Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities

§ 9.12.3 Now if they had husbanded the good fortune that was then theirs and had kept the camp under guard, they would have got possession of the Romans' baggage and forced them to a shameful retreat; but as it was, by turning to plundering what had been left behind and from then on refreshing themselves, as most of them did, they allowed a fine booty to escape out of their hands. For as soon as word of the taking of the camp reached the other consul, he hastened thither with the flower of both horse and foot.

§ 9.12.4 The Tyrrhenians, informed of this approach, formed a circle round the camp and a sharp battle occurred between them, as the Romans endeavoured to recover what was theirs and the enemy feared being annihilated if their camp should be taken. When considerable time passed and the Tyrrhenians had many advantages, since they fought from higher ground and against men spent with fighting the whole day,

§ 9.12.5 Titus Siccius, the legate and proconsul, after communicating his plan to the consul, ordered that a retreat should be sounded and that all the men should assemble in a single body and assault one side of the camp where it was most easy of attack. He left free from attack the parts next the gates, reasoning plausibly — and in this he was not deceived — that if the Tyrrhenians saw any hope of saving themselves, they would abandon the camp, whereas, if they despaired of this, finding themselves surrounded on all sides and no way of escape left, necessity would make them brave.

§ 9.12.6 And when the attack was directed against one point only, the Tyrrhenians no longer resisted, but opening the gates, made their way back in safety to their own camp.

§ 9.13.1 The consul, after he had averted the danger, returned once more to the assistance of those who were in the plain. This battle is said to have been greater than any the Romans had previously fought as regards not only the numbers of the combatants, but also the time it lasted and its sudden turns of fortune. For of the Romans themselves from the city the flower and choice of their youth consisted of about 20,000 foot and some 1200 horse attached to the four legions, while from their colonies and allies there was another force equally large.

§ 9.13.2 As for the duration of the battle, it began a little before noon and lasted till sunset. Its fortunes continued for a long time shifting to and fro with alternating victories and defeats. A consul was slain, as well as a legate who had himself been twice consul, and many other commanders, tribunes and centurions — more indeed than in any previous battle. But the victory in the struggle seemed to rest with the Romans, for this one reason alone, that the Tyrrhenians left their camp the following night and withdrew.

§ 9.13.3 The next day the Romans turned to plundering the camp which had been abandoned by the Tyrrhenians, and having buried the dead, returned to their own camp. There, having called an assembly of the soldiers, they distributed the rewards of valour to those who had distinguished themselves in the battle, as follows: first, to Caeso Fabius, the consul's brother, who had performed great and remarkable exploits; next, to Siccius, who had brought about the recovery of their camp; and third, to Marcus Flavoleius, the commander of the legion, on account of both the oath he had taken and the prowess he had shown in the midst of danger.

§ 9.13.4 After attending to these things they remained a few days in the camp; then, when none of the enemy came out to fight against them, they returned home. Though all in the city wished to honour the surviving consul with the victor's reward of a triumph because of a most glorious outcome to a very great battle, the consul declined the favour they offered, saying that it was neither right nor lawful for him to ride in procession and wear a crown of laurel after the death of his brother and the loss of his colleague. But after putting away the standards and dismissing the soldiers to their homes he resigned the consulship when two months still remained to complete his year's term, since he was no longer capable of performing the duties of the office. For he was still suffering from a horrible wound and obliged to keep his bed.

§ 9.14.1 The senate chose interreges to preside at the election of magistrates, and the second interrex having assembled the centuries in the Field, Caeso Fabius, the one who had been awarded the prize for valour in the battle, and brother to the man who had abdicated his magistracy, was chosen consul for the third time, and with him Titus Verginius. These, having drawn lots for the armies, took the field, Fabius to war against the Aequians, who were plundering the fields of the Latins, and Verginius against the Veientes.

§ 9.14.2 The Aequians, when they learned that an army was going to come against them, hastily evacuated the enemy's country and returned to their own cities; and after that they permitted their own territory to be ravaged, so the consul possessed himself at the first blow of large amounts of money, many slaves, and much booty of other sorts. As for the Veientes, they at first remained within their walls; but as soon as they thought they had a favourable opportunity, they fell upon the enemy as they were dispersed over the plains and occupied in seizing booty.

§ 9.14.3 And attacking them with a large army in good order, they not only took away their booty, but also killed or put to flight all who engaged them. Indeed, if Titus Siccius, who was legate at the time, had not come to their relief with a body of foot and horse in good order and held the foe in check, nothing could have prevented the army from being utterly destroyed. But when he got in the enemy's way, the rest of the troops, who had been scattered one here and one there, succeeded in getting together before it was too late; and being now all united, they occupied a hill late in the afternoon and remained there the following night.

§ 9.14.4 The Veientes, elated by their success, encamped near the hill and sent for their forces in the city, imagining that they had shut up the Romans in a place where they could not get any provisions, and that they would soon force them to deliver up their arms to them. And when a multitude of their men had arrived, there were now two armies posted on the two sides of the hill that could be assailed, as well as many smaller detachments to guard the less vulnerable positions; and every place was full of armed men.

