know if he is to be a good and noble man.”

§ 13.28 And speaking in this manner he would exhort his hearers to take care to give heed to his words, and to pursue philosophy; for he knew that if they sought that which he recommended, they would be doing nothing else than studying philosophy. For if a man strives earnestly to be good and honourable, that is nothing but being a philosopher. However, he did not often use that word for it, but merely bade them to seek to be good men.

§ 13.29 Now to my hearers I used to say practically the same things as Socrates did, things old-fashioned and trite though they were, and when they refused to leave me in peace even on reaching Rome itself, I did not venture to speak any word of my own, fearing lest I be laughed at and regarded as a fool, since I was well aware how completely old-fashioned and ignorant I was; and I said to myself: “Come now, if I, copying the words of another, use such derogatory words about things which are highly regarded at Rome here, and tell them that not one of these things is a good, if I speak of luxury and intemperance, and tell them that what they need is a thorough and sound education, perhaps they will not laugh at me for uttering such sentiments nor declare that I am a fool.

§ 13.30 But if they do, I shall be able to say that those words were spoken by a man whom the Greeks one and all admired for his wisdom, and what is more, whom Apollo actually considered the wisest man in the world, while Archelaus, the king of Macedonia, who knew a great deal and had consorted with many wise men, tried to get him to come to Macedonia, offering him gifts and fees that he might have the privilege of hearing him say such things.”

§ 13.31 And thus it came about that I too endeavoured to talk to the Romans when they had summoned me and invited me to speak, but I did not take them by twos and threes in wrestling-schools and cloistered walks; for it was not possible to meet them thus in that city; but when a great number had gathered in one place, I would tell them that they needed a better and more carefully planned education, if they were ever to be happy in truth and reality and not merely in the opinion of the majority, as was now the case; that if anyone should win them to this view and take them in charge and teach them that not a single one of those things is a good to which they devoted themselves and which they strove with all their zeal to acquire, in the belief that, the more they acquired, the better and happier their life would be;

§ 13.32 but that if they wholeheartedly practised temperance, manliness, and justice, and took them into their souls, securing from somewhere teachers who taught these things and all the other things too, not caring whether the men were Greeks or Romans, or, for that matter, if there is among the Scythians or the Indians a man who teaches the things of which I have spoken, — not, as I think, archery and horsemanship, but far better, if there were a physician who, knowing how to treat the infirmities of the body, is in that way competent to heal the maladies of the soul — a teacher, I mean, who would be able to rid of licentiousness and covetousness and all such infirmities those who were dominated by them -

§ 13.33 of that man, I say, they should take possession and lead him to their homes, inducing him to come either by argument or by friendship — for by money such a man cannot be induced nor by any other gifts — and after establishing him on their acropolis they ought to issue an edict bidding all the young men to resort to him regularly and associate with him, and equally the older men too, until all of them, having become enamoured of righteousness, and having learned to despise gold and silver and ivory, yea, and rich food too and perfume and the lust of the flesh, should thereafter live happy lives, and be masters first and foremost of themselves and afterwards

§ 13.34 of all other men as well. “For only then,” I continued, “will your city be great and strong and truly imperial, since at present its greatness arouses distrust and is not very secure. For,” said I, “in proportion as courage, justice, and temperance increase among you, in that degree there will be less silver and gold and furniture of ivory and of amber, less of crystal and citron-wood and ebony and women's adornments and embroideries and dyes of many hues; in short, all the things which are now considered in your city precious and worth fighting for, you will need in smaller quantities,

§ 13.35 and when you have reached the summit of virtue, not at all. And the houses in which you live will be smaller and better, and you will not support so great a throng of idle and utterly useless slaves and — the most paradoxical thing of all — the more god-fearing and pious you become, the less frankincense and fragrant offerings and garlands there will be among you, and you will offer fewer sacrifices and at less expense, and the whole multitude that is now being supported in your city will be much smaller; while the entire city, like a ship that has been lightened, will ride higher and be much more buoyant and safer.

§ 13.36 These same pronouncements you will find were made both by Sibylla and by Bacis, it if be true that the two of them proved to be good soothsayers and seers. But as your possessions are now, on account of the great amount of wealth, all of which has been collected from all the world into this one place, luxury and covetousness being prevalent, the situation is similar to that in which Achilles, after heaping high the pyre of Patroclus with many logs of wood, with many coverlets and garments, and also with fat and olive oil in addition, summons the winds, with libations and promise of sacrifices, to come and set it afire and burn it.

