Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis

Sefaria · Second Temple > Philo · 622 sections

Book I._.23.1
[72] “The fourth river,” he says, “is Euphrates.” “Euphrates” means ‘fruitfulness,’ and is a figurative name for the fourth virtue, justice, a virtue fruitful indeed and bringing gladness to the mind. When, then, does it appear? When the three parts of the soul are in harmony. Harmony for them is the dominance of the more excellent; for instance, when the two, the high-spirited and the lustful, are guided by the reasoning faculty as horses by their driver, then justice emerges; for it is justice for the better to rule always and everywhere, and for the worse to be ruled: and the reasoning faculty is better, the lustful and the high-spirited the inferior.
Book I._.23.2
[73] Whenever, on the other hand, high spirit and desire turn restive and get out of hand, and by the violence of their impetus drag the driver, that is the reason, down from his seat and put him under the yoke, and each of these passions gets hold of the reins, injustice prevails. For it cannot but be that owing to the badness and want of skill of the driver, the team is swept down precipices and gullies, just as by experience and skill it must needs be brought safely through.
Book I._.24.1
[74] Now let us go on to look at our subject in this way. “Pheison” signifies ‘alteration of mouth,’ and “Evilat” ‘in travail’: and by these prudence is plainly indicated. For while most people deem the man prudent who can find sophistical arguments, and is clever at expressing his ideas, Moses knows such an one to be a lover of words indeed, but a prudent man by no means. For prudence is discerned in “alteration of the mouth,” that is in the word of utterance undergoing a transformation. This comes to the same thing as saying that prudence is not seen in speech but in action and earnest doings.
Book I._.24.2
[75] And prudence surrounds with an encircling wall Evilat, or “folly in travail,” to besiege and overthrow it. “Travailing” is a name strictly appropriate to folly, because the foolish mind, being enamoured of things out of its reach, is evermore in travail pangs. This is so when it is enamoured of money, when of glory, when of pleasure, when of anything else.
Book I._.24.3
[76] But, though in travail, it never brings to the birth, for the soul of the worthless man has not by nature the power to bring forth any offspring. What it seems to produce turn out to be wretched abortions and miscarriages, devouring half of its flesh, an evil tantamount to the death of the soul. Accordingly Aaron, the sacred word, begs of Moses, the beloved of God, to heal the change in Miriam, that her soul may not be in travail with evils; and so he says “Let her not become as one dead, as an abortion coming forth from the womb of a mother; consuming half of her flesh” (Num. 12:12).
Book I._.25.1
[77] To resume. “There,” it says, “where (or ‘whose’) the gold is” (Gen. 2:11). It does not merely say that the gold is there, but “there (is He) ‘whose’ it is.” For prudence, which he has likened to gold, a substance free from alloy and pure and cleansed by fire and tested and precious, is there in the wisdom of God, but, being there, is not a possession of wisdom, but of Him whose is wisdom itself also, even God Who created it and makes it His.
Book I._.25.2
[78] “Now the gold of that land is good.” “Is there, then, other gold that is not good?” Yes, indeed, for prudence is of two kinds, the one universal, the other particular. The prudence that is in me, being particular, is not good, for when I perish, it perishes together with me. But the universal prudence, which has for its abode the wisdom of God and His dwelling-place, is good, for, itself imperishable, it abides in an imperishable dwelling-place.
Book I._.26.1
[79] “And there is the ruby and the greenstone (ibid.), the two concrete embodiments of this virtue, the man who has good sense, and the man who exercises good sense: the determining quality in the one is potential good sense, that in the other good sense exercised. For it was for the sake of these concretes that God sowed in the earth-born man good sense (in particular) and virtue (in general). For what benefit had there been in virtue had there not been ready for it the activities of reason to welcome it and receive its impressions?” So that, naturally, there where good sense, is, there is both the man who has good sense, and the man who exercises good sense, the two precious stones.
Book I._.26.2
[80] Judah and Issachar seem to be these. For the man who exercises himself in the practical wisdom of God, makes thankful acknowledgement to Him who bestowed good without stint; while the representative of the other aspect is furthermore engaged in noble and worthy works. Now of the man who makes confession of thankfulness Judah is the symbol, with whose birth Leah leaves off bearing (Gen. 29:35); but of him who is engaged in noble deeds Issachar is the figure, “for he submitted his shoulder to labour and became a tiller of the soil” (Gen. 49:15). In his case, as Moses says, when he has been sown and planted in the soul “there is a reward” (Gen. 30:18), that is to say his labour is not in vain, but crowned by God and awarded a recompense.
Book I._.26.3
[81] That he is referring to these patriarchs he shows elsewhere when he says of the high-priestly garment, “And thou shalt weave together in it precious stones in fourfold order: there shall be a row of precious stones, sardius, topaz, smaragdus, making the one row”—Reuben, Simeon, Levi—“and the second row” it says “ruby and sapphire” (Exod. 28:17 f.): but the sapphire is a green stone. Now Judah is engraved in the ruby, for he is fourth in order, and Issachar on the sapphire.
