Fragments

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 187 sections

A.96.1
To the longer life and the worse, the shorter life, if it is better, ought by all means to be preferred.
A.97.1
When we are children our parents deliver us to a paedagogue to take care on all occasions that we suffer no harm. But when we are become men, God delivers us to our innate conscience (συνειδήσει) to take care of us. This guardianship then we must in no way despise, for we shall both displease God and be enemies to our own conscience.
A.98.1
[We ought to use wealth as the material for some act, not for every act alike.]
A.99.1
[Virtue then should be desired by all men more than wealth which is dangerous to the foolish; for the wickedness of men is increased by wealth. And the more a man is without sense, the more violent is he in excess, for he has the means of satisfying his mad desire for pleasures.
A.100.1
What we ought not to do, we should not even think of doing.
A.101.1
Deliberate much before saying or doing anything, for you will not have the power of recalling what has been said or done.
A.102.1
Every place is safe to him who lives with justice.
A.103.1
Crows devour the eyes of the dead, when the dead have no longer need of them. But flatterers destroy the souls of the living and blind their eyes.
A.104.1
The anger of an ape and the threats of a flatterer should be considered as the same.
A.105.1
Listen to those who wish to advise what is useful, but not to those who are eager to flatter on all occasions; for the first really see what is useful, but the second look to that which agrees with the opinion of those who possess power, and imitating the shadows of bodies they assent to what is said by the powerful.
A.106.1
The man who gives advice ought first to have regard to the modesty and character (reputation) of those whom he advises; for those who have lost the capacity of blushing are incorrigible.
A.107.1
To admonish is better than to reproach: for admonition is mild and friendly, but reproach is harsh and insulting; and admonition corrects those who are doing wrong, but reproach only convicts them.
A.108.1
Give of what you have to strangers (ξένοις) and to those who have need: for he who gives not to him who wants, will not receive himself when he wants.
A.109.1
A pirate had been cast on the land and was perishing through the tempest. A man took clothing and gave it to him, and brought the pirate into his house, and supplied him with every thing else that was necessary. When the man was reproached by a person for doing kindness to the bad, he replied, I have shown this regard not to the man, but to mankind.
A.110.1
A man should choose (pursue) not every pleasure, but the pleasure which leads to the good.
A.111.1
It is the part of a wise man to resist pleasures, but of a foolish man to be a slave to them.
A.112.1
Pleasure, like a kind of bait, is thrown before (in front of) every thing which is really bad, and easily allures greedy souls to the hook of perdition.
A.113.1
Choose rather to punish your appetites than to be punished through them.
A.114.1
No man is free who is not master of himself.
A.115.1
The vine bears three bunches of grapes: the first is that of pleasure, the second of drunkenness, the third of violence.
A.116.1
Over your wine do not talk much to display your learning; for you will utter bilious stuff.
A.117.1
He is intoxicated who drinks more than three cups: and if he is not intoxicated, he has exceeded moderation.
A.118.1
Let your talk of God be renewed every day, rather than your food.
A.119.1
Think of God more frequently than you breathe.
A.120.1
If you always remember that whatever you are doing in the soul or in the body, God stands by as an inspector, you will never err (do wrong) in all your prayers and in all your acts, but you will have God dwelling with you.
A.121.1
As it is pleasant to see the sea from the land, so it is pleasant for him who has escaped from troubles to think of them.
A.122.1
Law intends indeed to do service to human life, but it is not able when men do not choose to accept her services; for it is only in those who are obedient to her that she displays her special virtue.
A.123.1
As to the sick physicians are as saviours, so to those also who are wronged are the laws.
A.124.1
The justest laws are those which are the truest.
A.125.1
To yield to law and to a magistrate and to him who is wiser than yourself, is becoming.
A.126.1
The things which are done contrary to law are the same as things which are not done.
A.127.1
In prosperity it is very easy to find a friend; but in adversity it is most difficult of all things.
A.128.1
Time relieves the foolish from sorrow, but reason relieves the wise.
A.129.1
He is a wise man who does not grieve for the things which he has not, but rejoices for those which he has.