§ 9.14.5 The other consul, Fabius, learning from a letter that came from his colleague that the troops shut up on the hill were in the direst straits and would be in danger of being reduced by famine unless someone came to their relief, broke camp and marched in haste against the Veientes. Indeed, if he had been one day later in completing his march, he would have been of no help, but would have found the army there destroyed. For the men holding the hill, distressed by the lack of provisions, had sallied out, ready to choose the most honourable death; and having engaged the enemy, they were then fighting, though the bodies of most of them were weakened by hunger, thirst, want of sleep, and every other hardship. 6 But after a short time, when the army of Fabius, which was very large and drawn up in order of battle, was seen approaching, it brought confidence to their own men and fear to the enemy; and the Tyrrhenians, believing themselves no longer to be strong enough to engaged in battle with a valiant and fresh army, abandoned their camps and withdrew. When the two armies of the Romans had come together, they made a large camp in a strong position near the city; then, after remaining there many days and plundering the best part of the territory of the Veientes, the generals led the army home. 7 When the Veientes heard that the forces of the Romans had been discharged from the standards, taking the light-armed youth, not only their own which they had already assembled, but also that of their neighbours which was then present, they made an incursion into the plains bordering upon their own territory, which were full of corn, cattle and men, and plundered them. For the husbandmen had come down from the strongholds to get feed for their cattle and to till their lands, relying upon the protection of their army, which then lay encamped between them and the enemy; and after this army had retired, they had made no hasten to move back, as they did not expect the Veientes, after having suffered so many defeats, to make a return attack so promptly against the foes. 8 This irruption of the Veientes into the Romans' country, though brief in point of the time it lasted, was very serious with respect to the amount of territory they overran; and it caused the Romans unusual vexation, mingled with shame, since it extended as far as the river Tiber and Mount Janiculum, which is not twenty stades from Rome. For there was no force then under the standards to stop the enemy's further progress; at any rate, the army of the Veientes had gone before the Romans could assemble and be assigned to centuries.

§ 9.15.1 When the senate was later called together by the consuls and had deliberated in what manner the war should be carried on against the Veientes, the opinion which prevailed was to maintain a standing army upon the frontiers, which should keep guard over the Roman territory, camp ing in the open and always remaining under arms. But the expense of maintaining the garrisons, which would be very great, grieved them, since the public treasury was exhausted as a result of the continual campaigns, and their private fortunes had prove unequal to the burden of the war-taxes. And they were grieved still more by the problem of enlisting the garrisons which were to be sent out, how that could be accomplished, there being little probability that a few men would, willingly at least, serve as a bulwark in defence of all and submit to hardships, not in successive shifts, but continuously.

§ 9.15.2 While the senate was troubled on both these accounts, the two Fabii assembled all the members of their clan, and having consulted with them, promised the senate that they themselves would voluntarily undertake this risk in defence of all the citizens, taking along with them their clients and friends, and would at their own expense continue in arms as long as the war should last.

§ 9.15.3 All admired them for their noble devotion and placed their hopes of victory in this single undertaking; and while they were being acclaimed and their names were on the lips of all, they took their arms and marched forth, accompanied by vows and sacrifices. Their leader was Marcus Fabius, the man who had been consul the preceding year and had conquered the Tyrrhenians in the late battle; those he took with him were about four thousand in number, the greater part of them being clients and friends, while of the Fabian clan there were three hundred and six men. They were followed a little later by the Roman army under the command of Caeso Fabius, one of the consuls.

§ 9.15.4 When they came near the river Cremera, which is not far from the city of the Veientes, they built upon a steep and craggy hill a fortress to command their territory, as large as could be garrisoned by an army of such size, surrounding it with a double ditch and erecting frequent towers; and the fortress was named Cremera, after the river. Since many hands were employed at this work and consul himself assisted them, it was completed sooner than might have been expected. 5 After that the consul marched out with the army and went past the city to the other side of the territory of the Veientes, the side facing toward the rest of Tyrrhenia, where the Veientes kept their herds, not expecting that a Roman army would ever come there; and having possessed himself of much booty, he returned home to the newly erected fortress. This quarry afforded him great satisfaction for two reasons — first, because he had so promptly retaliated upon the enemy, and again, because it would furnish abundant supplies to the garrison of the stronghold. For he neither turned over any part of the spoils to the treasury nor distributed any to the soldiers, but presented all the cattle, the beasts of burden, the yokes of oxen, the iron, and the other implements of husbandry to the patrols of the country. 6 After accomplishing this he led the army home. The Veientes found themselves in very dire straits after the erection of the frontier stronghold, since they could no longer either till their land in safety or receive the provisions that were imported from abroad. 7 For the Fabii had divided their army into four bodies, with one of which they guarded the stronghold, while with the other three they continually pillaged the enemy's country; and often, when the Veientes openly attacked them with a considerable force or endeavoured to entice them into places beset with ambuscades, the Fabii had the advantage in both situations, and after killing many of them, would retire safely to their stronghold. Consequently the enemy no longer dared to engage them, but remained shut up within their walls for the most part, and only ventured out by stealth. Thus ended that winter.

§ 9.16.1 The next year, when Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Servilius had assumed the consulship, the Romans were informed that the Volscians and the Aequians had entered into an agreement to lead out armies against them at the same time, and that they would soon make an irruption into their territory. And this information was true. At all events, sooner than anyone was expecting, both nations with their armies were ravaging the parts of the Roman territory that adjoined their own, in the belief that the Romans would not be able to cope with the Tyrrhenian war and at the same time to withstand their own attack.

§ 9.16.2 And again other messengers came reporting that all Tyrrhenia had become hostile to them and was prepared to send joint reinforcements to the Veientes. For the latter, finding themselves unable to destroy the fortress by themselves alone, had turned to them for help, reminding them of their kinship and friendship, and enumerating the many wars they had waged in common. In view of all this, they asked them to assist them in their war against the Romans, since they were now serving as a bulwark for all Tyrrhenia and stemming the torrent of war which was rushing from Rome upon all the peoples of their race. The Tyrrhenians were persuaded, and promised to send them as large a force of auxiliaries as they asked for.

