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Diodorus Siculus, Library 8-40

ToposText · Diodorus Siculus · 6,503 sections

  1. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.55.1

    § 14.55.1 Himilcon gave sealed orders to all the pilots with commands to open them after they had sailed and to carry out the instructions. He devised this scheme in order that no spy should be able to report to Dionysius where they would put in; and the orders read for them to put in at Panormus.

  2. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.55.2

    § 14.55.2 When a favourable wind arose, all the vessels cast off their cables and the transports put out to open sea, but the triremes sailed into the Libyan Sea and skirted the land. The wind continued favourable, and as soon as the leading vessels of the transports were visible from Sicily, Dionysius dispatched Leptines with thirty triremes under orders to ram and destroy all he could intercept.3 Leptines sailed forth promptly and straightway sank, together with their men, the first ships he encountered, but the rest, having all canvas spread and catching the wind with their sails, easily made their escape. Nevertheless, fifty ships were sunk, together with five thousand soldiers and two hundred chariots. 4 After Himilcon had put in at Panormus and disembarked his army, he advanced toward the enemy, ordering the triremes to sail along beside him; and having himself taken Eryx by treachery as he passed, he took up quarters before Motye. Since Dionysius and his army were during this time at Aegeste, Himilcon reduced Motye by siege. 5 Although the Sicilian Greeks were eager for a battle, Dionysius conceived it to be better, both because he was widely separated from his allied cities and because the transport of his food supplies was reduced, to renew the war in other areas. 6 Having decided, therefore, to break camp, he proposed to the Sicani to abandon their cities for the present and to join him in the campaign; and in return he promised to give them richer territory of about equal size and, at the conclusion of the war, to return to their native cities any who so wished. 7 Of the Sicani only a few, fearing that, if they refused, they would be plundered by the soldiers, agreed to Dionysius' offer. The Halicyaeans similarly deserted him and sent ambassadors to the Carthaginian camp and concluded an alliance with them. And Dionysius set out for Syracuse, laying waste the territory though which he led his army.

  3. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.56.1

    § 14.56.1 Himilcon, now that his affairs were proceeding as he wished, made preparations to lead his army against Messene, being anxious to get control of the city because of its favourable facilities; for it had an excellent harbour, capable of accommodating all his ships, which numbered more than six hundred, and Himilcon also hoped that by getting possession of the straits he would be able to bar any aid from the Italian Greeks and hold in check the fleets that might come from the Peloponnesus.

  4. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.56.2

    § 14.56.2 With this programme in mind, he formed relations of friendship with the Himeraeans and the dwellers in the fort of Cephaloedium, and seizing the city of Lipara, he exacted thirty talents from the inhabitants of the island. Then he set out in person with his entire army toward Messene, his ships sailing along the coast beside him.

  5. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.56.3

    § 14.56.3 Completing the distance in a brief time, he pitched his camp at Peloris, at a distance of one hundred stades from Messene. When the inhabitants of this city learned that the enemy was at hand, they could not agree among themselves about the war.

  6. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.56.4

    § 14.56.4 One party, when they heard reports of the great size of the enemy's army and observed that they themselves were without any allies — what is more, that their own cavalry were at Syracuse — were fully convinced that nothing could save them from capture. When contributed most to their despair was the fact that their walls had fallen down and that the situation allowed no time for their repair. Consequently they removed from the city their children and wives and most valuable possessions to neighbouring cities.

  7. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.56.5

    § 14.56.5 Another party of the Messenians, however, hearing of a certain ancient oracle of theirs which ran, “ Carthaginians must be bearers of water in Messene,” interpreted the utterance to their advantage, believing that the Carthaginians would serve as slaves in Messene.

  8. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.56.6

    § 14.56.6 Consequently not only were they in a hopeful mood, but they made many others eager to face battle for their freedom. At once, then, they selected the ablest troops from among their young men and dispatched them to Peloris to prevent the enemy from entering their territory.

  9. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.57.1

    § 14.57.1 While the Messenians were busied in this way, Himilcon, seeing that they had sallied against his place of landing, dispatched two hundred ships against the city, for he hoped, as well he might, that while the soldiers were trying to prevent his landing, the crews of the ships would easily seize Messene, stripped of defenders as it was.

  10. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.57.2

    § 14.57.2 A north wind sprang up and the ships with all canvas spread entered the harbour, while the Messenians who were on guard at Peloris, in spite of their hurried return, failed to arrive before the ships.

