History of the Peloponnesian War

For on other grounds it was not easy to pass through Thessaly without an escort, and with an armed force, especially, to pass through a neighbour's country without having obtained his consent, was regarded with suspicion by all the Greeks alike. Besides, the great mass of the Thessalians had always been on friendly terms with Athens;

so that, had not Thessaly, by the constitution of their country, been under the dominion of a few individuals, rather than in the enjoyment of civil equality, he would never have made his way; since even as it was, another party, of contrary views to those who have been named, met him on his march on the river Enipeus, and tried to stop him, telling him that he did wrong in advancing without the national consent.

But his conductors said that they would not escort him against their will, and that they were only attending him as friends, on his unexpectedly coming to them. Brasidas himself also told them that he came as a friend both to the country of the Thessalians and to themselves, and was bringing his forces against the Athenians, who were at war with his country, and not against them; nor did he know of any enmity existing between the Thessalians and the Lacedaemonians, to prevent their having access to each other's territory:

and now he would not advance against their will (for neither indeed could he); but yet he claimed not to be obstructed After hearing this, they went away; and he, without halting at all, pushed on at a rapid pace, according to the advice of his conductors, before a greater force might be collected to stop him. And so on the day of his setting out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus;

thence to Phacium, and thence to Peraebia. At that point his Thessalian escort returned; but the Peraxbians, who were subject to the Thessalians, brought him to Dium, in the dominions of Perdiccas, a town of Macedonia lying under Mount Olympus, on the side of Thessaly.

In this way Brasidas stole a rapid march through Thessaly, before any one was prepared to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.

For what brought the army up out of the Peloponnese, while the affairs of Athens were so prosperous, was the fear of the Thrace-ward cities which had revolted from the Athenians, and that of Perdiccas:

the Chalcidians thinking that the Athenians would in the first place march against them, (and moreover, the cities near to them which had not revolted, secretly joined in the invitation,) and Perdiccas, though not an open enemy, yet being afraid, on his part also, because of his old quarrels with the Athenians, and most of all being desirous of reducing to subjection Arrhibaeus, the king of the Lyncestians.

And what contributed to their getting the army out of the Peloponnese the more easily, was the misfortune of the Lacedaemonians at that time. For as the Athenians were pressing hard upon the Peloponnese, and especially upon their territory, they hoped to divert them from it most effectually, if they annoyed them in return by sending an army to their allies; especially as they were ready to maintain it, and were calling them to their aid, with a view to revolting.

Besides, they were glad to have a pretext for sending away some of the Helots; lest in the present state of affairs, when Pylus was occupied by an enemy, they might attempt some revolution.

Indeed through fear of their youth and great numbers, they even perpetrated the following deed: (for at all times most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were framed particularly with a view to the Helots, to guard against them.) They made proclamation, that as many of them as claimed to have done the state most service against the enemy should be picked out, professing that they would give them their liberty; thus applying a test to them, and thinking that those who severally claimed to be first made free, would also, through their high spirit, be most ready to attack them.

Having thus selected as many as two thousand, the Helots crowned themselves, and went round to the temples, on the strength of having gained their freedom; but the Spartans soon after did away with them, and no one ever knew by what means they were severally dispatched. And on this occasion they eagerly sent away seven hundred of them with Brasidas as heavy-armed troops:

the rest of his army he induced by pay to follow him from the Peloponnese. As for Brasidas himself, it was chiefly at his own desire that the Lacedaemonians sent him out.

But the Chalcidians were also very anxious to have him, as a man who both appeared, while in Sparta, to be active in every thing, and after he had gone from home, proved himself most valuable to the Lacedaemonians.

For at that present time, by showing himself just and moderate towards the cities, he caused their revolt in most instances; while other places he took through their being betrayed to him; so that the Lacedaemonians, if they might wish to conclude peace, (as they did,) had towns to give and receive back, and a respite from the war in the Peloponnese. And at a later period of the war, after what had happened in Sicily, it was the probity and tact of Brasidas at this time, experienced by some and heard of by others, that most raised amongst the allies of Athens a strong inclination towards the Lacedaemonians.