§ 13.37 For such possessions as yours are no less likely to kindle the wanton spirit and licentiousness of human beings.” I did not, however, maintain that it was difficult for them to become educated, “for,” said I, “although you have hitherto been no whit better than other men, you learned easily enough all the other things that you wished.” I refer to horsemanship, archery, fighting in heavy armour...

§ 14.1 The Fourteenth Discourse: On Slavery and Freedom I Men desire above all things to be free and say that freedom is the greatest of blessings, while slavery is the most shameful and wretched of states; and yet they have no knowledge of the essential nature of this freedom and this slavery of which they speak. And, what is more, they do practically nothing whatever to escape the shameful and grievous thing, which is slavery, and to gain what they consider to be valuable, that is, freedom; but on the contrary, they do the things which result in their continuing in slavery all their lives and never attaining to freedom.

§ 14.2 However, we should perhaps feel no surprise that these men are unable either to get or to avoid the thing of which they happen to be ignorant. For instance, if they happened to be ignorant as to what a sheep and a wolf are respectively, but nevertheless thought that the one was profitable and good to get while the other was harmful and unprofitable, it would not be at all surprising if they feared the sheep and fled from it at times as though it were a wolf, but let the wolf approach and awaited its coming, thinking to be a sheep. For ignorance has this effect upon men who lack knowledge, and forces them to flee from and to pursue the opposite of what they desire to flee from and to pursue, and of what would be to their advantage.

§ 14.3 Come then, let us consider whether the majority of men really have any clear knowledge about freedom and slavery. For it is quite possible that we are criticizing them without good reason, and that they know well what these are. Now if one were to ask statement what the nature of freedom is, they would say, perhaps, that it consists in being subject to no one and acting simply in accordance with one's own judgement.

§ 14.4 But if one were to go on and ask the man who made this answer whether he thought it a fine thing, and worthy of a free man, that when he is a member of a chorus he should not pay attention to the leader nor be subject to him, but should sing in tune or out of tune just as he took the notion, and whether he thought the opposite course, namely, to pay attention and obey the director of the chorus and to begin and to stop singing only at his command, was shameful and slavish, I do not think that he would agree.

§ 14.5 And again, if one were to ask whether he thought it was characteristic of a free man, when a passenger on board a ship, to pay no attention to the captain and refuse to carry out whatever orders he should give; for instance, to stand erect in the ship when ordered to sit down, simply if he took a notion to do so; and if he were on occasion ordered to bale or help hoist the sails, neither to bale nor lay hold of the ropes; this man, too, he would not call free or enviable, because he does what seems best to himself.

§ 14.6 And surely one would not call soldiers slaves because they are subject to their general's orders and spring to their feet the moment he gives a command, and partake of food and lay hold of their weapons and fall in and advance and retire only at their general's order. Neither will they call persons who are sick slaves because they must obey their physicians.

§ 14.7 And yet the orders which they obey are neither insignificant nor easy to carry out, but at times they order them to do without both food and drink; and if the physician decides at any time to bind the patient, he is straightway bound; and if he decides to use the knife or cautery, the patient will be burned and cut to the extent that the physician decides is best. And if the sick man refuses to obey, all the household will help the physician to cope with him, and not the free alone, but often the sick man's domestics themselves bind their master and fetch the fire that he may suffer cautery, and give any other assistance.

§ 14.8 You do not say, do you, that this man is not free because he endures many unpleasant things at another's command? Surely you would not have denied, for instance, that Darius, the King of the Persians, was a free man when, after suffering a fall from his horse in a hunt and dislocating his ankle, he obeyed the surgeons while they pulled and twisted his foot in order to set the joint, and that too although they were Egyptians. Nor, to take another instance, would you have denied that Xerxes was a free man, when on his retreat from Greece a storm arose and he while aboard the ship obeyed the captain in everything and would not permit himself against the captain's judgement even to nod or to change his position. Therefore they will not persist in maintaining that rendering obedience to no man or doing whatever one likes constitutes freedom.