  11. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.57.3

    § 14.57.3 Consequently the Carthaginians invested Messene, forced their way through the fallen walls, and made themselves masters of the city.

  12. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.57.4

    § 14.57.4 Of the Messenians, some were slain as they put up a gallant fight, others fled to the nearest cities, but the great mass of the common people took to flight through the surrounding mountains and scattered among the fortresses of the territory;

  13. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.57.5

    § 14.57.5 of the rest, some were captured by the enemy and some, who had been cut off in the area near the harbour, hurled themselves into the sea in hopes of swimming across the intervening strait. These numbered more than two hundred and most of them were overcome by the current, only fifty making their way in safety to Italy.

  14. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.57.6

    § 14.57.6 Himilcon now brought his entire army into the city and at first set to work to reduce the forts over the countryside; but since they were strongly situated and the men who had fled to them put up gallant struggles, he retired to the city, having found himself unable to master them. After this he refreshed his army and made preparations to advance against Syracuse.

  15. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.58.1

    § 14.58.1 The Siceli, who had hated Dionysius from of old and now had an opportunity to revolt, went over in a body, with the exception of the people of Assorus, to the Carthaginians. In Syracuse Dionysius set free the slaves and manned sixty ships from their numbers; he also summoned over a thousand mercenaries from the Lacedemonians, and went about the countryside strengthening the fortresses and storing them with provisions. He was most concerned, however, to fortify the citadels of the Leontines and to store in them the harvest from the plains.

  16. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.58.2

    § 14.58.2 He also persuaded the Campanians who were dwelling in Catane to move to Aetne, as it is now called, since it was an exceptionally strong fortress. After this he led forth his entire army one hundred and sixty stades from Syracuse and encamped near Taurus, as it is called. He had at that time thirty thousand infantry, more than three thousand cavalry, and one hundred and eighty ships of war, of which only a few were triremes.

  17. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.58.3

    § 14.58.3 Himilcon threw down the walls of Messene and issued orders to his soldiers to raze to the ground the dwellings, and to leave not a tile or timber or anything else but either to burn or break them. When the many hands of the soldiers speedily accomplished this task, no one would have known that the site had been occupied.

  18. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.58.4

    § 14.58.4 For, reflecting that the place was far separated from the cities which were his allies and yet was the most strategically situated of any in Sicily, he had determined that he would see either that it was kept uninhabited or that it was an arduous and prolonged task to rebuild it.

  19. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.59.1

    § 14.59.1 After Himilcon had exhibited his hatred for the Greeks by the calamity he visited upon the Messenians, he dispatched Magon his admiral with his naval armament under orders to sail to the peak known as Taurus. This area had been taken by Siceli in large numbers, who, however, had no leader.

  20. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.59.2

    § 14.59.2 They had formerly been given by Dionysius the territory of the Naxians, but at this time, having been induced by Himilcon's offers, they occupied this peak. Since it was a strong position, both at this time and subsequent to the war, they made it their home, throwing a wall about it, and since those who gathered remained (menein) upon Taurus, they named the city Tauromenium.

  21. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.59.3

    § 14.59.3 Himilcon, advancing with his land forces, made so rapid a march that he arrived at the same time as Magon put in there by sea. But since there had recently been a fiery eruption from Mt. Aetne as far as the sea, it was no longer possible for the land forces to advance in the company of the ships as they sailed beside them; for the regions along the sea were laid waste by the lava, as it is called, so that the land army had to take it was way around the peak of Aetne.

  22. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.59.4

    § 14.59.4 Consequently he gave orders to Magon to come to port at Catane, while he himself advanced speedily through the heart of the country with the intention of joining the ships on the Catanaean shore; for he was concerned lest, when his forces were divided, the Sicilian Greeks should fight a battle with Magon at sea.

  23. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.59.5

    § 14.59.5 And this is what actually took place. For Dionysius, when he realized that Magon had a short sail, whereas the route of the land forces was toilsome and long, hastened to Catane with the object of attacking Magon by sea before the arrival of Himilcon.

  24. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.59.6

    § 14.59.6 His hope was that his land forces lined up along the coast would embolden his own troops while the enemy would be the more fearful, and, what was the most important consideration, that if he should suffer a reverse of some kind, the ships in distress would be able to take refuge in the camp of the land forces.

