Eudemian Ethics

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 611 sections

7.2.36.1
Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an activity of the thing loved, whereas loving is an activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate thing also, for even inanimate things are loved.
7.2.37.1
And since to love actively is to treat the loved object qua loved, and the friend is an object of love to the friend qua dear to him but not qua musician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the pleasure derived from the person himself qua himself; for the friend loves him as himself, not because he is something else. Consequently if he does not take pleasure in him qua good, it is not the primary friendship.
7.2.38.1
Nor ought any accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend’s goodness causes delight; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not expect our society!
7.2.38.2
This then is the primary friendship, which all people recognize.
7.2.39.1
It is on account of it that the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing stable, and only this friendship is stable; for a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things quickly or easily makes the judgement right.
7.2.40.1
And there is no stable friendship without confidence, and confidence only comes with time; for it is necessary to make trial, as Theognis says: You cannot know the mind of man nor woman Before have you tried them as you try cattle. Those who become friends without the test of time are not real friends but only wish to be friends; and such a character very readily passes for friendship,
7.2.41.1
because when eager to be friends they think that by rendering each other all friendly services they do not merely wish to be friends but actually are friends. But as a matter of fact it happens in friendship as in everything else; people are not healthy merely if they wish to be healthy, so that even if people wish to be friends they are not actually friends already.
7.2.42.1
A proof of this is that people who have come into this position without first testing one another are easily set at variance; for though men are not set at variance easily about things in which they have allowed each other to test them, in cases where they have not, whenever those who are attempting to set then, at variance produce evidence they may be convinced.
7.2.43.1
At the same time it is manifest that this friendship does not occur between base people either; for the base and evil-natured man is distrustful towards everybody, because he measures other people by himself. Hence good men are more easily cheated, unless as a result of trial they are distrustful.
7.2.44.1
But the base prefer the goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love people more than things; and so they are not friends, for the proverbial common property as between friends is not realized in this way—the friend is made an appendage of the things, not the things of the friends.
7.2.45.1
Therefore the first kind of friendship does not occur between many men, because it is difficult to test many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice in the case of a friend in the same way as about a coat;
7.2.46.1
although in all matters it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two things, and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a long time and had not yet worn his better one, the better one ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old friend to choose one whom you do not know to be a better man. For a friend is not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the peck of salt has come to be proverbial.
7.2.47.1
At the same time if a friend is really to be your friend he must be not only good absolutely but also good to you; for a man is good absolutely by being good, but he is a friend by being good to another, and he is both good absolutely and a friend when both these attributes harmonize together, so that what is good absolutely is also good for another person; or also he may be not good absolutely yet good to another because useful.
7.2.48.1
But being a friend of many people at once is prevented even by the factor of affection, for it is not possible for affection to be active in relation to many at once.
7.2.49.1
These things, therefore, show the correctness of the saying that friendship is a thing to be relied on, just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And it has been rightly said: Nature is permanent, but wealth is not— although it would be much finer to say Friendship than Nature.
7.2.50.1
And it is proverbial that time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more than good fortune. For then the truth of the saying friends’ possessions are common property is clear for only friends, instead of the natural goods and natural evils on which good and bad fortune turn, choose a human being rather than the presence of the former and the absence of the latter;
7.2.51.1
and misfortune shows those who are not friends really but only because of some casual utility. And both are shown by time; for even the useful friend is not shown quickly, but rather the pleasant one—except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also not quick to show himself. For men are like wines and foods; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For absolute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the End it effects and the time it lasts.
7.2.52.1
And even the multitude would agree, not in consequence of results only, but in the same way as in the case of a drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant not because of its result, but because its pleasantness is not continuous, although at first it quite takes one in.
7.2.53.1
The primary form of friendship therefore, and the one that causes the name to be given to the others, is friendship based on goodness and due to the pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The other friendships occur even among children and animals and wicked people: whence the sayings— "Two of an age each other gladden" and "Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad."
7.2.54.1
And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not as being bad or neutral, but if for instance both are musicians or one fond of music and the other a musician, and in the way in which all men have some good in them and so fit in with one another.
7.2.55.1
Further they might be mutually useful and beneficial (not absolutely but for their purpose) not as being bad or neutral.
7.2.56.1
It is also possible for a bad man to be friends with a good man, for the bad man may be useful to the good man for his purpose at the time-and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for the purpose natural to him; and he will wish his friend what is good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it for the given purpose.
7.2.57.1
Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in which men not good may be friends with one another: he may be pleasant to him not as being bad but as sharing some common characteristic, for instance if he is musical. Again they may be friends in the way in which there is some good in everybody (owing to which some men are sociable even though good), or in the way in which they suit each particular person, for all men have something of good.
7.3.1.1
These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of goodness.
7.3.2.1
But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man,for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically. The friendship of father for son is in this class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary.
7.3.3.1
And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way.