§ 14.9 But perhaps they will counter by saying that these men obey for their own advantage, just as people on shipboard obey the captain and soldiers their general, and that the sick for this reason give heed to their physician, that they prescribe nothing but what is for the advantage of their patients. But masters, they will assert, do not order their slaves to do what will benefit them, but what they think will be of profit to themselves.

§ 14.10 Well then, is it to the master's advantage that his servant should die or be ill or be a knave? No one would say so, but would affirm that the contrary is to his advantage, namely that he should keep alive and well and should be an honest man. And these same things will be found to be for the advantage of the servant as well; so that the master, if indeed he is wise, will order his servant to do that which is equally to the servant's advantage; for that will prove to be of advantage to himself as well.

§ 14.11 But the man for whom one pays down money is of necessity a slave. DIO: But have not many men paid down money for many who are free, when they have paid a ransom, at one time to enemies in warfare and at another to pirates, and some few have paid their own value to their masters? And yet surely these last are not slaves to themselves?

§ 14.12 No, but whenever another has the power to have a man scourged or imprisoned or put to death, or have anything else done to him that he wishes, then that man is the slave of the other. DIO: How is that? Do not pirates have the power to treat the men they have captured in this way? And yet none the less the captives are not slaves. Then again, have not judges the power to impose the penalty of imprisonment or death or anything else they wish upon many of those who are before them for trial? And yet surely these men are not slaves. But if they are slaves for the one day during which they each are on trial, this means nothing; for is a man really ever said to have been a slave for one day?

§ 14.13 But surely we may put the matter briefly and declare that whoever has the power to do whatever he wishes is free, and that whoever has not that power is a slave. DIO: No, you cannot say this in the case of those on board ship nor of the sick either, nor of those serving in the field, nor of those learning to read and write or to play the harp or to wrestle or to acquire any other art; for these have not the right to follow their own preferences, but must act as the captain, physician, or teacher, as the case may be, instructs. If that is so, then men in general are not allowed to do what they wish, but if they violate the established laws, they will be punished.

§ 14.14 Then I say that the man who has the power to act or not, just as he pleases, in regard to those matters which are not forbidden by the laws or enjoined by them, is free, and that the man who on the contrary lacks that power is a slave. DIO: Well then, do you think that it is permitted to you to do all things, which, while they are not expressly forbidden by the laws, yet are regarded as base and unseemly by mankind? I mean, for example, collecting taxes, or keeping a brothel, or doing other such things. — O no, indeed. I should say that it is not permissible for the free to do such things either. And indeed for these acts the penalty fixed is to be hated or abominated by men.

§ 14.15 DIO: Well then, in the case of intemperate men, whatever acts they commit by reason of their intemperance, and in the case of the ignorant all that they do owing to their ignorance in neglecting either their property or their person or in treating their fellows unjustly and inconsiderately, do not all these things impose a penalty upon those that do them? For they are injured either in their person or in their property or, most serious of all, in their own soul. — What you now say is true. DIO: Therefore it is not permissible to do these things either? — No, certainly not.

§ 14.16 DIO: In a word, then, it is not permissible to do mean and unseemly and unprofitable things, but things that are just and profitable and good we must say that it is both proper and permissible to do? — It seems so to me at any rate. DIO: Therefore no one may do that which is mean and unprofitable without suffering the penalty, whether he be Greek or barbarian... or a man for whom one has paid a price in cash? — No, indeed. DIO: But the opposite things are allowed to all alike, and those who do what is allowed continue free from penalty, while those who do what is forbidden are punished.

§ 14.17 Now do you think that any others do what is permissible except those who know what that is, or that any others do the opposite except those who do not know? — Oh, no! DIO: Therefore, the wise are permitted to do anything whatsoever they wish, while the foolish attempt to do what they wish although it is not permissible; so that it follows of necessity that while the wise are free and are allowed to act as they wish, the ignorant are slaves and do that which is not allowable for them? — Perhaps.

§ 14.18 DIO: Therefore we are forced to define freedom as the knowledge of what is allowable and what is forbidden, and slavery as ignorance of what is allowed and what is not. According to this definition there is nothing to prevent the Great King, while wearing a very tall tiara upon his head, from being a slave and not being allowed to do anything that he does; for every act that he performs will bring a penalty and be unprofitable. But some other man who is regarded as a slave and is so called, who has not once but often, if it so chance, been sold, and if it should so happen, wears very heavy fetters, will be more free than the Great King.