  25. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.59.7

    § 14.59.7 With this purpose in mind, he dispatched Leptines with his whole fleet under orders to engage with his ships in close order, and not to break his line lest he be endangered by the great numbers of his opponents; for, including merchantmen and oared vessels with brazen beaks, Magon had no less than five hundred ships.

  26. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.60.1

    § 14.60.1 When the Carthaginians saw the shore thronged with infantry and the ships of the Greeks bearing down on them, they were at once not a little alarmed and began to make for the land; but later, when they realized the risk they ran of destruction in giving battle at the same time both to the fleet and to the infantry, they quickly changed their mind. Deciding, therefore, to face the battle at sea, they drew up their ships and awaited the approach of the enemy.

  27. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.60.2

    § 14.60.2 Leptines advanced with his thirty best vessels far ahead of the rest and joined battle, in no cowardly fashion, but without prudence. Attacking forthwith the leading ships of the Carthaginians, at the outset he sank no small number of the opposing triremes; but when Magon's massed ships crowded about the thirty, the forces of Leptines surpassed in valour, but the Carthaginians in numbers.

  28. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.60.3

    § 14.60.3 Consequently, as the battle grew fiercer, the steersmen laid their ships broadside in the fighting and the struggle came to resemble conflicts on land. For they did not drive upon the opposing ships from a distance in order to ram them, but the vessels were locked together and the fighting was hand to hand. Some, as they leaped for the enemy's ships, fell into the sea, and others, who succeeded in their attempt, continued the struggle on the opponents' ships.

  29. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.60.4

    § 14.60.4 In the end Leptines was driven off and compelled to flee to the open sea, and his remaining ships, attacking without order, were overcome by the Carthaginians; for the defeat suffered by the admiral raised the spirits of the Phoenicians and markedly discouraged the Sicilian Greeks.

  30. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.60.5

    § 14.60.5 After the battle had ended in the manner we have described, the Carthaginians pursued with even greater ardour the enemy who were fleeing in disorder, and destroyed more than one hundred of their ships, and stationing their lighter craft along the shore, they slew any of the sailors who were swimming toward the land army.

  31. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.60.6

    § 14.60.6 And as they perished in great numbers not far from the land, while the troops of Dionysius were unable to help them in any way, the whole region was full of corpses and wreckage. There perished in the sea battle no small number of Carthaginians, but the loss of the Sicilian Greeks amounted to more than one hundred ships and over twenty thousand men.

  32. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.60.7

    § 14.60.7 After the battle the Phoenicians anchored their triremes in the harbour of Catane, took in tow the ships they had captured, and when they had brought them in, repaired them, so that they made the greatness of their success not only a tale for the ears but also a sight for the eyes of the Carthaginians.

  33. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.61.1

    § 14.61.1 The Sicilian Greeks made their way toward Syracuse, but as they reflected that they would certainly be invested and forced to endure a laborious siege, they urged Dionysius to seek an immediate encounter with Himilcon because of his past victory; for, they said, perhaps their unexpected appearance would strike terror into the barbarians and they could repair their late reverse.

  34. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.61.2

    § 14.61.2 Dionysius was at first won over by these advisers and ready to lead his army against Himilcon, but when some of his friends told him that he ran the risk of losing the city if Magon should set out with his entire fleet against Syracuse, he quickly changed his mind; and in fact he knew that Messene had fallen to the hands of the barbarians in a similar manner. And so, believing that it was not safe to strip the city of defenders, he set out for Syracuse.

  35. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.61.3

    § 14.61.3 The majority of the Sicilian Greeks, being angered at his unwillingness to encounter the enemy, deserted Dionysius, some of them departing to their own countries and others to fortresses in the neighbourhood.

  36. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.61.4

    § 14.61.4 Himilcon, who had reached in two days the coast of the Catanaeans, hauled all the ships up on land, since a strong wind had arisen, and, while resting his forces for some days, sent ambassadors to the Campanians who held Aetne, urging them to revolt from Dionysius.

  37. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.61.5

    § 14.61.5 He promised both to give them a large amount of territory and to let them share in the spoils of the war; he also informed them that the Campanians dwelling in Entella found no fault with the Carthaginians and took their side against the Sicilian Greeks, and he pointed out that as a general thing the Greeks as a race are the enemies of all other peoples.

