History of the Peloponnesian War

Mel. It is but natural and pardonable for men so circumstanced to have recourse to many things, both in thinking and speaking. However, this our meeting is held with a view to our preservation; and let the discussion proceed, if you please, in the way which you propose.

Ath. We then shall not ourselves advance fair pretences, either of our justly enjoying empire in consequence of having overthrown the Mede, or of now coming against you because we are being injured-and so make a long speech which would not be believed; nor do we wish you to think of persuading us by saying, either that you did not join the standard of the Lacedaemonians, though you were their colony; or that you have done us no wrong. But we advise you, according to the real sentiments of us both, to think of getting what you can; since you know, and are speaking to those who know, that, in the language of men, what is estimated by equality of power compel; but what is possible is that which the stronger practise, and to which the weak submit.

Mel. So far then as our opinion goes, it is for our advantage (for we must, since you have so prescribed, speak of what is expedient, to the neglect of what is right) that you should not take away what is a common benefit; but that for every one who at any time is in danger, what is reasonable should also be considered right; and that if he can gain assent to something which ails short of strict justice, he should have the benefit of it. And this is not less for your interest; in as much, as you would afford to others, should you fail, a pattern for inflicting the heaviest vengeance upon you.

Ath. Nay, for our part, we are not disheartened about the end of our empire, even should it be brought to an end. For it is not those who rule over others, like the Lacedaemonians, that are to be feared by the vanquished. Nor is it with the Lacedaemonians that we have to struggle, but with the possibility of our subjects in any quarter by themselves attacking and overpowering those who have had rule over them.

So on this point let the danger be left to us. But that we are come here for the benefit of our empire, and that we shall also speak on the present occasion for the preservation of your country, on these points we will give you proofs; since we wish to maintain our own sovereignty over you without trouble, and to have you preserved for the advantage of us both.

Mel. And how then could it prove advantageous for us to serve, as it is for you to govern?

Ath. Because you would have the benefit of submitting before you suffered the last extremities; while we should be gainers by not destroying you.

Mel. But would you not accept our proposals, on condition of our remaining quiet, and being friends instead of enemies, but in alliance with neither side?

Ath. No; for your enmity is not so hurtful to us, as your friendship is to our subjects an evident proof of our weakness, but your hatred, of our power.

Mel. And do your subjects then take such a view of equity, as to put on the same footing those who are not at all connected with you, and those who, being in most cases your colonists, and in some cases having revolted from you, have been reduced to subjection?

Ath. Why, for an argument resting on justice they think that neither of us are at a loss; but that on the ground of their power they escape, and we, through fear, abstain from attacking them. So that, besides our ruling over more subjects, you would also through your subjection confer security upon us; especially by the fact that you who are islanders, and weaker too than some others, did not escape our dominion, who have the command of the sea.

Mel. And do you consider that there is no security in that other case? (For here again, as you have excluded us from appeals to justice, and urge us to yield to considerations of your advantage, we too must explain what is expedient for us, and so endeavour to persuade you, if the same happen to be for your interest also.) For how can you avoid making enemies of all that are at present neutral, when, on looking to the present case, they reckon that some time or other you will proceed against them also? And by that course what do you do, but aggrandize your present enemies, and bring those upon you against their will who would never else be likely to become hostile to you?

Ath. Why, we do not consider those who live any where on the mainland, and who in consequence of their liberty will long delay taking precautions against us, to be so formidable to us as those who are islanders any where without being under our rule, like you, and those who by the severity of our rule are now exasperated against us. For it is these who would most give way to recklessness, and bring both themselves and us into danger that was evident beforehand.

Mel. Surely then, if you run such a risk not to be deprived of your empire, and those who are already in subjection, to be released from it; for us who are still free it were great baseness and cowardice not to have recourse to every thing before we submit to it.

Ath. No; not at least if you take a sensible view of the case. For you are not on equal terms contending for honour, to avoid incurring disgrace; but you are rather deliberating for your preservation, to avoid resisting those who are far stronger than yourselves.

