Diodorus Siculus, Library 8-40

§ 13.36.4 And finally they sailed to Oropus without preparation and met the Peloponnesians in a sea-battle; but since they made a wretched beginning of the battle and stood up to the fighting like churls, they lost twenty-two ships and barely got the rest safe over to eretria.

§ 13.36.5 After these events had taken place, the allies of the Athenians, because of the defeats they had suffered in Sicily as well as the estranged relations of the commanders, revolted to the Lacedemonians. And since Darius, the king of the Persians, was an ally of the Lacedemonians, Pharnabazus, who had the military command of the regions bordering on the sea, supplied money to the Lacedemonians; and he also summoned the three hundred triremes supplied by Phoenicia, having in mind to dispatch them to the aid of the Lacedemonians.

§ 13.37.1 Inasmuch as the Athenians had experienced setbacks so serious at one and the same time, everyone had assumed that the war was at an end; for no one expected that the Athenians could possibly endure such reverses any longer, even for a moment. However, events did not come to an end that tallied with the assumption of the majority, but on the contrary it came to pass, such was the superiority of the combatants, that the whole situation changed for the following reasons.

§ 13.37.2 Alcibiades, who was in exile from Athens, had for a time fought on the side of the Lacedemonians and had rendered them great assistance in the war; for he was a most able orator and far the outstanding citizen in daring, and, besides, he was in high birth and wealth first among the Athenians.

§ 13.37.3 Now since Alcibiades was eager to be allowed to return to his native city, he contrived every device whereby he could do the Athenians some good turn, and in particular at the crucial moments when the Athenians seemed doomed to utter defeat.

§ 13.37.4 Accordingly, since he was on friendly terms with Pharnabazus, the satrap of Darius, and saw that he was on the point of sending three hundred ships to the support of the Lacedemonians, he persuaded him to give up the undertaking; for he showed him that it would not be to the advantage of the King to make the Lacedemonians too powerful. That would not, he said, help the Persians, and so a better policy would be to maintain a neutral attitude toward the combatants so long as they were equally matched, in order that they might continue their quarrel as long as possible.

§ 13.37.5 Thereupon Pharnabazus, believing that Alcibiades was giving him good advice, sent the fleet back to Phoenicia. Now on that occasion Alcibiades deprived the Lacedemonians of so great an allied force; and some time later, when he had been allowed to return to Athens and been given command of a military force, he defeated the Lacedemonians in many battles and completely restored again the sunken fortunes of the Athenians.

§ 13.37.6 But we shall discuss these matters in more detail in connection with the appropriate period of time, in order that our account may not by anticipation violate the natural order of events.

§ 13.38.1 After the close of the year Theopompus was archon in Athens and the Romans elected in place of consuls four military tribunes, Tiberius Postumius, Gaius Cornelius, Gaius Valerius, and Caeso Fabius. At this time the Athenians dissolved the oligarchy of the Four hundred and formed the constitution of the government from the citizens at large.

§ 13.38.2 The author of all these changes was Theramenes, a man who was orderly in his manner of life and was reputed to surpass all others in judgement; for he was the only person to advise the recall from exile of Alcibiades, through whom the Athenians recovered themselves, and since he was the author of many other measures for the benefit of his country, he was the recipient of no small approbation.

§ 13.38.3 But these events took place at a little later time, and for the war the Athenians appointed Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus generals, who collected the fleet at Samos and trained the soldiers for battle at sea, giving them daily exercises.

§ 13.38.4 But Mindarus, the Lacedemonian admiral, was inactive for some time at Miletus, expecting the aid promised by Pharnabazus; and when he heard that three hundred triremes had arrived from Phoenicia, he was buoyed up in his hopes, believing that with so great a fleet he could destroy the empire of the Athenians.

§ 13.38.5 But when a little later he learned from sundry persons that Pharnabazus had been won over by Alcibiades and had sent the fleet back to Phoenicia, he gave up the hopes he had placed in Pharnabazus and by himself, after equipping both the ships bought from the Peloponnesus and those supplied by his allies from abroad, he dispatched Dorieus with thirteen ships to Rhodes, since he had learned that certain Rhodians were banding together for a revolution. —

§ 13.38.6 The ships we have mentioned had recently been sent to the Lacedemonians as an allied force by certain Greeks of Italy. — And Mindarus himself took all the other ships, numbering eighty-three, and set out for the Hellespont, since he had learned that the Athenian fleet was tarrying at Samos.