  38. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.61.6

    § 14.61.6 But since the Campanians had given hostages to Dionysius and had sent their choicest troops to Syracuse, they were compelled to maintain the alliance with Dionysius, although they would gladly have joined the Carthaginians.

  39. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.62.1

    § 14.62.1 After this Dionysius, who was in terror of the Carthaginians, sent his brother-in law Polyxenus as ambassador both to the Greeks in Italy and to the Lacedemonians, as well as the Corinthians, begging them to come to his aid and not to suffer the Greek cities of Sicily to be utterly destroyed. He also sent to the Peloponnesus men with ample funds to recruit mercenaries, ordering them to enlist as many soldiers as they could without regard to economy.

  40. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.62.2

    § 14.62.2 Himilcon decked his ships with the spoils taken from the enemy and put in at the great harbour of the Syracusans, and he caused great dismay among the inhabitants of the city. For two hundred and fifty ships of war entered the harbour, with oars flashing in order and richly decorated with the spoils of war; then came the merchantmen, in excess of three thousand, laden with more than five hundred...; and the whole fleet numbered some two hundred vessels. The result was that the harbour of the Syracusans, despite its great size, was blocked up by the vessels and it was almost entirely concealed from view by the sails.

  41. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.62.3

    § 14.62.3 The sails had just come to anchor when at once from the other side the land army advanced, consisting, as some have reported, of three hundred thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry. The general of the armaments, Himilcon, took up his quarters in the temple of Zeus and the rest of the multitude encamped in the neighbourhood twelve stades from the city.

  42. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.62.4

    § 14.62.4 After this Himilcon led out the entire army and drew up his troops in battle order before the walls, challenging the Syracusans to battle; and he also sailed up to the harbours with a hundred of his finest ships in order to strike terror into the inhabitants of the city and to force them to concede that they were inferior at sea as well.

  43. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.62.5

    § 14.62.5 But when no one ventured to come out against him, for the time being he withdrew his troops to the camp and then for thirty days overran the countryside, cutting down the trees and laying it all waste, in order not to only to satisfy the soldiers with every kind of plunder, but also to reduce the besieged to despair.

  44. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.63.1

    § 14.63.1 Himilcon seized the suburb of Achradine; and he also plundered the temples of both Demeter and Core, for which acts of impiety against the divinity he quickly suffered a fitting penalty. For his fortune quickly worsened from day today, and whenever Dionysius made bold to skirmish with him, the Syracusans had the better of it.

  45. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.63.2

    § 14.63.2 Also at night unaccountable tumults would arise in the camp and the soldiers would rush to arms, thinking that the enemy was attacking the palisade. To this was added a plague which was the cause of every kind of suffering. But of this we shall speak a little later, in order that our account may not anticipate the proper time.

  46. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.63.3

    § 14.63.3 Now when he threw a wall about the camp, Himilcon destroyed practically all the tombs in the area, a among which was that of Gelon and his wife Demarete, of costly construction. He also built three forts along the sea, one at Plemmyrium, one at the middle of the harbour, and one by the temple of Zeus, and into them he brought wine and grain and all other provisions, believing that the siege would continue a long time.

  47. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.63.4

    § 14.63.4 He also dispatched merchant ships to Sardinia and Libya to secure grain and every kind of food. Polyxenus, the brother-in law of Dionysius, arrived from the Peloponnesus and Italy, bringing thirty warships from his allies, with Pharacidas the Lacedemonian as admiral.

  48. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.64.1

    § 14.64.1 After this Dionysius and Leptines had set out with warships to escort a supply of provisions; and the Syracusans, who were thus left to themselves, seeing by chance a vessel approaching laden with food, sailed out against it with five ships, seized it, and brought it to the city.

  49. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.64.2

    § 14.64.2 The Carthaginians put out against them with forty ships, whereupon the Syracusans manned all their ships and in the ensuing battle both captured the flag-ship and destroyed twenty-four of the remainder; and then, pursuing the fleeing ships as far as the enemy's anchorage, they challenged the Carthaginians to battle.

  50. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.64.3

    § 14.64.3 Elated at their success and thinking how often Dionysius had met defeat, whereas a they, without his presence, had won a victory over the Carthaginians, they were now puffed up with pride.

  51. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.64.4

    § 14.64.4 And as they gathered in groups they talked together about how they took no steps to end their slavery to Dionysius, even though they had an opportunity to depose him; for up until then they had been without arms, but now because of the war they had weapons at their command.