§ 9.16.3 The senate, being informed of this, resolved to send three armies into the field; and the levies were speedily raised. Lucius Aemilius was sent against the Tyrrhenians; and taking part in the expedition with him was Caeso Fabius, the man who had recently resigned the consulship, having now asked leave of the senate to join his kinsmen on the Cremera whom his brother had led out to garrison that place, and to take part in the same contests as they; and invested with the proconsular power, he set out with his followers. 4 Gaius Servilius, the other consul, marched against the Volscians, and Servius Furius, the proconsul, against the Aequians. Each of them was at the head of two legions of Romans and an equally strong force of Latins, Hernicans and the other allies. In the case of the proconsul Servius the war went according to his wish and was soon over. For in a single battle he routed the Aequians, and that without any trouble, having terrified the enemy at the first onset; and thereafter he laid waste their country, as the people had taken refuge in their forts. 5 But Servilius, one of the consuls, having rushed into battle in a precipitate and headstrong fashion, found himself greatly disappointed in his expectations, with the result that after losing many brave men he was forced to give up engaging in pitched battles with them any longer, but remaining in his camp, to carry through the war by means of skirmishes and engagements of the light-armed troops. 6 Lucius Aemilius, who had been sent against the Tyrrhenians, finding that the Veientes had taken the field before their city together with a large number of auxiliaries of the same race, set to work without further delay; and letting only a single day pass after making camp, he led out his forces to battle, in which the Veientes joined with great confidence. When the contest continued doubtful, he took the horse and charged the right wing of the enemy; then, after throwing that into confusion, he proceeded to the other wing, fighting on horseback where the ground would permit, and where it would not, dismounting and fighting on foot. When both of the enemy's wings were in distress, those in the centre could no longer hold out either, but were thrust back by the Roman foot; and after that they all fled to their camp. 7 Aemilius followed them in their flight with his army in good order and killed many of them. When he came near their camp, he attacked it with relays of fresh troops, remaining there all that day and the following night; and the next day, when the enemy were spent with weariness, wounds and want of sleep, he made himself master of the camp. The Tyrrhenians, when they saw the Romans already mounting the palisades, left their camp and fled, some to the city and some to the neighbouring hills. 8 That day the consul remained in the enemy's camp; and on the next day he rewarded with the most magnificent presents those who had distinguished themselves in the battle, and gave to the soldiers all the beasts of burden and slaves that had been left behind in the camp, together with the tents, which were full of many valuables. And the Roman army found itself in greater opulence than after any former battle. For the Tyrrhenians were a people of dainty and expensive tastes, both at home and in the field carrying about with them, besides the necessities, costly and artistic articles of all kinds designed for pleasure and luxury.

§ 9.17.1 In the course of the following days the Veientes, yielding at last to their misfortunes, sent their oldest citizens to the consul with the tokens of suppliants to treat for peace. These men, resorting to lamentations and entreaties and with many tears rehearsing every argument calculated to arouse compassion, endeavoured to persuade the consul to let them send ambassadors to Rome to treat with the senate for a termination of the war, and until the ambassadors should return with the senate's answer, to do no injury to their country. In order to obtain these concessions, they promised to supply the Roman army with corn for two months and with money for their pay for six months, as the victor commanded.

§ 9.17.2 And the consul, after receiving what they brought and distributing it among his men, made the truce with them. The senate, having heard the ambassadors and received the letter of the consul, in which he earnestly recommended and urged putting an end to the war with the Tyrrhenians as soon as possible, passed a decree to grant peace as the enemy desired; as to the terms on which the peace should be made, they left them for the consul Lucius Aemilius to determine in such manner as he should think best.

§ 9.17.3 The consul, having received this answer, concluded a peace with the Veientes that was more equitable than advantageous to the conquerors; for he neither took far from them any part of their territory, nor imposed on them any further fine of money, nor compelled them to give hostages as security for the performance of their agreement.

§ 9.17.4 This action brought upon him great odium and was the reason for his not receiving from the senate the rewards due for his success; for when he requested the customary triumph, they opposed it, censuring his arbitrary behaviour in the matter of the treaty, in that he had concluded it without their concurrence. But lest he should take this action as an insult and evidence of their anger, they ordered him to march with his army against the Volscians in order to bear aid to his colleague, on the chance that if he succeeded in the war there — for he was a man of great bravery — he might blot out the resentment for his former errors. But Aemilius, angry at this slight upon his honour, inveighed violently against the senate in the popular assembly, accusing them of being displeased that the war against the Tyrrhenians was ended, He declared that they were doing this with treacherous intent and through contempt of the poor, lest these, when freed from foreign wars, should demand the performance of the promises concerning the allotment of land with which they had been cajoled by them for so many years already.

§ 9.17.5 After he had in his ungovernable resentment poured forth these and many similar reproaches against the patricians, he not only dismissed from the standards the army that had served under him, but also sent for the forces that were tarrying in the country of the Aequians under Furius the proconsul and dismissed them to their homes. Thereby he once more gave the tribunes a considerable warrant for accusing the senators in the meetings of the assembly and sowing dissension between the poor and the rich.

§ 9.18.1 These consuls were succeeded by Gaius Horatius and Titus Menenius in the seventy-sixth Olympiad (the one at which Scamander of Mitylene won the foot-race) [476 BCE], when Phaedo was archon at Athens. The new consuls were at first hindered from transacting the public business by the domestic disturbance, the populace being exasperated and not permitting any other public business to be carried on until they should divide up among themselves the public land; but after a time the seditious and turbulent elements yielded to necessity and came in voluntarily to be enlisted.

§ 9.18.2 For the eleven cities of the Tyrrhenians which had had no part in the peace, holding a general assembly, inveighed against the Veientes for having put an end to the war with the Romans without the general consent of the nation, and demanded that they do one of two things — either break the compact they had made with the Romans, or join with the Romans in making war upon the rest of the Tyrrhenians.

§ 9.18.3 But the Veientes laid the blame for the peace upon necessity, and proposed that the assembly consider how they might break it with decency. Upon this someone suggested to them that they should make formal complaint of the erection of the frontier stronghold on the Cremera and of the failure of its garrison to withdraw from there, and then should first make an oral demand that they evacuate the place, and, if they refused, should lay siege to the fortress and make this action the beginning of the war.

§ 9.18.4 Having agreed on this course, they left the assembly; and not long afterwards the Veientes sent ambassadors to the Fabii to demand from them the fortress, and all Tyrrhenia was in arms. The Romans, learning of these things through letters from the Fabii, resolved that both the consuls should take the field, one to command in the war that was coming upon them from Tyrrhenia and the other to prosecute the war which was still going on with the Volscians.