A.130.1
Epictetus being asked how a man should give pain to his enemy answered, By preparing himself to live the best life that he can.
A.131.1
Let no wise man be averse to undertaking the office of a magistrate (τοῦ ἄρχειν): for it is both impious for a man to withdraw himself from being useful to those who have need of our services, and it is ignoble to give way to the worthless; for it is foolish to prefer being ill-governed to governing well.
A.132.1
Nothing is more becoming to him who governs than to despise no man and not show arrogance, but to preside over all with equal care.
A.133.1
[In poverty any man lives (can live) happily, but very seldom in wealth and power (ἀρχαῖς). The value of poverty excels so much that no just man (νόμιμος) would exchange poverty for disreputable wealth, unless indeed the richest of the Athenians Themistocles, the son of Neocles, was better than Aristides and Socrates, though he was poor in virtue. But the wealth of Themistocles and Themistocles himself have perished and have left no name. For all things die with death in a bad man, but the good is eternal.]
A.134.1
Remember that such was, and is, and will be the nature of the universe, and that it is not possible that the things which come into being can come into being otherwise than they do now; and that not only men have participated in this change and transmutation, and all other living things which are on the earth, but also the things which are divine. And indeed the very four elements are changed and transmuted up and down, and earth becomes water and water becomes air, and the air again is transmuted into other things, and the same manner of transmutation takes place from above to below. If a man attempts to turn his mind towards these thoughts, and to persuade himself to accept with willingness that which is necessary, he will pass through life with complete moderation and harmony.
A.135.1
He who is dissatisfied with things present and what is given by fortune is an ignorant man (ἰδιώτης) in life: but he who bears them nobly and rationally and the things which proceed from them is worthy of being considered a good man.
A.136.1
All things obey and serve the world (the universe), earth and sea and sun and the rest of the stars, and the plants of earth and animals. And our body obeys it also both in disease and in health when it (the universe) chooses, both in youth and in age, and when it is passing through the other changes. What is reasonable then and in our power is this, for our judgment not to be the only thing which resists it (the universe): for it is strong and superior, and it has determined better about us by administering (governing) us also together with the whole. And besides, this opposition also is unreasonable and does nothing more than cause us to be tormented uselessly and to fall into pain and sorrow.
A.136.2
The fragments which follow are in part assigned to Epictetus, in part to others.
A.137.1
Contentment, as it is a short road and pleasant, has great delight and little trouble.
A.138.1
Fortify yourself with contentment, for this is an im- pregnable fortress.
A.139.1
Let nothing be valued more than truth: not even selec- tion of a friendship which lies without the influence of the affects, by which (affects) justice is both confounded (disturbed) and darkened.
A.140.1
Truth is a thing immortal and perpetual, and it gives to us a beauty which fades not away in time nor does it take away the freedom of speech which proceeds from justice; but it gives to us the knowledge of what is just and lawful, separating from them the unjust and refuting them.
A.141.1
We should not have either a blunt knife or a freedom of speech which is ill managed.
A.142.1
Nature has given to men one tongue, but two ears, that we may hear from others twice as much as we speak.
A.143.1
Nothing really pleasant or unpleasant subsists by nature, but all things become so through habit (custom).
A.144.1
Choose the best life, for custom (habit) will make it pleasant.
A.145.1
Be careful to leave your sons well instructed rather than rich, for the hopes of the instructed are better than the wealth of the ignorant.
A.146.1
A daughter is a possession to her father which is not his own.
A.147.1
The same person advised to leave modesty to children rather than gold.
A.148.1
The reproach of a father is agreeable medicine, for it contains more that is useful than it contains of that which gives pain.
A.149.1
He who has been lucky in a son in law has found a son: but he who has been unlucky, has lost also a daughter.
A.150.1
The value of education (knowledge) like that of gold is valued in every place.
A.151.1
He who exercises wisdom exercises the knowledge which is about God.
A.152.1
Nothing among animals is so beautiful as a man adorned by learning (knowledge).
A.153.1
We ought to avoid the friendship of the bad and the enmity of the good.
A.154.1
The necessity of circumstances proves friends and detects enemies.
A.155.1
When our friends are present, we ought to treat them well; and when they are absent, to speak of them well.