  52. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.64.5

    § 14.64.5 Even while discussions of this kind were taking place, Dionysius sailed into the harbour and, calling an assembly, praised the Syracusans and urged them to be of good courage, promising that he would speedily put an end to the war. And he was on the point of dismissing the assembly when Theodorus, a Syracusan, who was held in high esteem among the cavalry and was considered a man of action, made bold to speak as follows in regard to their liberty.

  53. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.65.1

    § 14.65.1 “Although Dionysius has introduced some falsehoods, the last statement he made was true: that he would speedily put an end to the war. He could accomplish this if he were no longer our commander — for he has often been defeated — but had returned to the citizens the freedom their fathers enjoyed.

  54. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.65.2

    § 14.65.2 As things are, no one of us faces battle with good courage so long as victory differs not a whit from defeat; for if conquered, we shall have to obey the commands of the Carthaginians, and if conquerors, to have in Dionysius a harsher master than they would be. For even should the Carthaginians defeat us in war, they would only impose a fixed tribute and would not prevent us from governing the city in accordance with our ancient laws; but this man has plundered our temples, has taken the property of private citizens together with the lives of their owners, and pays a wage to servants to secure the enslavement of their masters. Such horrors as attend the storming of cities are perpetrated by him in time of peace, yet he promises to put an end to the war with the Carthaginians.

  55. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.65.3

    § 14.65.3 But it behooves us, fellow citizens, to put an end not only to the Phoenician war but to the tyrant within our walls. For the acropolis, which is guarded by the weapons of slaves, is a hostile redoubt in our city; the multitude of mercenaries has been gathered to hold the Syracusans in slavery; and he lords it over the city, not like a magistrate dispensing justice on equal terms, but like a dictator who by policy makes all decisions for his own advantage. For the time being the enemy possess a small portion of our territory, but Dionysius has devastated it all and given it to those who join in increasing his tyranny.

  56. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.65.4

    § 14.65.4 ”How long, then, are we to be patient though we suffer such abuses as brave men endure to die rather than to experience them? In battle against the Carthaginians we bravely face the final sacrifice, but against a harsh tyrant, in behalf of freedom and our fatherland, even in speech we no longer dare to raise our voices; we face in battle so many myriads of the enemy, but we stand in shivering fear of a single ruler, who has not the manliness of a superior slave.

  57. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.66.1

    § 14.66.1 “Surely no one would think of comparing Dionysius with Gelon of old. For Gelon, by reason of his own high character, together with the Syracusans and the rest of the Sicilian Greeks, set free the whole of Sicily, whereas this man, who found the cities free, has delivered all the rest of them over to the lordship of the enemy and has himself enslaved his native state.

  58. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.66.2

    § 14.66.2 Gelon fought so far forward in behalf of Sicily that he never let his allies in the cities even catch siege of the enemy, whereas this man, after fleeing from Motye through the entire length of the island, has cooped himself up within our walls, full of confidence against his fellow citizens, but unable to bear even the sight of the enemy.

  59. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.66.3

    § 14.66.3 As a consequence Gelon, by reason both of his high character and of his great deeds, received the leadership by the free will not only of the Syracusans but also of the Sicilian Greeks, while, as for this man whose generalship has led to the destruction of his allies and the enslavement of his fellow citizens, how can he escape the just hatred of all? For not only is he unworthy of leadership but, if justice were done, would die ten thousand deaths.

  60. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.66.4

    § 14.66.4 Because of him Gela and Camarina were subdued, Messene lies in total ruin, twenty thousand allies are perished in a sea-battle, and, in a word, we have been enclosed in one city and all the other Greek cities throughout Sicily have been destroyed. For in addition to his other malefactions he sold into slavery Naxos and Catane; he has completely destroyed cities that were allies, cities whose existence was opportune.

  61. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.66.5

    § 14.66.5 With the Carthaginians he has fought two battles and has come out vanquished in each. Yet when he was entrusted with a generalship by the citizens but one time, he speedily robbed them of their freedom, slaying those who spoke openly on behalf of the laws and exiling the more wealthy; he gave the wives of the banished in marriage to slaves and to a motley throng; he put the weapons of citizens in the hands of barbarians and foreigners. And these deeds, O Zeus and all the gods, were the work of a public clerk, of a desperate man.