Book I._.26.4
[82] Why then, while saying “a green stone,” does he not also say, “a ruby stone”? Because Judah, the disposition prone to make confession of praise, is exempt from body and matter. For indeed the very word denoting confession (of praise) vividly portrays the acknowledgement that takes a man out of himself. For whenever the mind goes out from itself and offers itself up to God, as Isaac or “laughter,” does, then does it make confession of acknowledgement towards the Existent One. But so long as the mind supposes itself to be the author of anything, it is far away from making room for God and from confessing or making acknowledgement to Him. For we must take note that the very confession of praise itself is the work not of the soul but of God who gives it thankfulness. Incorporeal assuredly is Judah with his confession of praise.
Book I._.26.5
[83] But for Issachar who has advanced through labour there is need accordingly of a material body. For how shall the keen endeavourer read without eyes? How shall he hear the words of encouragement without ears? How shall he eat food and drink without a stomach and its wonderful processes? That is why he is likened to a stone.
Book I._.26.6
[84] Yes, and the colours differ. To him who makes confession of praise the hue of the ruby belongs, for he is permeated by fire in giving thanks to God, and is drunk with a sober drunkenness. But to him who is still labouring the hue of the green stone is proper, for men in exercise and training are pale, both by reason of the wearing labour and by reason of the fear that they may perchance not obtain the result that accords with their prayer.
Book I._.27.1
[85] It is worth inquiring why, while the two rivers Pheison and Geon encompass countries, the one Evilat, the other Ethiopia, neither of the others does so; but of the Tigris it is said that it is over against the Assyrians, and the Euphrates is not said to be over against anything; and yet as a matter of fact the Euphrates both flows round many countries and has many facing it. But the subject of the passage is not the river, but amendment of character.
Book I._.27.2
[86] We must observe, then, that prudence and courage are able to construct an enclosing wall against the opposite vices, folly and cowardice, and capture them; for they are both of them weak and easy to take, for the foolish man falls an easy victim to the prudent man, and the coward lies at the mercy of the brave man; self-mastery on the contrary is powerless to encircle desire and pleasure; for they are hard to wrestle with and difficult to overthrow. Mark you not that even the most self-controlled of men under compulsion of the mortal element in them resort to food and drink, out of which the pleasures of the appetite develop? So we must be content to face and fight lust as a principle.
Book I._.27.3
[87] That is why the river Tigris is over against the Assyrians, self-mastery over against pleasure. Justice, however, the characteristic of the river Euphrates, neither besieges and encircles anyone with a palisade, nor withstands any in conflict. Why? Because it is the function of justice to assign to each what he deserves, and justice sustains the part neither of prosecutor nor of defendant but of judge. Even as the judge, therefore, makes it his business neither to conquer any persons, nor to wage war on any and oppose them, but pronounces a judgement and awards what is just, so too justice, being nobody’s opponent, accords to each matter what it merits.
Book I._.28.1
[88]. “And the Lord God took the man whom He had made, and placed him in the garden to till and to guard it” (Gen. 2:15). “The man whom God made” differs, as I have said before, from the one that “was moulded”: for the one that was moulded is the more earthly mind, the one that was made the less material, having no part in perishable matter, endowed with a constitution of a purer and clearer kind.
Book I._.28.2
[89] This pure mind, then, God takes, not suffering it to go outside of Himself, and, having taken it, sets it among the virtues that have roots and put forth shoots, that he may till them and guard them. For many, after beginning to practise virtue, have changed at the last: but on the man to whom God affords secure knowledge, He bestows both advantages, both that of tilling the virtues, and also that of never desisting from them, but of evermore husbanding and guarding each one of them. So “tilling” represents practising, while “guarding” represents remembering.
Book I._.29.1
[90] “And the Lord God commanded Adam saying: From every tree that is in the garden thou shalt feedingly eat, but of the tree of knowing good and evil ye shall not eat of it: and in the day that ye eat of it ye shall surely die” (Gen. 2:16, 17).
Book I._.29.2
We must raise the question what Adam He commands and who this is; for the writer has not mentioned him before, but has named him now for the first time. Perchance, then, he means to give us the name of the man that was moulded. “Call him earth” he says, for that is the meaning of “Adam,” so that when you hear the word “Adam,” you must make up your mind that it is the earthly and perishable mind; for the mind that was made after the image is not earthly but heavenly.
Book I._.29.3
[91] And we must inquire why when assigning their names to all the other creatures Adam did not assign one to himself. What, then, are we to say? The mind that is in each one of us can apprehend other objects, but is incapable of knowing itself. For just as the eye sees other objects but does not see itself, so the mind too perceives other objects, but does not apprehend itself. Can it say what it is and of what kind, breath or blood or fire or air or anything else? Can it even say that it is a body or else that it is incorporeal? Are not they simpletons, then, who inquire about God’s substance? For how should those, who know not the substance of their own soul, have accurate ideas about the soul of the universe? For we may conceive of God as the soul of the universe.
Book I._.30.1
[92] Quite naturally, therefore, Adam, that is the Mind, though he names and apprehends other things, gives no name to himself, since he is ignorant of himself and his own nature. Now it is to this being, and not to the being created after His image and after the original idea, that God gives the command. For the latter, even without urging, possesses virtue instinctively; but the former, independently of instruction, could have no part in wisdom.
Book I._.30.2
[93] There is a difference between these three—injunction, prohibition, command accompanied by exhortation. For prohibition deals with wrongdoings and is addressed to the bad man, injunction concerns duties rightly done, and exhortation is addressed to the neutral man, the man who is neither bad nor good: for he is neither sinning, to lead anyone to forbid him, nor is he so doing right as right reason enjoins, but has need of exhortation, which teaches him to refrain from evil things, and incites him to aim at things noble.
