Against Leptines

Perseus Greek · Perseus Greek · 191 sections

90.1
For Solon, who imposed this method, did not think it right that while the junior archons, who are appointed by lot to administer the laws, undergo two scrutinies before entering on office, one in the Council and a second in the law-courts before you, the laws themselves, which regulate their official acts and all other civic duties, should be passed at haphazard to meet some emergency, and should be at once valid without passing a scrutiny.
91.1
For in those days, indeed, while they legislated in that way, they kept to the existing laws and were not always proposing new ones; but ever since certain statesmen rose to power and, as I am informed, contrived to get into their own hands the right to initiate legislation at any time and in any way they wished, there are so many contradictory statutes that for a long time you have had to appoint a commission to sort out the contradictory ones;
92.1
yet in spite of this the business never comes to an end. Our laws are no better than so many decrees; nay, you will find that the laws which have to be observed in drafting the decrees are later than the decrees themselves. Not to be content, then, with a bare assertion, but to show you the actual law to which I refer, please take and read the law constituting the original legislative commission.
92.2
[The law is read]
93.1
You understand, Athenians, the beauty of Solon’s directions for legislating. The first stage is in your courts, before men under oath, where all other ratifications are made; the next is the repeal of the contradictory laws, so that there may be only one law dealing with each subject, and that the plain citizen may not be puzzled by such contradictions and be at a disadvantage compared with those who are acquainted with the whole body of law, but that all may have the same ordinances before them, simple and clear to read and understand.
94.1
Moreover, before these proceedings, Solon ordered that the laws should be exposed before the statues of the eponymous heroes and handed in to the town-clerk to recite them at the meetings of the Assembly, so that each of you may hear them more than once and digest them at leisure, and if they are just and expedient, may add them to the statute-book. Now, numerous as those enactments are, Leptines yonder has observed not one of them, for, if he had, I do not think that you would ever have consented to pass his law. We on the other hand, Athenians, have observed them all, and we are submitting a much better and more equitable law than his. You will realize that when you hear it.
95.1
Take and read first of all the clauses of his law which we have indicted, and next the clauses we propose to substitute for them. Read.
95.2
[The law is read]
95.3
These are the parts of the law of Leptines which we arraign as unsatisfactory. Next in order read our proposed amendments. Pray attend, gentlemen of the jury, to these as they are recited. Read.
95.4
[The law is read]
96.1
Stop there. The laws now in force contain this provision—a capital one, men of Athens, and unambiguous—that all rewards granted by the people shall be valid. Equitable too, by all the powers! So Leptines should not have proposed his own law until he had indicted and repealed this. As it is, neglecting proof of his own violation of the law, he nevertheless proceeded to legislate, in face of the fact that another law proclaims his law indictable for this very offence, namely, for contradicting previous legislation. Here is the very law in question.
96.2
[The law is read]
97.1
Men of Athens, is not the provision that all rewards granted by the people shall be valid contradicted by the clause that no one shall be immune, no one, that is, of those to whom the people has granted immunity? That is plain enough, at any rate. But it is not so in the alternative law which my friend here proposes, and which confirms what you have granted, and provides a fair ground of action against those who have imposed upon you, or have subsequently injured you, or are generally undeserving; so that you will thus prevent anyone you please from retaining his grant. Read the law.
97.2
[The law is read]
98.1
You hear the law, Athenians, and you understand that it enables the deserving to retain their rewards, and those who are judged otherwise to be deprived of any privilege they have unjustly secured; for the future everything is left in your hands, as is right, to grant or to withhold. Now I do not think that Leptines will deny that this law is sound and just, or, if he does, that he will be able to prove it. But perhaps he will try to lead you astray by repeating what he said before the junior archons. For he alleged that the publication of this amended law was a mere trick, and that should his own law be repealed, this one would never be passed.