7.3.4.1
For it would be ludicrous if one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to love in another way.
7.3.5.1
And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same.
7.3.6.1
And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure.
7.3.7.1
This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus has said: A loved one so would speak, but not a lover. But they think that the reason is the same.
7.4.1.1
There being then, as has been said, three kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of superiority.
7.4.2.1
Though both sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality are the parties friends; for it would be absurd for a man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel affection for him and receive it from him. In some cases, while the superior partner ought to receive affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an unworthy object; for affection is measured by the worth of the friends and by one sort of equality.
7.4.3.1
So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity of affection because of inferiority of age, in others on the ground of goodness or birth or some other such superiority; it is right for the superior to claim to feel either less affection or none, alike in a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and one based on goodness.
7.4.4.1
So in cases of small degrees of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small amount is not of importance in some matters, as in weighing timber, though in gold plate it is; but people judge smallness of amount badly, since one’s own good because of its nearness appears big and that of others because of its remoteness small);
7.4.5.1
but when there is an excessive amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love from God.
7.4.6.1
It is manifest, therefore, that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return of affection is possible without their being friends.
7.4.7.1
And it is clear why men seek friendship on a basis of superiority more than that on one of equality; for in the former case they score both affection and a sense of superiority at the same time. Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed than the friend, for he makes the person flattered appear to score both advantages. And this most of all characterizes men ambitious of honors, since to be admired implies superiority.
7.4.8.1
Some persons grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious; one who enjoys loving more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved more. So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving. For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity of loving; for being loved is an accident, as one can be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love without knowing it.
7.4.9.1
Loving depends, more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved corresponds with the nature of the object. A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were not possible, would choose to know the other person rather than to be known by him, as for example women do when they allow others to adopt their children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Antiphon. Indeed the wish to be known seems to be selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and bestowing affection.
7.4.10.1
For this reason we praise those who remain constant in affection towards the dead; for they know, but are not known.
7.4.10.2
It has, then, been stated that there are several modes of friendship, and how many modes there are, namely three, and that receiving affection and having one’s affection returned, and friends on an equality and those on a footing of superiority, are different.
7.5.1.1
But as the term friend is used in a more universal sense as well, as was also said at the beginning, by those who take in wider considerations (some saying that what is like is dear, others what is opposite), we must also speak about these forms of friendship and their relation to the kinds that have been discussed.
7.5.2.1
As for likeness, it connects with pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good is simple, whereas the bad is multiform; and also the good man is always alike and does not change in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning.
7.5.3.1
Hence if wicked men do not hit it off together, they are not friends with one another but they separate; yet an insecure friendship is not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in this way, because the good is like. But in a way it is also dear on the score of pleasantness; for to those who are alike the same things are pleasant, and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself.
7.5.4.1
Owing to this relations find one another’s voices and characters and society pleasantest, and so with the lower animals; and in this way it is possible even for bad men to feel affection for each other: But pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.
7.5.5.1
But opposite is dear to opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need one another; and the opposite is pleasant and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the cold and the wet the dry.
7.5.6.1
But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the good. For opposites strive to reach one another through the middle point, for they strive after each other as tallies, because in that way one middle thing results from the two.
7.5.7.1
Hence accidentally love of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive to reach one another but the middle. If when people have got too cold they are subjected to heat, and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters; but without such treatment they are always in a state of desire, because they are not at the middle points.
7.5.8.1
But a man in the middle enjoys without passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas the others enjoy everything that takes them outside their natural state.
7.5.9.1
This kind of relationship, then, exists even between inanimate things; but when it occurs in the case of living things it becomes affection. Hence sometimes people take delight in persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are brought by one another into the middle state.
7.5.10.1
Hence accidentally, as was said, opposites are dear to opposites also on account of the good.
7.5.10.2
It has, then, been said how many kinds of friendship there are, and what are the different senses in which people are termed friends, and also givers and objects of affection, both in a manner that makes them actually friends and without being friends.
7.6.1.1
The question whether one is one’s own friend or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly similar.
7.6.2.1
For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one’s spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing,whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly.For all these relations involve two separate factors;
7.6.3.1
in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not.
7.6.3.2
From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses. For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other’s sake;
7.6.4.1
and in another way when a man wishes another’s existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone existence—for that other’s sake and not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other;
7.6.5.1
and in another way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake of his company and not for something else, as fathers desire their children’s existence, though they associate with other people. All these cases conflict with one another;
7.6.6.1
some men do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their existence is desired, others unless their society.
7.6.7.1
Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for their masters’ own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and birds that share each other’s pain.
7.6.8.1
For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same as may be.
7.6.9.1
The same principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is rejoicing. Again there are sayings about friendship such as Amity is equality and True friends have one spirit.
7.6.10.1
All these sayings refer back to the single individual; for that is the way in which the individual wishes good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such and such a consideration, because he acted as an individual; for one who displays his affection wishes not to be but to be thought affectionate.