Mel. But we know that warlike measures sometimes come to more impartial results than might have been expected from the different numbers on each side. And in our case to yield is immediate despair; but by making an effort there is yet hope of our keeping ourselves up.

Ath. Hope, which is the solace of danger, when entertained by those who have abundant means, though it may injure, yet does not ruin them. But in the case of those who risk all they have on a throw, (for it is naturally an extravagant passion,) it is only found out at the time of their ruin, and leaves no room for guarding against it in future, when it is found out.

Do not you then, weak as you are, and hanging on one single turn of the scale, be desirous of this fate, nor of resembling the greater part of mankind, who, when they might have been saved by human means, after visible hopes have failed them in their distress, betake themselves to such as are invisible, namely, prophecy, and oracles, and all such things as bring men to ruin, together with the hopes resting upon them.

Mel. Difficult indeed even we, be well assured, consider it to contend against your power and fortune, unless we are able to do it on equal terms. However, we trust that in point of fortune we shall, by the favour of the gods, not be worsted, because we are standing up in a righteous cause against unjust opponents; and that our deficiency in power will be made up by our Lacedaemonian allies; who are under a necessity of succouring us, if for no other reason, yet on account of our connexion with them, and for very shame.

Ath. As regards then the favour of heaven, we trust that we too shall not fall short of it: since we are not requiring or doing any thing beyond the opinion of men, with respect to the gods, or their determination, with respect to themselves.

For of the gods we hold as a matter of opinion, and of men we know as a certainty, that, in obedience to an irresistible instinct, they always maintain dominion, wherever they are the stronger. And we neither enacted this law, nor were the first to carry it out when enacted; but having received it when already in force, and being about to leave it after us to be in force for ever, we only avail ourselves of it; knowing that both you and others, if raised to the same power, would do the same.

And so, with regard to the gods, we are with good reason fearless of defeat. But with regard to your opinion respecting the Lacedaemonians, according to which you trust, that from a sense of shame, forsooth, they will assist you; though we bless your simplicity, we do not admire your folly.

For with respect to themselves, and the institutions of their country, the Lacedaemonians do indeed to a very great extent practise virtue; but with respect to others, though we might descant at length on their conduct towards them, speaking most concisely we should declare, that of all the men we are acquainted with, most evident consider what is agreeable to be honourable, and what is exedient to be just. And yet such a view of things is not in favour of your present unreasonable hopes of safety.

Mel. But it is on this very ground that we now rely on their sense of interest, and believe that they will not be tray us Melians, who are their colonists, and so lose the confidence of those Greeks who wish them well, while they help those who are hostile to them.

Ath. Then you do not think that interest is connected with security, whereas justice and honour are practised with danger; a course on which the Lacedaemonians, generally speaking, least of all men venture.

Mel. Nay, but we are of opinion that they would even incur dangers for our sake, more than usual, and would regard them as less hazardous than in the case of others; in as much as we he near the Peloponnese, for the execution of their measures; while in feeling we are, through our kindred with them, more to be trusted than another party would be.

Ath. Ay, but to men going to take part in a quarrel safety does not appear to consist in the good feeling of those who call them to their aid, but in the fact of their being far superior in power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than the rest of the world. At any rate, through their mistrusting their own resources, it is only in concert with many allies that they attack those who are near to them; so that it is not likely they will cross over to an island, while we are masters of the sea.

Mel. But they would have others to send; and the Cretan sea is of wide extent, and to intercept a party in crossing it is more difficult for those who command it, than to escape is for those who wish to elude observation.

Besides, if they should be disappointed in this, they would proceed against your territory, and to the remainder of your allies, such as Brasidas did not reach: and you will have to exert yourselves, not so much for territory which does not belong to you, as for your own confederacy and country.

Ath. On this point you, as well as others, may learn by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that from no single siege did the Athenians ever yet retreat through fear of others.

But it strikes us, that though you said you would consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for thinking that they would be saved; but your strongest points depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are too scanty, compared with those at present opposed to you, to give you a chance of escape. And so you afford proof of great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allowing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this.