§ 14.19 To me it appears exceeding strange that one who wears fetters or has been branded or who grinds in a mill will be more free than the Great King. DIO: Well, now have you ever been in Thrace? — Yes. DIO: Then you have seen the women there, the free women, covered with branded marks, and having the more such marks and the more elaborate in proportion to their social standing and that of the families to which they belong? — Now, pray, what does this signify?

§ 14.20 DIO: That, as it seems, there is nothing to prevent a queen from being tattooed; but do you think that there is anything to prevent a king? And further, have you never heard of that race, either, where the king is kept under guard in a very high tower and may not descend from that tower? But, if you had heard, you would have understood that it is possible for a man to be king even if kept closely confined. And you might perhaps have heard those people expressing surprise if you had tried to tell them about the Persian King, and refusing to believe that there is such a thing as a king who drives about in a chariot and goes wherever he wishes. — But you cannot give an instance of a king who is in bonds.

§ 14.21 DIO: No king of men, perhaps, and yet the King of the Gods, the first and eldest one, is in bonds, they say, if we are to believe Hesiod and Homer and other wise men who tell this tale about Cronus, and indeed he does not receive this treatment unjustly from a personal enemy, but from one most just who loved him dearly, who evidently treats him thus because it is fit treatment for a king and profitable to him.

§ 14.22 But they do not know this and would never imagine that a beggar or a prisoner or man without repute was once king, although they hear that Odysseus, for all his being a beggar and begging of the suitors, was none the less a king and the owner of the house, while Antinous and Eurymachus, whom Homer named'kings,' were miserable and unfortunate wretches. But this, as I said, they do not know, and as badges of royalty they clothe themselves with tiaras and sceptres and crowns so that none may fail to know that they are kings; just as, I imagine, owners mark their cattle to make them easily distinguishable.

§ 14.23 This undoubtedly is the reason why the King of the Persians ordained that he alone should wear his tiara upright; and if anyone else did this, he straightway ordered his execution, in the belief that it was not good or advantageous that in the midst of so many myriads of people two men should wear tiaras upright; but that he should have his mind upright

§ 14.24 and that no one should have greater wisdom than himself, for this he had no concern. So I fear that just as in those days there were such symbols of royalty as we have described, so now also there ought to be similar badges to mark the free man, and that he ought to walk abroad wearing a felt skull-cap, else we shall not be able to distinguish between the free man and the slave.

§ 15.1 The Fifteenth Discourse: On Slavery and Freedom II Recently, I assure you, I was present when two men were disputing at great length about slavery and freedom, not before judges or in the market-place, but at their ease at home, taking a long time about it; and each of the two men had a considerable number of warm adherents. For they had been debating other questions before that, as is my impression; and the one who was worsted in the debate, being at a loss for arguments, became abusive, as often happens in such cases, and taunted the other with not being a freeman. Whereupon the first very gently smiled and said:

§ 15.2 A. “But how can you say that? Is it possible, my good friend, to know who is a slave, or who is free?” B. “Yes, it certainly is,” replied the other. “I know at any rate that I myself am free and that all these men here are, but that you have no lot or share in freedom.” At this some of those present laughed, and yet the first man was not one whit more abashed, but just as gallant cocks are aroused at the blow of their masters and take courage, so he too was aroused and took courage at the insult, and asked his opponent where he got his knowledge about the two of them.

§ 15.3 B. “Because,” said he, “I know that my father is an Athenian, if any man is, while yours is the slave of so-and so,” mentioning his name. A. “According to this, then,” said the first man, “what is to prevent me from anointing myself in the Cynosarges along with the bastards, if I really am the son of a free-born mother — who is, perhaps, a citizen into the bargain — and of the father whom you mention? Have not many women who are citizens, embarrassed by the scarcity of eligible men, been got with child either by foreigners or by slaves, sometimes not knowing the fact, but sometimes also with full knowledge of it? And of the children thus begotten none is a slave, but only a non- Athenian.”