§ 13.38.7 The moment the generals of the Athenians saw them sailing by, they put out to sea against them with sixty ships. But when the Lacedemonians put in at Chios, the Athenian generals decided to sail on to Lesbos and there to gather triremes from their allies, in order that it should not turn out that the enemy surpassed them in number of ships.

§ 13.39.1 Now the Athenians were engaged in gathering ships. But Mindarus, the Lacedemonian admiral, setting out by night with his entire fleet, made in haste for the Hellespont and arrived on the second day at Sigeium. When the Athenians learned that the fleet had sailed by them, they did not wait for all the triremes of their allies, but after only three had been added to their number they set out in pursuit of the Lacedemonians.

§ 13.39.2 When they arrived at Sigeium, they found the fleet already departed, but three ships left behind they at once captured; after this they put in at Eleus and made preparations for the sea-battle.

§ 13.39.3 The Lacedemonians, seeing the enemy rehearsing for the battle, did likewise, spending five days in proving their ships and exercising their rowers; then they drew up the fleet for the battle, its strength being eighty-eight ships. Now the Lacedemonians stationed their ships on the Asian side of the channel, while the Athenians lined up against them on the European side, being fewer in number but of superior training.

§ 13.39.4 The Lacedemonians put on their right wing the Syracusans, whose leader was Hermocrates, and the Peloponnesians themselves formed the whole left wing with Mindarus in command. For the Athenians Thrasyllus was stationed on the right wing and Thrasybulus on the left. At the outset both sides strove stubbornly for position in order that they might not have the current against them.

§ 13.39.5 Consequently they kept sailing around each other for a long time, endeavouring to block off the straits and struggling for an advantageous position; for the battle took place between Abydus and Sestus and it so happened that the current was of no little hindrance where the strait was narrow. However, the pilots of the Athenian fleet, being far superior in experience, contributed greatly to the victory.

§ 13.40.1 For although the Peloponnesians had the advantage in the number of their ships and the valour of their marines, the skill of the Athenian pilots rendered the superiority of their opponents of no effect. For whenever the Peloponnesians, with their ships in a body, would charge swiftly forward to ram, the pilots would manoeuvre their own ships so skilfully that their opponents were unable to strike them at any other spot but could only meet them bows on, ram against ram.

§ 13.40.2 Consequently Mindarus, seeing that the force of the rams was proving ineffective, gave orders for his ships to come to grips in small groups, or one at a time. But not by this manoeuvre either, as it turned out, was the skill of the Athenian pilots rendered ineffective; on the contrary, cleverly avoiding the on-coming rams of the ships, they struck them on the side and damaged many.

§ 13.40.3 And such a spirit of rivalry pervaded both forces that they would not confine the struggle to ramming tactics, but tangling ship with ship fought it out with the marines. Although they were hindered by the strength of the current from achieving great success, they continued the struggle for a considerable time, neither side being able to gain the victory.

§ 13.40.4 While the fighting was thus equally balanced, there appeared beyond a cape twenty-five ships which had been dispatched to the Athenians from their allies. The Peloponnesians thereupon in alarm turned in flight toward Abydus, the Athenians clinging to them and pursuing them the more vigorously.

§ 13.40.5 Such was the end of the battle; and the Athenians captured eight ships of the Chians, five of the Corinthians, two of the Ambraciotes, and one each of the Syracusans, Pellenians, and Leucadians, while they themselves lost five ships, all of them, as it happened, having been sunk.

§ 13.40.6 After this Thrasybulus set up a trophy on the cape where stands the memorial of Hecabe and sent messengers to Athens to carry word of the victory, and himself made his way to Cyzicus with the entire fleet. For before the sea-battle this city had revolted to Pharnabazus, the general of Darius, and to Clearchus, the Lacedemonian commander. Finding the city unfortified the Athenians easily achieved their end, and after exacting money of the Cyziceni they sailed off to Sestus.

§ 13.41.1 Mindarus, the Lacedemonian admiral, after his flight to Abydus from the scene of his defeat repaired his ships that had been damaged and also sent the Spartan Epicles to the triremes at Euboea with orders to bring them with all speed.