99.1
Now, to avoid dispute, I will not press the point that the old law of Solon, in accordance with which the junior archons have notified these amendments to you, clearly enjoins that if the law of Leptines is repealed by your vote, the alternative law shall be valid. I will pass to another point. Leptines, in saying this, obviously admits that our law is better and fairer than his own, but bases his argument on the way in which it is to be passed.
100.1
Now, in the first place, there are many ways open to him, if he wishes, of compelling the amender to introduce his own law. In the next place, Phormio and myself and anyone else he likes to name are prepared to guarantee that we will introduce it. You know there is a law making death the penalty for anyone who breaks his promise to the Assembly or one of the Councils or law-courts. You have our guarantee, our promise. Let the archons record it, and let the matter rest in their hands.
101.1
Neither do anything that is unworthy of this court, nor, if a worthless person is found among those who enjoy the grant, let him keep it; only let each case be judged on its merits. But if Leptines shall say that that is all talk and humbug, this at any rate is not mere talk; let him bring in the amended law himself and cease to say that we will not do so. It is surely a greater honor to propose the law, stamped with your approval, than this of his own devising.
102.1
It seems to me, Athenians, that Leptines—and pray, be not angry, for I am not going to say anything offensive about you—Leptines has either never read Solon’s laws or else does not understand them. For if Solon made a law that every man could grant his property to whomsoever he pleased, in default of legitimate offspring, not with the object of depriving the next of kin of their rights of consanguinity, but that by making the prize open to all he might excite a rivalry in doing good one to another;
103.1
and if you, on the contrary, have proposed a law that the people shall not be permitted to bestow on any man any part of what is their own, how can you be said to have read or understood the laws of Solon? You make the nation barren of would-be patriots by proclaiming unmistakably that those who benefit us shall gain nothing by it.
104.1
Again, there is another excellent law of Solon, forbidding a man to speak ill of the dead, even if he is himself defamed by the dead man’s children. You do not speak ill of our departed benefactors, Leptines; you do ill to them, when you blame one and assert that another is unworthy, though these charges have nothing to do with the dead men. Are you not very far from the intention of Solon?
105.1
Now I have been quite seriously informed that with regard to the absolute prohibition of all rewards, whatever a man’s services may be, our opponents are prepared to use some such argument as this. The Lacedaemonians, who are a well-organized state, and the Thebans grant no such reward to any of their citizens, and yet possibly there are some good men among them. In my opinion, men of Athens, all such arguments are provocative, and intended to persuade you to abolish the immunities, but just they are certainly not. For I am quite aware that the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians and ourselves do not observe the same laws and customs, nor the same form of government.
106.1
For in the first place, if this is their argument, they are about to do exactly what a man cannot do at Sparta—praise the laws of Athens or of any other state; nay, so far from that, he is obliged to praise, as well as do, whatever accords with his native constitution. Then again, though the Lacedaemonians do not hold with these customs, yet there are other honors at Sparta, which our citizens to a man would shrink from introducing here.
107.1
What, then, are those honors? Not to take each singly, I will describe one which comprises all the rest. Whenever a man for his good conduct is elected to the Senate, or Gerusia, as they call it, he is absolute master of the mass of citizens. For at Sparta the prize of merit is to share with one’s peers the supremacy in the State; but with us the people is supreme, and any other form of supremacy is forbidden by imprecations and laws and other safeguards, but we have crowns of honor and immunities and free maintenance and similar rewards, which anyone may win, if he is a good citizen.
108.1
And both these customs are right enough, the one at Sparta and the other here. Why? Because in an oligarchy harmony is attained by the equality of those who control the State, but the freedom of a democracy is guarded by the rivalry with which good citizens compete for the rewards offered by the people.
109.1
Again, with regard to the absence of honors at Thebes, I think I can express the truth thus. The Thebans, men of Athens, plume themselves more on brutality and iniquity than you on humanity and love of justice. If a prayer may be allowed, may they never cease to withhold honor and admiration from those who do them service, or to deal with kindred states in the same way (For you remember how they treated Orchomenus.) And never may you cease to do the opposite, honoring your benefactors and winning your rights from your fellow-citizens by debate and in harmony with the laws!