§ 15.4 B. “Well, in your case,” he rejoined, “I myself know that your mother is a slave in the same household as your father.” A. “Very well!” said the first man, “Do you know who your own mother is?” B. “Why certainly; a citizen born of citizens, who brought to her husband a pretty good dowry too.” A. “Could you actually take your oath that you are the son of the father of whom she says that you are? Telemachus, you know, did not care at all to insist in support of Penelope, the daughter of Icarius, who was regarded as a very chaste woman, that she spoke the truth when she declared that Odysseus was his father. But you, not only in support of yourself and of your mother, would take oath apparently, if anyone should bid you, but in regard to any slave woman as to who the man was by whom she was got with child, such a slave woman as you say that my mother was.

§ 15.5 Pray, does it seem to you impossible that she should have been got with child by some other man, a freeman, or even by her own master? Do not many Athenian men have intercourse with their maidservants, some of them secretly, but others quite openly? For surely it cannot be that every Greek is superior to Heracles, who did not think it beneath him to have intercourse even with the slave woman of Iardanus, who became the mother of the kings of Sardis.

§ 15.6 And further, you do not believe, as it seems, that Clytemnestra, the daughter of Tyndareus and the wife of Agamemnon, not only lived with Agamemnon, her own husband, but also, when he was away, had relations with Aegistheus, and that Aerope, the wife of Atreus, accepted the advances of Thyestes, and that many other wives of distinguished and wealthy men in both ancient and modern times have had relations with other men and sometimes have had children by them? But she who you say was a maidservant was so scrupulously faithful to her own husband that she would not have had relations with any other man!

§ 15.7 And further, in regard to yourself and me as well you asseverate that each of us was born of the woman who is reputed to be and is called his mother. And yet you might name many Athenians, and very prominent ones too, who turned out later not only not to have been the sons of the father but not even those of the mother to whom they were attributed, having been suppostitious children of unknown origin who had been reared as sons. And such incidents you yourself are constantly seeing exhibited and described by the writers of comedy and in tragedies, but nevertheless you go on in the same old way, making positive statements about yourself and about me, as if you knew for a certainty the circumstances of our birth and the identity of our parents.

§ 15.8 Do you not know,” he continued, “that the law permits anyone to bring an action for libel against the man who slanders without being able to adduce any clear proof of his statements?” B. And the other man replied, “Yes, I know that freeborn women often palm off other persons' children as their own on account of their childlessness, when they are unable to conceive children themselves, because each one wishes to keep her own husband and her home, while at the same time they do not lack the means to support the children; but in the case of slave women, on the other hand, some destroy the child before birth and others afterwards, if they can do so without being caught, and yet sometimes even with the connivance of their husbands, that they may not be involved in trouble by being compelled to raise children in addition to their enduring slavery.”

§ 15.9 A. “O yes, certainly,” the first man replied, “if you make an exception of the slave girl of Oineus, the bastard son, as he alleged, of Pandion. For Oineus' herdsman, who lived at Eleutherae, and that herdsman's wife, so far from exposing their own children, took up other people's children whom they found by the roadside, without having the least notion whose children they were, and reared them as their own, nor at any time afterwards were they willing to admit that they were not their own. But you, perhaps, would have abused both Zethus and Amphion before their identity became known, and would have taken solemn oath that the sons of Zeus were slaves.”

§ 15.10 B. Then this opponent laughed very ironically and said: “Aha! is it the tragic poets to whom you appeal as witnesses?” A. “Yes indeed,” said the other man, “for the Greeks have confidence in them; for whomsoever these poets exhibit as heroes, to them you will find all Greeks offering sacrifice as heroes, and you may see with your eyes the shrines which the people have erected in their honour. And in the same manner consider, if you please, the Phrygian woman, who was the slave of Priam, who reared Alexander on Mount Ida as her own son after taking him from her husband, who was a herdsman, and raised no objection to her rearing a child. And Telephus, the son of Auge and Heracles, they say was not reared by a woman but by a hind. Or do you think that a hind would have more compassion on a babe and desire to rear it than a human being would if she happened to be a slave?

§ 15.11 Come now, in Heaven's name, if I should go so far as to admit to you that my parents are those whom you say they are, how can you know that they are slaves? Or were you really sure who their parents were, and are you ready to take your solemn oath in regard to each of them also that both were born of two slaves — they and their progenitors back to the very beginning — all of them? For it is clear that if any member of a family is free-born, it is no longer possible rightly to regard his descendants as slaves. And it is impossible, my good sir, that from all eternity, as the saying is, there should be any race of men in which there have not been countless numbers free and not fewer than these in number those who have been slaves; and indeed, tyrants and kings and prisoners and branded slaves and shopkeepers and cobblers and all the rest such as are found in the world of men, so that among them you have had experience of all the occupations, all the careers, all the fortunes, and all the mischances.