  62. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.67.1

    § 14.67.1 ”Where, then, is the Syracusans' love of freedom? Where the deeds of our ancestors? I say nothing of the three hundred thousand Carthaginians who were totally destroyed at Himera; I pass by the overthrow of the tyrants who followed Gelon. But only yesterday, as it were, when the Athenians attacked Syracuse with such great armaments, our fathers left not a man free to carry back word of the disaster.

  63. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.67.2

    § 14.67.2 And shall we, who have such great examples of our fathers' valour, take orders from Dionysius, especially when we have weapons in our hands? Surely some divine providence has gathered us here, with allies about us and weapons in our hands, for the purpose of recovering our freedom, and it is within our power this day to play the part of brave men and rid ourselves with one accord of our heavy yoke.

  64. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.67.3

    § 14.67.3 For hitherto, while we were disarmed and without allies and guarded by a multitude of mercenaries, we have, I dare say, yielded to the pressure of circumstances; but now, since we have arms in our hands and allies to give us aid as well as bear witness of our bravery, let us not yield but make it clear that it was circumstances, not cowardice, that made us submit to slavery.

  65. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.67.4

    § 14.67.4 Are we not ashamed that we should have as commander in our wars the man who has plundered the temples of our city and that we choose as representative in such important matters a person to whom no man of good sense would entrust the management of his private affairs? And though all other peoples in times of war, because of the great perils they face, observe with the greatest care their obligations to the gods, do we expect that a man of such notorious impiety will put an end to the war?

  66. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.68.1

    § 14.68.1 “In fact, if a man cares to put a finer point on it, he will find that Dionysius is as wary of peace as he is of war. For he believes that, as matters stand, the Syracusans, because of their fear of the enemy, will not attempt anything against him, but that once the Carthaginians have been defeated they will claim their freedom, since they will have weapons in their hands and will be proudly conscious of their deeds.

  67. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.68.2

    § 14.68.2 Indeed this is the reason, in my opinion, why in the first war he betrayed Gela and Camarina and made these cities desolate, and why in his negotiations he agreed that most of the Greek cities should be given over to the enemy.

  68. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.68.3

    § 14.68.3 After this he broke faith in time of peace with Naxos and Catane and sold the inhabitants into slavery, razing one to the ground and giving the other to the Campanians from Italy to dwell in.

  69. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.68.4

    § 14.68.4 And when, after the destruction of these peoples, the rest of Sicily made many attempts to overthrow his tyranny, he again declared war upon the Carthaginians; for his scruple against breaking his agreement in violation of the oaths he had taken was not so great as his fear of the surviving concentrations of the Sicilian Greeks. ”Moreover, it is obvious that he has been at all times on the alert to effect their destruction.

  70. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.68.5

    § 14.68.5 First of all at Panormus, when the enemy were disembarking and were in bad physical condition after the stormy passage, he could have offered battle, but did not choose to do. After that he stood idly by and sent no help to Messene, a city strategically situated and of great size, but allowed it to be razed, not only in order that the greatest possible number of Sicilian Greeks should perish, but also that the Carthaginians might intercept the reinforcements from Italy and the fleets from the Peloponnesus.

  71. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.68.6

    § 14.68.6 Last of all, he joined battle offshore at Catane, careless of the advantage of pitching battle near the city, where the vanquished could find safety in their own harbours. After the battle, when strong winds sprang up and the Carthaginians were forced to haul their fleet up on land, he had a most favourable opportunity for victory;

  72. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.68.7

    § 14.68.7 for the land forces of the enemy had not yet arrived and the violent storm was driving the enemy's ships on the shore. At that time, if we had all attacked on land, the only outcomes left the enemy would have been, either to be captured with ease, if they left their ships, or to strew the coast with wreckage, if they matched their strength against the waves.

  73. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.69.1

    § 14.69.1 “But to lodge accusations against Dionysius at greater length among Syracusans is, I should judge, not necessary. For if men who have suffered in very deed such irretrievable ruin are not roused to rage, will they, forsooth, be moved by words to wreak vengeance upon him — men too who have seen his behaviour as the worst of citizens, the harshest of tyrants, the most ignoble of all generals?