§ 9.18.5 Horatius, accordingly, marched against the Volscians with two legions and an adequate force of the allies, and Menenius was preparing to set out against the Tyrrhenians with another force of equal size; but while he was making his preparations and losing time, the fortress on the Cremera was destroyed by the enemy and the entire Fabian clan perished. Concerning the disaster that befell these men two accounts are current, one less probable and the other coming nearer to the truth. I shall give them both as I have received them.

§ 9.19.1 Some say that when the time was at hand for a traditional sacrifice which devolved upon the Fabian clan, the men set out from the fortress, attended by a few clients, to perform the rites, and proceeded without reconnoitring the roads or marching ranged in centuries under their standards, but negligently and unguardedly as in time of peace and as if they were passing through friendly territory.

§ 9.19.2 The Tyrrhenians, having learned of their departure in advance, placed one part of their army in ambush at a spot along the road, and followed son after with the rest of their forces in regular formation. When the Fabii drew near the ambuscade, the Tyrrhenians who were lying in wait there rose up and fell upon them, some in front and others in flank, and a little later the rest of the Tyrrhenian force attacked them from the rear; and surrounding them on all sides and shooting at them, some with slings, some with bows, and others hurling javelins and spears, they overwhelmed them all with the multitude of their missiles.

§ 9.19.3 Now this account seems to me to be the less credible. For not only is it improbable that so many serving under the standards would have returned from the camp to the city because of a sacrifice without a decree from the senate, when the rites might have been performed by others of the same clan who were advanced in years; but even if they had all gone from the city and no part of the Fabian clan was left in their homes, it is improbable that all who held the fortress would have abandoned the guarding of it, since even three or four of them would have sufficed to return to Rome and perform the rites for the whole clan. For these reasons, then, this account has not seemed to me to be credible.

§ 9.20.1 The other account concerning the destruction of the Fabii and the capture of the fortress, which I regard as being nearer to the truth, is somewhat as follows. As the men went out frequently to forage and, encouraged by the continued success of their forays, advanced even farther, the Tyrrhenians got ready a numerous army and encamped in the near neighbourhood unperceived by the enemy. Then, sending out of their strongholds flocks of sheep, herds of cattle, and drove of mares as if to pasture, they lured the garrison to these; and the men, coming out, seized the herdsmen and rounded up the cattle.

§ 9.20.2 The Tyrrhenians kept doing this and drawing the enemy ever farther away from their camp; then, when they had destroyed in them all thought for their safety by enticing them with constant booty, they placed ambuscades at night in the most suitable positions, while others occupied the heights that commanded the plains. The next day, sending ahead a few armed men, as if to serve as a guard for the herdsmen, they drove out a large number of herds from their strongholds.

§ 9.20.3 When word was brought to the Fabii that if they went over the neighbouring hills they would in a very short time find the plain covered with cattle of all sorts with a guard insufficient to defend them, they went out of the fortress, leaving an adequate garrison there. And covering the distance speedily in their eagerness, they appeared before the guards of the cattle in battle array. These did not await their attack, but fled, and the Fabii, thinking themselves now quite secure, set about seizing the herdsmen and rounding up the cattle.

§ 9.20.4 Thereupon the Tyrrhenians, rising up from ambush in many places, fell upon them from all sides. The greater part of the Romans, being scattered and unable to assist one another, were killed upon the spot; but those who were in a body, being eager to reach a secure position and hastening toward the hills, fell into another ambuscade that lay concealed in the woods and glens. Here a sharp battle took place between them and there was great slaughter on both sides. But nevertheless they repulsed even these foes, and after filling the ravine with dead bodies, they ran up to the top of a hill that was not easy to take, and there passed the following night in want of the necessary provisions.

§ 9.21.1 The next day those who were holding the fortress, upon being informed of the disaster that had befallen their companions — namely, that the greater part of the army had been destroyed in their pursuit of plunder and the bravest of them were shut up and besieged on a lonely mountain, and that if some aid seems reach them promptly they would soon be destroyed for want of provisions — set out in haste, leaving very few in the fortress to guard it. These troops, before they could join their companions, were surrounded by the Tyrrhenians, who rushed down upon them from their strongholds; and though they displayed many feats of valour, they were in time all destroyed.

§ 9.21.2 Not long afterwards those also who had seized the hill, being oppressed by both hunger and thirst, resolved to charge the enemy; and engaging, a few against many, they continued fighting from morning till night, and made so great a slaughter of the enemy that the heaps of dead bodies piled up in many places were a hindrance to them in fighting. Indeed, the Tyrrhenians had lost above a third part of their army, and fearing for the rest, they now gave the signal for a retreat and stopped fighting for a short time; and sending heralds to the men, they offered them their lives and a safe-conduct if they would lay down their arms and evacuate the fortress.

§ 9.21.3 When the others refused their offer and chose the death befitting men of noble birth, the Tyrrhenians renewed the struggle, attacking them in relays, though no longer fighting at close quarters in hand-to-hand combat, but standing in a body and hurling javelins and stones at them from a distance; and the multitude of missiles was like a snow-storm. The Romans, massing by companies, rushed upon their foes, who did not stand their ground, and though they received many wounds from those surrounding them, they stood firm.

§ 9.21.4 But when the swords of many had become useless, some having their edges blunted and others being broken, and the borders of their shields next the rims were hacked in pieces, and the men themselves were for the most part bled white and overwhelmed by missiles and their limbs paralysed by reason of the multitude of their wounds, the Tyrrhenians scorned them and came to close quarters. Then the Romans, rushing at them like wild beasts, seized their spears and broke them, grasped their swords by the edges and wrenched them out of their hands, and twisting the bodies of their antagonists, fell with them to the ground, locked in close embrace, fighting with greater rage than strength.

§ 9.21.5 Hence the enemy, astonished at their endurance and terrified at the madness that had seized them in their despair of life, no longer ventured to come to grips with them, but retiring again, stood in a body and hurled at them sticks, stones, and anything else they could lay their hands on, and at last buried them under the multitude of missiles. After destroying these men they ran to the fortress, carrying with them the heads of the most prominent, expecting to take the men there prisoners at their first onset.