Book I._.30.3
[94] There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (Divine) image, for none of these does the perfect man require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child of exhortation and teaching. Just so the perfect master of music or letters requires none of the directions that apply to those arts, whereas the man who stumbles over the subjects of his study does require what we may call laws or rules with their injunctions and prohibitions, while one who is now beginning to learn requires teaching.
Book I._.30.4
[95] Quite naturally, then, does God give the commandments and exhortations before us to the earthly man who is neither bad nor good but midway between these. To enforce the exhortation, both Divine titles are employed, both “Lord” and “God,” for it says “God the Lord commanded him.” This is in order that, should he obey the exhortations, he may be deemed worthy by God of His benefactions; but that, should he rebel, he may be driven from the presence of the Lord who has a Master’s authority over him.
Book I._.30.5
[96] For this reason again, when he is being cast out of the garden, the sacred writer has introduced the same titles, for he says, “And the Lord God sent him forth out of the garden of delight, to till the ground, out of which he was taken” (Gen. 3:23). This is to show that, since “the Lord” as Master and “God” as Benefactor had issued the commands, so in both capacities does He inflict punishment on him who had disobeyed them. For he dismisses the disobedient by the exercise of the very powers which He had exercised in urging him to obedience.
Book I._.31.1
[97] The charge which he gives is this: “From every tree that is in the garden thou shalt eat feedingly thereon” (Gen. 2:16). He moves the soul of the man to get benefit, not from a single tree or from a single virtue but from all the virtues: for eating is a figure of soul-nourishment: and the soul is nourished by the acquisition of things noble, and the practice of things rightful.
Book I._.31.2
[98] And He says not merely “shalt eat,” but also “feedingly,” that is, chewing and masticating the nourishment, not like an ordinary person, but like an athlete, that you may gain strength and power: for, as we know, the trainers charge the athletes not to bolt their food, but to masticate it slowly, in order that they may grow stronger. For the athlete and I take nourishment with different objects; I, just to sustain life, the athlete, for the further purpose of growing brawny and strong; and so mastication of food is a special point in training. Such is the meaning of “thou shalt eat feedingly thereon.”
Book I._.31.3
[99] Let us try to form a yet more precise conception of it. To honour our parents is something eatable and nutritious: but good and bad sons honour them differently, the latter in compliance with custom, and these do not “eat feedingly,” but simply eat. When, then, eat they feedingly too? When, after exploring the precept and searching for the grounds on which it rests, they freely determine that such conduct is noble. The grounds for it are such as these: they gave us birth, nurtured us, educated us, have been authors of all good things to us. Honour again shown to the Existent One is something eatable; it is shown “feedingly,” when the honour we show is coupled with close search into the precept, and with a due appreciation of its motives.
Book I._.32.1
[100] “But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil ye shall not eat” (Gen. 2:17). Therefore this tree is not in the garden: for if He bids them to eat of every tree in the garden, but not to eat of this one, it is evident that it is not in the garden: and this is quite naturally so: for actually, as I have said, it is there, and virtually it is not. For as all the impressions are virtually in the wax, but actually only the one that has been made, so in the soul, whose nature is waxlike, all the types are contained virtually, but not in actual execution, and the single one engraved in it is in possession, so long as it has not been obliterated by another seal which has made over it a clearer and bolder impression.
Book I._.32.2
[101] Next there is this further question to be raised. When He is giving the charge to eat of every tree of the garden, He addresses the command to a single person, but when He issues the prohibition against making any use of that which causes evil and good, He speaks to more than one: for in the former case He says, “Thou shalt eat from every tree”; but in the latter, “ye shall not eat, and in the day that ye eat” not “that thou eatest,” and “ye shall die” not “thou shalt die.”
Book I._.32.3
[102] We must accordingly remark in the first place that the good is scarce, the evil abundant. Hence it is hard to find a single wise man, while of inferior men there is a countless multitude. Quite fitly, therefore, does He bid a single man to find nourishment in the virtues, but many to abstain from evil-doing, for myriads practise this.
Book I._.32.4
[103] In the second place, for the acquisition and practice of virtue a single thing only, namely our understanding, is requisite: but the body not only fails to co-operate to this end, but is an actual hindrance; for we may almost make it an axiom that the business of wisdom is to become estranged from the body and its cravings: but for the enjoyment of evil it is necessary not only that the mind be in a certain condition, but also the power of perception and of speech, in fact the body;
Book I._.32.5
[104] for all these the inferior man requires for the full satisfaction of his particular form of wickedness. For how shall he divulge sacred and hidden truths unless he have an organ of speech? And how is he to indulge in pleasures, if he be bereft of a stomach and the organs of taste? So it is in accordance with the necessities of the case that He addresses the understanding alone about gaining virtue; for, as I said, it alone is needed for its acquisition; whereas in the pursuit of evil several faculties are needed, soul, speech, senses, body, for wickedness employs all these in displaying itself.
Book I._.33.1
[105] And further he says, “In the day that ye eat thereof, ye shall die the death” (Gen. 2:17). And yet after they have eaten, not merely do they not die, but they beget children and become authors of life to others. What, then, is to be said to this? That death is of two kinds, one that of the man in general, the other that of the soul in particular. The death of the man is the separation of the soul from the body, but the death of the soul is the decay of virtue and the bringing in of wickedness.