  74. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.69.2

    § 14.69.2 For as often as we have stood in line of battle under his command, so often have we been defeated, whereas but just now, when we fought independently, we defeated with a few ships the enemy's entire force. We should, therefore, seek out another leader, to avoid fighting under a general who has pillaged the shrines of the gods and so finding ourselves engaged in a war against the gods;

  75. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.69.3

    § 14.69.3 for it is manifest that heaven opposes those who have selected the worst enemy of religion to be their commander. Noting that when he is present our armies in full force suffer defeat, whereas, when he is absent, even a small detachment is sufficient to defeat the Carthaginians, should not all men see in this the visible presence of the gods?

  76. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.69.4

    § 14.69.4 Therefore, fellow citizens, if he is willing to lay down his office of his own accord, let us allow him to leave the city with his possessions; but if he does not choose to do so, we have at the present moment the fairest opportunity to assert our freedom. We are all gathered together; we have weapons in our hands; we have allies about us, not only the Greeks from Italy but also those from the Peloponnesus.

  77. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.69.5

    § 14.69.5 The chief command must be given, according to the laws, either to citizens, or to the Corinthians who dwell in our mother-city, or to the Spartans who are the first power in Greece.”

  78. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.70.1

    § 14.70.1 After this speech by Theodorus the Syracusans were in high spirits and kept their eyes fixed on their allies; and when Pharacidas the Lacedemonian, the admiral of the allies, stepped up to the platform, all expected that he would take the lead for liberty.

  79. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.70.2

    § 14.70.2 But he was on friendly terms with the tyrant and declared that the Lacedemonians had dispatched him to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians, not to overthrow the rule of Dionysius. At this statement so contrary to expectation the mercenaries flocked about Dionysius, and the Syracusans in dismay made no move, although they called down many curses on the Spartans.

  80. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.70.3

    § 14.70.3 For on a previous occasion Aretes the Lacedemonian, at the time that he was asserting the right of the Syracusans to freedom, had betrayed them, and now at this time Pharacidas vetoed the movement of the Syracusans. For the moment Dionysius was in great fear and dissolved the assembly, but later he won the favour of the multitude by kindly words, honouring some of them with gifts and inviting some to general banquets.

  81. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.70.4

    § 14.70.4 After the Carthaginians had seized the suburb and pillaged the sanctuary of Demeter and Core, a sickness struck the army. Over and above the disaster sent by influence of the city, there were contributing causes: that myriads of people were gathered together, that it was the time of year which is most productive of sicknesses, and that the particular summer had brought unusually hot water.

  82. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.70.5

    § 14.70.5 It also seems likely that the place itself was responsible for the excessive extent of the disaster; for on a former occasion the Athenians too, who occupied the same camp, had perished in great numbers from the plague, since the terrain was marshy and in a hollow.

  83. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.70.6

    § 14.70.6 First, before sunrise, because of the cold from the breeze over the waters, their bodies were struck with chills, but in the middle of the day the heat was stifling, as must be the case when so great a multitude is gathered together in a narrow place.

  84. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.71.1

    § 14.71.1 Now the plague first attacked the Libyans, and, as many of them perished, at first they buried the dead, but later, both because of the multitude of corpses and because those who tended the sick were seized by the plague, no one dared approach the suffering. When even nursing was thus omitted, there was no remedy for the disaster.

  85. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.71.2

    § 14.71.2 For by reason of the stench of the unburied and the miasma from the marshes, the plague began with a catarrh; then came a swelling in the throat; gradually burning sensations ensued, pains in the sinews of the back, and a heavy feeling in the limbs; then dysentery supervened and pustules upon the whole surface of the body.

  86. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.71.3

    § 14.71.3 In most cases this was the course of the disease; but some became mad and totally lost their memory; they circulated through the camp, out of their mind, and struck at anyone they met. In general, as it turned out, even help by physicians was of no avail both because of the severity of the disease and the swiftness of the death; for death came on the fifth day or on the sixth at the latest, amidst such terrible tortures that all looked upon those who had fallen in the war as blessed.

  87. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.71.4

    § 14.71.4 In fact all who watched beside the sick were struck by the plague, and thus the lot of the ill was miserable, since no one was willing to minister to the unfortunate. For not only did any not akin abandon one another, but even brothers were forced to desert brothers, friends to sacrifice friends out of fear for their own lives.