§ 9.21.6 However, the attempt did not turn out according to their hopes; for the men who had been left there, emulating the noble death of their comrades and kinsmen, came out of the fortress, though very few in number, and after fighting for a considerable time were all destroyed in the same manner as the others; and the place was empty of men when the Tyrrhenians took it. To me now this account appears much more credible than the former; but both of them are to be found in Roman writings of good authority.

§ 9.22.1 The addition to this account which has been made by certain writers, though neither true nor plausible, but invented by the multitude from some false report, does not deserve to be passed over without examination. For some report that after the three hundred and six Fabii had been slain, there was only one boy left out of the whole clan, thereby introducing a detail that is not only improbable, but even impossible;

§ 9.22.2 for it is not possible that all the Fabii who went out to the fortress were unmarried and childless. For not only did the ancient law of the Romans oblige all of the proper age to marry, but they were forced also to rear all their children; and surely the Fabii would not have been the only persons to violate a law which had been observed by their ancestor down to their time.

§ 9.22.3 But even if one were to admit this assumption, yet he would never make the further assumption that none of them had any brothers still in their childhood. Why, such institutions resemble myths and fictions of the stage! Besides, would not as many of their fathers as were still of an age to beget children, now that so great a desolation had come upon their clan, have begotten other children both willingly and unwillingly, in order that neither the sacrifices of their ancestors might be abandoned nor the great reputation of the clan be extinguished?

§ 9.22.4 Unless, indeed, none even of their fathers were left and all the conditions which would render it impossible to perpetuate the clan combined together ink those three hundred and six men — namely, that they left behind them no infant children, no wives with child, no brothers still under age, no fathers in the prime of life.

§ 9.22.5 Testing the story by such reasoning, I have come to the conclusion that it is not true, but that the following is the true account. Of the three brothers, Caeso, Quintus, and Marcus, who had been consuls for seven years in succession, I believe that Marcus left one young son, and that this boy was the one who is reported to have been the survivor of the Fabian house.

§ 9.22.6 There is no reason why it should not have been because no one else of the clan became famous and illustrious except this one son, when he had grown to manhood, that most people came to hold the belief that he was the only survivor of the Fabian clan — not, indeed, that there was no other, but that there was none like those famous three — judging kinship on the basis of merit, not of birth. But enough on this subject.

§ 9.23.1 After the Tyrrhenians, then, had destroyed the Fabii and taken the fortress on the Cremera, they led their forces against the other army of the Romans. It chanced that Menenius, one of the consuls, lay encamped not far away in an insecure position; and when the Fabian clan and their clients perished, he was only some thirty stades from the place where the disaster occurred — a circumstance which gave many people reason to believe that, though aware of the dire straits of the Fabii, he had shown no concern for them because of the envy he felt of their valour and reputation.

§ 9.23.2 Accordingly, when he was later brought to trial by the tribunes, this was the chief ground for his condemnation. For the people of Rome deeply mourned their having shorn themselves of the valour of so many and so brave men and were severe and inexorable toward all whom they suspected of having been responsible for so great a calamity; and they regard the day on which the disaster occurred as black and inauspicious and will begin no useful labour on it, looking upon the disaster which then occurred on that day as a bad omen.

§ 9.23.3 When the Tyrrhenians came near the Romans and observed the situation of their camp, which lay under a flank of a hill, they felt contempt for the inexperience of the general and gladly grasped the advantage presented to them by Fortune. They at once marched up the opposite side of the hill with their horse and gained the summit without opposition. Then, having possessed themselves of the height above the Romans, they made camp there, brought up the rest of their army in safety, and fortified the camp with a high palisade and a deep ditch.

§ 9.23.4 Now if Menenius, when he perceived what an advantage he had given the enemy, had repented of his error and removed his army to a safer position, he would have been wise; but as it was, being ashamed to be thought to have made a mistake, and maintaining an obstinate front toward those who advised him to change his plans, he came a merited fall which brought disgrace as well.

§ 9.23.5 For as the enemy were constantly sending out detachments from places that commanded his camp, they had many advantages, not only seizing the provisions which the merchants were bringing to the Romans, but also attacking his men as they went out for forage or for water; and it had come to the point where the consul did not have it in his power to choose either the time or the place of combat — which seems to be strong evidence of the inexperience of a general — whereas the Tyrrhenians could do both as they wished.

§ 9.23.6 And not even then could Menenius bring himself to move his army away from there; but leading out the troops, he drew them up ready for battle, scorning all who offered salutary advice. The Tyrrhenians, looking upon the folly of the general as a piece of great good fortune, came down from their camp with numbers fully twice those of their foe.

§ 9.23.7 When they engaged, there was a great slaughter of the Romans, who were unable to keep their ranks. For they were forced back by the Tyrrhenians, who not only had the terrain as an ally, but were also helped by the vigorous pressure of those who stood behind them, their army being drawn up with deep files. When the most prominent centurions had fallen, the rest of the Roman army gave way and fled to the camp; and the enemy pursued them, took away their standards, seized their wounded, and got possession of their dead.

§ 9.23.8 Then they shut them up in their camp and besieged them; and delivering numerous attacks during all the rest of the day, without desisting even at night, they captured the camp, which the Romans had abandoned, and took many prisoners and a great quantity of booty; for those who fled had not been able to pack up their belongings, but were glad to escape with their bare lives, many not keeping even their arms.

§ 9.24.1 When those at Rome heard that their army was destroyed and their camp taken — the first who had saved themselves from the rout arrived while it was still deep night — they fell into great confusion, as may well be imagined; and expecting the enemy to come against them at any moment, they seized their arms and some formed a circle about the walls, others stationed themselves before the gates, and still others occupied the heights in the city.

§ 9.24.2 There was a disorderly running to and fro throughout the entire city and a confused clamour; on the roofs of the houses were the members of each household, prepared to defend themselves and give battle; and an uninterrupted succession of torches, as it was in the night and dark, blazed through lanterns and from roofs, so many in number that to those seeing them at a distance it seemed to be one continuous blaze and gave the impression of a city on fire.

