Gorgias

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 1,107 sections

494.1
well, one man, when he has taken his fill, neither draws off any more nor troubles himself a jot, but remains at ease on that score; whilst the other finds, like his fellow, that the sources are possible indeed, though difficult, but his vessels are leaky and decayed, and he is compelled to fill them constantly, all night and day, or else suffer extreme distress. If such is the nature of each of the two lives, do you say that the licentious man has a happier one than the orderly? Do I, with this story of mine, induce you at all to concede that the orderly life is better than the licentious, or do I fail?
494.2
You fail, Socrates. For that man who has taken his fill can have no pleasure any more; in fact it is what I just now called living like a stone, when one has filled up and no longer feels any joy or pain. But a pleasant life consists rather in the largest possible amount of inflow.
494.3
Well then, if the inflow be large, must not that which runs away be of large amount also, and must not the holes for such outflow be of great size?
494.4
Certainly.
494.5
Then it is a plover’s life you are describing this time, not that of a corpse or a stone. Now tell me, is the life you mean something like feeling hunger and eating when hungry?
494.6
Yes, it is.
494.7
And feeling thirst and drinking when thirsty?
494.8
Yes, and having all the other desires, and being able to satisfy them, and so with these enjoyments leading a happy life.
494.9
Bravo, my fine fellow! Do go on as you have begun, and mind you show no bashfulness about it. I too, it seems, must try not to be too bashful. First of all, tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.
494.10
What an odd person you are, Socrates—a regular stump-orator!
494.11
Why, of course, Callicles, that is how I upset Polus and Gorgias, and struck them with bashfulness; but you, I know, will never be upset or abashed; you are such a manly fellow. Come, just answer that.
494.12
Then I say that the man also who scratches himself will thus spend a pleasant life.
494.13
And if a pleasant one, a happy one also?
494.14
Certainly.
494.15
Is it so if he only wants to scratch his head? Or what more am I to ask you? See, Callicles, what your answer will be, if you are asked everything in succession that links on to that statement; and the culmination of the case, as stated—the life of catamites—is not that awful, shameful, and wretched? Or will you dare to assert that these are happy if they can freely indulge their wants?
494.16
Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion into such topics?
495.1
What, is it I who am leading it there, noble sir, or the person who says outright that those who enjoy themselves, with whatever kind of enjoyment, are happy, and draws no distinction between the good and bad sorts of pleasure? But come, try again now and tell me whether you say that pleasant and good are the same thing, or that there is some pleasure which is not good.
495.2
Then, so that my statement may not be inconsistent through my saying they are different, I say they are the same.
495.3
You are spoiling your first statements, Callicles, and you can no longer be a fit partner with me in probing the truth, if you are going to speak against your own convictions.
495.4
Why, you do the same, Socrates.
495.5
Then I am just as much in the wrong if I do, as you are. But look here, my gifted friend, perhaps the good is not mere unconditional enjoyment: for if it is, we have to face not only that string of shameful consequences I have just shadowed forth, but many more besides.
495.6
In your opinion, that is, Socrates.
495.7
And do you, Callicles, really maintain that it is?
495.8
I do.
495.9
Then are we to set about discussing it as your serious view?
495.10
Oh yes, to be sure.
495.11
Come then, since that is your opinion, resolve me this: there is something, I suppose, that you call knowledge?
495.12
Yes.
495.13
And were you not saying just now that knowledge can have a certain courage coupled with it?
495.14
Yes, I was.
495.15
And you surely meant that they were two things, courage being distinct from knowledge?
495.16
Quite so.
495.17
Well now, are pleasure and knowledge the same thing, or different?
495.18
Different, I presume, O sage of sages.
495.19
And courage too, is that different from pleasure?
495.20
Of course it is.
495.21
Come now, let us be sure to remember this, that Callicles the Acharnian said pleasant and good were the same, but knowledge and courage were different both from each other and from the good.
495.22
And Socrates of Alopece refuses to grant us this; or does he grant it?
495.23
