Hippias Minor

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 231 sections

369.8
Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I; but it is always my custom to pay attention when anyone is speaking, especially when the speaker seems to me to be wise; and because I desire to learn what he means, I question him thoroughly and examine and compare the things he says, in order that I may learn. But if the speaker seems to me to be worthless, I neither ask questions nor care what he says. And by this you will recognize whom I regard as wise; for you will find me persistently asking such a man questions about what he says, in order that I may profit by learning something.
370.1
And so now I noticed when you were speaking, that in the lines which you repeated just now to show that Achilles speaks to Odysseus as to a deceiver, it seems to me very strange, if what you say is true, that Odysseus the wily is nowhere found to have spoken falsely, but Achilles is found to be a wily sort of person, according to your argument; at any rate, he speaks falsely. For he begins by speaking these lines which you just quoted: For hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his heart and says another, and a little later says that he would not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon and would not stay at Troy at all, but,—Tomorrow, after sacrificing to Zeus and all the gods, (he says), I will load my ships well and drag them into the sea; then you shall see, if you like and if it interests you, early in the morning my ships sailing the fishy Hellespont and my men eagerly rowing in them; and if the glorious Earthshaker should grant me a fair voyage, on the third day I should come to fertile Phthia.And even before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said:And now I shall go to Phthia, since it is far better to go home with my beaked ships, and I do not intend to stay here without honor, and heap up wealth and riches for you.After he has said these things, at one time in the presence of the whole army and at another before his own comrades, he is nowhere found to have either prepared or attempted to drag down his ships to sail home, but he shows quite superb disregard of truthspeaking. Now I, Hippias, asked my question in the first place because I was perplexed as to which of the two men is represented as better by the poet, and because I thought both were very good, and it was hard to decide which was better, both in regard to falsehood and truth and to virtue in general; for both are similar in this matter.
370.2
That is because you do not look at it aright, Socrates. For the falsehoods that Achilles utters, he utters evidently not by design, but against his will, since he is forced by the misfortune of the army to remain and give assistance; but Odysseus utters his falsehoods voluntarily and by design.
370.3
You are deceiving me, beloved Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus.
371.1
Not at all, Socrates. What do you mean and to what do you refer?
371.2
That you say Achilles did not speak falsely by design, he who was not only a deceiver, but was also such a cheat and plotter, as Homer has represented him, that he is seen to be so much more clever than Odysseus in deceiving him unnoticed without difficulty, that he dared to contradict himself in his presence, and Odysseus did not notice it; at any rate Odysseus does not appear to have said anything to him which indicates that he noticed his falsehood.
371.3
What is this that you say, Socrates?
371.4
Don’t you know that after he said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away at daybreak, in speaking to Ajax he does not repeat that he is going to sail away, but says something different?
371.5
Where, pray?
371.6
Where he says:For I shall not be mindful of bloody war until warlike Priam’s son, the glorious Hector, shall reach the tents and ships of the Myrmidons through slaughter of Argives and shall burn the ships with fire. But at my tent and my black ship I think Hector, though eager for battle, will come to a halt. Now, Hippias, do you think the son of Thetis and pupil of the most wise Cheiron was so forgetful, that, although a little earlier he had reviled deceivers in the most extreme terms, he himself immediately said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away and to Ajax that he was going to stay, and was not acting by design and in the belief that Odysseus was behind the times and that he himself would get the better of him in just this matter of contrivance and falsehood?
371.7
No, I do not agree, Socrates; but in this case also Achilles was induced by the goodness of his heart to say to Ajax something different from what he had said to Odysseus; whereas Odysseus, when he speaks the truth always speaks with design, and when he speaks falsehood likewise.
371.8
Then Odysseus, as it seems, is better than Achilles.
371.9
Not in the least, Socrates.
371.10
How is that? Were not those who utter falsehoods voluntarily found to be better than those who do so involuntarily?