A.156.1
Let no man think that he is loved by any man when he loves no man.
A.157.1
You ought to choose both physician and friend not the most agreeable, but the most useful.
A.158.1
If you wish to live a life free from sorrow, think of what is going to happen as if it had already happened.
A.159.1
Be free from grief not through insensibility like the irrational animals, nor through want of thought like the foolish, but like a man of virtue by having reason as the consolation of grief.
A.160.1
Whoever are least disturbed in mind by calamities, and in act struggle most against them, these are the best men in states and in private life.
A.161.1
Those who have been instructed, like those who have been trained in the palaestra, though they may have fallen, rise again from their misfortune quickly and skilfully.
A.162.1
We ought to call in reason like a good physician as a help in misfortune.
A.163.1
A fool having enjoyed good fortune like intoxication to a great amount becomes more foolish.
A.164.1
Envy is the antagonist of the fortunate.
A.165.1
He who bears in mind what man is will never be trou- bled at any thing which happens.
A.166.1
For making a good voyage a pilot (master) and wind are necessary: and for happiness reason and art.
A.167.1
We should enjoy good fortune while we have it, like the fruits of autumn.
A.168.1
He is unreasonable who is grieved (troubled) at the things which happen from the necessity of nature.
B.169.1
Of the things which are, God has put some of them in our power, and some he has not. In our own power he has placed that which is the best and the most important, that indeed through which he himself is happy, the use of appearances (φαντασιῶν). For when this use is rightly employed, there is freedom, happiness, tranquillity, constancy: and this is also justice and law, and temperance, and every virtue. But all other things he has not placed in our power. Wherefore we also ought to be of one mind with God, and making this division of things, to look after those which are in our power; and of the things not in our power, to intrust them to the Universe (τῷ κόσμῳ), and whether it should require our children, or our country, or our body, or any thing else, willingly to give them up.
B.170.1
When a young man was boasting in the theatre and saying, I am wise, for I have conversed with many wise men; Epictetus said, I also have conversed with many rich men, but I am not rich.
B.171.1
The same person said, It is not good for him who has been well taught to talk among the untaught, as it is not right for him who is sober to talk among those who are drunk.
B.172.1
Epictetus being asked, What man is rich, answered, He who is content (who has enough).
B.173.1
Xanthippe was blaming Socrates, because he was making small preparation for receiving his friends: but Socrates said, If they are our friends, they will not care about it; and if they are not, we shall care nothing about them.
B.174.1
When Archelaus was sending for Socrates to make him rich, Socrates told the messengers to return this answer: At Athens four measures (choenices) of meal are sold for one obolus (the sixth of a drachme), and the fountains run with water: if what I have is not enough (sufficient) for me, yet I am sufficient for what I have, and so it becomes sufficient for me. Do you not see that it was with no nobler voice that Polus acted the part of Oedipus as king than of Oedipus as a wanderer and beggar at Colonus? Then shall the good man appear to be inferior to Polus, and unable to act well every character (personage) imposed on him by the Deity? and shall he not imitate Ulysses, who even in rags made no worse figure than in the soft purple robe?
B.175.1
What do I care, he (Epictetus) says, whether all things are composed of atoms (ἀτόμων), or of similar parts (ὁμοιομερῶν) or of fire and earth? for is it not enough to know the nature of the good and the evil, and the measures (μέτρα) of the desires and the aversions (ἐκκλίσεων), and also the movements towards things and from them; and using these as rules to administer the affairs of life, but not to trouble ourselves about the things above us? For these things are perhaps incomprehensible to the human mind: and if any man should even suppose them to be in the highest degree comprehensible, what then is the profit of them, if they are comprehended? And must we not say that those men have needless trouble who assign these things as necessary to the philosopher’s discourse? Is then also the precept written at Delphi superfluous, which is Know thyself? It is not so, he says. What then is the meaning of it? If a man gave to a choreutes (member of chorus) the precept to know himself, would he not have observed in the precept that he must direct his attention to himself?
B.176.1
You are a little soul carrying a dead body, as Epictetus said.