He does not; nor, I believe, will Callicles either, when he has rightly considered himself. For tell me, do you not regard people who are well off as being in the opposite condition to those who are badly off?
495.24
I do.
495.25
Then if these conditions are opposite to each other, must not the same hold of them as of health and disease? For, you know, a man is never well and ill at the same time, nor gets rid of health and disease together.
495.26
How do you mean?
496.1
Take, for instance, any part of the body you like by itself, and consider it. A man, I suppose, may have a disease of the eyes, called ophthalmia?
496.2
Certainly.
496.3
Then I presume he is not sound also at that time in those same eyes?
496.4
By no conceivable means.
496.5
And what say you, when he gets rid of his ophthalmia? Does he at that time get rid too of the health of his eyes, and so at last is rid of both things together?
496.6
Far from it.
496.7
Because, I imagine, this would be an astonishing and irrational result, would it not?
496.8
Very much so.
496.9
Whereas, I take it, he gets and loses either turn?
496.10
I agree.
496.11
And so with strength and weakness in just the same way?
496.12
Yes.
496.13
And speed and slowness?
496.14
Certainly.
496.15
And so too with good things and happiness and their opposites—bad things and wretchedness—does one take on each of these in turn, and in turn put it off?
496.16
Absolutely, I presume.
496.17
Then if we find any things that a man puts off and retains at one and the same moment, clearly these cannot be the good and the bad. Do we admit this? Now consider very carefully before you answer.
496.18
Oh, I admit it down to the ground.
496.19
So now for our former admissions: did you say that being hungry was pleasant or painful? I mean, hunger itself.
496.20
Painful, I said; though eating when one is hungry I call pleasant.
496.21
I see: but at all events hunger itself is painful, is it not?
496.22
I agree.
496.23
And so too with thirst?
496.24
Quite so.
496.25
Then am I to ask you any further questions, or do you admit that all want and desire is painful?
496.26
I admit it; no, do not question me further.
496.27
Very good: but drinking when one is thirsty you surely say is pleasant?
496.28
I do.
496.29
Now, in this phrase of yours the words when one is thirsty, I take it, stand for when one is in pain?
496.30
Yes.
496.31
But drinking is a satisfaction of the want, and a pleasure?
496.32
Yes.
496.33
So in the act of drinking, you say, one has enjoyment?
496.34
Quite so.
496.35
When one is thirsty?
496.36
I agree.
496.37
That is, in pain?
496.38
Yes.
496.39
Then do you perceive the conclusion,—that you say one enjoys oneself, though in pain at the same moment, when you say one drinks when one is thirsty? Or does this not occur at once, at the same place and time—in either soul or body, as you please? For I fancy it makes no difference. Is this so or not?
496.40
It is.
496.41
But further, you say it is impossible to be badly off, or to fare ill, at the same time as one is faring well.
497.1
Yes, I do.
497.2
But to enjoy oneself when feeling pain you have admitted to be possible.
497.3
Apparently.
497.4
Hence enjoyment is not faring well, nor is feeling pain faring ill, so that the pleasant is found to be different from the good.
497.5
I cannot follow these subtleties of yours, Socrates.
497.6
You can, but you play the innocent, Callicles. Just go on a little further, that you may realize how subtle is your way of reproving me. Does not each of us cease at the same moment from thirst and from the pleasure he gets by drinking?
497.7
I cannot tell what you mean.
497.8
No, no, Callicles, you must answer him, for our sakes also, that the arguments may be brought to a conclusion.
497.9
But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias he keeps on asking petty, unimportant questions until he refutes one.
497.10
Why, what does that matter to you? In any case it is not your credit that is at stake, Callicles; just permit Socrates to refute you in such manner as he chooses.
497.11
Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours, since Gorgias is so minded.
497.12
You are fortunate, Callicles, in having been initiated into the Great Mysteries before the Little: I did not think that was the proper thing. So go on answering where you left off—as to whether each of us does not cease to feel thirst and pleasure at the same time.
497.13
I grant it.
497.14
And so, with hunger and the rest, does he cease to feel the desires and pleasures at the same time?
497.15
That is so.
497.16
And also ceases to feel the pains and pleasures at the same time?
497.17
Yes.

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