§ 15.12 Or do you not know that the reason why the poets trace the families of so called heroes directly back to the gods is simply that the character in question may not be investigated further? And quite the majority of them men say are sprung from Zeus, in order that they may not have their kings and the founders of their cities and their eponymous heroes getting into predicaments of the kind that are regarded among men as disgraceful. Consequently, if it really is with men as we and others wiser than we claim, you can have no greater share in freedom on the score of family than any one of those who are regarded as out-and out slaves — unless, of course, you too make haste to trace your own ancestry back to Zeus or Poseidon or Apollo — and I no greater share in slavery.”

§ 15.13 B. “Well then,” said the other, “let us drop all this about family and ancestors, since you think it is so difficult to determine; for it is quite possible that you will turn out to be just like Amphion and Zethus, and like Alexander the offspring of Priam. But as for you, your own self, we all know that you are in a state of servitude.” A. “What,” said the first man, “do you think that all those who are in a state of servitude are slaves? But are not many of these, although free men, yet held unjustly in servitude? Some of them have already gone before the court and proved that they are free, while others are enduring to the end, either because they have no clear proof of their freedom, or else because those who are called their masters are not harsh with them.

§ 15.14 Consider, for instance, the case of Eumaeus, the son of Ctesias, son of Ormenus: he was the son of a man who was altogether free and of great wealth, but did he not serve as a slave in Ithaca in the households of Odysseus and Laertes? And yet, although he could, time and again, have sailed off home if he had so wished, he never thought it worth while. What, did not many Athenians among those made prisoners in Sicily serve as slaves in Sicily and in the Peloponnese although they were free men; and of those taken captive from time to time in many other battles, some only for a time until they found men who would ransom them, and others to the very end?

§ 15.15 In the same period too, even the son of Callias was thought to have been in servitude a long time in Thrace after the battle in which the Athenians suffered a defeat at Acanthus, so that when he escaped afterwards and reached home he laid claim to the estate left by Callias and caused a great deal of trouble to the next of kin, being, in my opinion, an impostor. For he was not the son of Callias but his groom, in appearance resembling that boy of Callias who did lose his life in the battle; and besides he spoke Greek accurately and could read and write. -

§ 15.16 But there have been innumerable others who have suffered this fate, since, even of those who are in servitude here at the present time I firmly believe that many are free-born men. For we shall not assert that any Athenian who is free-born is a slave if he has been made a prisoner in war and carried off to Persia, or even, if you like, is taken to Thrace or Sicily and sold like a chattel; but if any Thracian or Persian, not only born there of free parents but even the son of some prince or king, is brought here, we shall not admit that he is a free person.

§ 15.17 Do you not know,” he continued, “the law they have at Athens and in many other states as well, which does not allow the man who was born a slave to enjoy the rights of a citizen? But the son of Callias, if he actually did escape from captivity on that occasion, after reaching home from Thrace, even though he had spent many years there and had often been scourged, no one would think it right to exclude from Athenian citizenship; so that there are occasional instances where the law too denies that those who have been unjustly in servitude have thereby become slaves.

§ 15.18 In heaven's name, I ask you, what is it that I do of which you have knowledge, or what is it that is done to me, which justifies your saying that you know that I am in a state of slavery?” B. “I know that you are being kept by your master, dance attendance upon him, and do whatever he commands; or else you take a beating.” A. “According to that,” said the first man, “you can make out that sons also are the slaves of their fathers; for they dance attendance upon their fathers, often, if they are poor, walking with them to the gymnasium or to dinner; and they without exception are supported by their fathers and frequently are beaten by them, and they obey any orders their fathers give them.

§ 15.19 And yet, so far as obeying and being thrashed are concerned, you can go on and assert that the boys who take lessons of schoolmasters are likewise their servants and that the gymnastic trainers are slave-masters of their pupils, or those who teach anything else; for they give orders to their pupils and trounce them when they are disobedient.” B. “Indeed that's true,” replied the other, “but it is not permissible for the gymnastic instructors or for the other teachers to imprison their pupils or to sell them or to cast them into the mill, but to slave-masters all these things are allowed.”