§ 9.24.3 And if the Tyrrhenians at that time had scorned the booty to be got from the camp and had followed on the heels of the fleeing Romans, the whole army which had taken the field against them would have been destroyed; but as it was, by turning to plundering everything which had been left behind in the camp and to resting their bodies, they deprived themselves of a great opportunity for boasting. The next day they led their forces against Rome, and when they were about sixteen stades from the city, they occupied the mount called Janiculum, from which the city is in full view. And using that as a base of operations, they pillaged the territory of the Romans without hindrance, holding those in the city in great contempt, till the other consul, Horatius, appeared with the army which had been among the Volscians.

§ 9.24.4 Then at last the Romans thought themselves safe, and arming the youth that were in the city, they took the field; and having not only in the first battle, which was fought at the distance of eight stades from the city near the temple of Hope, overcome their opponents and driven them back, but also, after that engagement, having fought brilliantly with them again near the gate called the Colline, when the Tyrrhenians had come against them with another and larger army, they recovered from their fear. Thus ended that year.

§ 9.25.1 The following year, about the summer solstice, in the month of August, Servius Servilius and Aulus Verginius succeeded to the consulship, both being men of experience in warfare. To them the Tyrrhenian war, though great and difficult, seemed pure gold in comparison with the conflict inside the city walls. For since the land had gone unsown the preceding winter because the enemy had fortified the adjacent hill against them and had kept up incessant raids, and since not even the merchants any longer imported the usual provisions from outside, Rome suffered from a great scarcity of corn, as the city was then crowded not only with its permanent population, but also with a multitude that had flocked thither from the country.

§ 9.25.2 For of adult citizens there were more than 110,000, as appeared by the latest census; and the number of the women, children, domestics, foreign traders and artisans who plied the menial trades — for no Roman citizen was permitted to earn a livelihood as a tradesman or artisan — was not less than treble the number of the citizens. This multitude was not easy to placate; for they were exasperated at their misfortune, and gathering together in the Forum, clamoured against the magistrates, rushed in a body to the houses of the rich and endeavoured to seize without payment the provisions that were stored up by them.

§ 9.25.3 In the meantime the tribunes assembled the people, and by accusing the patricians of always contriving some mischief against the poor, and calling them the authors of all the evils which had ever happened at the caprice of Fortune, whose whims men can neither foresee nor guard against, they inspired them with insolence and bitter resentment.

§ 9.25.4 The consuls, beset by these evils, sent men with large sums of money to the neighbouring districts to purchase corn, and ordered all those who had stored up more than a moderate amount of corn for their own subsistence to turn it over to the state; and they fixed a reasonable price for it. By these and many other like expedients they put a stop to the lawless actions of the poor and thus got respite for their preparations for war.

§ 9.26.1 But when the provisions from outside were slow in coming and all the food supplies in the city had been consumed and there was no other means of averting the evils but to choose one of two courses — either to hazard an engagement with all their forces, in order to drive the enemy out of the country, or by remaining shut up within the walls to perish both by famine and by sedition — they chose the lesser of these evils and resolved to go forth to meet the perils from the enemy.

§ 9.26.2 Marching out of the city, therefore, with their forces, they crossed the river about midnight on rafts, and before it was broad daylight encamped near the enemy. The next day they came out of their camp and drew up their army for battle, Verginius commanding the right wing and Servilius the left.

§ 9.26.3 The Tyrrhenians, seeing them ready for the contest, rejoiced greatly, believing that by this single battle, if it turned out according to their wish, they would overthrow the empire of the Romans; for they knew that all their foes' best soldiery was entered in this contest, and they entertained the hope, which was very ill founded, of defeating them with ease, since they had conquered the troops of Menenius when these had been arrayed against them in a disadvantageous position. But after a sharp and protracted battle, in which they killed many of the Romans but lost many more of their own men, they began to retreat gradually toward their camp.

§ 9.26.4 Verginius, who commanded the right wing, would not permit his men to pursue the enemy, but urged them to rest content with the advantage they had gained; Servilius, however, who was posted on the other wing, pursued the foes who had faced him, following them for a long distance. But when he reached the heights, the Tyrrhenians face about and, those in the camp coming to their aid, they fell upon the Romans. These, after receiving their attack for a short time, turned their backs and, being pursued down hill, were slain as they became scattered.

§ 9.26.5 When Verginius was informed of the plight of the left wing of the army, he led his entire force in battle array by a transverse road that passed over the hill. Then, finding himself in the rear of those who were pursuing his troops, he left a part of his army there to block any who should be sent from the camp to the relief of their comrades, and he himself with the rest attacked the enemy. In the meantime the troops also under Servilius, encouraged by the arrival of their comrades, faced about and, standing their ground, engaged. The Tyrrhenians, being thus surrounded by both forces and being unable either to break through in front, by reason of those who engaged them, or to flee back to their camp, by reason of those who attacked them in the rear, fought bravely but unsuccessfully, and were almost all destroyed.

§ 9.26.6 The Romans having thus gained a melancholy victory and the outcome of the battle being not altogether fortunate, the consuls encamped before the bodies of the slain and there spent the following night under the open sky. The Tyrrhenians who were occupying the Janiculum, when no reinforcements came to them from home, decided to abandon the fortress; and breaking camp in the night, they withdrew to Veii, which lay nearest to them of the Tyrrhenian cities.

§ 9.26.7 The Romans, having possessed themselves of their camp, plundered all the effects which the enemy had left behind as being impossible to carry away in their flight, and also seized many of their wounded, part of whom had been left in their tents, while others lay scattered all along the road.

§ 9.26.8 For some, eager to be on their way home, were holding out and with hearts stout beyond their strength were persisting in following their comrades; then, when their limbs grew heavy, they collapsed half dead to the ground. These the Roman horsemen slew as they advanced a good distance along the road. And when there was no longer any sign of the enemy, the army razed the fortress and returned to the city with the spoils, carrying with them the bodies of those who had been slain in the battle — a piteous sight to all the citizens by reason both of the number and of the valour of those who had perished.