372.1
And how, Socrates, could those who voluntarily do wrong and voluntarily and designedly do harm be better than those who do so involuntarily? And there seems to be good reason to forgive a man who unwittingly does wrong or speaks falsehood or does any other evil. And the laws surely are much more severe towards those who do evil and tell falsehoods voluntarily, than towards those who do so involuntarily.
372.2
Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth when I say that I am persistent in questioning wise men? And this is probably the only good thing about me, as I am otherwise quite worthless; for I am all wrong about facts, and do not know the truth about them. And it is to me sufficient proof of the truth of this, that when I come into contact with one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness, I am found to know nothing; for there is hardly a single thing about which you and I have the same opinion; and yet what greater proof of ignorance is there than when one disagrees with a wise man? But I have this one remarkable good quality, which is my salvation; for I am not afraid to learn, but I inquire and ask questions and am very grateful to him who answers, and I never failed in gratitude to anyone; for when I have learned anything I have never denied it, pretending that the information was a discovery of my own; but I praise the wisdom of him who instructed me and proclaim what I learned from him. And so now I do not agree with what you say, but disagree very strongly; and I know very well that this is my own fault, because I am the sort of man I am—not to give myself any greater title. For my opinion, Hippias, is the exact opposite of what you say; I think that those who injure people and do wrong and speak falsehood and cheat and err voluntarily, not involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily. Sometimes, however, the opposite of this seems to me to be the case, and I am all astray about these matters, evidently because I am ignorant; but now at the present moment a sort of paroxysm of my disease has come upon me, and those who err in respect to anything voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. And I lay the blame for my present condition upon our previous argument, which causes those who do any of these things involuntarily to appear to me at this moment worse than those who do them voluntarily.
373.1
So please do me a favour and do not refuse to cure my soul; for you will be doing me much more good if you cure my soul of ignorance, than if you were to cure my body of disease. Now if you choose to deliver a long speech, I tell you beforehand that you would not cure me—for I could not follow you—but if you are willing to answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I think you yourself will not be injured, either. And I might fairly call upon you also, son of Apemantus, for help; for you stirred me up to converse with Hippias; so now, if Hippias is unwilling to answer me, ask him in my behalf to do so.
373.2
Well, Socrates, I imagine Hippias will need no asking from us; for that is not what he announced; he announced that he would not avoid the questioning of any man. How is that, Hippias? Is not that what you said?
373.3
Yes, I did; but Socrates, Eudicus, always makes confusion in arguments, and seems to want to make trouble.
373.4
Most excellent Hippias, I do not do these voluntarily at all—for then I should be wise and clever, according to you—but involuntarily, so forgive me; for you say, too, that he who does evil involuntarily ought to be forgiven.
373.5
And do not refuse, Hippias; but for our sake, and also because of your previous announcements, answer any questions Socrates asks you.
373.6
Well, I will answer since you request it. Ask whatever questions you like.
373.7
I certainly have a great desire, Hippias, to investigate what we are just at present talking about, namely which are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily. Now I think the best way to go at the investigation is this. Just answer. Do you call some one a good runner?
373.8
I do.
373.9
And a bad one?
373.10
Yes.
373.11
Now, he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs badly a bad one; is it not so?
373.12
Yes.
373.13
Then does not he who runs slowly run badly, and he who runs fast run well?
373.14
Yes.
373.15
In a race, then, and in running, rapidity is a good thing, and slowness an evil.
373.16
Why, of course.
373.17
Which, then, is the better runner, he who runs slowly voluntarily or he who does so involuntarily?
373.18
He who does it voluntarily.
373.19
Well, then, is not running doing something?
373.20
Yes, it is doing.
373.21
And if doing, is it not also performing some act?
373.22
Yes.
373.23
Then he who runs badly performs a bad and disgraceful act in a race?
373.24
Yes, a bad act of course.
373.25
But he runs badly who runs slowly?
373.26
Yes.
373.27
Then the good runner performs this bad and disgraceful act voluntarily, and the bad runner involuntarily?
373.28
So it seems.
374.1
In running, then, he who does bad acts involuntarily is worse than he who does them voluntarily?
374.2
Yes, in running.
374.3
And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler, he who is thrown voluntarily, or involuntarily?
374.4
He who is thrown voluntarily, as it seems.
374.5
But is it worse and more disgraceful in a wrestling match to be thrown or to throw one’s opponent?
374.6
To be thrown.
374.7
In wrestling also, then, he who performs bad and disgraceful acts voluntarily is a better wrestler than he who performs them involuntarily.
374.8
So it seems.
374.9
And how is it in every other bodily exercise? Is not he who is the better man in respect to his body able to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the weak, the disgraceful and the fine, so that whenever he performs bad acts of a bodily kind, he who is the better man in respect to his body does them voluntarily, but he who is worse does them involuntarily?
374.10
That seems to be the case in matters of strength also.
374.11
And how about grace, Hippias? Does not the better body take ugly and bad postures voluntarily, and the worse body involuntarily? Or what is your opinion?
374.12
That is my opinion.
374.13
Then ungracefulness when voluntary is associated with excellence of the body, but when involuntary with faultiness.
374.14
Apparently.
374.15
And what do you say about the voice? Which do you say is the better? That which sings out of tune voluntarily, or involuntarily?
374.16
That which does it voluntarily.
374.17
And that which does it involuntarily is the worse?
374.18
Yes.
374.19
Would you choose to possess good or bad things?
374.20
Good ones.
374.21
Would you, then, choose to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily?
374.22
Voluntarily.
374.23
But is not a limp faultiness and ungracefulness of the feet?
374.24
Yes.
374.25
Well, is not dimness of sight faultiness of the eyes?
374.26
Yes.
374.27
Which eyes, then, would you choose to possess and live with? Those with which one would see dimly and incorrectly voluntarily, or involuntarily?
374.28
Those with which one would do so voluntarily.
374.29
Those parts, then, of yourself which voluntarily act badly you consider better than those which do so involuntarily?
374.30
Yes; that is, in matters of that sort.
374.31
Well, then, one statement embraces all alike, such as ears and nose and mouth and all the senses —that those which act badly involuntarily are undesirable because they are bad, and those which do so voluntarily are desirable because they are good.
374.32
I think so.
374.33
Well now, which instruments are better to have to do with, those with which a man does bad work voluntarily, or involuntarily? For instance, is a rudder better with which a man will involuntarily steer badly, or one with which he will do so voluntarily?
374.34
One with which he will do so voluntarily.
374.35
And is not the same true of a bow and a lyre and flutes and all the rest?
375.1
Quite true.
375.2
Well now, would you choose to possess a horse of such spirit that you would ride him badly voluntarily, or involuntarily?
375.3
Voluntarily.
375.4
Then that spirit is better.
375.5
Yes.
375.6
Then with the horse of better spirit one would do voluntarily the bad acts of that spirit, but with the one of worse spirit involuntarily?
375.7
Certainly.
375.8
And is not that true of a dog, and all other animals?
375.9
Yes.
375.10
Well now, then, in the case of an archer is it better to possess the mind which voluntarily misses the mark, or that which does so involuntarily?
375.11
That which does so voluntarily.
375.12
Then that is the better mind for the purpose of archery?
375.13
Yes.
375.14
Is, then, the mind also which errs involuntarily worse than that which errs voluntarily?
375.15
Yes, in the case of archery.
375.16
And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not the mind which does harm to the patients’ bodies voluntarily the more scientific?
375.17
Yes.
375.18
In this art, then, this mind is better than the other.
375.19
It is better.
375.20
Well now, the more musical, whether with lyre or with flute, and in everything else that concerns all the other arts and sciences—is not that mind better which voluntarily does bad and disgraceful things and commits errors, whereas that which does so involuntarily is worse?
375.21
Apparently.

Perseus Greek. CTS URN tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-eng2. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. Source.