§ 13.41.2 When Epicles arrived at Euboea, he gathered all the ships, which amounted to fifty, and hurriedly put out to sea; but when the triremes were off Mt. Athos there arose a storm of such fury that all the ships were lost and of their crews twelve men alone survived.

§ 13.41.3 These facts are set forth by a dedication, as Ephorus states, which stands in the temple at Coroneia and bears the following inscription: These from the crews of fifty ships, escaping destruction, Brought their bodies to land hard by Athos' sharp crags; Only twelve, all the rest the yawning depth of the waters Took to their death with their ships, meeting with terrible winds.

§ 13.41.4 At about the same time Alcibiades with thirteen triremes came by sea to the Athenians who were lying at Samos and had already heard that he had persuaded Pharnabazus not to come, as he had intended, with his three hundred ships to reinforce the Lacedemonians.

§ 13.41.5 And since the troops at Samos gave him a friendly welcome, he discussed with them the matter of his return from exile, offering promises to render many services to the fatherland; and in like manner he defended his own conduct and shed many tears over his own fortune, because he had been compelled by his enemies to give proof of his own valour at the expense of his native land.

§ 13.42.1 And since the soldiers heartily welcomed the offers of Alcibiades and sent messages to Athens regarding them, the people voted to dismiss the charges against Alcibiades and to give him a share in the command; for as they observed the efficiency of his daring and the fame he enjoyed among the Greeks, they assumed, and with good reason, that his adherence to them would add no little weight to their cause.

§ 13.42.2 Moreover, Theramenes, who at the time enjoyed the leadership in the government and who, if anyone, had a reputation of sagacity, advised the people to recall Alcibiades. When word of this action was reported to Samos, Alcibiades added nine ships to the thirteen he already had, and sailing with them to Halicarnassus he exacted money from that city.

§ 13.42.3 After this he sacked Meropis and returned to Samos with much plunder. And since a great amount of booty had been amassed, he divided the spoils among the soldiers at Samos and his own troops, thereby soon causing the recipients of his benefactions to be well disposed toward himself.

§ 13.42.4 About the same time the Antandrians, who were held by a garrison, sent to the Lacedemonians for soldiers, with whose aid they expelled the garrison and thus made their country a free place to live in; for the Lacedemonians, finding fault with Pharnabazus for the sending of the three hundred ships back to Phoenicia, gave their aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus.

§ 13.42.5 Of the historians, Thucydides ended his History, having included a period of twenty-two years in eight Books, although some divide it into nine; and Xenophon and Theopompus have begun at the point where Thucydides left off. Xenophon embraced a period of forty-eight years, and Theopompus set forth the facts of Greek history for seventeen years and bring his account to an end with the sea-battle of Cnidus in twelve Books.

§ 13.42.6 Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. The Romans were waging war with the Aequi and invaded their territory with a strong army; and investing the city named Bolae they took it by siege.

§ 13.43.1 When the events of this year had come to an end, in Athens Glaucippus was archon and in Rome the consuls elected were Marcus Cornelius and Lucius Furius. At this time in Sicily the Aegestaeans, who had allied themselves with the Athenians against the Syracusans, had fallen into great fear at the conclusion of the war; for they expected, and with good reason, to pay the penalty to the Sicilian Greeks for the wrongs they had inflicted upon them.

§ 13.43.2 And when the Selinuntians went to war with them over the land in dispute, they withdrew from it of their free will, being concerned lest the Syracusans should use this excuse to join the Selinuntians in the war and they should thereby run the risk of utterly destroying their country.

§ 13.43.3 But when the Selinuntians proposed, quite apart from the territory in dispute, to carve off for themselves a large portion of the neighbouring territory, the inhabitants of Aegesta thereupon dispatched ambassadors to Carthage, asking for aid and putting their city in the hands of the Carthaginians.

§ 13.43.4 When the envoys arrived and laid before the Senate the instructions the people had given them, the Carthaginians found themselves in no little quandary; for while they were eager to acquire a city so strategically situated, at the same time they stood in fear of the Syracusans, having just witnessed their defeat of the armaments of the Athenians.

§ 13.43.5 But when Hannibal, their foremost citizen, also advised them to acquire the city, they replied to the ambassadors that they would come to their aid, and to supervise the undertaking, in case it should lead to war, they selected as general Hannibal, who at the time lawfully exercised sovereign powers. He was the grandson of Hamilcar, who fought in the war against Gelon and died at Himera, and the son of Gescon, who had been exiled because of his father's defeat and had ended his life in Selinus.