110.1
And in general, I think that then only ought you to praise the habits and character of other nations and decry your own, when it is possible to prove that they are more prosperous than you. As long as you (thank Heaven!) are more prosperous than they, in public policy, in internal harmony, and in every other way, why should you belittle your national institutions and imitate theirs? Even if theirs could be proved superior in theory, yet the good fortune that you have enjoyed under your own institutions makes it worth your while to retain them.
111.1
Besides all this, if I must say what I think is right, I would put it in this way. It is not right, Athenians, to cite the laws of the Lacedaemonians or of the Thebans in order to undermine the laws established here; it is not right that you should want to put a man to death for transplanting to Athens any of the institutions that have made those nations great, and yet lend a willing ear to those who propose to destroy the institutions under which our democracy has flourished.
112.1
Then they have another argument ready; that even at Athens in former generations men who had rendered great services met with no recognition of this sort, but were content with an inscription in the Hermes-Portico. Perhaps indeed the inscription will be read to you. But in my opinion, Athenians, this argument is in many ways prejudicial to the State, besides being unjust.
113.1
For if anyone says that even these men deserved no honor, let him say who does deserve it, if there is no one either before or after them. If he shall say no one, I should be very sorry for our city, if no one in the course of its history has proved worthy of reward. Again, if while admitting their merit he points out that they got nothing by it, assuredly he accuses the city of ingratitude. But that is not the truth or anything like it; but whenever a man maliciously gives a wrong twist to his arguments, I think they must appear hateful.
114.1
I, however, will explain the case to you, as truth and justice demand. There were, men of Athens, plenty of zealous citizens in former generations, and our city even then honored its good men; only honors then, like everything else, reflected the temper of the times, just as they now reflect the temper of today. And why do I say this? Because for myself I should be inclined to assert that they did get from the State everything that they wished.
115.1
What is my evidence? Lysimachus, only one of the worthies of that day, received a hundred roods of orchard in Euboea and a hundred of arable land, besides a hundred minas of silver and a pension of four drachmas a day. And the decree in which these gifts are recorded stands in the name of Alcibiades. For then our city was rich in lands and money, though now—she will be rich some day; for I must put it in that way to avoid anything like obloquy. Yet today who, think you, would not prefer a third of that reward to mere immunity? To prove the truth of my words, please take the decree.
115.2
[The decree is read]
116.1
Now this decree, Athenians, proves that your ancestors, like yourselves, were accustomed to honor good men; if they used different methods from ours today, that is another matter. So even if we should admit that neither Lysimachus nor anyone else gained anything from our ancestors, does that make it any fairer in us to rob the men whom we have just rewarded?
117.1
For there is nothing outrageous in withholding what one never dreamed of giving; but it is an outrage to give and afterwards take back one’s gift, with no fault alleged. Prove to me that our ancestors ever took back the gifts they had bestowed, and you too have my leave to do the same, though the disgrace remains none the less; but if no one can cite an instance from the whole course of our history, why is such a precedent to be set in our generation?
118.1
Again, men of Athens, you must also consider well and carefully the fact that you have come into court today, sworn to give your verdict according to the laws, not of Sparta or Thebes, nor those of our earliest ancestors, but those under which immunities were granted to the men whom Leptines is now trying to rob by his law; and where there are no statutes to guide you, you are sworn to decide according to the best of your judgement. So far, so good. Then you must apply these principles to the law as a whole.
119.1
Is it right, Athenians, to honor your benefactors? It is. Well then, is it right to allow a man to keep what has once been given him? It is. Then, to observe your oaths, act on that principle yourselves; resent the imputation that your ancestors acted otherwise; and as for those who cite such instances, alleging that your ancestors rewarded no man for great benefits received, look upon them as both knaves and dullards—knaves, because they falsely charge your ancestors with ingratitude; fools, because they do not see that were the charge proved to the hilt, it would better become them to deny than to repeat it.