For you surely will not betake yourselves to that shame, which in dangers that are disgraceful, because foreseen, destroys men more than any thing else. For in the case of many men, though they foresee all the time what they are running into, the thing which is called disgrace, by the influence of a seducing name, allures them on, enslaved as they are to the word, in fact to fall wilfully into irretrievable disasters, and to incur a shame more shameful as the attendant on folly than on fortune.

Against this then you, if you take good advice, will be on your guard; and will not consider it discreditable to submit to the most powerful state, when it offers you fair terms, namely, that you should become tributary allies, with the enjoyment of your own country; and when a choice of war or safety is given you, to avoid choosing through animosity what is worse for you. For whatever men do not yield to their equals, while they keep on good terms with their superiors, and are moderate to their inferiors, they would be most successful.

Consider then, even after we have retired; and reflect again and again, that it is for your country that you are consulting, which you can do but for one country, and for once, whether it prove successful or unsuccessful.

So the Athenians retired from the conference; and the Melians, having been left to themselves, as they still thought pretty nearly the same as they had maintained in the discussion, gave the following answer:

We neither think differently from what we did at first, Athenians, nor will we in a short space of time rob of its liberty a city which has now been inhabited seven hundred years; but trusting to the fortune which, by the favour of heaven, has hitherto preserved it, and to the help of man, especially of the Lacedaemonians, we will endeavour to save ourselves.

But we propose to you that we should be your friends, and the enemies of neither party; and that you should retire from our country after making such a treaty as may appear suitable for both sides.

Such then was the answer which the Melians gave. The Athenians, now departing from the conference, said: Well then you are the only men who by these counsels, as appears to us, consider what is future as more certain than what is seen, and regard what is out of sight as already occurring, because you wish it; and having staked and relied most on [ such things as] Lacedaemonians, and fortune, and hopes, you will also be most disappointed.

So the Athenian ambassadors returned to their forces: and their generals, since the Melians did not listen at all to their proposals, immediately proceeded to apply themselves to war; and having divided the work between the different states, enclosed the Melians with lines on all sides.

Afterwards, the Athenians left a part of their own troops and the allies, to keep guard both by land and sea, and returned with the main body of the forces. Those who were left behind remained and besieged the place.

About the same time an Argive force invaded the Phliasian territory, and being intercepted by an ambuscade of the Phliasians and their allies, were cut off to the number of eighty.

And now the Athenians at Pylus took great spoils from the Lacedaemonians; in consequence of which the Lacedaemonians, though even then they did not renounce the treaty, and go to war with them, proclaimed that any of their people who pleased might plunder the Athenians.

Moreover, the Corinthians proceeded to hostilities with the Athenians for some private quarrels of their own;

but the rest of the Peloponnesians remained quiet. The Melians, too, attacked by night the part of the Athenian lines opposite the market-place, and slew some of the men; and having carried in corn, and as many useful things as they could, returned and kept quiet; while the Athenians made better provision for the guard in future. And so the summer ended.

The following winter, the Lacedaemonians intended to march against the Argive territory, but returned on finding, when at the frontier, that the sacrifices for crossing it were not favourable. Owing to this intention on their part, the Argives, suspecting a certain party in their city, seized some of them, while others escaped them.

About the same time, the Melians again took a part of the Athenian lines in another direction, the garrison not being numerous.

A fresh force having afterwards come from Athens in consequence of these occurrences, under the command of Philocrates son of Demeas, and the inhabitants being now vigorously blockaded, after there had also been some treachery practised by their own men, they surrendered at discretion to the Athenians;

who put to death all the Melian adults they took, and made slaves of the children and women. As for the country, they afterwards sent out five hundred colonists, and inhabited it themselves.

THE same winter the Athenians wished to sail again to Sicily, with a larger armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and bring it into subjection to them, if they could; the mass of the people being ignorant of the size of the island, and the number of its inhabitants, both Greeks and barbarians; and that they were undertaking a war not much inferior in magnitude to that with the Peloponnesians.