§ 13.43.6 Now Hannibal, who by nature was a hater of the Greeks and at the same time desired to wipe out the disgraces which had befallen his ancestors, was eager by his own efforts to achieve some advantage for his country. Hence, seeing that the Selinuntians were not satisfied with the cession of the territory in dispute, he dispatched ambassadors together with the Aegestaeans to the Syracusans, referring to them the decision of the dispute; and though ostensibly he pretended to be seeking that justice be done, in fact he believed that, after the Selinuntians refused to agree to arbitration, the Syracusans would not join them as allies.

§ 13.43.7 Since the Selinuntians also dispatched ambassadors, refusing the arbitration and answering at length the ambassadors of the Carthaginians and Aegestaeans, in the end the Syracusans decided to vote to maintain their alliance with the Selinuntians and their state of peace with the Carthaginians.

§ 13.44.1 After the return of their ambassadors the Carthaginians dispatched to the Aegestaeans five thousand Libyans and eight hundred Campanians.

§ 13.44.2 These troops had been hired by the Chalcidians to aid the Athenians in the war against the Syracusans, and on their return after its disastrous conclusion they found no one to hire their services; but the Carthaginians purchased horses for them all, gave them high pay, and sent them to Aegesta.

§ 13.44.3 The Selinuntians, who were prosperous in those days and whose city was heavily populated, held the Aegestaeans in contempt. And at first, deploying in battle order, they laid waste the land which touched their border, since their armies were far superior, but after this, despising their foes, they scattered everywhere over the countryside.

§ 13.44.4 The generals of the Aegestaeans, watching their opportunity, attacked them with the aid of the Carthaginians and Campanians. Since the attack was not expected, they easily put the Selinuntians to flight, killing about a thousand of the soldiers and capturing all their loot. And after the battle both sides straightway dispatched ambassadors, the Selinuntians to the Syracusans and the Aegestaeans to the Carthaginians, asking for help.

§ 13.44.5 Both parties promised their assistance and the Carthaginian War thus had its beginning. The Carthaginians, foreseeing the magnitude of the war, entrusted the responsibility for the size of their armament to Hannibal as their general and enthusiastically rendered him every assistance.

§ 13.44.6 And Hannibal during the summer and the following winter enlisted many mercenaries from Iberia and also enrolled not a few from among the citizens; he also visited Libya, choosing the stoutest men from every city, and he made ready ships, planning to convey the armies across with the opening of spring. Such, then, was the state of affairs in Sicily.

§ 13.45.1 In Greece Dorieus the Rhodian, the admiral of the triremes from Italy, after he had quelled the tumult in Rhodes, set sail for the Hellespont, being eager to join Mindarus; for the latter was lying at Abydus, and collecting from every quarter the ships of the Peloponnesian alliance.

§ 13.45.2 And when Dorieus was already in the neighbourhood of Sigeium in the Troad, the Athenians who were at Sestus, learning that he was sailing along the coast, put out against him with their ships, seventy-four in all.

§ 13.45.3 Dorieus held to his course for a time in ignorance of what was happening; but when he observed the great strength of the fleet he was alarmed, and seeing no other way to save his force he put in at Dardanus.

§ 13.45.4 Here he disembarked his soldiers and took over the troops who were guarding the city, and then he speedily got in a vast supply of missiles and stationed his soldiers both on the fore-parts of the ships and in advantageous positions on the land.

§ 13.45.5 The Athenians, sailing in at full speed, set to work hauling the ships away from the shore, and they were wearing down the enemy, having crowded them on every side by their superior numbers.

§ 13.45.6 When Mindarus, the Peloponnesian admiral, learned of the situation, he speedily put out from Abydus with his entire fleet and sailed to the Dardanian Promontory with eighty-four ships to the aid of the fleet of Dorieus; and the land army of Pharnabazus was also there, supporting the Lacedemonians.

§ 13.45.7 When the fleets came near one another, both sides drew up the triremes for battle; Mindarus, who had ninety-seven ships, stationed the Syracusans on his left wing, while he himself took command of the right; as for the Athenians, Thrasybulus led the right wing and Thrasyllus the other.