120.1
Now I expect that another argument of Leptines will be that his law does not deprive the recipients of their inscriptions and their free maintenance, nor the State of the right to confer honor on those who deserve it, but that it will still be in your power to set up statues and grant maintenance and anything else you wish, except this one privilege. But with respect to the powers that he will pretend to leave to the State, I have just this to say. As soon as you take away one of the privileges you have already granted, you will shake the credit of all the rest. For how can the grant of a statue or of free maintenance be more indefeasible than that of an immunity, which you will seem to have first given and then taken away?
121.1
Further, even if this difficulty were not likely to arise, I cannot think that it is well to bring the State into this dilemma, that it must either put all citizens on an equality with its greatest benefactors, or to avoid this must treat some with ingratitude. Now as for great benefactions, it is not well that you should have many opportunities of receiving them, nor is it perhaps easy for an individual to confer them;
122.1
but the humbler duties to which one can rise in time of peace and in the civil sphere—loyalty, justice, zeal and the like—it is, in my opinion, both well and necessary that they should be rewarded. Grants ought, therefore, to be so apportioned that each man may receive from the people the exact reward that he deserves.
123.1
And then again, with regard to what he will say about leaving their honors to those who have received them, some would have a perfectly plain and straightforward answer, when they claim their right to all their rewards, because they were granted for the same service, but the others will reply that the man who says that he leaves them anything is mocking them. For if a man has been thought to deserve immunity and has received that from you as his sole reward, be he foreigner or citizen, what reward has he left, Leptines, if that is taken from him? None whatever! Then you have no right to rob some because you arraign the worthlessness of the others, or to rob one class of their sole reward because you say that you are going to leave the other class something.
124.1
To put it plainly, the danger is not that of doing a greater or less injustice to one member of the whole body, but that of rendering precarious the honors with which we reward men’s services, nor is immunity the main topic of my speech, but the evil precedent which this law will establish, so that there will be no security for the nation’s gifts.
125.1
Again, the most unscrupulous argument that they have framed, as they think, to persuade you to withdraw the immunities, is one which I had better explain for fear you should be their innocent dupes. They are going to claim that all such payments are religious dues, and that of course it is monstrous that anyone should be exempt from the dues of religion. For my part, I see no unfairness in such exemption, if the people have bestowed it; the really monstrous thing is the course which they propose, if that is to be their argument.
126.1
For if by appealing to the name of the gods they try to justify a robbery which they cannot justify otherwise, will not that be most impious and monstrous conduct? In my opinion, whenever a man appeals solemnly to the gods, his conduct ought to be clearly such as would not appear base even if supported only by human authority. Now that there is a difference between exemption from religious duties and exemption from public services, and that the defendants are trying to deceive you by transferring the name of public services to religious acts, I shall adduce Leptines himself as my witness.
127.1
For the first clause of the law says Leptines proposed that, to the end that the wealthiest citizens may perform the public services, none shall be immune save and except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton. But if immunity from religious duties were the same as immunity from public services, what was the object of that clause? For immunity from religious duties has never been granted even to the persons here named. To prove that this is so, please take and read the copy of the inscription and then the beginning of the law of Leptines.
127.2
[The copy of the inscription is read]
128.1
You hear the copy of the inscription, men of Athens, ordering them to be immune, save from religious duties. Now read the beginning of the law of Leptines.
128.2
[The law is read
128.3
Good; stop there. After the words to the end that the wealthiest citizens may perform the public services, he added no one shall be immune save and except, the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Why so, if to pay for a religious rite is to perform a public service? For if that is his meaning, his own drafting will be found to contradict the inscription.