Book I._.33.2
[106] It is for this reason that God says not only “die” but “die the death,” indicating not the death common to us all, but that special death properly so called, which is that of the soul becoming entombed in passions and wickedness of all kinds. And this death is practically the antithesis of the death which awaits us all. The latter is a separation of combatants that had been pitted against one another, body and soul, to wit. The former, on the other hand, is a meeting of the two in conflict. And in this conflict the worse, the body, overcomes, and the better, the soul, is overcome.
Book I._.33.3
[107] But observe that wherever Moses speaks of “dying the death,” he means the penalty-death, not that which takes place in the course of nature. That one is in the course of nature in which soul is parted from body; but the penalty-death takes place when the soul dies to the life of virtue, and is alive only to that of wickedness.
Book I._.33.4
[108] That is an excellent saying of Heracleitus, who on this point followed Moses’ teaching, “We live,” he says, “their death, and are dead to their life.” He means that now, when we are living, the soul is dead and has been entombed in the body as in a sepulchre; whereas, should we die, the soul lives forthwith its own proper life, and is released from the body, the baneful corpse to which it was tied.
Book I.Appendix.1
APPENDIX TO ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION, I
Book I.Appendix.2
§ 3. Multiplication of two unequal factors. Ἑτερομήκης, though often used more widely by general writers, is a term reserved by the mathematicians for numbers of the form x(x+1), i.e. 1×2, 2×3, 3×4, etc. (See Nicomachus ii. 17.) This restricted use of the word obviously fits the present passage.
Book I.Appendix.3
§ 30. Impressions … active impulse. The φαντασία, translated now by “presentation,” now by “mental picture,” conceived of as an imprint (τύπωσις) on the mind, is a thoroughly Stoic idea. (See e.g. Diog. Laert. vii. 45; S. V. F. ii. 52 ff.) So also is ὁρμή, “impulse” or “appetite.” The sense of this section is given more fully and clearly in Quod Deus 43.
Book I.Appendix.4
§ 57. Theoretical … practical. A more careful classification of the arts is given by Aristotle, Met. v. 1, viz.—θεωρητικαί, πρακτικαί and ποιητικαί (“productive”). Thus rhetoric and dancing are πρακτικαί, sculpture and poetry ποιητικαί, Cf. Quintilian ii. 18.
Book I.Appendix.5
ibid. Its three parts. This division is claimed for the Stoics by Diogenes Laertius (vii. 39), though actually it appears incidentally in Aristotle, Topica i. 14, 105 b 20. The comparison quoted by Diogenes in vii. 40 of τὸ λογικόν to the fledge (φραγμός), τὸ φυσικόν to the field or trees, and τὸ ἠθικόν to the fruit is adopted by Philo in De Agr. 14.
Book I.Appendix.6
§ 60. Another suggestion may be made for emending this passage. Elsewhere Philo explains unexpected silences on Moses’ part by his desire to stimulate the mystic to discover some high truth for himself. E.g. L.A. ii. 55. iii. 239. Note in particular De Cherubim 121 fin., where the likeness of diction to this passage is significant. There the silence is stated to be ἵνα ὁ μὴ φυσιολογίας ἀμύητος εἰς ἐπιστήμην ὠφελῆται. The stimulus to thought, that is to say, will be an actual assistance to the philosophical mind in its quest for knowledge. Here if we change the order of ὁ and μὴ we may perhaps leave the text otherwise undisturbed, translating “that the man versed in natural philosophy may <discover the="" truth="" for="" himself="" and=""> revere Him that is for His knowledge.” Or we might read (for τὸν ὄντα) τὸν <μεταδ>όντα τῆς ἐπιστήμης. The sense conveyed will then be that the stimulus to thought will lead to a higher knowledge, and so to reverence for Him who has imparted it.
Book I.Appendix.7
§ 70. Our soul is threefold, etc. This theory is familiar to readers of Plato from the famous myth of the soul’s chariot in the Phaedrus 246 ff., where τὸ λογικόν appears as the charioteer, τὸ θυμικόν and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν as the nobler and baser horses respectively. Cf. Timaeus 69 C; Republic 439 D. Philo, in fact, reproduces the figure in 72 f., but without Plato’s distinction of the character of the two horses. The location of the three in different parts of the body here mentioned is taken from Timaeus 69 E, 90 A.
Book I.Appendix.8
§ 80. Judah and Issachar. The idea seems to be that Judah, the mystic representing φρόνησις as a spiritual or mental condition, is ὁ φρόνιμος, while Issachar, who represents the same as carried into practical life, is ὁ φρονῶν. The somewhat unexpected use of ἀσκητής as applied to the mystic may perhaps be explained by laying stress on θεοῦ. He is a “practiser,” but of a wisdom higher than that of practisers in general.
Book I.Appendix.9
§ 91. We conceive of God as the soul of the universe. It is implied that it is not an accurate or adequate expression. Cf. De Migr. 179, where the possible danger of this expression, as tending to suggest that God is contained in the universe, is pointed out, and ibid. 181, where the thought is further developed. The expression is Stoic (S. V. F. ii. 774). The equivalent ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή is attributed to Cleanthes himself (S. V. F. i. 532).
Book II.Introduction.1
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION TO BOOK II
Book II.Introduction.2
This treatise deals with Genesis 2:18–3:1. Let us mark its mode of dealing with the Sacred Text in salient instances.