§ 9.26.9 Accordingly, the people did not think it fitting either to hold festival as for a glorious victory or to mourn as for a great and irreparable calamity; and the senate, while ordering the required sacrifices to be offered to the gods, did not permit the consuls to conduct the triumphal procession in token of a victory. A few days later the city was filled with all sorts of provisions, as not only the men who had been sent out by the commonwealth but also those who were accustomed to carry on this trader had brought in much corn; consequently, everybody enjoyed the same abundance as aforetime.

§ 9.27.1 The foreign wars being now ended, the civil dissensions began to flare up again as the tribunes once more stirred up the populace. And though all their other measures were defeated as the result of marshalling their forces against every proposal, yet they were unable to suppress the accusation against Menenius, the late consul, in spite of all their efforts,

§ 9.27.2 but he was brought to trial by Quintus Considius and Titus Genucius, two of the tribunes. And being called upon to give an accounting of his conduct of the war, the outcome of which had been neither fortunate nor honourable, and being blamed particularly for the destruction of the Fabii and the capture of Cremera, he was condemned by no small majority of the votes when the plebeians passed judgement upon him by tribes — even though he was the son of Agrippa Menenius who had brought the populace home after their secession and reconciled them with the patricians, the son of a man whom the senate after his death had honoured with a most magnificent funeral at the public expense and for whom the Roman matrons had mourned for a whole year, laying aside their purple and gold.

§ 9.27.3 However, those who convicted him did not impose death as the penalty, but rather a fine — one which if compared with the fortunes of to-day would appear ridiculous, but to the men of that age, who worked their own farms and aimed at no more than the necessaries of life, and particularly to Menenius, who had inherited poverty from his father, was excessive and oppressive, amounting to 2000 asses. The as was at that time a copper coin weighing a pound, so that the whole fine amounted to sixteen talents of copper in weight.

§ 9.27.4 And this appeared invidious to the men of those days, who, in order to redress it, abolished all pecuniary fines, changing them to payments in sheep and oxen, and limiting the number even of these in the case of all fines to be imposed thereafter by the magistrates upon private persons. From this condemnation of Menenius the patricians took fresh occasion for resentment against the plebeians and would neither permit them to carry out the allotment of lands nor make any other concession in their favour.

§ 9.27.5 And not long afterwards even the populace repented of having condemned him, when they learned of his death. For from that time he no longer entered into any intercourse with his fellow men nor was seen by anyone in any public place; and though it was his privilege by paying his fine not to be excluded from any public doings — for not a few of his friends were ready to pay the fine — he would not accept their offer, but rating his misfortune as a capital sentence and remaining at home and admitting no one, wasted away through dejection and abstinence from food, and so perished. These were the events of that year.

§ 9.28.1 When Publius Valerius Publicola and Gaius Nautius had succeeded to the consulship, another of the patricians, Servius Servilius, who had been consul the preceding year, was put on trial for his life not long after laying down his magistracy. Those who cited him to trial before the populace were Lucius Caedicius and Titus Statius, two of the tribunes, who demanded an accounting, not for any crime, but for his bad luck, inasmuch as in the battle against the Tyrrhenians he had pressed forward to the enemy's camp with greater daring than prudence, and being pursued by the garrison, who rushed out in a body, had lost the flower of the youth.

§ 9.28.2 This trial was regarded by the patricians as the most grievous of all; and meeting together, they expressed their resentment and indignation if boldness on the part of generals and their refusal to shirk any danger were going to be made a ground for accusations, in case Heaven opposed their plans, on the part of those who had not faced the dangers; and they reasoned that such trials would in all probability be the cause of cowardice, shirking and the lack of any further initiative on the part of commanders — the very weaknesses through which liberty is lost and supremacy undermined.

§ 9.28.3 They earnestly implored the plebeians not to condemn the man, pointing out that they would do great harm to the commonwealth if they punished their generals for being unfortunate.

§ 9.28.4 When the time for the trial was at hand, Lucius Caedicius, one of the tribunes, came forward and accused Servilius of having through his folly and inexperience in the duties of a general led his forces to manifest destruction and lost the finest manhood of the army; and he declared that if his colleague had not been informed promptly of the disaster and had not by bringing up his forces in all haste repulsed the enemy and saved their own men, nothing could have prevented the other army from being utterly destroyed and the state from being reduced henceforth to one-half its former members.

§ 9.28.5 After he had thus spoken, he produced as witnesses all the centurions who had survived and some of the rank and file, who in the effort to wipe out their own disgrace arising from that defeat and flight were ready to blame the general for the ill success of the engagement. Then, having poured out many words of commiseration for the fate of those who had lost their lives upon that occasion, exaggerated the disaster, and with great contempt of the patricians dwelt at length upon everything else which by exposing their whole order to hatred was sure to discourage all who were intending to intercede for the man, he gave him an opportunity of speaking.

§ 9.29.1 Taking up his defence, Servilius said: “If it is to a trial, citizens, that you have summoned me, and you desire an accounting of my generalship, I am ready to make my defence; but if it is to a punishment all determined, and no advantage is to accrue to me for showing that I have not wronged you in any way, take my person and deal with it as you have long desired to do.

§ 9.29.2 Indeed, for me it is better to die without a trial than after getting a chance to plead my cause and then failing to convince you — since I should in that case seem to suffer deservedly whatever you determined against me — and you on your part will be less blameworthy for depriving me of the right to plead my cause and for indulging your angry passions while it is still uncertain even whether I have done you any wrong. And your intention will be evident to me by the manner in which you give me a hearing: by your clamour and by your silence I shall judge whether it is to vengeance or to judgement that you have summoned me.”

§ 9.29.3 Having said this, he stopped, And when silence followed and then the majority cried out to him to be of good courage and say all that he wished, he resumed his plea and said: “Well then, citizens, if you are to be my judges and not my enemies, I believe I shall easily convince you that I am guilty of no crime. I shall begin my defence with facts with which you are all familiar. I was chosen consul together with that most excellent man, Verginius, at the time when the Tyrrhenians, having fortified against you the hill that commands the city, were masters of all the open country and entertained hopes of speedily overthrowing our empire. There was a great famine in the city, and sedition, and perplexity as to what should be done.