129.1
Now I should like to put a question to Leptines. When you say that the public services come under the head of religious dues, in what, according to you, did the immunity consist, which our ancestors then granted and you now leave untouched? For by the old laws they are not immune from all the special war-taxes or from the equipment of war-galleys; and they enjoy no immunity from the state services, since they are included in the religious duties.
130.1
And yet the inscription says that they shall be immune. From what? From the tax on resident aliens, since nothing else is left? Of course not. It is from the regularly recurring services, as the inscription shows, as your law further specifies, and as all history witnesses. During all that length of time no tribe has ever ventured to nominate one of these descendants as chorus-master, and no one nominated has ever ventured to challenge them to an exchange of property. If Leptines dares to deny it, you must pay no heed to him.
131.1
Again, perhaps they will say in their haphazard style that some citizens, by claiming to be Megarians and Messenians, at once gain immunity, whole crowds at a time, to say nothing of slaves and jailbirds like Lycidas and Dionysius; such are the examples they select. When they hold such language, deal with them thus. Tell them, if they are speaking the truth, to produce the decrees which contain these men’s immunity; for no one in your city enjoys immunity unless granted by some decree or law.
132.1
Many such men, however, have been proclaimed Friends of the State here at the instance of your politicians Lycidas, for example. But it is one thing to be a Friend of the State and another to enjoy immunity. Be not misled by them. Because slaves, like Lycidas and Dionysius and perhaps one other, were made Friends of the State by men who are readily bribed to propose such decrees, they must not try to take away the gifts that you have justly bestowed on men of a different class—mentorious, freeborn, munificent benefactors.
133.1
On this principle, what a gross insult it would be to Chabrias, if politicians of that stamp, not content with making his slave, Lycidas, a Friend of your State, should make the slave an excuse for taking back rewards conferred on the master, and that on a false plea! For neither Lycidas nor anyone else enjoys immunity as a Friend of the State, unless such immurity has been expressly conferred by the people. The men in question have not received it; I defy the defendants to prove it. If they have the effrontery to assert it, they will be acting dishonorably.
134.1
I now come to speak of a matter about which I feel bound, Athenians, to warn you most seriously. For even if one could admit the truth of all that Leptines will say in praise of his law, it would be impossible under any circumstances to wipe out one disgrace which his law, if ratified, will bring upon our city. To what do I refer? To the reputation of having cheated our benefactors.
135.1
Now I think you would all agree that this is a distinct disgrace; how much worse in you than in others, hear me explain. You have an ancient law, one held in great respect, that if anyone deceives the people by false promises, he shall be brought to trial, and if convicted shall be punished with death. And are you not then ashamed, Athenians, to find yourselves doing the very thing for which you punish other men with death? Nay, but in everything it is right to take heed against doing whatever seems or is dishonorable, but especially in cases where a man is seen to be indignant with others. For there is no room left even for hesitation in avoiding acts which a man’s own judgement has already condemned.
136.1
Then there is another precaution that you must take—to do nothing as a community which you would shun as individuals. Not a man among you would take away from another his own personal gifts, nor even dream of doing so. Then do not so in your public capacity, but tell the official defenders of this law that
137.1
if they say that any of the recipients of these rewards is undeserving, or holds them under false pretences, or is open to any other charge, they should indict him under the amended law which we are now proposing, either when we have carried it through, as we guarantee and assert that we will, or when they have themselves carried it, that is, as soon as the legislative commission has been appointed. But each defender of this law, it seems, has a personal enemy, whether Diophantus or Eubulus or someone else.
138.1
If they hang back and refuse to take this step, then consider, men of Athens, whether it is to your credit that you should be known to have taken away from your benefactors what not one of these men ventures to take from his personal enemy, and that you should pass a law to rob collectively of their rewards men who have served you well and whom no one dreams of indicting, when the handful of unworthy recipients, if there are any, could be dealt with just as effectively, if these men would impeach them and bring them to trial one by one. For it passes my comprehension how the present arrangement can consort with your honor and your dignity.