For the voyage round Sicily in a merchant vessel is one of not much less than eight days; and though it is of such extent, it is only excluded by the space of about twenty stades of sea from being mainland.

Now it was settled originally in the following manner, and these were all the nations that occupied it. The earliest people said to have lived in any part of the country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; with regard to whom, I can neither tell their race, nor whence they came into it, nor whither they departed out of it: but let that suffice which has been said by the poets, and which every body in any way knows of them.

The Sicanians appear to have been the first who settled in it after them; indeed, as they themselves assert, even before them, as being the aboriginal population; but as the truth is found to be, they were Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus, in Theria, by the Ligurians. And it was from them that the island was at that time called Sicania, having previously been called Trinacria; and still, even to this day, they inhabit Sicily in its western districts.

But on the capture of Troy, some of the Trojans, having escaped the Greeks, came in vessels to Sicily, and having settled in the neighbourhood of the Sicanians, they were all together called Elymi, and their cities, Eryx and Segesta. There were also settled with them some of the Phocians, who, while returning from Troy, were carried by a tempest, first to Libya, and then from that country to Sicily.

The Sicels, again, went over into Sicily from Italy, (for it was there that they used to live,) while flying from some Opicans; crossing on rafts, (as is probable, and reported to have been the case,) having watched an opportunity for the passage, when the wind set down the strait; or, perhaps, having sailed to it in some other way. Even to this day there are still Sicels in Italy; and it was in this way that the country was called Italy, after Italus, a king of the Sicels who had that name.

Having gone, then, to Sicily with a great host, and being victorious in battle over the Sicanians, they compelled them to remove to the southern and western parts of it, and caused the island to be called Sicily, instead of Sicania, and occupied the best parts of the land; having held them, after they crossed over, nearly three hundred years before any Greeks came into Sicily; and still, even to this day, they retain the central and northern parts of the island.

There were also Phoenicians living around the whole of Sicily, having occupied promontories on the sea-coast, and the small islands adjacent, for purposes of trading with the Sicels: but after the Greeks sailed to it in great numbers by sea, in addition to those already there, they evacuated the greater part of them, and lived in Motya, Solois, and Panormus, near the Elymi, having united with them, both from confidence in their alliance, and because from that quarter the voyage from Sicily to Carthage is shortest. As regards barbarians, then, so many of them were there that inhabited Sicily, and in such a manner.

Of the Greeks, on the other hand, some Chalcidians of Euboea first sailed with Thucles as the leader of the colony, and founded Naxos, and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes, which is now outside the city, and on which when any deputies to the games sail from Sicily, they first sacrifice.

Syracuse was founded the next year by Archias, of the family of Hercules at Corinth, after he had first expelled the Sicels from the island; on which, being no longer surrounded with water, the inner city now stands; and at a later period the outer one also was enclosed within the wall, and became populous.

Moreover, Thucles and the Chalcidians from Naxos set out in the fifth year after the founding of Syracuse, and having expelled the Sicels by arms, re—settled Leontini, and after it Catana, the Catanians themselves having chosen Evarchus as their founder.

At the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and after settling in a place beyond the river Pantacyas, Trotilus by name, and subsequently removing thence, and uniting for a short time with the Chalcidians at Leontini, and being driven out by them, he founded Thapsus, and then he himself died; while the rest, being expelled from Thapsus, effected a settlement at Megara, called the Hyblaean, Hyblo, a Sicel king, having given up the place to them and led them in.

After inhabiting it two hundred and forty—five years, they were expelled from the city and country by Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse. Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after their settlement, they founded Seliaus, having sent Pamillus for the purpose, who came from Megara, their mother—city, and joined them in founding it.

Gela, again, was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, who led a common colony, in the forty-fifth year after the founding of Syracuse. The name of the city was taken from the river Gelas, but the spot where the city, [properly so called,] now stands, and which was first fortified, is named Lindii. The institutions established amongst them were Dorian.

Just about a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, the Geloans settled Acragas, [or Agrigentum,] naming the city from the river Acragas: they made Aristonous and Pystilus the leaders of their colony, and gave it the institutions of the Geloans.