Book II.Introduction.3
The story of the creation of Eve, we are told, is not meant to be taken literally. It is a Myth,” showing forth the origin of Sense-perception, which becomes active when Mind is asleep (Gen. 2:21). The bringing of Woman to Man is the introduction of Sense-perception to Mind, which hails it as its own (2:22 f.). (19 ff., 40 ff.)
Book II.Introduction.4
That Adam and Eve were both naked (2:25) means that they were without either good or evil; for nakedness of soul can show itself as (a) freedom from passions; (b) loss of virtue; (c) neutrality. Adam and Eve were inactive both in mind and sense-perception, and were “unashamed,” i.e. without either the shamelessness of the worthless man, or the shamefastness of the man of worth. (53 ff.)
Book II.Introduction.5
The entry of the Serpent (Gen. 3:1) is due to the need of some means of uniting Mind and Sense-perception for their joint apprehension of objects, and of eliciting their activities. (71 ff.)
Book II.Introduction.6
Let us notice next the extent to which Philo dwells on single words.
Book II.Introduction.7
The word “alone” in Gen. 2:18 draws out the reminder that God only is alone, self-contained, needing naught, not composite; while the heavenly Man ever yearns to be with God, and the earthy man always is with his passions. (1–4.)
Book II.Introduction.8
The word “help” or “helper” suggests to him the created, later-born helpers given to the earthy man. These “wild beasts” are the senses and passions, such as desire, fear, anger, given to Mind (Gen. 2:19)—our helpers, but often our foes. (5 ff.)
Book II.Introduction.9
The word “moreover” (in the Greek version of Gen. 2:19) is taken by Philo to mean a second creation of senses and passions; and this further creation is accounted for by the observation that evils are numerous, and by the suggestion that Gen. 1:24 refers to genera, and Gen. 2:19 to species, a suggestion in support of which evidence is adduced. (11 f.)
Book II.Introduction.10
In the account of the giving of names to the creatures, the words “what he would call” are taken as meaning “why he would invite.” (14 f.)
Book II.Introduction.11
In the story of the creation of Eve, “ribs” or “sides” are understood as “strength”; “took” as meaning “entered on the roll,” “registered,” i.e. brought into active service (this on the strength of Numb. 31:26, “take the sum”); “filled up flesh in its stead” means “fulfilled” sense-perception, and “filled” the body “with it”; and woman is “builded” (Gen. 2:22, R.V. margin) because she is moved to activity from without. (19 f., 35, 38 f.)
Book II.Introduction.12
A striking example of single words pressed into the service of allegory is Adam’s welcome to Eve, “This is now bone of my bones.” “This” is Sense-perception no longer passive but become active; and “now” is indicative of Sense-perception being affected only by the present. (42 f.)
Book II.Introduction.13
We pass on to observe the examples afforded by this treatise of Philo’s fondness for drawing illustrations and adducing parallels from the story of the patriarchs and the early history of Israel.
Book II.Introduction.14
In 46 f. Philo maintains that, though active Sense-perception, being an extension of the potential Sense-perception inherent in Mind, may be said to come from Mind, yet to suppose that anything whatever is, in the strict sense of the word, derived from Mind is to be guilty of shallow thinking, and illustrates the truth of what he says by the contrast between Rachel addressing to Jacob the appeal “Give me children,” and “the Lord opening Leah’s womb” (Gen. 29:31 and 30:1 f.).
Book II.Introduction.15
In 51 f. the danger of the drawing down of Mind from the love of God by its cleaving to Sense-perception is brought out by a reference to Levi’s noble choice (Deut. 33:9) making the Lord his portion (10:9), and to the two goats of Lev. 16:8.
Book II.Introduction.16
Freedom from passions (one of the meanings of “nakedness”) is illustrated by Moses setting up the Tent of Witness outside the Camp (Exod. 33:7); by Aaron entering unrobed (!) into the Holy of Holies (cf. Lev. 16:1 ff.); by Nadab and Abihu leaving their coats (or irrational parts) for Mishael and Elzaphan (Lev. 10:5); by Abraham leaving his country (Gen. 12:1); by Isaac being forbidden to go down into Egypt (i.e. the body, Gen. 26:2); and by Jacob’s smoothness (Gen. 27:11). (54 ff.)
Book II.Introduction.17
Loss of virtue (another meaning given to “nakedness”) is illustrated by Noah’s lapse (Gen. 9:21). And the indications which Philo finds in the narrative that the lapse was not irretrievable are illustrated by the provision in the Law that vows made only in intent may be rescinded (Numb. 30:10). (60 ff.)
Book II.Introduction.18
The assaults of pleasure and the healing virtue of Self-mastery are illustrated by the deadly serpents and the brazen serpent of the wilderness journey (Numb. 21). Distraction, Pleasure’s agent, is like the scorpion (= “scattering”) of the desert. The soul-thirst of “Egypt” is quenched by the Wisdom (“Water”) as is hunger by the Word (“Manna”) of God. A sign of the great daring of Pleasure, in attacking even Moses, is found in the story of his rod. Like Jacob’s, it is “discipline.” Shrinking from this, Moses casts it away, and is then bidden to grasp it by its tail (Exod. 4:1 ff.). (78 ff., 87 ff.)