139.1
Again, we must not deviate from this principle, that it was fair to investigate their merits at the time of conferring the reward, when none of these men opposed the vote, but after that to let the reward stand, unless you have received any subsequent wrong at their hands. If they allege that (for they cannot prove it), it must be shown that the men were punished at the time of the alleged wrongs. But if you ratify this law, though no such wrong was committed, it will seem that you have taken away their reward because you were envious, not because you found them rascals.
140.1
Every reproach, I might almost say, should be avoided, but this above all, men of Athens. Why? Because in every way envy is the mark of a vicious nature, and the man who is subject to it has no claim whatever to consideration. Moreover there is no reproach more alien to our city than the appearance of envy, averse as she is from all that is disgraceful.
141.1
See what strong evidence we have of this. In the first place, you alone of all mankind publicly pronounce over your dead funeral orations, in which you extol the deeds of the brave. Such, however, is the practice of men who admire bravery, not of men who envy the honors that bravery wins. Next, you have from time immemorial given the richest rewards to those who win crowns in the athletic games; nor, because such honors are necessarily confined to a few, have you grudged or stinted the honors of the victors on that account. Beside these notable instances, no one, I think, has ever surpassed our State in generosity; such a superabundance of rewards has she heaped on those who serve her well.
142.1
All these, men of Athens, are proofs of justice, of virtue, of magnanimity. Then do not now destroy the very qualities on which throughout its history our city’s reputation is founded; do not, in order that Leptines may vent his spite on men whom he dislikes, rob both yourselves and your city of the fair fame that has been yours in every age; do not suppose that anything else is at stake in this trial save the honor of Athens, whether it is to stand unimpaired as of old, or to pass into neglect and degradation.
143.1
But of all the astonishing features of Leptines’ law, what astonishes me most is his ignorance of the fact that just as a man who assigns heavy penalties for offences would be unlikely to have contemplated an offence himself, so one who abolishes the rewards for benefactions will not himself be likely to have contemplated a good deed. Now if, as is just possible, he did not know this, he will at once confess it by allowing you to repeal the law which embodies his own error, but if he shows himself obstinate and eager to ratify the law, I for one cannot praise him, though I refrain from censure.
144.1
Then be not stubborn, Leptines; do not insist on a course which will not add to your own reputation or that of your supporters, especially as this trial no longer endangers you. For owing to the death of the father of Apsephion here, Bathippus, who indicted Leptines when he was still liable, the legal period has elapsed, and now our whole concern is with the law, and its proposer runs no risk.
145.1
I am told, however, that you assert that three distinct persons indicted you before Apsephion, but dropped the action. Well, if your complaint against them is that they did not endanger you, you must be fonder of danger than other people, but if you bring it forward as a proof of the justice of your proposals, you are doing a very silly thing. For how is your law improved by the fact that one of those who indicted you died before he could come into court, or was induced by you to drop the charge, or even was simply suborned by you? But I am ashamed even to suggest such things.
146.1
There are advocates appointed to defend the law, and very able speakers they are; Leodamas of Acharnae, Aristophon of Hazenia, Cephisodotus of Ceramicus, and Dinias of Herchia. Let me tell you, then, how you may reasonably retort upon them, and do you consider whether the retort is fair. Take Leodamas first. It was he who impeached the grant to Chabrias, which included among other things the gift of immunity, and when his case came before you, he lost it.
147.1
Now the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue, be it a civil action, a scrutiny, a contested claim, or anything else of the sort. But quite apart from all this, it would be a most absurd result if on the first occasion the services of Chabrias outweighed the arguments of Leodamas, but when to his services were added those of all the other benefactors, then the combined effect should be weaker than the arguments.
148.1
To Aristophon I think I could raise many sound objections. He obtained his grant, which included immunity, by your votes. I find no fault with that, for it is right that you should have it in your power to bestow what is yours on anyone you please. But I do suggest that it is unfair that he should raise no objection when he was going to receive it himself, but when it has been given to others, he should take offence and urge you to withdraw it.