§ 15.20 A. “Yes, but perhaps you do not know that in many states which have exceedingly good laws fathers have all these powers which you mention in regard to their sons, and what is more, if they wish to do so, they may even imprison or sell them; and they have a power even more terrible than any of these; for they actually are allowed to put their sons to death without any trial and even without bringing any accusation at all against them; but still none the less they are not their fathers' slaves but their sons. And even if I was once in a state of slavery in the fullest sense of the term and had been a slave justly from the very beginning, what is to prevent me now,” he continued, “from being just as free as anybody else, and you in your turn, on the contrary, even if you most indisputably were the son of free parents, from being an out-and out slave?”

§ 15.21 B. “For my part,” rejoined the other, “I do not see how I am to become a slave when, in fact, I am free; but as for you, it is not impossible that you have become free by your master's having emancipated you.” A. “See here, my good fellow,” said his antagonist, “would nobody get his freedom unless emancipated by his owner?” B. “Why, how could anybody?” asked the other. A. “In the same way that, when the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea passed a vote to the effect that those slaves who would help them in the war should receive their freedom, if the war had continued and Philip had not made peace with them too soon, many of the slaves at Athens, or rather, practically all of them, would have been free without having been emancipated one at a time by their respective masters.” B. “Yes, let that be granted — if the state is going to free you by taking official action.”

§ 15.22 A. “But what have you to say to this: Do you not think that I could liberate myself?” B. “Yes, if you should raise the money somewhere to pay your master with.” A. “That is not the method I mean, but the one by which Cyrus freed not only himself but also all the Persians, great host that they were, without paying down money to anyone or being set free by any master. Or do you not know that Cyrus was the vassal of Astyages and that when he got the power and decided that the time was ripe for action, he became both free and king of all Asia?” B. “Granted; I know it. But what do you mean by saying that I might become a slave?”

§ 15.23 A. “I mean that great numbers of men, we may suppose, who are free-born sell themselves, so that they are slaves by contract, sometimes on no easy terms but the most severe imaginable.” Now up to this point the audience paid attention to their arguments, under the impression that they were not made so much in earnest as in jest. Yet afterwards they fell to wrangling and were inclined to the opinion that it was a strange thing if it was going to be impossible for a man to cite any evidence by which the slave could be unequivocally distinguished from the free man, but that it would be easy to debate and argue about every individual case.

§ 15.24 So they dropped their discussion about the particular man in question and his slavery, and proceeded to consider the general question: Who is a slave. And the consensus of their opinion was that when anyone gets possession of a human being, in the strict meaning of the term, just as he might of any item of his goods or cattle, so as to have the right to use him as he likes, then that man is both correctly called and in fact is the slave of the man into whose possession he has come. Consequently, the man who had objected to being called a slave raised the further question as to what constituted the validity of possession.

§ 15.25 For, he said, in the case of a house, a plot of land, a horse, or a cow, many of those who had possession had in the past been found to have held them for a long time unjustly, in some instances even though they had inherited the things from their fathers. In precisely the same way it was possible, he maintained, to have gained possession also of a human being unjustly. For manifestly of those who from time to time acquire slaves, as they acquire all other pieces of property, some get them from others either as a free gift from someone or by inheritance or by purchase, whereas some few from the very beginning have possession of those who were born under their roof,'home-bred' slaves as they call them. A third method of acquiring possession is when a man takes a prisoner in war or even in brigandage and in this way holds the man after enslaving him, the oldest method of all, I presume. For it is not likely that the first men to become slaves were born of slaves in the first place, but that they were overpowered in brigandage or war and thus compelled to be slaves to their captors.

§ 15.26 So we see that this earliest method, upon which all the others depend, is exceedingly vulnerable and has no validity at all; for just as soon as those men are able to make their escape, there is nothing to prevent them from being free as having been in servitude unjustly. Consequently, they were not slaves before that, either. And sometimes they not only escaped from slavery themselves, but also reduced their masters to slavery. In this case, also, we have now found that'at the flip of a shell,' as the saying goes, their positions are completely reversed. At this point one of the audience interjected that while those men themselves perhaps could not be called slaves, yet their children and those of the second and third generations could quite properly be so designated.