§ 13.45.8 After the forces had made ready in this fashion, their commanders raised the signal for battle and the trumpeters at a single word of command began to sound the attack; and since the rowers showed no lack of eagerness and the pilots managed their helms with skill, the contest which ensued was an amazing spectacle.

§ 13.45.9 For whenever the triremes would drive forward to ram, at that moment the pilots, at just the critical instant, would turn their ships so effectively that the blows were made ram on.

§ 13.45.10 As for the marines, whenever they would see their own ships borne along with their sides to the triremes of the enemy, they would be terror-stricken, despairing of their lives; but whenever the pilots, employing the skill of practice, would frustrate the attack, they would in turn be overjoyed and elated in their hopes.

§ 13.46.1 Nor did the men whose position was on the decks fail to maintain the zeal which brooked no failure; but some, while still at a considerable distance from the enemy, kept up a stream of arrows and soon the space was full of missiles, while others, each time that they drew near, would hurl their javelins, some doing their best to strike the defending marines and others the enemy pilots themselves; and whenever the ships would come close together, they would not only fight with their spears but at the moment of contact would also leap over on the enemy's triremes and carry on the contest with their swords.

§ 13.46.2 And since at each reverse the victors would raise the war-cry and the others would rush to aid with shouting, a mingled din prevailed over the entire area of the battle. For a long time the battle was equally balanced because of the very high rivalry with which both sides were inspired; but later on Alcibiades unexpectedly appeared from Samos with twenty ships, sailing by mere chance to the Hellespont.

§ 13.46.3 While these ships were still at a distance, each side, hoping that reinforcement had come for themselves, was elated in its hopes and fought on with far greater courage; but when the fleet was now near and for the Lacedemonians no signal was to be seen, but for the Athenians Alcibiades ran up a purple flag from his own ship, which was the signal they had agreed upon, the Lacedemonians in dismay turned in flight and the Athenians, elated by the advantage they now possessed, pressed eagerly upon the ships trying to escape.

§ 13.46.4 And they speedily captured ten ships, but then a storm and violent winds arose, as a result of which they were greatly hindered in the pursuit; for because of the high waves the boats would not respond to the tillers, and the attempts at ramming proved fruitless, since the ships were receding when struck.

§ 13.46.5 In the end the Lacedemonians, gaining the shore, fled to the land army of Pharnabazus, and the Athenians at first essayed to drag the ships from the shore and put up a desperate battle, but when they were checked in their attempts by the Persian forces they sailed off to Sestus.

§ 13.46.6 For Pharnabazus, wishing to build a defence for himself before the Lacedemonians against the charges they were bringing against him, put up all the more vigorous fight against the Athenians; while at the same time, with respect to his sending the three hundred triremes to Phoenicia, he explained to them that he had done so on receiving information that the king of the Arabians and the king of the Egyptians had designs upon Phoenicia.

§ 13.47.1 When the sea-battle had ended as we have related, the Athenians sailed off at the time to Sestus, whence it was already night, but when day came they collected their ships which had been damaged and set up another trophy near the former one.

§ 13.47.2 And Mindarus about the first watch of the night set out to Abydus, where he repaired his ships that had been damaged and sent word to the Lacedemonians for reinforcements of both soldiers and ships; for he had in mind, while the fleet was being made ready, to lay siege with the army together with Pharnabazus to the cities in Asia which were allied with the Athenians.

§ 13.47.3 The people of Chalcis and almost all the rest of the inhabitants of Euboea had revolted from the Athenians and were therefore highly apprehensive lest, living as they did on an island, they should be forced to surrender to the Athenians, who were masters of the sea; and they therefore asked the Boeotians to join with them in building a causeway across the Euripus and thereby joining Euboea to Boeotia.

§ 13.47.4 The Boeotians agreed to this, since it was to their special advantage that Euboea should be an island to everybody else but a part of the mainland to themselves. Consequently all the cities threw themselves vigorously into the building of the causeway and vied with one another; for orders were issued not only to the citizens to report en masse but to the foreigners dwelling among them as well, so that by reason of the great number that came forward to the work the proposed task was speedily completed.