149.1
Moreover it was Aristophon who proposed to pay Gelarchus five talents for sums advanced to the democrats in the Piraeus; and he was right. Then, my friend, if you recommended the repayment of unattested sums on the ground of service done to the people, you must not advise the revocation of grants for services which the people themselves attested by inscriptions in the temples, and which are indeed known to all men. You must not exhibit yourself as at the same time proposing that debts ought to be paid, and urging that a man should be deprived of what he has won at the hands of the people.
150.1
Next, I have this much to say to Cephisodotus. As an orator, men of Athens, he is inferior to none. Then it would be far more honorable to use his talents for the chastisement of evil-doers than for the injury of those who deserve well. If he must make enemies, I suggest that they should be those who injure the people, not those who benefit them.
151.1
Then as to Dinias. Perhaps he will tell you of the war-galleys he has equipped and of his other public services. For my part, though Dinias has proved himself a valuable servant of the public, as I sincerely believe, I would urge him rather to claim from you some reward for himself than to tell you to take back rewards previously given to others; for a man gives a surer proof of excellence by claiming a reward for his own services than by grudging others the rewards they have received for theirs.
152.1
But the most effective retort is one which applies to all the commissioners alike. Each one of them has often before served as commissioner for some business or other. Now you have a very sound law—not, of course, directed against these men, but framed to prevent any commissioner from using his opportunity for profit or blackmail—that no one, elected by the people, be permitted to serve as commissioner more than once.
153.1
Surely those who are going to advocate a law and urge its necessity ought to show themselves ready to obey existing laws; otherwise it is absurd for them to defend one law as commissioners and violate another themselves. Take and read the law which I cite.
153.2
[The law is read]
153.3
That, Athenians, is both an old and a sound law, which the commissioners will be careful not to violate, if they are wise.
154.1
I have still a few things to say to you before I sit down. For you ought, in my opinion, men of Athens, to be anxious for the utmost possible efficiency of our laws, but especially of those on which depends the strength or weakness of our State. And which are they? They are those which assign rewards to those who do good and punishments to those who do evil. For in truth, if from fear of legal penalties all men shunned wrongdoing, and if from ambition for the rewards of good service all chose the path of duty, what prevents our city from being great and all our citizens honest, with not a rogue among them?
155.1
Now the law of Leptines, Athenians, does harm not only by abolishing the rewards of good service and so rendering fruitless the good intentions of those who are ambitious for honor, but also by leaving our city under the serious reproach of imbecility. For you are of course aware that for each grave offence a single penalty is provided by the law, which says explicitly that at any trial there shall be not more than one assessment of penalty, whichever the court imposes, whether a personal punishment or a fine, but not both.
156.1
But Leptines has used a different measure and says that if anyone claims a return from you, he shall be disfranchised, and his property shall be confiscated. There you have two penalties. The process shall be by laying information or by summary arrest; and if he be convicted, he shall be liable under the law which provides for the case of a man holding office while in debt to the treasury. Death is what he means, for such is the punishment in that case. Why, here are three penalties! Is it not monstrously hard, Athenians, if it proves more serious in your courts to ask for a return for good service than to be convicted of some heinous crime?
157.1
Men of Athens, this law, so dishonorable, so unsound, so suggestive of envy and spite and—I spare you the rest. Those are the sort of things that the framer of the law seems to favor, but you must not imitate them nor display sentiments unworthy of yourselves. I ask you in Heaven’s name, what should we all most earnestly deprecate? What do all our laws most carefully guard against? What but those vengeful murders against which our specially appointed protector is the Council of the Areopagus?
158.1
Now Draco, in this group of laws, marked the terrible wickedness of homicide by banning the offender from the lustral water, the libations, the loving-cup, the sacrifices and the market-place; he enumerated everything that he thought likely to deter the offender; but he never robbed him of his claim to justice; he defined the circumstances that make homicide justifiable and proclaimed the accused in such case free from taint. If, then, your laws can justify homicide, is this fellow’s law to forbid any claim, even a just one, to recompense? Not so, men of Athens!
