Hippias Major

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 356 sections

287.22
Well, surely it is plain that you know best; but still, my good friend, consider; for he asked you, not what is beautiful, but what the beautiful is.
287.23
I understand, my good friend, and I will answer and tell him what the beautiful is, and I shall never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if I must speak the truth, a beautiful maiden is beautiful.
288.1
Beautifully answered, Hippias, by the dog, and notably! Then if I give this answer, I shall have answered the question that was asked, and shall have answered it correctly, and shall never be confuted?
288.2
Yes, for how could you, Socrates, be confuted, when you say what everybody thinks, and when all who hear it will bear witness that what you say is correct?
288.3
Very well; certainly. Come, then, Hippias, let me rehearse to myself what you say. The man will question me in some such fashion as this: Come Socrates, answer me. All these things which you say are beautiful, if the absolute beautiful is anything, would be beautiful? And I shall say that if a beautiful maiden is beautiful, there is something by reason of which these things would be beautiful.
288.4
Do you think, then, that he will still attempt to refute you and to show that what you say is not beautiful, or, if he does attempt it, that he will not be ridiculous?
288.5
That he will attempt it, my admirable friend, I am sure but whether the attempt will make him ridiculous, the event will show. However, I should like to tell you what he will ask.
288.6
Do so.
288.7
How charming you are, Socrates! he will say. But is not a beautiful mare beautiful, which even the god praised in his oracle? What shall we say, Hippias? Shall we not say that the mare is beautiful, I mean the beautiful mare? For how could we dare to deny that the beautiful thing is beautiful?
288.8
Quite true, Socrates for what the god said is quite correct, too; for very beautiful mares are bred in our country.
288.9
Very well, he will say, and how about a beautiful lyre? Is it not beautiful? Shall we agree, Hippias?
288.10
Yes.
288.11
After this, then, the man will ask, I am sure, judging by his character: You most excellent man, how about a beautiful pot? Is it, then, not beautiful?
288.12
Socrates, who is the fellow? What an uncultivated person, who has the face to mention such worthless things in a dignified discussion!
288.13
That’s the kind of person he is, Hippias, not elegant, but vulgar, thinking of nothing but the truth. But nevertheless the man must be answered, and I will declare my opinion beforehand: if the pot were made by a good potter, were smooth and round and well fired, as are some of the two-handled pots, those that hold six choes, very beautiful ones— if that were the kind of pot he asked about, we must agree that it is beautiful; for how could we say that being beautiful it is not beautiful?
288.14
We could not at all, Socrates.
288.15
Then, he will say, a beautiful pot also is beautiful, is it not? Answer.
288.16
Well, Socrates, it is like this, I think. This utensil, when well wrought, is beautiful, but absolutely considered it does not deserve to be regarded as beautiful in comparison with a mare and a maiden and all the beautiful things.
289.1
Very well I understand, Hippias, that the proper reply to him who asks these questions is this: Sir, you are not aware that the saying of Heracleitus is good, that Ôthe most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared with the race of man,Õ and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared with the race of maidens, as Hippias the wise man says. Is it not so, Hippias?
289.2
Certainly, Socrates; you replied rightly.
289.3
Listen then. For I am sure that after this he will say: Yes, but, Socrates, if we compare maidens with gods, will not the same thing happen to them that happened to pots when compared with maidens? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else? Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly if compared with the gods?
289.4
Yes, for who would deny that, Socrates?
289.5
If, then, we agree to that, he will laugh and say: Socrates, do you remember the question you were asked? I do, I shall say, the question was what the absolute beautiful is. Then, he will say, when you were asked for the beautiful, do you give as your reply what is, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly? So it seems, I shall say; or what do you, my friend, advise me to say?
289.6
That is what I advise; for, of course, in saying that the human race is not beautiful in comparison with gods, you will be speaking the truth.
289.7
But if I had asked you, he will say, in the beginning what is beautiful and ugly, if you had replied as you now do, would you not have replied correctly? But do you still think that the absolute beautiful, by the addition of which all other things are adorned and made to appear beautiful, when its form is added to any of them—do you think that is a maiden or a mare or a lyre?
289.8
Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful. So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him: This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold, he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.
289.9
You don’t know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.
290.1
What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct, or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.
290.2
This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say: You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman? And I shall say, Not in the least.
290.3
And you will be right, Socrates.
290.4
Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman, Well, then, he will say, do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of? Why do you ask that? I shall say. Because, he will say, he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added. When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias?
290.5
That is easy; for we shall say that Pheidias did right; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.
290.6
Why, then, he will say, did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful? Shall we say that it is, Hippias?
290.7
Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.
290.8
But ugly when not appropriate? Shall I agree, or not?
290.9
Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.
290.10
What then? Do not gold and ivory, he will say, when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly? Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct?
290.11
We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.
290.12
Well, then, he will say, when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood?
290.13
Heracles! What a fellow this is that you speak of! Won’t you tell me who he is?
290.14
You would not know him if I should tell you his name.
290.15
But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.
291.1
He is a great nuisance, Hippias but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things, so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.
291.2
No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.
291.3
Quite right, my friend; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks; but for me it doesn’t matter if I do associate with the fellow; so instruct me and for my sake answer him. For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one, the fellow will say, would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate? Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden?
291.4
Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free yourself from long discussion?
291.5
Certainly; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.
291.6
Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.
291.7
Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is?
291.8
I will tell you; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.
291.9
Certainly, Hippias; now you understand beautifully.
291.10
Listen, then; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.
291.11
Then for Heaven’s sake, speak as quickly as you can.
291.12
I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents, to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring.
291.13
Bravo, bravo, Hippias! You have spoken in a way that is wonderful and great and worthy of you; and now, by Hera, I thank you, because you are kindly coming to my assistance to the best of your ability. But our shots are not hitting the man; no, he will laugh at us now more than ever, be sure of that.
292.1
A wretched laugh, Socrates; for when he has nothing to say to this, but laughs, he will be laughing at himself and will himself be laughed at by those present.
292.2
Perhaps that is so perhaps, however, after this reply, he will, I foresee, be likely to do more than laugh at me.
292.3
Why do you say that, pray?
292.4
Because, if he happens to have a stick, unless I get away in a hurry, he will try to fetch me a good one.
292.5
What? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it? Or does your city disregard justice and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly?
292.6
Oh no that is not allowed at all.
292.7
Then he will have to pay a penalty for beating you unjustly.
292.8
I do not think so, Hippias. No, if I were to make that reply, the beating would be just, I think.
292.9
Then I think so, too, Socrates, since that is your own belief.
292.10
Shall I, then, not tell you why it is my own belief that the beating would be just, if I made that reply? Or will you also beat me without trial? Or will you listen to what I have to say?
292.11
It would be shocking if I would not listen; but what have you to say?
292.12
I will tell you, imitating him in the same way as a while ago, that I may not use to you such harsh and uncouth words as he uses to me. For you may be sure, Tell me, Socrates, he will say, do you think it would be unjust if you got a beating for singing such a long dithyramb so unmusically and so far from the question? How so? I shall say. How so? he will say; are you not able to remember that I asked for the absolute beautiful, by which everything to which it is added has the property of being beautiful, both stone and stick and man and god and every act and every acquisition of knowledge? For what I am asking is this, man: what is absolute beauty? and I cannot make you hear what I say any more than if you were a stone sitting beside me, and a millstone at that, having neither ears nor brain. Would you, then, not be angry, Hippias,if I should be frightened and should reply in this way? Well, but Hippias said that this was the beautiful; and yet I asked him, just as you asked me, what is beautiful to all and always. What do you say? Will you not be angry if I say that?
292.13
I know very well, Socrates, that this which I said was beautiful is beautiful to all and will seem so.
292.14
And will it be so, too he will say for the beautiful is always beautiful, is it not?
292.15
Certainly.
292.16
Then was it so, too? he will say.
292.17
It was so, too.
293.1
And, he will say, did the stranger from Elis say also that for Achilles it was beautiful to be buried later than his parents, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and all the others who were born of gods, and for the gods themselves?
293.2
What’s that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow’s are not even respectful to religion.
293.3
Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?
293.4
Perhaps.
293.5
Perhaps, then, you are the man, he will say, who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one’s offspring, and to bury one’s parents; or was not Heracles included in ’every one,’ he and all those whom we just now mentioned?
293.6
But I did not say it was so for the gods.
293.7
Nor for the heroes either, apparently.
293.8
Not those who were children of gods.
293.9
But those who were not?
293.10
Certainly.
293.11
Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops and the others who were born as he was?
293.12
I think so.
293.13
You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one’s parents and be buried by one’s offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful; and it is still more impossible, as it seems, for this to become and to be beautiful for all, so that the same thing has happened to this as to the things we mentioned before, the maiden and the pot, in a still more ridiculous way than to them; it is beautiful for some and not beautiful for others. And you are not able yet, even today, Socrates, he will say, to answer what is asked about the beautiful, namely what it is. With these words and the like he will rebuke me, if I reply to him in this way. For the most part, Hippias, he talks with me in some such way as that but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of training, he himself volunteers a question, and asks whether I think the beautiful is so and so or whatever else it is which happens to be the subject of our questions and our discussion.
293.14
What do you mean by that, Socrates?
293.15
I will tell you. Oh, my dear Socrates, he says, stop making replies of this sort and in this way—for they are too silly and easy to refute; but see if something like this does not seem to you to be beautiful, which we got hold of just now in our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful. Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time for I don’t know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?
293.16
Yes, certainly, Socrates.
293.17
Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.
293.18
Yes, we must consider.
294.1
See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which, when it is added, makes each of those things to which it is added appear beautiful, or which makes them be beautiful, or neither of these?
294.2
I think so.
294.3
Which?
294.4
That which makes them appear beautiful; as when a man takes clothes or shoes that fit, even if he be ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.
294.5
Then if the appropriate makes him appear more beautiful than he is, the appropriate would be a sort of deceit in respect to the beautiful, and would not be that which we are looking for, would it, Hippias? For we were rather looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—like that by which all great things are great, that is, excess; for it is by this that all great things are great; for even if they do not appear great, but exceed, they are of necessity great; so, then, we say, what would the beautiful be, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or not? For it could not be the appropriate, since that, by your statement, makes things appear more beautiful than they are, but does not let them appear such as they are. But we must try to say what that is which makes things be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not; for that is what we are looking for, since we are looking for the beautiful.
294.6
But the appropriate, Socrates, makes things both be and appear beautiful by its presence.
294.7
Is it impossible, then, for things which are really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful, at any rate when that is present which makes them appear so?
294.8
It is impossible.
294.9
Shall we, then, agree to this, Hippias, that all things which are really beautiful, both uses and pursuits, are always believed to be beautiful by all, and appear so to them, or, quite the contrary, that people are ignorant about them, and that there is more strife and contention about them than about anything else, both in private between individuals and in public between states?
294.10
The latter rather, Socrates; that people are ignorant about them.

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