Book II.Introduction.19
Pleasure is again pointed at in the Prayer of Jacob (Gen. 49:16–18), where Dan (= “distinguishing”) is the principle of self-mastery, who is to become a serpent biting the horse (sc. passions), and saving from them Mind (the “horseman”), who “waits for” God’s “salvation”; and in the Song of Moses (Exod. 15:1), where horse and rider, i.e. the four passions with Mind mounted on them, are cast into the sea.
Book II._.1.1
[1] “And the Lord God said, It is not good that the man should be alone, let us make for him a helper corresponding to him” (Gen. 2:18). Why, O prophet, is it not good that the man should be alone? Because, he says, it is good that the Alone should be alone: but God, being One, is alone and unique, and like God there is nothing. Hence, since it is good that He Who IS should be alone—for indeed with regard to Him alone can the statement “it is good” be made—it follows that it would not be good that the man should be alone. There is another way in which we may understand the statement that God is alone.
Book II._.1.2
[2] It may mean that neither before creation was there anything with God, nor, when the universe had come into being, does anything take its place with Him; for there is absolutely nothing which He needs. A yet better interpretation is the following. God is alone, a Unity, in the sense that His nature is simple not composite, whereas each one of us and of all other created beings is made up of many things. I, for example, am many things in one. I am soul and body. To soul belong rational and irrational parts, and to body, again, different properties, warm and cold, heavy and light, dry and moist. But God is not a composite Being, consisting of many parts, nor is He mixed with aught else.
Book II._.1.3
[3] For whatever is added to God, is either superior or inferior or equal to Him. But there is nothing equal or superior to God. And no lesser thing is resolved into Him. If He do so assimilate any lesser thing, He also will be lessened. And if He can be made less, He will also be capable of corruption; and even to imagine this were blasphemous. The “one” and the “monad” are, therefore, the only standard for determining the category to which God belongs. Rather should we say, the One God is the sole standard for the “monad.” For, like time, all number is subsequent to the universe; and God is prior to the universe, and is its Maker.
Book II._.2.1
[4] It is not good that any man should be alone. For there are two races of men, the one made after the (Divine) Image, and the one moulded out of the earth. For the man made after the Image it is not good to be alone, because he yearns after the Image. For the image of God is a pattern of which copies are made, and every copy longs for that of which it is a copy, and its station is at its side. Far less is it good for the man moulded of the earth to be alone. Nay, it is impossible. For with the mind so formed, linked to it in closest fellowship, are senses, passions, vices, ten thousand other presences.
Book II._.2.2
[5] With the second man a helper is associated. To begin with, the helper is a created one, for it says, “Let us make a helper for him”; and, in the next place, is subsequent to him who is to be helped, for He had formed the mind before and is about to form its helper. In these particulars again, while using terms of outward nature he is conveying a deeper meaning. For sense and the passions are helpers of the soul and come after the soul. In what way they help we shall see: let us fix our attention on their coming later than the soul.
Book II._.3.1
[6] In the view of the best physicians and natural philosophers the heart is thought to be formed before the whole body, by way of a foundation, or as the keel in a ship, the rest of the body being built upon it; and they assert that accordingly even after death it still beats, and decays after the body, as it came into existence before it. In just the same way, it is thought, the princely part of the soul is older than the soul as a whole, and the irrational portion younger. The creation of this the prophet has not as yet related, but he is going to describe it. The irrational portion is sense and the passions which are the offspring of sense, unquestionably so if they are not the result of any choice of our own. This helper then is later born and of course created.
Book II._.3.2
[7] Now let us consider the point which we deferred, how the help is given. How does our mind apprehend the fact that an object is white or black, except by using sight as a helper? How does it become aware that the musician’s voice is sweet or on the other hand out of tune, save by using the sense of hearing as a helper? How does it recognize that perfumes are pleasant or disagreeable, except by using as an ally the sense of smell? How does it distinguish savours, except by means of the taste acting as its helper?
Book II._.3.3
[8] Things smooth and rough, again, how but by touch? Moreover, there are, as I have said, helpers of another kind, namely the passions. For pleasure and desire contribute to the permanence of our kind: pain and fear are like bites or stings warning the soul to treat nothing carelessly: anger is a weapon of defence, which has conferred great boons on many: and so with the other passions. This shows also that the prophet was perfectly right in saying that the helper must be one “corresponding to him.” For in very deed this helper is intimately allied to the mind, as though a brother of one blood with it: for sense-perception and passions are parts and offspring of one soul with it.
Book II._.4.1
[9] There are two species of this helper: the one has its sphere in the passions, the other in sense-perception. At present He will produce the former only, for he says, “And God moulded moreover out of the earth all the wild beasts of the field, and all the birds of the heaven, and led them to Adam, to see what he would call them: and whatever Adam called a living soul, this was its name” (Gen. 2:19). You see who are our helpers, the wild beasts, the soul’s passions: for after saying, “Let us make a helper corresponding to him,” he adds the words, “He moulded the wild beasts,” implying that the wild beasts are our helpers. These are not properly called our helpers,
Book II._.4.2
[10] but by a straining of language; in reality they are found to be our actual foes, just as the allies of states sometimes turn out to be traitors and deserters, and in private friendships flatterers prove enemies instead of comrades. He uses the terms “heaven” and “field” as synonyms, meaning the mind. For the mind is like the field in having countless sproutings and upgrowths, and like heaven again in having natures brilliant and godlike and blessed.
Book II._.4.3
[11] The passions he likens to wild beasts and birds, because, savage and untamed as they are, they tear the soul to pieces, and because like winged things they light upon the understanding; for the assault of the passions is violent and irresistible. The addition of “further” to “formed” is by no means otiose. How do we see this? Because above also he mentions the forming of the wild beasts before the creation of man, as we see from these words referring to the sixth day: and He said, “Let the earth bring forth the living soul after its kind, four-footed animals and creeping things and wild beasts” (Gen. 1:24).
Book II._.4.4
[12] How comes He, then, to form other wild beasts now, and not to be satisfied with those former ones? From the ethical point of view what we must say is this. In the realm of created things the class or kind of wickedness is abundant. It follows that in this the worst things are ever being produced. From the philosophical point of view our answer must be, that on the former occasion, when engaged in the Work of the six days, He wrought the genera or kinds and the originals of the passions, whereas now He is fashioning the species as well.
Book II._.4.5
[13] This is why he says, “He fashioned moreover.” That what were created in the first instance were genera, is evident from the words employed, “Let the earth bring forth the living soul,” not according to species but “according to kind.” And we find Him in every instance working in this way. Before the species He completes the genera. He does so in the case of man. Having first fashioned man as a genus, in which the prophet says that there is the male and the female genus. He afterwards makes Adam, the finished form or species.
Book II._.5.1
[14] Helpers of this sort the prophet has now dealt with; the other sort he defers, that of sense-perception, I mean, until the Creator takes in hand to fashion woman. Having deferred that subject, he goes on to a systematic treatment of the giving of names. Here his literal statement and his symbolic interpretation alike claim our admiration. What we admire in the Lawgiver’s literal statement is his ascription to the first man of the fixing of names.
Book II._.5.2
[15] Indeed Greek philosophers said that those who first assigned names to things were wise men. Moses did better than they, first of all in ascribing it not to some of the men of old but to the first man created. His purpose was that, as Adam was formed to be the beginning from which all others drew their birth, so too no other than he should be regarded as the beginning of the use of speech: for even language would not have existed, if there had not been names. Again, had many persons bestowed names on things, they would inevitably have been incongruous and ill-matched, different persons imposing them on different principles, whereas the naming by one man was bound to bring about harmony between name and thing, and the name given was sure to be a symbol, the same for all men, of any object to which the name was attached or of the meaning attaching to the name.
Book II._.6.1
[16] What he says in the domain of ethics is to this effect. We often use “τί”(= “what”) for “διὰ τί” (“by reason of what”), as “what (i.e. why) have you bathed?” “What (i.e. ‘why’) are you walking?” “What (i.e. ‘why’) are you conversing?” In all these cases “what” stands for “because of what.” When the prophet says “to see what he would call them” you should understand something equivalent to ‘why the mind would call and invite to it and greet’ each of these objects, whether only for the sake of that which it cannot dispense with, seeing that all that is mortal is necessarily bound up with passions and vices, or also for the sake of what is in excess of reasonable needs; and whether to satisfy the needs of flesh and blood, or because it deems them good and admirable above all things.
Book II._.6.2
[17] For example. A created being cannot but make use of pleasure. But the worthless man will use it as a perfect good, but the man of worth simply as a necessity, remembering that apart from pleasure nothing in mortal kind comes into existence. Again the worthless man accounts the acquisition of wealth a most perfect good; the man of worth regards it as just necessary and serviceable and no more.
Book II._.6.3
[18] No wonder then that God wishes to see and ascertain how the mind invites and welcomes each of these, whether as good, or as indifferent, or as bad but at all events as serviceable. Hence it came about that everything which he called to himself and greeted as living soul, reckoning it equal in worth to the soul, this became the name not only of the thing called but of him who called it. For example, if he welcomed pleasure, he was called pleasure-loving; if desire, desire-ridden; if licence, licentious; if cowardice, cowardly; and so on. For, just as the man whose quality is determined by the virtues is from them called wise or sober-minded or just or brave, so from the vices is he called unjust and foolish and unmanly, whensoever he has invited to himself and given a hearty welcome to the corresponding dispositions.
Book II._.7.1
[19] “And God brought a trance upon Adam, and he fell asleep; and He took one of his sides” and what follows (Gen. 2:21). These words in their literal sense are of the nature of a myth. For how could anyone admit that a woman, or a human being at all, came into existence out of a man’s side? And what was there to hinder the First Cause from creating woman, as He created man, out of the earth? For not only was the Maker the same Being, but the material too, out of which every particular kind was fashioned, was practically unlimited. And why, when there were so many parts to choose from, did He form the woman not from some other part but from the side? And which side did he take? For we may assume that only two are indicated, as there is in fact nothing to suggest a large number of them. Did he take the left or the right side?
Book II._.7.2
[20] If He filled up with flesh (the place of) the one which He took, are we to suppose that the one which He left was not made of flesh? Truly our sides are twin in all their parts and are made of flesh. What then are we to say?
Book II._.7.3
[21] “Sides” is a term of ordinary life for “strength.” To say that a man has “sides” is equivalent to saying that he is strong, we say of a powerful athlete “he has stout sides,” and to say that a singer has “sides” is as much as to say that he has great lung power in singing.