159.1
Do not let it appear that you have been more diligent to prevent any of your benefactors from winning a recompense than to suppress murder in your city. Rather, recalling the occasions on which you have repaid the services rendered you, and remembering the inscription of Demophantus, already referred to by Phormio, on which it stands written and confirmed by oath that whoso shall suffer in defence of the democracy shall receive the same reward as Harmodius and Aristogiton, vote for the repeal of this law; for if you do not, it is impossible for you to observe your oaths.
160.1
And besides all this, observe a further point. That law cannot be a sound one which deals with the past and the future in the same way. None, says this law, shall be immune save and except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Good! Nor shall anyone in future be granted immunity. What! not even if other such benefactors arise, Leptines? If you found fault with the past, can it be that you also foresaw the future?
161.1
Because, you will say, we are now past such expectation. I pray that we may be, Athenians. But as we are mere mortals, neither our language nor our laws should offend religious sentiment; we may both expect blessings and pray for them, but we must reflect that all things are conditioned by mortality. For the Lacedaemonians never dreamed that they would be brought to their present straits, and perhaps even the Syracusans, once a democracy, who exacted tribute from the Carthaginians and ruled all their neighbors and beat at us at sea, little thought they would fall under the tyranny of a single clerk, if report be true.
162.1
Nor again could the present Dionysius ever have exacted that Dion would come against him in a cargo-boat with a handful of soldiers and expel the master of so many warships and mercenaries and cities. But, methinks, the future is hidden from all men, and great events hang on small chances. Therefore we must be modest in the day of prosperity, and must show that we are not blind to the future.
163.1
There are still many arguments that one might develop at length, showing that this law is in every respect unsound and opposed to your interests; but to sum up and bring my speech to a conclusion, I will ask you to do this. Calculate and compare in your own minds what will happen to you if you repeal this law, and what if you do not; and then be careful to remember all the consequences of either step, so that you may make the better choice.
164.1
Now if, on our advice, you reject it, deserving men will receive their due reward from you, and any undeserving man (assuming that there are such) will not only lose his reward, but will pay whatever penalty you approve, in accordance with our alternative law, while all men will acknowledge the honor, justice and veracity of our city. If, on the other hand, you allow it to pass, as I pray you may not, the good will suffer for the sake of the bad, the undeserving will bring calamity on the rest, but come off scot-free themselves, and the reputation of Athens will be the very reverse of what I have described; all men will regard her as faithless, envious and mean.
165.1
It is unworthy of you, Athenians, to prefer such a foul reproach to advantages so honorable and so appropriate to you. For each of you will share individually in the credit of your joint decision. For it is known to all standing round us, as to everyone else, that in this court Leptines is contending with us, but within the conscience of each member of the jury humanity is arrayed against envy, justice against malice, and all that is good against all that is most base.
166.1
If you yield to the nobler impulse and cast your votes with us, you will win for yourselves the credit, and for the State the benefit, of a righteous verdict, and if ever occasion arises, you will not lack friends willing to encounter risk in your behalf. I ask you, therefore, to take all these considerations seriously to heart and to beware that you are not forced into an error of judgement. For on many occasions, men of Athens, the justice of the case has not been brought home to you, but a verdict has been wrested from you by the clamor, the violence and the shamelessness of the pleaders.
167.1
Let not that be your case today, for that would be unworthy of you; but hold fast to what you are convinced is just, and bear it in mind until you vote, so that true to your oaths you may cast your votes against the counsels of the wicked. If you punish with death those who debase the coinage, I shall be surprised if you lend an ear to men who render our whole State base and counterfeit. By all the gods, I will not believe it of you.
167.2
I think I need say no more, for I believe you understand all my arguments.

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