7.6.11.1
And wishing for the other to exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and being one spirit and being unable even to live without one another but dying together—for this is the case with the single individual, and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself.
7.6.12.1
In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man actually to be his own enemy; but as being one and indivisible he is desirable to himself.
7.6.13.1
This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man’s affection for himself carries back to love of the good;for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature.
7.6.14.1
But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his former, like the liar—
7.6.15.1
(and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as John Styles is related to good John Styles ; for it is clear that the same amount of John Styles is good as of good John Styles )—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said, because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw asunder.
7.6.16.1
Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself . . . so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with the appetite.
7.6.17.1
And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connection is in people’s own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives.
7.6.17.2
From what has been said, then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term affection, and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one.
7.7.1.1
It is relative to our inquiry to consider also the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly feeling; for some people think that they are the same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart. Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friendship nor yet identical with it.
7.7.2.1
If friendship is divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not found in the friendship of utility nor in friendship for pleasure. If A wishes B prosperity because he is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B’s interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly feeling like . . . is not for the sake of the person who feels it himself but for the sake of him for whom he feels kindly; and if kindly feeling were found in friendship for the pleasant, men would feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the friendship that is based on character.
7.7.3.1
But it is the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good, whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the good that he wishes; for kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, but it is not friendship.
7.7.3.2
For it is thought that friends agree in feeling, and that those who agree in feeling are friends.
7.7.4.1
But the agreement of friendship is not in regard to everything, but to things practicable for the parties, and the good to all that contributes to their association. Nor is it only agreement in thought or in appetition, for it is possible to think and to desire opposite things,as in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire also.
7.7.5.1
Agreement occurs in the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and desire the same things they harm one another.
7.7.6.1
And it appears that agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement shown even by bad men when their purpose and desire are for the same objects.
7.7.7.1
But it is only proper for them to aim at the same objects in cases when it is possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel.
7.7.8.1
Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship. So much for the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.
7.8.1.1
The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who have received it than those who have received it feel for those who have conferred it; whereas justice seems to require the opposite.
7.8.2.1
One might conceive that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the other party’s duty to repay it. But really it is not this alone;
7.8.3.1
it is also a law of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and activity as between the parties here: the person benefited is as it were the product of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and also to protect the offspring produced.
7.8.4.1
And in fact fathers love their children more than they are loved by them (mothers more so than fathers) and these in their turn love their children more than their parents, because activity is the greatest good. And mothers love their children more than fathers, because they think that the children are more their work;
7.8.5.1
for people estimate work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child the mother has more pain.
7.8.5.2
Such may be our decision on the subject of friendship for oneself and of friendship among more than one.
7.9.1.1
It is thought that what is just is something that is equal, and also that friendship is based on equality, if there is truth in the saying Amity is equality. And all constitutions are some species of justice; for they are partnerships, and every partnership is founded on justice, so that there are as many species of justice and of partnership as there are of friendship, and all these species border on each other and have their differentia closely related.
7.9.2.1
But since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and tool, and master and slave are similar, between the two terms of each of these pairs there is no partnership;for they are not two, but the former is one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself; nor is the good divisible between them, but that of both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist. For the body is the soul’s tool born with it, a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate slave.
7.9.3.1
The other partnerships are a constituent part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or with business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same thing is found in constitutions as in the case of musical modes)—
7.9.4.1
paternal authority being royal, the relationship of man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of justice.
7.9.5.1
And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical and proportional, there will also be various species of justice and of partnership and friendship. The partnership of democracy is based on numerical equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it is measured by the same standard; whereas the aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and inferior to have not the same share but proportional shares;
7.9.6.1
and similarly also the friendship of father and son, and the same way in partnerships.
7.10.1.1
Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really friendship of relatives has more than one species, one as between brothers, another as of father and son: it may be proportional, for example paternal friendship, or based on number, for example the friendship of brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of seniority.
7.10.2.1
Civic friendship on the other hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seems to be the individual’s lack of self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent—since they would have been formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of superiority.
7.10.3.1
The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them.
7.10.4.1
It does indeed come about that even the tool itself receives attention which it deserves with a view to its work, since it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important half being its activity, boring. And the body and the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said before.
7.10.5.1
Therefore to seek the proper way of associating with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice. In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons; and persons who are partners, and a friend is a partner, either in one’s family or in one’s life. For man is not only a political but also a house-holding animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple occasionally and with any chance female or male,
7.10.6.1
but man is in a special way not a solitary but a gregarious animal, associating with the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there would be partnership; and justice of a sort, even if there were no state.
7.10.7.1
And a household is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of master and slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body, and such relationships are not friendships or forms of justice but something analogous, just as health is not justice but analogous to it.
7.10.8.1
But the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that between god and man and between benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject.

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