  88. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.72.1

    § 14.72.1 When Dionysius heard of the disaster that had struck the Carthaginians, he manned eighty ships and ordered Pharacidas and Leptines the admirals to attack the enemy's ships at daybreak, while he himself, profiting by a moonless night, made a circuit with his army and, passing by the sanctuary of Cyane, arrived near the camp of the enemy at daybreak before they were aware of it.

  89. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.72.2

    § 14.72.2 The cavalry and a thousand infantry from the mercenaries were dispatched in advance against that part of the Carthaginian encampment which extended toward the interior. These mercenaries were the most hostile, beyond all others, to Dionysius and had engaged time and again in factional quarrels and uproars.

  90. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.72.3

    § 14.72.3 Consequently Dionysius had issued orders to the cavalry that as soon as they came to blows with the enemy they should flee and leave the mercenaries in the lurch; when this order had been carried out and the mercenaries had been slain to a man, Dionysius set about laying siege to both the camp and the forts. While the barbarians were still dismayed at the unexpected attack and bringing up reinforcements in disorderly fashion, he on his part took by storm the fort known as Polichne; and on the opposite side the cavalry, aided in an attack by some of the triremes, stormed the area around Dascon.

  91. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.72.4

    § 14.72.4 At once all the warships joined in the attack, and when the army raised the war-cry at the taking of the forts, the barbarians were in a state of panic. For at the outset they had rushed in a body against the land troops in order to ward off the assailants of the camp; but when they saw the fleet also coming up to attack, they turned back to give help to the naval station. The swift course of events, however, outstripped them and their haste was without result.

  92. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.72.5

    § 14.72.5 Even as they were mounting on the decks and manning the triremes, the enemy's vessels, driven on by rowers, struck the ships athwart in many cases. Now one well-delivered blow would sink a damaged ship; but blows in repeated rammings, which broke through the nailed timbers, struck terrible dismay into the opponents.

  93. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.72.6

    § 14.72.6 Since all about the mightiest ships were being shattered, the rending of the vessels by the crushing blows raised a great noise and the shore extending along the scene of the battle was strewn with corpses.

  94. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.73.1

    § 14.73.1 The Syracusans, eagerly co operating in their success, rivalled one another in great zeal to be the first to board the enemy's ships, and surrounding the barbarians, who were terror-stricken at the magnitude of the peril they faced, put them to death.

  95. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.73.2

    § 14.73.2 Nor did the infantry who were attacking the naval station show less zeal than the others, and among them, it so happened, was Dionysius himself, who had ridden on horseback to the section about Dascon. Finding there forty ships of fifty oars, which had been drawn up on the beach, and beside them merchant ships and some triremes at anchor, they set fire to them.

  96. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.73.3

    § 14.73.3 Quickly the flame leaped up into the sky and, spreading over a large area, caught the shipping, and none of the merchants or owners was able to bring any help because of the violence of the blaze. Since a strong wind arose, the fires carried from the ships drawn up on land to the merchantmen lying at anchor.

  97. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.73.4

    § 14.73.4 When the crews dived into the water from fear of suffocation and the anchor cables were burnt off, the ships came into collision because of the rough seas, some of them being destroyed as they struck one another, and others as the wind drove them about, but the majority of them were victims of the fire.

  98. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.73.5

    § 14.73.5 Thereupon, as the flames swept up through the sails of the merchant-ships and consumed the yard-arms, the sight was like a scene from the theatre to the inhabitants of the city and the destruction of the barbarians resembled that of men struck by lightning from heaven for their impiety.

  99. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.74.1

    § 14.74.1 Forthwith, elated by the Syracusan successes, both the oldest youths and such aged men as were not yet entirely incapacitated by years manned lighters, and approaching without order all together made for the ships in the harbour. Those which the fire had ruined they plundered, stripping them of anything that could be saved, and such as were undamaged they took in tow and brought to the city.

  100. urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0060.tlg001:14.74.2

    § 14.74.2 Thus even those who by age were exempt from war duties were unable to restrain themselves, but in their excessive joy their ardent spirit prevailed over their age. When the news of the victory ran through the city, children and women, together with their households, left their homes, everyone hurrying to the walls, and the whole extent was crowded with spectators.

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Via ToposText (topostext.org), a project of the Aikaterini Laskaridis Foundation created by Brady Kiesling. Translated by George Booth (1635-1719) and J.C. Ferdinand Hoefer (1811-1878). Composed ca. 49 BCE. Licence: public domain. Source.