B.177.1
He (Epictetus) said that he had discovered an art in giving assent; and in the topic (matter) of the movements he had discovered that we must observe attention, that the movements be subject to exception, (μεφ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως), that they be social, that they be according to the worth of each thing; and that we ought to abstain entirely from desire, and to employ aversion (ἐκκλίσει) to none of the things which are not in our power.
B.178.1
About no common thing, he said, the contest (dispute) is, but about being mad or not.
B.179.1
Favorinum ego audivi dicere Epictetum philosophum dixisse, plerosque istos qui philosophari videntur, philosophos esse hujuscemodi, ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν. Id significat, factis procul, verbis tenus. Jam illud est vehementius, quod Arrianus solitum eum dictitare in libris, quos de Dissertationibus ejus composuit, scriptum reliquit. Nam, quum, inquit, animadverterat hominem pudore amisso, importuna industria, corruptis moribus, audacem, confidentem lingua, caeteraque omnia praeter animum procurantem; istiusmodi, inquit, hominemi quum viderat studia quoque et disciplinas philosophiae contrectare, et physica adire et meditari dialectica, multaque id genus theoremata suspicari sciscitarique, inclamabat deum atque hominum fidem, ac plerumque, inter clamandum his eum verbis increpabat: Ἄνθρωπε, ποῦ βάλλεις; σκέψαι εἰ κεκάθαρται τὸ ἀγγεῖον. ἂν γὰρ εἰς τὴν οἴησιν βάλλῃς, ἀπώλετο. ἢν σαπῇ, ἢ οὖρον ἢ ὂξος γένοιτ’ ἂν, ἢ τι τούτων χεῖρον. Nihil profecto his verbis gravius, nihil verius, quibus declarabat maximus philosophorum, literas atque doctrinas Philosophiae, quum in hominem falsum atque degenerem, tamquam in vas spurcum atque pollutum influxissent, verti, mutari, corrumpi, et (quod ipse κυνικώτερον ait) urinam fieri, aut si quid est urina spurcius. Praeterea idem ille Epictetus, quod ex eodem Favorino audivimus, solitus dicere est: duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima et taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, quum aut injurias quae sunt ferendae non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus non tenemus. Itaque, inquit, si quis haec duo verba cordi habeat, eaque sibi imperando atque observando curet, is erit pleraque impeccabilis vitamque vivet tranquillissimam. Verba duo haec dicebat, Ἀνέχου καὶ Ἀπέχου.
B.180.2
Philosophus in disciplina Stoica celebratus. . . . ex sarcinula sua librum protulit Epicteti philosophi quintum Διαλεξέαν: quas ab Arriano digestas congruere scriptis Zenonis et Chrysippi non dubium est. In eo libro Graeca scilicet oratione scriptum ad hanc sententiam legimus: Visa animi, quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant, qui bus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad ani mum rei pellitur, non voluntatis sunt, neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda. Probationes autem quas συγκαταθέσεις vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur, voluntariae sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu. Propterea quum sonus aliquis aut caelo aut ex ruina aut repentinus [nesciusj pericali nuntius vel quid aliud ejusmodi factum, sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est, non opinione alicujus mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium mentis atque rationis praevertentibus. Mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem [idem?] τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας, id est, visa istaec animi sui terrifica non approbat: hoc est οὐσυγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει, sed abjicit respuitque, nec ei metuendum esse in his quidquam videtur. Atque hoc inter insipientis sapientisque animum differre dicunt, quod insipiens, qualia esse primo animi sui pulsu visa sunt saeva et aspera, talia esse vero putat, et eadem incepta tamquam jure metuenda sint, sua quoque assensione approbat καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει (hoc enim verbo Stoici quum super ista re disserunt utuntur). Sapiens autem quum breviter et strictim colore atque vultu motus est, οὐ συγκατατίθεται, sed statum vigoremque sententiae suae retinet, quam de hujuscemodi visis semper habuit, ut de minime metuendis, sed fronte falsa et formidine inani territantibus.
B.181.2
Quum de animarum agitur salute ac de respectu nostri; aliquid et sine ratione faciendum est, ut Epictetum dixisse approbat Arrianus.

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