For by going out first, and showing himself to be in all respects a worthy man, he left amongst them an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

On his arrival then at this time in the countries Thrace-ward, the Athenians, when they heard it, declared war against Perdiccas, thinking that he was the cause of his march thither; and kept a closer watch over their allies in that quarter.

Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, and led them with his own forces against Arrhibaeus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, whose territory bordered on his own; for he had a quarrel with him, and wished to reduce him to subjection.

But when he had come with his army, accompanied by Brasidas, to the pass into Lyncus, Brasidas told him that he wished to go, before hostilities were commenced, and by means of words bring Arrhibaeus into alliance with the Lacedaemonians, if he could.

Indeed Arrhibaeus sent a herald to make some advances, being willing to refer the matter to Brasidas as an arbitrator between them: and the Chalcidian envoys who were with him, advised him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas, that they might be able to command his more hearty assistance in their own affairs also.

Besides, the envoys from Perdiccas had made at Lacedaemon a declaration to this effect, that he would bring many places around him into alliance with them; so that Brasidas, on the strength of this, thought himself entitled to arrange the affairs of Arrhibaeus in common with Perdiccas, rather than leave them to him alone.

But Perdiccas said that he had not taken Brasidas as an arbitrator in their disputes, but rather to destroy the enemies he should point out to him; and, that he would act unjustly. if, while he supported half his army, he should hold a conference with Arrhibaeus.

But Brasidas, against the king's will, and after a quarrel with him, had a meeting with Arrhibaeus, and being persuaded by his arguments, drew off the army before they entered his country. And Perdiccas after this supplied but a third, instead of half, towards the support of the army, considering himself to be aggrieved.

The same summer, Brasidas, accompanied by the Chalcidians, immediately made an expedition against Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians, a little before the vintage.

The people there were divided into parties amongst themselves on the subject of receiving him, those who with the Chalcidians joined in inviting him, and the commons [who were opposed to it]. Nevertheless, through fear for their fruit, which was still out, when the commons were urged by Brasidas to admit him alone, and to decide after hearing him, they admitted him. And coming forward to speak to the people, (being, for a Lacedaemonian, not deficient in eloquence,) he addressed them as follows:

"The sending out, Acanthians, of myself and my army by the Lacedaemonians, has been executed to verify the reason we alleged for hostilities at the commencement of them, viz. that to liberate Greece we should go to war with the Athenians.

And if we have been long in coming to you, through being disappointed in our expectation regarding the war in those parts, according to which we hoped quickly by ourselves, and without any risk on your part, to overthrow the Athenians, let no one find fault with us; for now, when we had an opportunity, we are come, and will endeavour, in concert with you, to subdue them. But I am astonished at my being shut out of your gates, and that my arrival should be unwelcome to any of you.

For we Lacedaemonians, as thinking that we should come to men who in feeling, at any rate, were on our side, even before we actually joined them, and that we should be welcome to you, ran the great risk of making a march of many days through the country of strangers, and evinced all possible zeal:

and now, if you have aught else in mind, or if you should stand in the way of your own liberty, and that of the rest of the Greeks, it would be a hard case.

For it is not merely that you oppose me yourselves, but of those also to whom I may apply, each will be less disposed to come over to me, raising a difficulty on the ground that you, to whom I first came, and who are seen in the possession of a considerable city, and are considered to be prudent men, did not admit me.

And I shall not be able to prove the credibility of the reason [alleged by us for the war], but shall be charged with either bringing to them a liberty which has an unjust end in view, or of having come too weak and powerless to assist them against the Athenians, in case of their attacking them. And yet when I went with the army I now have to the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians, though more numerous, were unwilling to engage with me: so that it is not likely, that coming with forces conveyed by sea, they will send against you an army equal in numbers to that at Nisaea.

With regard to myself, too, I have come to you, not for the injury, but for the liberation of the Greeks-having bound the Lacedaemonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that such as I win over shall assuredly be independent confederates-nor, again, that we may have allies whom we have got by violence or deceit, but, on the contrary, prepared to act as allies to you, who are enslaved by the Athenians. I claim, therefore, neither to be suspected myself, since I have given the strongest pledges for my honesty, nor to be considered a powerless avenger; and I call on you to come over to me with confidence.