§ 13.47.5 On Euboea the causeway was built at Chalcis, and in Boeotia in the neighbourhood of Aulis, since at that place the channel was narrowest. Now it so happened that in former times also there had always been a current in that place and that the sea frequently reversed its course, and at the time in question the force of the current was far greater because the sea had been confined into a very narrow channel; for passage was left for only a single ship. High towers were also built on both ends and wooden bridges were thrown over the channel.a

§ 13.47.6 Theramenes, who had been dispatched by the Athenians with thirty ships, at first attempted to stop the workers, but since a strong body of soldiers was at the side of the builders of the causeway, he abandoned this design and directed his voyage toward the islands.

§ 13.47.7 And since he wished to relieve both the citizens and the allies from their contributions, he laid waste the territory of the enemy and collected great quantities of booty. He visited also the allied cities and exacted money of such inhabitants as were advocating a change in government.

§ 13.47.8 And when he put in at Paros and found an oligarchy in the city, he restored their freedom to the people and exacted a great sum of money of the men who had participated in the oligarchy.

§ 13.48.1 It happened at this time that a serious civil strife occurred in Corcyra accompanied by massacre, which is said to have been due to various causes but most of all to the mutual hatred that existed between its own inhabitants.

§ 13.48.2 For never in any state have there taken place such murderings of citizens nor have there been greater quarrelling and contentiousness which culminated in bloodshed. For it would seem that the number of those who were slain by their fellow citizens before the present civil strife was some fifteen hundred, and all of these were leading citizens.

§ 13.48.3 And although these misfortunes had already befallen them, Fortune brought upon them a second disaster, in that she increased once more the disaffection which prevailed among them. For the foremost Corcyraeans, who desired the oligarchy, favoured the cause of the Lacedemonians, whereas the masses which favoured the democracy were eager to ally themselves with the Athenians.

§ 13.48.4 For the peoples who were struggling for leadership in Greece were devoted to opposing principles; the Lacedemonians, for example, made it their policy to put the control of the government in the hands of the leading citizens of their allied states, whereas the Athenians regularly established democracies in their cities.

§ 13.48.5 Accordingly the Corcyraeans, seeing that their most influential citizens were planning to hand the city over to the Lacedemonians, sent to the Athenians for an army to protect their city.

§ 13.48.6 And Conon, the general of the Athenians, sailed to Corcyra and left in the city six hundred men from the Messenians in Naupactus, while he himself sailed on with his ships and cast anchor off the sacred precinct of Hera.

§ 13.48.7 And the six hundred, setting out unexpectedly with the partisans of the people's party at the time of full market against the supporters of the Lacedemonians, arrested some of them, slew others, and drove more than a thousand from the state; they also set the slaves free and gave citizenship to the foreigners living among them as a precaution against the great number and influence of the exiles.

§ 13.48.8 Now the men who had been exiled from their country fled to the opposite mainland; but a few days later some people still in the city who favoured the cause of the exiles seized the market-place, called back the exiles, and essayed a final decision of the struggle. When night brought an end to the fighting they came to an agreement with each other, stopped their quarrelling, and resumed living together as one people on their fatherland. Such, then, was the end of the massacre in Corcyra.

§ 13.49.1 Archelaus, the king of the Macedonians, since the people of Pydna would not obey his orders, laid siege to the city with a great army. He received reinforcement also from Theramenes, who brought a fleet; but he, as the siege dragged of, sailed to Thrace, where he joined Thrasybulus who was commander of the entire fleet.

§ 13.49.2 Archelaus now pressed the siege of Pydna more vigorously, and after reducing it he removed the city some twenty stades distant from the sea. Mindarus, when winter had come to an end, collected his triremes from all quarters, for many had come to him from the Peloponnesus as well as from the other allies. But the Athenian generals in Sestus, when they learned of the great size of the fleet that was being assembled by the enemy, were greatly alarmed lest they, attacking with all their triremes, should capture their ships.

§ 13.49.3 Consequently the generals on their side hauled down the ships they had at Sestus, sailed around the Chersonesus, and moored them at Cardia; and they sent triremes to Thrasybulus and Theramenes in Thrace, urging them to come with their fleet as soon as possible, and they summoned Alcibiades also from Lesbos with what ships he had. And the whole fleet was gathered into one place, the generals being eager for a decisive battle.

§ 13.49.4 Mindarus, the Lacedemonian general, sailing to Cyzicus, disembarked his whole force and invested the city. Pharnabazus was also there with a large army and with his aid Mindarus laid siege to Cyzicus and took it by storm.