§ 9.29.4 Having been brought face to face with so turbulent and so formidable a crisis, I together with my colleague overcame the enemy in two engagements and obliged them to abandon the fort and leave the country, while I soon put an end to the famine by supplying the markets with abundant provisions; and I handed over to my successors not only our territory freed from hostile arms but also our city cured of every political distemper with which the demagogues had infected it. For what wrongdoing, then, am I accountable to you — unless to conquer your enemies is to wrong you?

§ 9.29.5 And if some of the soldiers happened to lose their lives in the battle while fighting successfully, in what way has Servilius wronged the people? For naturally no god offers himself as surety to generals for the lives of all who are going into battle; nor do we receive the command of armies upon stated terms and conditions, namely that we are to overcome all our enemies and lose none of our own men. For who that is a mere mortal would consent to take upon himself all the consequences both of his judgement and of his luck? No man, I say; but our great successes we always buy at the cost of great hazards.

§ 9.30.1 ”Moreover, I am not the first to whom it has fallen to suffer this fate when engaging the enemy, but it has happened to practically all who have risked desperate battles against enemy forces more numerous than their own. For there have been instances when generals after chasing their foes have themselves been put to flight, and while slaying many of their opponents have lost still more of their own men.

§ 9.30.2 I shall not add that many even after meeting utter defeat have returned home with ignominy and great loss, yet not one of them has been punished for his bad luck. For the calamity itself is a sufficient punishment, and to receive no praise, as is inevitable, even without anything else, is a great and grievous penalty for a general. Nevertheless, I for my part am so far from maintaining — what all reasonable men will allow to be just — that I do not have to render an accounting of my luck, that, even though no one else was ever willing to submit to such a trial, I alone do not decline to do so, but consent that my luck be inquired into as well as my judgement — after I have first made this one statement:

§ 9.30.3 I observe that men's undertakings, both unsuccessful and successful, are judged, not by the several operations in detail, which are many and various, but by the final outcome. When this turns out according to their hopes, even though the intermediate operations, which are many, may not be to their liking, I nevertheless hear the undertakings praised and admired by all and regarded as the consequences of good luck; but when these measures lead to bad results, even though every measure before the final outcome is carried out with the greatest ease, they are ascribed, not to the good, but to the bad luck of their authors.

§ 9.30.4 So, taking this as the target, do you yourselves consider what has been my luck in the various wars; and if you find that I was vanquished by the enemy, call my luck bad, but if I was victorious over them, call it good. On the subject of luck, now, I could say still more; however, as I am not unaware that all who discuss it are tiresome, I will desist.

§ 9.31.1 “But since they censure my judgement also, not daring, indeed, to accuse me of treachery or cowardice, the charges on which other generals are tried, but accuse me of inexperience in the duties of a general and imprudence, in that I undertook an unnecessary risk in pressing forward to the enemy's camp, I wish to render you an accounting on that point, too, since I can make the very obvious retort that it is very easy and lies within the power of any man to censure past actions, whereas to venture upon glorious exploits is difficult and within the power of but few; also that it is not so apparent what future events will be as what past events are, but, on the contrary, we apprehend the latter by perception and our experiences, while we conjecture the others by divination and opinions, in which there is much that is deceptive; and again, that it is the easiest thing in the world for people to conduct wars by talk when they stand far from the danger, which is what my accusers do.

§ 9.31.2 But, to waive all this, tell me, in the name of the gods, do you regard me as the first or the only man who ever attempted to capture a stronghold by force and led his men against lofty positions? Or have not many others of your generals done the same, some of whom have succeeded, while the attempt of others has not turned out as they wished? Why in the world, then, did you let the others off but now try me, if you consider these actions to be marks of incapacity and imprudence in a general? How many other undertakings more daring than this does it occur to your generals to attempt when times of crisis will by no means admit of the safe and well-considered course?

§ 9.31.3 Some indeed have snatched the standards from their own men and hurled them among the enemy, in order that the indolent and cowardly might perforce gain courage, since they knew that those who failed to recover those standards must be put to death ignominiously by their generals. Others, after invading the enemy's country, have destroyed the bridges over the rivers what they had crossed, in order that any who entertained thoughts of saving themselves by flight might find their hope vain and so be inspired with boldness and resolution in the battles.

§ 9.31.4 Still others by burning their tents and baggage have imposed on their men the necessity of supplying themselves out of the enemy's country with everything they needed. I omit mentioning all the other instances of the kind, which are countless, and the many other daring actions and expedients of generals that we know of from both history and our own experience, for which no general was ever punished when disappointed in his helps. Unless, indeed, someone among you can bring the charge against me that when I exposed the others to manifest destruction I kept myself out of danger. But if I took my place in the line with all the rest, was last to withdraw and shared the same fortune with the others, of what crime am I guilty? Concerning myself, then, let this suffice.

§ 9.32.1 ”But concerning the senate and the patricians I wish to say a few words to you, since the general hatred you plebeians bear toward them because they prevented the allotment of land hurts me also, and since my accuser too did not conceal this hatred, but made it no small part of his accusation against me.

§ 9.32.2 And I shall prospect with frankness; for I could not speak in any other fashion, nor would it be to your interest to hear me if I did. You are not doing right in the eyes of men or the gods, plebeians, if, on the one hand, you show no gratitude for the many great benefits you have received from the senate, but, on the other hand, because, when you demanded a measure the concession of which would bring great harm to the public, the senate, not in any spirit of animosity toward you, but having in view the welfare of the commonwealth, opposed it, you angrily resent its action.

§ 9.32.3 But what you ought to have done was, preferably, to accept the senate's decisions as having been made with the best of motives and for the good of all and then to have desisted from your selfish striving; but if you were unable to restrain your inexpedient desire by means of sober reason, you should have sought to obtain these same ends by persuasion and not by violence.