"And if any one be backward to do so, from being personally afraid of some individual or other, lest I should put the city into the hands of a particular party, let him above all others feel confidence. For I am not come to be a partisan; nor am I minded to bring you a doubtful liberty, as I should do, if, disregarding your hereditary constitution, I should enslave the many to the few, or the few to the many.

For that would be more grievous than foreign dominion;

and towards us Lacedaemonians no obligation would be felt for our exertions, but instead of honour and glory, accusation rather.

And those charges with which we are throwing down the Athenians, we should ourselves seem to incur in a more odious degree than a party which has shown no pretensions to honesty. For to gain advantage by specious trickery is more disgraceful, at any rate for men in high station, than to do it by open violence:

since the one is a case of aggression on the plea of might, which fortune has given; the other, by the insidiousness of a dishonest policy. So great care do we take for things which most deeply interest us;

and in addition to oaths, you could not receive a greater assurance than in the case of men whose actions, when viewed in the light of their words, convey a necessary conviction that it is even expedient for them to do as they have said.

But if, when I advance these arguments, you say that you have not the power to comply with them, and yet claim, on the strength of your kind wishes, to incur no harm by refusing;

and allege that freedom does not appear to you unaccompanied with danger, and that it is right to offer it to those who have the power to accept it, but to force it on no one against his will: in that case, I will take the gods and heroes of your country to witness, that after coming for your benefit, I cannot prevail upon you to accept it; and will endeavour to compel you by ravaging your country. Nor shall I then think that I am doing wrong, but that reason is on my side, on the ground of two compulsory considerations;

with regard to the Lacedaemonians, that they may not, with all your kind feelings towards them, be injured, in case of your not being won over to them, by means of the money paid by you to the Athenians; and with regard to the Greeks, that they may not be prevented by you from escaping bondage. For otherwise, certainly we should have no right to act thus;

nor are we Lacedaemonians bound to liberate those who do not wish it, except on the plea of some general good. Nor is it dominion that we aim at;

but rather being anxious, as we are, to stop others from acquiring it, we should wrong the majority, if, when bringing independence to all, we should permit you to stand in the way of it.

Wherefore advise well, and strive to be the first to give liberty to the Greeks, and to lay up for yourselves everlasting glory; and both to avoid suffering in your private capacities, and to confer on your whole city the most honourable title.

To this effect spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much previous speaking on both sides of the question, gave their votes upon it in secret; and because Brasidas had urged alluring arguments, and at the same time through fear for their fruit, the majority determined to revolt from the Athenians; and after pledging him to the oaths which the Lacedaemonian authorities swore before they sent him out, that such as he won over should assuredly be independent allies, in this way they admitted the army.

Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, also joined them in revolt. Such then were the events of this summer.

At the very commencement of the following winter, when the towns in Boeotia were to be delivered up to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, and Demosthenes was to repair with his ships to Siphae, Hippocrates to Delium; a mistake having been made in the days on which they were both to take the field, Demosthenes sailed first to Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many allies from those parts on board, but did not succeed in his undertaking, through information of the design having been given by Nicomachus, a Phocian of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians.

Accordingly, succours being brought by all the Boeotians, (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to make a diversion,) Siphae and Chaeronea were secured by surprise; and when the conspirators were aware of the mistake, they attempted no movement in the cities.

But Hippocrates, having drawn out the whole population of Athens, citizens, resident aliens, and all the foreigners then in the city, afterwards arrived at Delium, when the Boeotians had now returned from Siphae; and having encamped his army, proceeded to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner.

They dug a trench all round the sacred precinct and the fane, and from the ground thus excavated threw up the earth in a mound, as a substitute for a wall; and fixing stakes on it, cut down the vines that were round the sanctuary and threw them in, taking down also at the same time stones and brick-work from the neighbouring houses; and so they ran up the work in every way. They also erected wooden towers where there was occasion for them, and where there was not already any building belonging to the temple:

for [on one side] the gallery that once existed had fallen down. Having begun the work on the third day after setting out from home, they continued it that day, the fourth, and till dinner-time of the fifth.