§ 13.49.5 The Athenian generals, having decided to sail to Cyzicus, put out to sea with all their ships and sailed around the Chersonesus. They arrived first at Eleus; and after that they made a special point of sailing past the city of Abydus at night, in order that the great number of their vessels might not be known to the enemy.

§ 13.49.6 And when they had arrived at Proconnesus, they spent the night there and the next day they disembarked the soldiers who had shipped with them on the territory of the Cyzicenes and gave orders to Chaereas, their commander, to lead the army against the city.

§ 13.50.1 As for the generals themselves, they divided the naval force into three squadrons, Alcibiades commanding one, Theramenes another, and Thrasybulus the third. Now Alcibiades with his own squadron advanced far ahead of the others, wishing to draw the Lacedemonians out to a battle, whereas Theramenes and Thrasybulus planned the manoeuvre of encircling the enemy and, if they sailed out, of blocking their retreat to the city.

§ 13.50.2 Mindarus, seeing only the ships of Alcibiades approaching, twenty in number, and having no knowledge of the others, held them in contempt and boldly set sail from the city with eighty ships to attack him. Then, when he had come near the ships of Alcibiades, the Athenians, as they had been commanded, pretended to flee, and the Peloponnesians, in high spirits, pursued after them vigorously in the belief they were winning the victory.

§ 13.50.3 But after Alcibiades had drawn them a considerable distance from the city, he raised the signal; and when this was given, the ships of Alcibiades suddenly at the same time turned about to face the enemy, and Theramenes and Thrasybulus sailed toward the city and cut off the retreat of the Lacedemonians.

§ 13.50.4 The troops of Mindarus, when they now observed multitude of the enemy ships and realized that they had been outgeneralled, were filled with great fear. And finally, since the Athenians were appearing from every direction and had shut off the Peloponnesians from their line of approach to the city, Mindarus was forced to seek safety on land near Cleri, as it is called, where also Pharnabazus had his army.

§ 13.50.5 Alcibiades, pursuing him vigorously, sank some ships, damaged and captured others, and the largest number, which were moored on the land itself, he seized and threw grappling-irons on, endeavouring by this means to drag them from the land.

§ 13.50.6 And when the infantry of Pharnabazus rushed to the aid of the Lacedemonians, there was great bloodshed, inasmuch as the Athenians because of the advantage they had won were fighting with greater boldness than expediency, while the Peloponnesians were in number far superior; for the army of Pharnabazus was supporting the Lacedemonians and fighting as it was from the land the position it had was more secure.

§ 13.50.7 But when Thrasybulus saw the infantry aiding the enemy, he put the rest of his marines on the land with intent to assist Alcibiades and his men, and he also urged Theramenes to join up with the land troops of Chaereas and come with all sped, in order to wage a battle on land.

§ 13.51.1 While the Athenians were busying themselves with these matters, Mindarus, the Lacedemonian commander, was himself fighting with Alcibiades for the ships that were being dragged off, and he dispatched Clearchus the Spartan with a part of the Peloponnesians against the troops with Thrasybulus; and with him he also sent the mercenaries in the army of Pharnabazus.

§ 13.51.2 Thrasybulus with the marines and archers at first stoutly withstood the enemy, and though he slew many of them, he also saw not a few his own men falling; but when the mercenaries of Pharnabazus were surrounding the Athenians and were crowding about them in great numbers from every direction, Theramenes appeared, leading both his own troops and the infantry with Chaereas.

§ 13.51.3 Although the troops of Thrasybulus were exhausted and had given up hope of rescue, their spirits were suddenly revived again when reinforcements so strong were at hand.

§ 13.51.4 An obstinate battle which lasted a long time ensued; but at first the mercenaries of Pharnabazus began to withdraw and the continuity of their battle line was broken; and finally the Peloponnesians who had been left behind with Clearchus, after having both inflicted and suffered much punishment, were expelled.

§ 13.51.5 Now that the Peloponnesians had been defeated, the troops of Theramenes rushed to give aid to the soldiers who had been fighting under Alcibiades. Although the forces had rapidly assembled at one point, Mindarus was not dismayed at the attack of Theramenes, but, after dividing the Peloponnesians, with half of them he met the advancing enemy, while with the other half which he himself commanded, first calling upon each soldier not to disgrace the fair name of Sparta, and that too in a fight on land, he formed a line against the troops of Alcibiades.