Book II._.7.4
[22] Having said this, we must go on to remark that the mind when as yet unclothed and unconfined by the body (and it is of the mind when not so confined that he is speaking) has many powers. It has the power of holding together, of growing, of conscious life, of thought, and countless other powers, varying both in species and genus. Lifeless things, like stones and blocks of wood, share with all others the power of holding together, of which the bones in us, which are not unlike stones, partake. “Growth” extends to plants, and there are parts in us, such as our nails and hair, resembling plants; “growth” is coherence capable of moving itself.
Book II._.7.5
[23] Conscious life is the power to grow, with the additional power of receiving impressions and being the subject of impulses. This is shared also by creatures without reason. Indeed our mind contains a part that is analogous to the conscious life of a creature without reason. Once more, the power of thinking is peculiar to the mind, and while shared, it may well be, by beings more akin to God, is, so far as mortal beings are concerned, peculiar to man. This power or faculty is twofold. We are rational beings, on the one hand as being partakers of mind, and on the other as being capable of discourse.
Book II._.7.6
[24] Well, there is also another power or faculty in the soul, closely akin to these, namely that of receiving sense-impressions, and it is of this that the prophet is speaking. For his immediate concern is just this, to indicate the origin of active sense-perception. And logical sequence leads him to do so.
Book II._.8.1
For it was requisite that the creation of mind should be followed immediately by that of sense-perception, to be a helper and ally to it. Having then finished the creation of the mind He fashions the product of creative skill that comes next to it alike in order and in power, namely active sense-perception, with a view to the completeness of the whole soul, and with a view to its apprehension of objects presented to it.
Book II._.8.2
[25] How is it, then, produced? As the prophet himself again says, it is when the mind has fallen asleep. As a matter of fact it is when the mind has gone to sleep that perception begins, for conversely when the mind wakes up perception is quenched. A proof of this is afforded by the fact that whenever we wish to get an accurate understanding of a subject we hurry off to a lonely spot; we close our eyes; we stop our ears; we say “good-bye” to our perceptive faculties. So then, we see that, when the mind is astir and awake, the power of perception is suppressed.
Book II._.8.3
[26] There is the other point to be noticed. Let us see what happens to the mind in sleep. When the perceptive faculty has been set astir and aflame, owing to the eye contemplating the masterpieces of painters or sculptors, does not the mind remain inactive, and cease to exercise itself on objects of thought? And when the ear is intent on the tunefulness of a voice, can the mind be employing its reasoning power upon any of the subjects belonging to its sphere? Of course not. And in good sooth the mind finds itself still more completely out of work when the sense of taste has fully roused itself and is gorging itself with all that delights the appetite.
Book II._.8.4
[27] And this is the reason why Moses, fearing lest the mind should not only go to sleep but absolutely die, says in another place, “And thou shalt have a shovel upon thy belt; and it shall be, when thou sittest down abroad, thou shalt dig therewith and cover over thine unseemliness” (Deut. 23:13). He uses the term “shovel” figuratively for the reason that digs out hidden matters.
Book II._.8.5
[28] And he bids the man wear it upon his passion, which must be girded up and which he must not allow to be loose and slack. And this girding must be put into practice whenever the mind, relaxing from the strain of its own objects, lowers itself to the passions, and “sits down abroad,” giving itself up to be drawn by bodily necessity.
Book II._.8.6
[29] And this is how the matter stands. Whenever the mind forgets itself amid the luxuries of a festive gathering and is mastered by all that conduces to pleasure, we are in bondage and we leave our “unseemliness” uncovered. But if the reason prove strong enough to purge the passion, we neither go on drinking till we are drunk, nor eat so greedily as to wax wanton, but we banish folly and take our food soberly.
Book II._.8.7
[30] Thus the wakefulness of the senses means sleep for the mind, and the wakefulness of the mind a time of leisure for the senses; just as, when the sun has risen, the lights of the other heavenly bodies are invisible; when it has set, they show themselves. The mind, like the sun, when awake, throws the senses into the shade, but if it goes to sleep, it causes them to shine out.
Book II._.9.1
[31] Having said this, we must show how the terms employed accord with it. “God cast,” he says, “a trance upon Adam, and he went to sleep” (Gen. 2:21). Quite correctly does he use this language. For the mind’s trance and change is its sleep, and it falls into a trance when it ceases to be engaged with the objects appropriate to it; and when it is not at work at these, it is sleeping. Rightly also does he say that this change or turning which he undergoes is not of his own motion but of God’s; that it is God who “casts it on him,” that is, brings and sends it on him.
Book II._.9.2
[32] For the case is this. For if the change were in our hands I should have recourse to it, when I wished, and when it was not my deliberate choice I should then continue unturned. But as it is, the change is actually repugnant to me, and many a time when wishing to entertain some fitting thought, I am drenched by a flood of unfitting matters pouring over me; and conversely when on the point of admitting a conception of something vile, I have washed the vile thing away with wholesome thoughts, God having by His grace poured upon my soul a sweet draught in place of the bitter one.
Book II._.9.3
[33] Now every created thing must necessarily undergo change, for this is its property, even as unchangeableness is the property of God. But, while some, after being changed, remain so until they are entirely destroyed, others continue so only so far as to experience that to which all flesh is liable, and these forthwith recover.

Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1929. Via Sefaria (sefaria.org), Sefaria-Export. Version source: https://www.nli.org.il/en/books/NNL_ALEPH001216057/NLI Licence: Public Domain. Source.