Then. as the main part of it was finished, the army went forward from Delium about ten stades on its way home; whence most of the light-armed proceeded straight on, but the heavy-armed halted, and remained stationary; while Hippocrates was still staying behind, and arranging the guards, and how they should complete such parts of the out-works as remained to be finished.

Now during the days thus employed, the Boeotians were mustering at Tanagra; and when they were come from all the cities, and found the Athenians on their progress homeward, the rest of the Boeotarchs, (who were eleven in number,) not consenting to an engagement, since the Athenians were no longer in Boeotia, (for they were just within the borders of the Oropian territory when they halted,) Pagondas son of Aeoladas, being Boeotarch of Thebes together with Arianthidas son of Lysimachidas, and having the command at the time, wished to fight the battle, and thought it best to run the risk; and so, calling the men to him separately, in their different battalions, that they might not all at once leave the arms that were piled, he tried to persuade the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and bring on the contest, by speaking to this effect:

Men of Boeotia, it should not have even entered the thoughts of any of us your commanders, that it would not be right to engage with the Athenians, in case we found them no longer in Boeotia. For it is Boeotia that they intend to ravage, after coming from the border territory, and building a fortress in it: and so they are surely our enemies, wherever they may be found, and from whatever country they may have come to act as enemies would.

But now, if any one has thought this the safer course, let him change his mind on the question. For prudence, in the case of men attacked by others, does not admit of such nice calculation as in the case of those who are enjoying their own, and yet wilfully attack others through coveting more. The custom of your country, too, is to repel alike a foreign force that has invaded you, whether in your own or in your neighbour's territory.

But against Athenians, and borderers besides, this is far more necessary than against any others. For, with respect to their neighbours, equality in the case of all men constitutes liberty;

and against these men, most especially, who endeavour to make vassals not only of those who are near them, but of those also who are far away, how can it fail to be our duty to struggle to the very utmost? (for in the Euboeans across the strait, and in the greater part of the rest of Greece, we have an example of the position in which they stand towards them;) and to be convinced, that with others their neighbours fight about the boundaries of their land, but that in our case there will be fixed for the whole of it, if we are conquered, one boundary, not to be controverted; for they will invade it and take by force whatever we have.

So much more dangerous neighbours have we in these men than in any others. It is usual, also, with such as through confidence in their power attack those who are near them, as the Athenians are now doing, to march more fearlessly against those who remain quiet, and only defend themselves in their own territory; but to be less ready to grapple with those who meet them beyond their borders, and strike the first blow, if they have an opportunity. And we have had a proof of this in the case of these very men;

for by conquering them at Coronaea, when they got possession of our country through our own divisions, we won great security for Boeotia, which has lasted up to the present time.

Remembering which, we ought, the older part of us, to come up to our former deeds, and the younger, as sons of fathers who then behaved so bravely, to strive not to disgrace the noble qualities that by birth belong to them; but to trust that the gods will be on our side, whose sanctuary they have lawlessly fortified, and are using, and to rely on the omens, which, after sacrificing, appear favourable to us; and so to meet these men in battle, and show them that what they want they must go and get by attacking such as will not resist them; but that from those who deem it noble ever to secure by their arms the liberty of their own country, and not to enslave unjustly that of other people, they shall not go away without a struggle.

By thus exhorting the Boeotians, Pagondas persuaded them to go against the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp, led the army forward (for it was now late in the day). On approaching near to their forces, he placed his troops in a position where, in consequence of a hill intervening, the armies did not see each other;

and there he drew them up, and made his arrangements for battle. When Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, received tidings of the advance of the Boeotians, he sent to his troops, with orders to throw themselves into line, and himself joined them soon after, leaving three hundred horse at Delium, both to defend it if any one came against it, and to watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the engagement.

Against these the Boeotians posted a division to resist their charge; and when all was well arranged by them, they appeared over the hill, and halted in the order they intended to fight in, to the number of about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers.