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Ab Urbe Condita, books 28-30 - 28

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   Book XXVIII WHILE the passage of Hasdrubal, by shifting the war to Italy, was felt to have lightened in proportion the burden for Spain, suddenly a war as dangerous as the former broke out again in that country. Spanish territory was at that time occupied by Romans and Carthaginians as follows: Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had retired all the way to the Ocean and Gades; the coast of Our Sea and nearly all of Spain facing eastward were under Scipio and Roman rule; a new commander, Hanno, as successor to Hasdrubal Barca had crossed over from Africa with a new army, and uniting with Mago, had promptly armed men in large numbers in Celtiberia, which lies directly between the two seas. Whereupon Scipio sent Marcus Silanus with not more than ten thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry against Hanno. Silanus made his marches as long as possible, being hampered, however, both by rough roads and narrow passes frequently hemmed in by wooded mountains, as is usual in Spain. Nevertheless he outstripped not only messengers reporting his approach but even rumours of it, and guided by deserters from the same Celtiberia he made his way to the enemy. From the same informants it was learned, when they were about ten miles from the enemy, that there were two camps, one on each side of the road along which they were moving; that, on the left lay the Celtiberians, a new army, over nine thousand men, on the right the Carthaginian camp; that this was strongly defended by outposts, sentries and all the protection usual in the field, while the other camp was lax and carelessly guarded, as belonging to barbarians who were raw recruits and less afraid because they were in their own country. Silanus, thinking this camp must be attacked first, ordered the standards to move as far to the left as possible, for fear he might be seen from somewhere by the Carthaginian outposts. He sent scouts in advance and himself proceeded towards the enemy with a swiftly moving column. He was some three miles away when not one of the enemy had yet noticed them; a rugged terrain and brush-covered hills kept them concealed. There in a deep valley that was consequently unseen he bade his soldiers sit down and take food. Meantime came the scouts confirming the deserters' reports. Then the Romans piled their light baggage in the centre, took up their arms and advanced to fight in regular line of battle. They were a mile away when they were seen by the enemy, who suddenly began to show alarm. Mago too, leaving his camp at the first shouting and uproar, rode up at a gallop. In the army of the Celtiberians there were four thousand men with long shields and two hundred horsemen. This complete legion —and they were the best of his troops —was placed in the front line. The rest, the light-armed, he posted as reserves. While he was leading the men in that order out of their camp and they had scarcely got beyond the rampart, the Romans hurled their javelins at them. The Spaniards squatted down to meet the enemy's volley; then they in turn rose to hurl their weapons. After the Romans in dense array, as usual, had received these on their shields held close together, men fought at close quarters and began to use swords. But the roughness of the ground made nimbleness of no use to the Celtiberians, whose custom it is to be skirmishers in battle, and at the same time it was not unfavourable for the Romans, accustomed to a static order of battle, except that restricted spaces and intervening thickets broke up their ranks, and they were forced to engage now singly, now in couples, as though with men paired against them. Whatever hampered the flight of the enemy exposed them to slaughter, as if they were fettered. And now that nearly all the Celtiberian heavy infantry had been slain, the light-armed and the Carthaginians who had come to their aid from the other camp were being routed and cut down. Not more than two thousand infantry and all the cavalry escaped with Mago almost at the beginning of the battle. Hanno, the second in command, was captured alive with those who had been the last to arrive when the battle was nearly over. Almost all the cavalry and such old soldiers as there were in the infantry followed Mago in flight and on the tenth day reached Hasdrubal in the region of Gades. The newly recruited Celtiberians slipped away into the neighbouring forests and thence scattered to their homes. This very timely victory had made a sudden end, not so much indeed of the war already in progress, as of the resources for some subsequent war, had it been possible for the Carthaginians, after calling out the Celtiberian nation, to entice other tribes also to take up arms. Accordingly Scipio praised Silanus in generous terms and cherished the hope of ending the war if only he should not retard the fulfilment by his own delaying. Aiming to finish what remained of the war he proceeded into the farthest part of Spain against Hasdrubal. The Carthaginian, in order to ensure the loyalty of his allies, had his camp at that time, as it happened, in Baetica. Nevertheless he suddenly took up his standards and with the appearance of a flight rather than of a march led his men all the way to the Ocean and Gades. But before taking ship along the strait to Gades, thinking he would be the object of attack so long as he kept his army together, he scattered his entire force among the cities in every direction, that they might defend themselves by walls and at the same time defend walled cities by their arms. Scipio, observing that the field of operations was widely extended, and that to attack the cities one after another would be a protracted task, if not a great one, turned back. Not to leave the region, however, to the enemy, he sent his brother Lucius Scipio with ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry to besiege the wealthiest city in that country —Orongis the barbarians called it. It is situated in the territory of the Maesesses, a Bastetanian tribe. Its land is fruitful; the inhabitants mine silver also. That city had been a stronghold for Hasdrubal in making-raids among the tribes of the interior. Scipio pitched his camp near the city and before investing it sent men up to the gates to sound the inhabitants by speaking to them from a short distance, urging them to test the friendship of the Romans rather than their power. When no peaceable replies were forthcoming, he surrounded the city with a trench and a double earthwork and divided his army into three parts, so that one third should always be attacking while two thirds in the meantime were resting. When the first third essayed an attack there was, to be sure, a fierce battle and indecisive. It was not easy to come near the walls for the shower of missiles, nor to bring up ladders. Some who had succeeded in raising their ladders against the walls were pushed down by forks made for that very purpose, others had iron grappling-hooks lowered upon them from above, so that they were in danger of being caught up and dragged to the top of the wall. When Scipio noted that owing to the greatly inferior number of his men the struggle was evenly balanced, and that the enemy had an advantage already in fighting from the wall, he attacked the city with two thirds of his men at the same time, having recalled the first third. This inspired so much alarm among men already spent in fighting with the first to attack them that the townsmen in sudden flight abandoned the walls and for fear the city had been betrayed the Carthaginian garrison also left their posts and gathered in one place. Then the men of the town were possessed by the fear that, if the enemy should enter the city, those whom they happened to meet anywhere would be slain with no distinction between Carthaginian and Spaniard. Accordingly they suddenly opened a gate and dashed out of the town in large numbers, holding their shields in front of them for fear weapons might be hurled at long range, but displaying their right hands empty, so that it should be clear that they had thrown away their swords. Whether this was not seen owing to distance, or whether some ruse was suspected, has not been ascertained. The Romans, making an attack upon the deserters, cut them down like an opposing battle-line; and by the same gate hostile units entered the city. Elsewhere also gates were being hewed to pieces and broken open with hatchets and pickaxes, while a cavalryman on entering would ride ahead at full speed to seize the forum; for such were their orders. A detachment of triarii also had been assigned to support the cavalry. The legionaries made their way through the other quarters of the city. They refrained from plundering and from slaying those they met, except when men defended themselves with arms. The Carthaginians were all put under guard, also about three hundred of the citizens who had closed the gates. The town was handed over to the rest and their property restored. About two thousand of the enemy were slain in the siege of the city, of the Romans not more than ninety. The storming of that city brought joy not only to those who took part in the exploit but also to the commander-in-chief and the rest of his army; and the troops made their approach an impressive sight, as they drove before them a great crowd of captives. Scipio warmly praised his brother, with the highest possible compliment placing his capture of Orongis on the same level as his own capture of (New) Carthage. Thereupon, and because winter was at hand, so that he was unable either to attack Gades or to follow up Hasdrubal's army, widely scattered throughout the province, he led all his forces back into Hither Spain. After sending the legions away to their winter quarters and his brother Lucius Scipio to Rome, and with him Hanno, a general of the enemy, and the rest of the noble captives, he himself retired to Tarraco. The same year a Roman fleet under Marcus Valerius Laevinus, the proconsul, was sent over from Sicily to Africa, and in the territory of Utica and Carthage they ravaged the country far and wide. Along the edge of the Carthaginian territory, close to the very walls of Utica, booty was carried off. On their return voyage to Sicily a Carthaginian fleet of seventy warships encountered them. Seventeen of these were captured, four sunk at sea, the rest of the fleet routed and put to flight. Victorious on land and sea, the Romans returned with ample plunder of every kind to Lilybaeum. Thereafter, as the sea was safe in consequence of the discomfiture of the enemy's ships, great supplies of grain were brought to Rome. At the beginning of the summer in which these events took place Publius Sulpicius, the proconsul, and King Attalus, after wintering at Aegina, as has been stated above, sailed across to Lemnus with their combined fleets, twenty-five Roman and thirty-five royal quinqueremes. And Philip, to be prepared for every effort of the enemy, whether he must be met on land or on sea, came down himself to the sea at Demetrias and appointed a day for the army to assemble at Larisa. From his allies all around deputations gathered at Demetrias on the first report of the king's coming. For the Aetolians in consequence of their alliance with the Romans, and particularly after the arrival of Attalus, had been emboldened and were laying waste their neighbours' lands. And not only were the Acarnanians and Boeotians and the inhabitants of Euboea greatly alarmed but also the Achaeans, who in addition to the Aetolian war were further terrified by Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta, who had pitched his camp not far from the Argive frontier. All these delegations stated the dangers impending by land and sea for their several cities and were imploring the aid of the king. Even from his own kingdom the report was of no peaceful conditions: that Scerdilaedus and Pleuratus had taken the field; also that of the Thracians the Maedi in particular were ready to invade the nearest part of Macedonia if some distant war should engage the king's attention. In fact the Boeotians and inland Greek states reported that the pass of Thermopylae, where a narrow entrance hems in the road, was being closed with a ditch and an earthwork by the Aetolians, that it might not allow Philip a passage in order to defend the cities of his allies. Even a general lacking in spirit might have been aroused by so many alarms from all sides. Philip sent the deputations away with a promise that he would lend aid to them all as time and circumstances might permit. As the urgency of the moment required, he sent to Peparēthus a garrison for the city, from which had come the news that Attalus, sending his fleet over from Lemnus, had ravaged all the country round the city. Philip sent Polyphantas with a force of moderate size into Boeotia; also one of his own generals, Menippus, to Chalcis with a thousand peltasts, whose shield is not unlike the caetra. Five hundred of the Agrianes were added, to enable Menippus to protect all parts of the island. The king himself set out for Scotussa and ordered that the Macedonian troops should march across from Larisa to the same place. There the report reached him that a council had been appointed for the Aetolians at Heraclēa, and that King Attalus would attend for a consultation on the issues of the war. To break up this gathering by his sudden arrival Philip led his men by forced marches to Heraclēa. He arrived indeed after the council had been dismissed; but he destroyed crops which were now almost ripe, especially along the Gulf of the Aenianes, and led his troops back to Scotussa. There he left the whole army and with his cohort of guards returned to Demetrias. From there, in order that he might meet every movement of his enemies, he sent men into Phocis and Euboea and to Peparethus, to select heights from which signal fires might be visible. For himself he placed a watch-tower on Mount Tisaeus, whose peak rises to a great height, so that by fires on distant heights he might in an instant receive a message as to where his enemies were active. The Roman commander and King Attalus crossed from Peparethus to Nicaea. From there they sailed over to Euboea in their fleet and to the city of Oreum, which is the first of the cities of Euboea situated on the left as one coming from the Gulf of Demetrias steers towards Chalcis and the Euripus. Between Attalus and Sulpicius it was agreed that the Romans should attack from the sea, the king's forces from the land. In four days after the fleet came in they attacked the city. That time was spent in secret conversations with Plator, who had been put in command of the city by Philip. The place has two citadels, one overhanging the sea; the other is in the centre of the city. From it a road leads down to the sea through a tunnel, and at the seaward end a tower having fie stories, a remarkable defensive work, used to close the road. There at first a very fierce engagement began, for the tower was provided with missiles of every kind, while artillery also and engines had been landed from the ships for an attack upon it. When that conflict had diverted the attention and the eyes of all, Plator admitted the Romans through a gate in the citadel by the sea, and in an instant the citadel was seized. The citizens being repulsed hastened to the heart of the city and the other citadel; and men had been posted there to close the gates. Being thus shut out they were surrounded and slain or captured. The Macedonian garrison stood in a mass under the wall of the citadel, having neither taken to flight in disorder nor gone into battle with determination. Plator, having gained permission from Sulpicius, embarked his men and landed them at Demetrium in Phthiotis, while he himself joined Attalus. Sulpicius, inspired by a success so easily won at Oreum, sailed thence with his victorious fleet directly to Chalcis, where the result by no means matched his expectation. The sea, which from a wide expanse on both sides is narrowed into a strait, might give one at first sight the appearance of a double harbour facing two entrances. But hardly any other anchorage is more dangerous for a fleet. For sudden, squally winds blow down from very high mountains on either shore, and also the Euripus strait itself does not reverse its direction seven times a day at fixed times, as report has it, but with a current that like the wind changes irregularly, now this way, now that, it races along as a torrent dashes down from a steep mountain. Thus neither by night nor by day are ships given rest. Not only was the anchorage into which the fleet came so dangerous, but in addition the town was strong and impregnable, being protected on one side by the sea, on the other side, towards the land, extraordinarily fortified and secured by a strong garrison and in particular by the loyalty of its commanders and leading citizens, a quality which at Oreum had been uncertain and delusive. It was wise on the part of the Roman, considering his rash undertaking, that after surveying the difficulties, in order not to waste time for nothing, he promptly gave up the attempt and with his fleet crossed over to Cynus in Locris, the mart of the city of Opus, which is situated a mile from the sea. Philip had been warned also by fire-signals from Oreum, but through the treachery of Plator they were set too late on the watch-tower. Also, since he was no match in naval strength, approach to the island by a fleet was not easy. He let slip that project by delaying, and, on receiving the signal accordingly, set out with spirit to bring aid to Chalcis. For although Chalcis is likewise a city of the same island, still it is separated by a strait so narrow that the city is linked to the mainland by a bridge, and approach by land is easier than by sea. Accordingly Philip hastened from Demetrias to Scotussa, whence he set out in the third watch, dislodged the garrison and routed the Aetolians occupying the pass of Thermopylae. Then after driving the enemy in alarm into Heraclēa, he himself in a single day covered a distance of more than sixty miles to Elatīa in Phocis. On about the same day the captured city of Opus was being sacked by King Attalus. Its booty had been given up to the king by Sulpicius because Oreum had been sacked by Roman soldiers a few days before, while the king's troops had no share in it. When the Roman fleet had returned to Oreum, Attalus, unaware of the coming of Philip, was spending his time in exacting money from leading citizens. And so unexpected was the attack that if some of the Cretans, who happened to have gone a long distance from the city to forage, had not caught sight of the enemy's column in the distance, the king could have been overpowered. Attalus' men, being unarmed and in disorder, rushed pellmell to the sea and their ships; and as they were struggling to cast off, Philip came upon them and from the shore caused further confusion among the sailors. Then he returned to Opus, accusing gods and men because he had lost so great an opportunity, snatched away almost before his eyes. The men of Opus also were no less angrily upbraided because, although they could have dragged out the siege until his coming, at the first sight of the enemy they had almost willingly surrendered. Having settled matters in the neighbourhood of Opus, he went to Thronium. Attalus also retired at first to Oreum; and then, when the report reached him that Prusias, King of Bithynia, had crossed into territory belonging to his kingdom, he sailed over to Asia, forsaking the Roman cause and the Aetolian war. And Sulpicius withdrew with his fleet to Aegina, from which he had set out at the beginning of the spring. Philip captured Thronium with no greater struggle than Attalus had in capturing Opus. The inhabitants of the former were refugees from Thebes in Phthiotis. When their city was taken by Philip they had sought refuge in the protection of the Aetolians, whereupon the Aetolians had given them an abiding-place in that city, desolated and abandoned in a previous war with the same Philip. Then setting out from Thronium, which he had recovered, as has just been said, he captured Tithronion and Drumiae, small and unimportant towns in Doris. Then he came to Elatīa, having bidden the envoys of Ptolemy and of the Rhodians to wait for him there. While they were there discussing how to end the Aetolian war —for the envoys had recently been present at the council of the Romans and Aetolians at Heraclēa —came the news that Machanidas had decided to attack the Eleans, who were making ready to celebrate the Olympic Games. Thinking he must make that his first task, the king sent away the envoys with a friendly answer: that he had not been the cause of this war, and would not delay making peace, provided it was possible to do so on fair and honourable terms. Setting out with a light column he came down through Boeotia to Megara and then to Corinth, from which he took on supplies and marched to Phlīus and Phenĕus. And when he had already reached Heraea, he heard that Machanidas, alarmed by the report of his coming, had fled back to Sparta. Thereupon the king went to Aegium for the council of the Achaeans, at the same time thinking that there he would find the Carthaginian fleet which he had summoned that he might be able to accomplish something by sea as well. A few days earlier the Carthaginians had crossed over to the Oxēae, and then had made for the Acarnanian ports, on hearing that Attalus and the Romans had set sail from Oreum. They were afraid they might be pursued and overpowered inside of Rhium, the narrows, that is, of the Gulf of Corinth. VIII. Philip was sorry indeed and vexed that, although he had himself made rapid marches in every direction, nevertheless he had not met a single situation at the right moment, and that fortune had mocked his speed by whisking everything out of his sight. In the council, however, concealing his vexation, he made a proud speech, calling gods and men to witness that at no place or time had he failed to hasten with all possible speed to any place where the din of enemies' arms had been heard. But it could scarcely be made out, he said, whether his audacity in carrying on the war was the greater, or his enemies' eagerness to run away. So from Opus Attalus had slipped out of his hands, so had Sulpicius from Chalcis, so in those very days had Machanidas. But not always was flight successful, nor must that be accounted a difficult war in which you are the victor if you have merely made contact with the enemy. What was of most significance, he said, he had the confession of his enemies that they were by no means his equals. Soon he would likewise have no uncertain victory, and they would fight against him with a result no better than they had hoped. The allies rejoiced when they listened to the king. Thereupon he delivered Heraea and Triphylia to the Achaeans, but restored Aliphēra to Megalopolis, because the citizens of the latter gave sufficient proofs that it had belonged to their territory. Then on receiving ships-they were three quadriremes and as many biremes-from the Achaeans, he sailed over to Anticyra. From there he set sail with seven quinqueremes and more than twenty light vessels previously sent by him into the Gulf of Corinth to be added to the Carthaginian fleet, and made a landing at Erythrae, in Aetolia and near Eupalium. He did not surprise the Aetolians, for all the men who were either on the farms or in the nearest strongholds, Potidania and Apollonia, fled into the forests and the mountains. Sheep and goats which in their haste could not be driven away were seized and loaded on the ships. With these and the rest of the booty Nicias, chief magistrate of the Achaeans, was sent to Aegium; and when the king had reached Corinth, he ordered his land forces to march from there overland across Boeotia. He himself sailing from Cenchreae along the coast of Attica round Sunium, almost through the midst of enemy fleets, came to Chalcis. Then, after praising their loyalty and courage, in that neither fear nor hope had swayed their spirit, and encouraging them to remain his allies with the same steadfastness for the future, if they preferred their own lot to that of the men of Oreum and Opus, he sailed from Chalcis to Oreum. Then entrusting the government and defence of the city to leading citizens who had preferred to flee after the capture of the city rather than to surrender to the Romans, he himself crossed over from Euboea to Demetrias, from which he had first set out to bring aid to his allies. At Cassandrīa he then laid down the keels of a hundred war-ships and brought together a great number of ship-carpenters to complete the task. Having done so, inasmuch as peaceful conditions had been produced in Greece both by the departure of Attalus and by the timely aid which he had himself borne to his distressed allies, he withdrew into his own kingdom in order to wage war against the Dardanians. At the end of the summer in which these events took place in Greece, Quintus Fabius Maximus the son, as an emissary of Marcus Livius, the consul, reported to the senate at Rome that the consul considered Lucius Porcius with his legions a sufficient defence for Gaul, his own assignment; that he himself could retire from it and his consular army could be withdrawn. Thereupon the senators ordered that not merely Marcus Livius but also his colleague Gaius Claudius should return to the city. The only difference in the decree was that they ordered the return of the army of Marcus Livius, but that Nero's legions facing Hannibal should remain in that province. Between the consuls an agreement was made by letter that, just as they had carried on the war with one purpose only, so, although coming from opposite directions, they should approach the city at one and the same time. Whichever should first reach Praeneste was instructed to wait for his colleague there. It chanced that both reached Praeneste on the same day. From there they sent in advance an edict that three days later the senate should meet with full attendance in the Temple of Bellona; and with the whole populace flocking out to meet them they drew near to the city. Not only did everyone in the surrounding crowd greet them, but vying with one another in their desire to grasp the victorious right hands of the consuls some were congratulating them, others were offering thanks because by their services the state was safe. In the senate after the manner of all commanders-in-chief they stated their achievements and demanded that for a brave and successful conduct of the war honour should be paid to the immortal gods; likewise that they themselves should be permitted to enter the city in triumph. Whereupon the senators replied that they did indeed decree the granting of their demands with due recognition first of the gods, and then next to the gods, of the consuls. After a thanksgiving had been decreed in honour of them both and a triumph also to each, in order that they should not have separate triumphs after conducting the war with a common purpose, they came to an agreement as follows. Inasmuch as the battle had been fought in the province of Marcus Livius, and on the day of the battle the auspices also, as it happened, had been his, and inasmuch as Livius' army had been brought back to Rome, while Nero's could not be brought back from his province, they agreed between them that Marcus Livius should enter the city in a four-horse chariot with his soldiers following him, and that Gaius Claudius should ride on horseback without his soldiers. This sharing of the triumph added indeed to the glory of both, but even more so for the one who had yielded to his colleague in honour to the same degree that he surpassed him in his achievement. That man now on horseback in the space of six days had traversed the whole length of Italy, men kept saying, and had fought, standards against standards, with Hasdrubal in Gaul on a day on which Hannibal had believed the consul had his camp established facing his own in Apulia. Thus a single consul in defence of both regions of Italy had confronted two armies and two generals, here with his strategy and there in person. Nero's name had been enough, they said, to keep Hannibal within his camp. As for Hasdrubal, what else than Nero's arrival had overwhelmed and destroyed him? Thus let the other consul drive standing erect in a chariot drawn, if he wished, by many horses. The truly triumphant progress through the city was on a single horse; and Nero, even if he went on foot, would be memorable, be it for the glory won in that war, or for his contempt of it in that triumph. Such was the talk of the spectators who accompanied Nero all the way to the Capitol. As for money, the consuls carried into the Treasury three million sesterces and eighty thousand asses. To his soldiers Marcus Livius apportioned fifty-six asses apiece. Gaius Claudius promised the same amount to his absent soldiers when he should return to the army. It has been remarked that in the jesting of the soldiers on that day more of their songs were levelled at Gaius Claudius than at their own consul; that the knights highly extolled Lucius Veturius and Quintus Caecilius, the lieutenant-generals, and urged the commons to elect them consuls for the following year; also that to the knights' preliminary choice the consuls on the next day added their authority by an address to the people, stating what brave and faithful service they had had in particular from their two lieutenants. Inasmuch as the time for elections was approaching and it had been decided that the elections should be conducted by a dictator, the consul Gaius Claudius named his colleague Marcus Livius dictator, and Livius named Quintus Caecilius master of the horse. The consuls elected were announced by Marcus Livius as dictator, namely, Lucius Veturius and Quintus Caecilius, the same being at the time master of the horse. Then the elections of praetors were held. Elected were Gaius Servilius, Marcus Caecilius Metellus, Tiberius Claudius Asellus, Quintus Mamilius Turrinus, who was at the time a plebeian aedile. The elections being completed, the dictator, abdicating his office and discharging his army, set out in accordance with a decree of the senate for Etruria as his province, to conduct an investigation as to what communities among the Etruscans or Umbrians had discussed plans to revolt from the Romans to Hasdrubal upon his arrival, and which states had aided him with auxiliaries or supplies or any kind of assistance. Such were the events at home and in the field that year. The Roman Games were repeated three times completely by the curule aediles, Gnaeus Servilius Caepio and Servius Cornelius Lentulus. Likewise the Plebeian Games were completely repeated once by the plebeian aediles, Marcus Pomponius Matho and Quintus Mamilius Turrinus. In the thirteenth year of the Punic war, the consulship of Lucius Veturius Philo and Quintus Caecilius Metellus, the land of the Bruttii was assigned by decree to them both as their province, to carry on war with Hannibal. The praetors then received their assignments by lot, Marcus Caecilius Metellus the city praetorship, Quintus Mamilius the duties of praetor peregrinus; Gaius Servilius received Sicily and Tiberius Claudius Sardinia. The armies were divided as follows: to one of the consuls the army which Gaius Claudius had had as consul in the preceding year, to the other consul that which Quintus Claudius had had as propraetor; and these were of two legions each. In Etruria Marcus Livius as proconsul, with his command continued for one year, was to take the two legions of slave-volunteers from Gaius Terentius, the propraetor; and it was decreed that Quintus Mamilius, handing over his judicial duties to his colleague, should have command of Gaul with the army which Lucius Porcius, the praetor, had commanded; and he was ordered to lay waste the lands of the Gauls who had revolted to the Carthaginians upon the coming of Hasdrubal. The defence of Sicily was given to Gaius Servilius with the two legions from Cannae, just as Gaius Mamilius had held it. From Sardinia the old army which Aulus Hostilius had commanded was withdrawn. A new legion which Tiberius Claudius should take across with him was enrolled by the consuls. Military authority was continued for the year for Quintus Claudius, to have Tarentum as his assignment, and for Gaius Hostilius Tubulus, who was to have Capua. Marcus Valerius, the proconsul, who had been in charge of the defence of the entire seacoast of Sicily, was ordered to turn over thirty ships to Gaius Servilius, the praetor, and to return to the city with all the rest of his fleet. In the state perturbed by so critical a moment in the war, since men attributed to the gods the causes of everything fortunate and unfortunate, many portents were reported: that at Tarracina the temple of Jupiter, at Satricum that of Mater Matuta, had been struck by lightning. The people of Satricum were no less alarmed by two serpents that glided into the temple of Jupiter, actually through the doorway. From Antium it was reported that ears of grain appeared to the reapers to be blood-stained. At Caere a pig had been born with two heads and a lamb that was at the same time male and female; and at Alba they said that two suns were seen, and at Fregellae that light had appeared in the night; and an ox was said to have spoken in the country about Rome, and the altar of Neptune in the Flaminian Circus to have been dripping with sweat; and the temples of Ceres and Salus and Quirinus to have been struck by lightning. The consuls were bidden to expiate the prodigies with full-grown victims and to have a single day of prayer observed. Both orders were carried out in accordance with the decree of the senate. More terrifying to men than all the prodigies, whether reported from outside or seen in the city, was the extinction of the fire in the Temple of Vesta; and the Vestal who had been on duty that night was scourged by order of Publius Licinius, the pontifex. Although the thing had happened without a portent from the gods but by a mortal's negligence, it was nevertheless decided that it should be expiated by full-grown victims and that a day of prayer at the Temple of Vesta should be observed. Before the consuls should leave for the field they were reminded by the senate that they should take care to restore the common people to their farms. By the favour of the gods the war had been removed, they said, from the city of Rome and from Latium, and it was possible to live on the farms without fear; it was illogical to give more attention to the cultivation of Sicily than of Italy. But it was no easy matter for the people, since free farmers had been wiped out by the war, and there was a scarcity of slaves, while cattle had been stolen and farm-houses demolished or burned. A large proportion of the rustics, however, were constrained by the authority of the consuls to move back to their farms. The occasion for bringing up the matter had been the complaints of representatives of Placentia and Cremona that their territory was being raided and laid waste by neighbouring Gauls, and that a large part of their colonists had scattered, and that now they had sparsely peopled cities and land desolated and deserted. Mamilius, the praetor, was ordered to protect the colonies from the enemy. The consuls in accordance with a decree of the senate proclaimed that all citizens of Cremona and Placentia should return to their colonies before a fixed date. Then at the beginning of spring they also set out for the field. Quintus Caecilius, the consul, received his army from Gaius Nero; Lucius Veturius took his from Quintus Claudius, the propraetor, and recruited it with fresh soldiers whom he had himself enrolled. The consuls led their army into the territory of Consentia and ravaged it far and wide. When the column was now laden with booty, they were so harried by Bruttians and Numidian spearmen in a narrow pass that not only the booty but also the troops were in danger. However, there was more commotion than battle; and sending the booty in advance the legions without loss made their way out into arable country. Thence the consuls set out for Lucania. That entire nation returned without a struggle to its allegiance to the Roman people. With Hannibal there was no campaigning that year. For neither did he invite attack, owing to his very recent wound, a blow national as well as personal, nor did the Romans provoke him so long as he remained inactive; such power they believed to be present in that one commander, even though everything else round him crashed. And I am inclined to think he was more marvellous in adversity than in success. For here he was, carrying on war in the enemy's land for thirteen years, so far from home with varying fortune, having an army not made up of his own citizens but a mixture of the offscourings of all nations, men who had in common no law, no custom, no language, differing from each other in bearing, in garb, in their arms, differing as to religious rites, sacred observances, one might almost say as to their gods. Yet he somehow bound them together by a single bond, so that no outbreak ensued among the men themselves nor any mutiny against their general. Yet in the enemy's country both money to pay them and supplies were often wanting —deficiencies which in the previous Punic war had given rise to many unspeakable acts on the part of commanders and soldiers. Certainly after the destruction of Hasdrubal's army with its commander-and on them he had rested all his hope of victory —, when by retiring into the remote land of the Bruttii he had given up the rest of Italy, who would not find it a marvel that there was no outbreak in his camp? For added to everything else was this also, that he had no hope even of feeding his army except from the Bruttian region; and even supposing all of it to be under cultivation, it was nevertheless too small to feed so large an army. Moreover a great part of the young men, drawn off from the farming of the land, had been claimed instead by the war and by their custom of training soldiers through brigandage, a practice viciously inbred in their nation. Furthermore, nothing was being sent from home, since they were concerned about their hold upon Spain, as though everything was succeeding in Italy. In Spain the campaign was having an issue in part the same, in part very different: the same in that the Carthaginians, vanquished in battle with the loss of a general, had been forced to the farthest coast of Spain, even to the Ocean; on the other hand different in that Spain, owing to the nature of the country and its people, was better adapted not merely than Italy but than any other part of the world to preparing for another war. In consequence, though the first of the provinces, at least of those on the mainland, to be entered by the Romans, it has been the last of all to be completely conquered, and not until our own times under the command and auspices of Augustus Caesar. There Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, being the greatest and most distinguished general after the Barca family in that war, had at that time returned from Gades in the hope of renewing the war. After conducting levies in Farther Spain with the help of Mago the son of Hamilcar, he armed about fifty thousand infantry and four thousand five hundred cavalry. As to the cavalry forces there is substantial agreement among the authorities, but some writers state that seventy thousand foot-soldiers were brought to the city of Silpia. There in open plains the two Carthaginian generals established themselves, resolved not to refuse a battle. Scipio, when the news reached him that they had got together so large an army, thought that with Roman legions alone he would be no match for such a multitude unless barbarian auxiliaries should confront them, at least for appearance' sake. Yet he felt that these must not compose so large a part of his forces that by changing sides —which had been the cause of disaster to his father and uncle —they might decide the outcome. Accordingly he sent Silanus in advance to Culchas, who ruled over twenty-eight towns, in order to receive from him the cavalry and infantry which he had promised to enlist during the winter. Then Scipio himself set out from Tarraco, and gathering up as he went a moderate number of auxiliaries from the allies dwelling near the road, he arrived at Castulo. Thither Silanus brought auxiliaries, three thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. From there Scipio advanced to the city of Baecula with the entire army, forty-five thousand legionaries and allies, infantry and cavalry. As they were pitching camp Mago and Masinissa with all their cavalry attacked them and would have thrown the men working on the fortifications into confusion, had not cavalry concealed by Scipio behind a hill favourably situated for the purpose unexpectedly charged them in their disorder. These horsemen at the very beginning of the battle put to flight the most active and those who had been the first to ride up close to the earthwork and even among the men at work. With the rest, who had advanced under their standards and in marching order, the battle was more protracted and for a long time indecisive. But when light cohorts at first drawn off from the outposts, and then soldiers withdrawn from work on the fortifications and ordered to take up arms, came up in increasing number, and fresh to assist the weary, while by this time a long column of men under arms was dashing out from camp into battle, Carthaginians and Numidians thereupon faced about in unmistakable retreat. And at first they were retiring by troops, while their ranks were not at all broken on account of fear or haste. Then when the Roman fell more fiercely upon their rear and the attack could not be withstood, no longer mindful of their ranks, they scattered in flight hither and thither, each taking the shortest way. And although the spirit of the Romans was notably higher in consequence of that battle and that of the enemy notably lowered, still for some days following there was never any respite from sudden attacks by cavalry and light-armed. When his forces had been sufficiently tested by these skirmishes, Hasdrubal was the first to lead his troops out into battle-line; then the Roman also went forward. But each of the two lines stood drawn up in front of its earthwork, and when neither side had begun the battle and the day was now nearing sunset, the troops were led back into camp, first by the Carthaginian and then by the Roman. The same thing happened for a number of days. Always the first to lead his troops out of camp, the first to sound the recall for his men weary of standing still, would be the Carthaginian. From neither side was there a charge, or a missile hurled, or any raising of a shout. The centre was held on one side by the Romans, on the other by the Carthaginians combined with Africans, the wings by their allies, and for both armies these were Spanish troops. In front of the wings, in advance of the Punic line of battle, the elephants presented from a distance the appearance of forts. Already it was common talk in both camps that they were to fight in the formation in which they had stood; that the centres, the Roman and Carthaginian troops, between whom lay the cause of the war, would clash, evenly matched in spirit and in arms. When Scipio observed that this was a persistent belief, he deliberately changed everything for the day on which he was to give battle. At evening he passed a written order through the camp that before daybreak the horses should be cared for and the men have breakfast, that the horsemen under arms should keep their mounts bridled and saddled. It was not yet quite daylight when he sent all his cavalry with the light-armed against the Punic outposts. Immediately afterwards he himself with the heavy column of the legions went forward, and contrary to the fixed idea of his own men and of the enemy, he formed strong wings of his Roman soldiers, while the allies were taken into the centre. When Hasdrubal, who was aroused by the shouts of the horsemen, sprang out of his tent and saw the uproar outside his earthwork and the excitement among his men, and in the distance the gleaming standards of the legions and the plain filled with the enemy, he forthwith sent out all his cavalry against the horsemen. As for himself, he marched out of the camp with the infantry column, and in drawing up his line made no change from the customary order. The cavalry engagement had long been uncertain, and by itself it could not be decisive because when repulsed —and this repeatedly happened almost by turns —they could safely retire into the infantry line. But when the lines of battle were not more than half a mile apart, Scipio sounding the recall and opening his ranks admitted all the cavalry and the light-armed into the centre; and dividing them into two sections he posted them as a reserve behind the wings. Then, when it was now time to begin the battle, he ordered the Spaniards —they formed the centre of the line-to advance at a slow pace. From the right wing —for he was himself in command there —he sent a message to Silanus and Marcius that they should prolong their wing towards the left, just as they had seen him pressing to the right, and with the light infantry and cavalry should engage the enemy before the centres could come together. Thus extending the wings, with three cohorts of infantry and three troops of cavalry on each wing, and with skirmishers in addition, they led at a rapid pace against the enemy, while the rest followed them obliquely. In the centre was a curve where the Spanish units were more slowly advancing. By this time the wings were already engaged, while the main strength of the enemy's line, the veteran Carthaginians and Africans, had not yet come within range, and did not dare to dash towards the wings to help the combatants, for fear of exposing the centre to the enemy directly advancing. The wings were being hard pressed by a double attack; cavalry and light-armed and skirmishers with enclosing wings were charging into their flanks, while the cohorts were pressing them in front, endeavouring to cut off the wings from the rest of the battle-line. XV. And not only was the battle in general far from being evenly matched, but especially because the horde of Baliares and Spanish recruits had been made to face Roman and Latin soldiers. Besides, as the day now wore on their strength also began to fail Hasdrubal's soldiers, who had been surprised by an early morning onslaught and compelled to go out into line in haste before they could take food to sustain them. And Scipio had deliberately dragged out the day, in order that the battle might be belated. For it was not until the seventh hour that the infantry units charged the wings. The battle reached the centre of the lines considerably later, so that the heat of the midday sun and the strain of standing under arms, and at the same time hunger and thirst, weakened their bodies before they engaged the enemy. Accordingly they stood resting on their shields. By this time, in addition to everything else, the elephants also took fright at the skirmishing tactics of cavalry and skirmishers and light-armed and had shifted from the wings into the centre. Weakened therefore in body and spirit the men retreated, keeping their ranks nevertheless, just as if by order of the general the line was giving way intact. But when the victors, on seeing that the tide of battle had turned, for that reason charged with more spirit from all sides, and it was not easy to withstand their attack, although Hasdrubal tried to hold his men back and confronted them as they gave way, shouting to them again and again that in the rear there were hills and a safe refuge if they retired slowly. Nevertheless, as fear overcame their respect for him and those nearest to the enemy were falling, at once they faced about and all took to flight. And at first the standard-bearers began to halt at the foot of the hills and to call the soldiers back into their ranks, while the Romans hesitated to advance their line up the hill. Then when the enemy saw the standards coming bravely on, they resumed their flight and were driven panic-stricken into camp. Not far from the earthwork were the Romans; and by such momentum they would have captured the camp if, after a blazing sun, such as shines out in the midst of clouds heavy with rain, there had not been so extraordinary a downpour that the victors with difficulty retired to their camp, and had not some been beset by scruples also against any further attempt that day. The Carthaginians, although night and pouring rain invited them to needed rest, being weak from exertion and wounds, nevertheless, because fear and danger gave them no time to be idle when the enemy would attack the camp at daybreak, raised their earthwork by gathering stones from near-by valleys all round, intending to defend themselves by a fortification, since in their arms they would have no sufficient protection. But the desertion of their allies made flight seem safer than delay. Defection began with Attenes, prince of the Turdetani, who deserted with a large force of his tribesmen. Then two fortified towns were handed over with their garrisons to the Roman by their commanders. And for fear the mischief might spread farther, now that men were once disposed to change sides, Hasdrubal moved his camp in the silence of the following night. Scipio, when men on outpost duty reported at daylight that the enemy had left, sent his cavalry ahead and ordered the standards to advance. The column also marched at such a pace that, if they had directly followed the enemy's track, they would undoubtedly have overtaken them. They believed the guides that there was another shorter road to the river Baetis, by which they might attack the enemy while crossing over. Hasdrubal, finding the passage of the river closed, turned aside towards the Ocean, and henceforward, scattering like fugitives, away they went. Thus he put a considerable distance between himself and the Roman legions. Cavalry and light-armed, dashing upon them now from the rear, now on the flanks, kept wearing them out and delaying them. But when in view of the numerous clashes the standards came to a halt and the men were engaged now with cavalry, now with skirmishers and auxiliary infantry, the legions came up. Thereafter it was no longer a battle but a slaughter as of cattle, until the general, himself now approving their flight, escaped to the nearest hills with some six thousand half-armed men. The rest were slain or captured. The Carthaginians hastily fortified an improvised camp on a very high hill and from it they defended themselves without difficulty, since the enemy had tried in vain to come up the steep slope. But in an exposed situation which furnished nothing a siege was scarcely endurable even for a few days. Accordingly there were repeated desertions to the enemy. Finally the general himself sent for ships — the sea was not far away —and leaving his army by night he escaped to Gades. Scipio, learning of the flight of the enemy's general, left Silanus ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry to besiege the camp. With the rest of the forces he himself returned to Tarraco in seventy days' marches, hearing the cases of chiefs and states as he proceeded, in order to bestow rewards according to the real worth of their services. After his departure Masinissa conferred secretly with Silanus, then crossed over to Africa with a few of his countrymen, in order that in changing his policy he might count upon the obedience of his nation also. The reason for his sudden change was not so clear then as was later the evidence furnished by a loyalty unswerving down to extreme age, that even at that time he had not acted without a reasonable ground. Mago then reached Gades on the ships sent back by Hasdrubal. The rest, abandoned by their generals, were scattered, some by desertion, others by flight, among the neighbouring states; no force remained which was notable for its numbers or its strength. So much in general for the manner in which under the command and auspices of Publius Scipio the Carthaginians were driven out of Spain in the fourteenth year from the beginning of the war, the fifth after Publius Scipio received his province and army. Not much later Silanus returned to Scipio at Tarraco, reporting the war at an end. Lucius Scipio with many noble captives was sent to Rome to announce the conquest of Spain. And while everyone else was publishing the fact abroad with great rejoicing and high praise, the one man who had accomplished it was insatiable in his craving for merit and well-earned distinction. He considered the conquest of Spain insignificant compared with all that he had imagined in his high-minded hopes. Already his eye was upon Africa and the greater Carthage and the glory of such a war, as if accumulated to bring him honour and a name. Accordingly, thinking that he must already make preparations and gain the goodwill of kings and tribes, he decided first to sound King Syphax. He was the king of the Masaesulians. A tribe bordering on the Mauri, the Masaesulians directly face the region of Spain in which lies New Carthage. At that time the king had a treaty with the Carthaginians; and Scipio, thinking it would have for Syphax no more weight and sanctity than is usual for barbarians, with whom loyalty depends upon success, sent Gaius Laelius as an envoy to him with gifts. Delighted with these, and since at that time the situation was everywhere favourable for the Romans but for the Carthaginians unfavourable in Italy and now quite hopeless in Spain, the barbarian indicated that he would accept the friendship of the Romans; that for its confirmation he would neither give nor receive a pledge except in the actual presence of the Roman commander. So Laelius, having received from the king a promise to this effect only, that for the visit safety would be assured, returned to Scipio. A factor of great importance in every respect for a man planning an attack upon Africa was Syphax, the richest king in that land and one who had already gained experience even of the Carthaginians in war, while boundaries of his kingdom were also well situated with reference to Spain in being separated from it by a narrow strait only. Consequently Scipio thought the matter deserved to be pursued even at a great risk, since it was otherwise impossible. Leaving Lucius Marcius at Tarraco and Marcus Silanus at New Carthage —to which he had come by land in long stages from Tarraco —that they might defend Spain, he himself sailed with Gaius Laelius and two quinqueremes from (New) Carthage. Using oars for the most part over a calm sea, while at times a gentle wind lent its help, he crossed over to Africa. It so chanced that at the very same time Hasdrubal, who had been forced out of Spain and had sailed into the harbour with seven triremes and cast anchor, was bringing his ships to the shore when the two quinqueremes were sighted. No one had any doubt that they belonged to the enemy, and that they could be surprised by superior numbers before they entered the harbour. But they caused nothing more than uproar and excitement both among soldiers and sailors, as they made ready their arms and ships all to no purpose. For the sails, catching a slightly stronger wind from the open sea, brought the quinqueremes into the harbour before the Carthaginians could weigh anchor. Nor did anyone dare to make further disturbance in the king's harbour. So first Hasdrubal and then Scipio and Laelius disembarked and went to the king. To Syphax it seemed a splendid thing —as indeed it was —that the generals of the two richest peoples of that time had come on the same day to ask for peace and friendship from him. He invited both of them to be his guests, and inasmuch as chance had ordained that they should be under one roof and in the same dwelling, he tried to draw them into a conference to put an end to their quarrels. Scipio indeed stated that neither as a private citizen had he any hatred toward the Carthaginian which might be ended by a conference, nor as regarded the state could he treat with an enemy without an order from the senate. When the king kept insisting that he consent to come to the same feast for fear one of his guests should seem to have been excluded from his table, Scipio did not decline, and they dined together in the king's house. On the same couch even, since the king would have it so, Scipio and Hasdrubal reclined. Moreover, such was the genial manner of Scipio, such his inborn cleverness in meeting every situation, that by his eloquent mode of address he won not Syphax only, the barbarian unacquainted with Roman ways, but his own bitterest enemy as well. Hasdrubal plainly showed that when he met him face to face, Scipio seemed even more marvellous than in his achievements in war, and that he did not doubt Syphax and his kingdom would soon be in the power of the Romans; such skill did the man possess in winning men over. And so, he said, it was not so essential for the Carthaginians to inquire how their Spanish provinces had been lost as to consider how they were still to hold Africa. It was not as a traveller, nor as one who idles along beautiful shores, that so great a Roman general had left a newly subdued province, had left his armies, and with only two ships had crossed over to Africa and entrusted himself to an enemy's land, to a king's power, to a man's untested honour; on the contrary he was cherishing a hope of conquering Africa. It had long been Scipio's constant reflection, his open complaint, he added, that he was not waging war in Africa, as Hannibal was in Italy. Scipio, after making a treaty with Syphax, set sail from Africa, and tossed in open sea by unsteady winds, mostly violent, he reached the harbour of New Carthage on the fourth day. Although the Spanish provinces were having a respite from a Carthaginian war, still it was evident that on account of a guilty conscience certain states were quiet out of fear rather than because of loyalty. Most conspicuous both for size and guilt among these were Iliturgi and Castulo. Although in favourable times its citizens had been allies, Castulo, after the Scipios had been slain with their armies, had revolted to the Carthaginians. The men of Iliturgi, by betraying and slaying those who from that disaster had fled to them for refuge, had added a crime also to their revolt. On Scipio's first coming, when the Spanish provinces were wavering, vengeance upon those states would have been deserved but not politic. Now, however, since in a time of peace the moment for exacting the penalty seemed to have arrived, he summoned Lucius Marcius from Tarraco and sent him with a third of his forces to lay siege to Castulo. He himself with the rest of the army reached Iliturgi in about five stages. The gates had been closed and everything disposed and prepared to resist an attack. So true was it that consciousness of what they knew they had deserved had meant as much for them as a declaration of war. With this point also Scipio opened his speech of encouragement to his soldiers, saying that the Spaniards by closing their gates had themselves shown what they had deserved to fear. Consequently, he said, they must wage war against them with much more animosity than against the Carthaginians. With these it was a contest almost devoid of anger in pursuit of power and glory; from the Iliturgians they must exact the penalty for treachery and cruelty and crime. The time had come for them to avenge the atrocious slaughter of their comrades and the perfidy which would have been brought to bear against themselves if in flight they had reached the same city. It was time also for them by a severe example to ordain that no one should ever account a Roman citizen or soldier in any misfortune as fair game for ill treatment. Immediately after this exhortation from their general the officers, thoroughly aroused, issued ladders to men picked out of one maniple after another, and dividing the army so that Laelius as lieutenant should command one half, they attacked the city in two places at the same time, causing a double alarm. It was not a single commander or a number of leading men that urged the citizens gallantly to defend the city, but their own fear due to consciousness of guilt. They remembered and reminded one another also that the aim was their punishment, not victory; that when every man perished what mattered most was whether he did so in battle and in the line, where the fortune of the fray, making no distinctions, often lifted up the defeated and dashed down the victor, or whether later, when their city was in ashes and ruins, there before the faces of their captured wives and children, after enduring every outrage and indignity, they breathed their last under the scourge and in chains. Accordingly not merely those of military age or men alone, but women and children also helped beyond their powers of mind and body, bringing up weapons for the fighting men and carrying stones for the builders up to the wall. The stake was not freedom only, which whets the courage of brave men alone, but all had before their eyes extreme penalties and a hideous death. Bravery was kindled by emulation in toil and danger and by the mere sight of one another. And so the battle was begun with such heat that that famous army, the conqueror of all Spain, was repeatedly beaten back from the walls by the young men of a single town and thrown into disorder in an inglorious battle. When Scipio saw this, he was afraid that, owing to so many vain attempts made by his men, the enemy's spirits might be cheered and his own soldiers lose heart. Thinking that he must himself make the attempt and claim a share in the danger, he berated the soldiers for their cowardice, ordered ladders to be brought up, and threatened that if the rest hesitated he would climb up himself. Already at no small risk he had come close to the walls when from all sides an outcry was made by the soldiers, who were concerned for their commander and began to set up ladders in many places at the same time; and on the other side Laelius pressed the attack. Then the resistance of the townsmen was broken and, once the defenders had been dislodged, the walls were occupied. The citadel also in the midst of the confusion was captured from the side on which it appeared to be impregnable. African deserters, who were at that time in the Roman auxiliaries, just when the townsmen had turned to the defence of places where the danger was evident, while at the same time the Romans kept coming up ... by any possible approach, caught sight of a very lofty part of the city lacking any kind of fortifications, lacking defenders as well, because it was protected by a very high cliff. Men of light build and nimble, thanks to much training, they carried iron spikes with them and climbed up wherever they could over the irregular projections of the cliff. Wherever they encountered rock too steep and smooth, by driving in spikes at suitable intervals they made something like steps. Then while the first men with their hands drew up those who followed and the last pushed up those ahead of them, they made their way up to the summit. Thence they dashed down with a shout into the city already captured by the Romans. It was then in truth evident that the city had been attacked out of anger and hatred. No one thought of taking men alive, no one thought of booty, although every place was open for plunder. They slaughtered the unarmed and the armed alike, women as well as men; cruel anger went even so far as to slay infants. Then they threw firebrands into houses and demolished what could not be consumed by the flames. So delighted were they to destroy even the traces of the city and to blot out the memory of their enemies' abode. Scipio then led his army to Castulo, a city defended not only by Spaniards from other places but also by remnants of the Carthaginian army after a scattering flight in every direction. But Scipio's coming had been preceded by a report of the disaster at Iliturgi, and in consequence alarm and despair had taken possession. Also as their interests were different, since everyone wished to be safeguarded himself without regard to any one else, at first unexpressed suspicion, then open discord produced a separation between Carthaginians and Spaniards. The latter were commanded by Cerdubelus, an open advocate of surrender, the Punic auxiliaries by Himilco. After receiving a secret promise Cerdubelus betrayed garrison and city to the Roman commander. More merciful was this victory. Not so serious a crime had been committed and voluntary surrender had greatly appeased their anger. Marcius was thereupon sent to bring under Roman sway and authority any barbarians who had not yet been thoroughly subdued. Scipio returned to (New) Carthage to pay his vows to the gods and to conduct the gladiatorial show which he had prepared in honour of his deceased father and uncle. The exhibition of gladiators was not made up from the class of men which managers are in the habit of pitting against each other, that is, slaves sold on the platform and free men who are ready to sell their lives. In every case the service of the men who fought was voluntary and without compensation. For some were sent by their chieftains to display an example of the courage inbred in their tribe; some declared on their own motion that they would fight to please the general; in other cases rivalry and the desire to compete led them to challenge or, if challenged, not to refuse. Some who had been unable or unwilling to end their differences by a legal hearing, after agreeing that the disputed property should fall to the victor, settled the matter with the sword. Men also of no obscure family but conspicuous and distinguished, Corbis and Orsua, being cousins and competing for the post of chief of a city called Ibes, declared that they would contend with the sword. Corbis was the older in years. Orsua's father had lately been chief, having succeeded to an elder brother's rank upon his death. When Scipio desired to settle the question by a hearing and to calm their anger, they both said they had refused that request to their common relatives, and that they were to have as their judge no other god or man than Mars. The older man was confident in his strength, the younger in the bloom of his youth, each preferring death in the combat rather than to be subject to the rule of the other. Since they could not be made to give up such madness, they furnished the army a remarkable spectacle, demonstrating how great an evil among mortals is the ambition to rule. The older man by his skill with arms and by his cunning easily mastered the brute strength of the younger. In addition to this gladiatorial show there were funeral games so far as the resources of the province and camp equipment permitted. Meantime operations were carried on no less actively by the lieutenants. Marcius after crossing the river Baetis, which the inhabitants call Certis, accepted the surrender of two rich cities without an engagement. There was the city of Astapa, always on the side of the Carthaginians; and this did not so much justify anger as that they bore a particular hatred against the Romans over and above the exigencies of war. Nor did they have a city secure either by reason of its situation or fortifications to make them over-confident. But their natural delight in brigandage had impelled the inhabitants to make raids into adjoining territory of allies of the Roman people and to capture stray Roman soldiers and sutlers and merchants. Even a caravan —large because there had been too little safety for small numbers —crossing their territory had been entrapped in an unfavourable spot by an ambuscade and cut to pieces. When the army had been brought up to lay siege to this city, the men of the town, prompted by a guilty conscience, because neither surrender to an enemy so incensed seemed safe nor was there any hope of defending their lives by walls and arms, resolved to carry out against themselves and their families a brutal and barbarous act. A spot in the marketplace was selected where they were to bring together their most valuable possessions. Having ordered their wives and children to sit down upon that heap they piled up wood all around and threw on bundles of brush. They then instructed fifty armed young men to keep guard at that place, so long as the issue of the battle was uncertain, over their treasures and over persons that were dearer than treasures. If they should see that the battle had gone against them and the city was on the point of being captured, they were to know that all those whom they now saw marching out to battle would meet death where they were fighting. They implored them, they said, by the gods above and below to remember the freedom which must be brought to an end that day either by an honourable death or an infamous slavery, and leave nothing upon which an angry enemy might vent his fury. Sword and firebrand were in their hands; let friendly and loyal hands destroy all that was doomed to perish, rather than have the enemy offer indignities with insolent mockery. To these exhortations they added a dreadful curse, in case hope or weakness of character should turn any one from their purpose. Then at the double they burst out of wide-open gates with a great uproar. And no outpost in sufficient strength had been stationed to face them, since nothing less could be feared than that the besieged should venture to sally out from the walls. A very few troops of cavalry and such light-armed infantry as were suddenly sent out of the camp for that very purpose encountered them. The battle was fierce in courageous onslaught rather than regular in any formation. Accordingly the horsemen who had been the first to confront the enemy were beaten back and brought panic to the light-armed. The fighting would also have been directly outside the earthwork had not the heavy legionary infantry drawn up their line of battle in spite of the very short time given them to form. Even there for a short time there was some alarm in the front line, while men blinded by frenzy dashed on to meet wounds and steel with mad recklessness. Then the veteran soldiers, steadfast against rash attacks, by slaying the first men checked those who followed. A little later, venturing to take the offensive, when they saw no one giving way and every man resolutely dying in his tracks, they extended their line, as superior numbers of armed men made it possible for them to do, outflanked the enemy, and as they fought in circular formation slew them to the last man. Such slaughter, however, arose from the attack of a furious enemy, fighting at that moment according to the law of war against armed men resisting. More horrible was another butchery within the city, when their own citizens were slaying an unarmed, unresisting throng of women and children and throwing bodies, very often only half-dead, upon a pyre they had lighted, and streams of blood were putting out the rising flames. Finally the men, exhausted by the pitiful slaying of their own kin, threw themselves and their arms into the midst of the fire. The slaughter was already finished when the victorious Romans arrived. And at the first sight of so terrible a scene they stood for a little while stunned with amazement. Then, when gold and silver glistened in the heap of other objects and with the eagerness which is natural to man they were trying to snatch them from the flames, some caught fire themselves, others were scorched by the hot blast, since those in front had no way of escape, while the mass of men pressed upon them from the rear. Thus was Astapa destroyed by sword and fire without booty for the soldiers. Marcius, having received the surrender of all the other tribes of that region owing to their fear, led his victorious army back to Scipio at (New) Carthage. About the same time came deserters from Gades promising to betray the city and the Punic garrison in that city and the commander of the garrison together with the fleet. Mago after his flight had halted there, and having assembled ships on the Ocean, he had gathered up a considerable force of auxiliaries both from the African coast across the strait and from the nearest places in Spain with the help of Hanno, the prefect. Promises were received from the deserters and given them, and Marcius with cohorts lightly equipped and Laelius also with seven triremes and one quinquereme were sent thither, to carry on the campaign by land and sea with a single plan. Scipio himself fell ill with an alarming malady, but still more alarming as reported, since everyone added something to what he had heard, with the inbred human passion for purposely magnifying rumours. His illness agitated the whole province and especially the distant parts of it. And how serious a situation would have been created if the fatality had been real was evident, since an empty report had stirred up such tempests. Allies did not remain loyal, nor the army mindful of duty. Mandonius and Indibilis, because they had reckoned upon a kingdom of Spain for themselves when the Carthaginians should be expelled from it, and yet nothing to match their hopes had come to them, stirred up their countrymen —and they were Lacetani —called out the young men of the Celtiberians and ravaged the territory of the Suessetani and Sedetani, allies of the Roman people, in warlike fashion. From citizens sprang a different outbreak in the camp near Sucro. Eight thousand soldiers were there, posted as a garrison for the tribes dwelling on this side of the Ebro. Their disloyalty, however, was not just beginning when unsubstantiated reports of the general's imminent danger reached them, but existed even before, owing to the usual licence resulting from long inaction. It was also to some extent because men accustomed to live unrestrainedly on plunder in an enemy's territory felt the pinch of peace-time. And at first they merely engaged in secret conversations: If there was a war in the province, what were they doing among people already pacified? If the war was over now and the province set in order, why were they not transported back to Italy? They made demands also for their pay with more petulance than accorded with the customary self-control of the soldier; and sentries heaped reproaches on tribunes making the rounds of the guard, and at night some men had gone out for plunder into peaceful country all around. Finally by day and openly without permission they would leave their standards. Everything was being done in accordance with the whim and fancy of the soldiers, nothing according to the traditions and discipline of the service or the orders of superior officers. The outward appearance, however, of a Roman camp was maintained in this alone, that, believing the tribunes, infected with their madness, would not fail to share their mutiny and revolt, they permitted them to hear cases before the headquarters, went to them for the password and did outpost and guard duty in succession. Moreover, though they had robbed their command of power, yet they kept up a show of obedience while actually giving orders themselves. Then the mutiny broke out after they observed that the tribunes censured and disapproved of what was being done and were endeavouring actively to oppose it, also openly declaring that they would not be partners in their madness. Accordingly, chasing the tribunes out of the space before headquarters and soon after out of the camp, they by common consent bestowed the command upon the leaders of the mutiny, the privates Gaius Albius of Gales and Gaius Atrius, an Umbrian. These men, not at all satisfied with the distinguishing marks of tribunes, ventured to pollute the insignia of the very highest command, the fasces and axes. Nor did it occur to them that those rods and axes, which they caused to be carried before them to frighten others, were hanging over their own backs and their own necks. The unfounded belief in Scipio's death was the cause of their blindness and, once rumour of it should presently be spread abroad, they had no doubt that all Spain would be ablaze with war. In that uprising, they thought, money could be exacted from allies, and also neighbouring cities plundered; and in the confusion, when any man would dare anything, what they had themselves done would be less conspicuous. While they waited from moment to moment for fresh news, expecting to hear not only of his death but even of his funeral, and yet none came and the groundless report was losing hold, then its first sponsors began to be sought out. And as one after another drew back, that he might be thought to have rashly believed such a thing rather than to have invented it, the deserted leaders were now alarmed at their own insignia and, in place of the empty semblance of command which was theirs, at the real, duly bestowed authority that would presently turn against them. Thus when the mutiny was at a standstill and credible informants brought the news, first that Scipio was alive, and then that he was even well, seven tribunes of the soldiers arrived, being sent by Scipio himself. Upon their arrival there was at first irritation; soon after, as the tribunes themselves by mild words calmed acquaintances whom they had met, the men were less resentful. For going round at first among the tents, then in the headquarters square and before the general's tent, where they saw groups talking together, they would speak to the men, asking them what was the reason for their anger and their sudden mania, instead of finding fault with them for what they had done. A common complaint was that their pay had not been given them on the proper date; also that, whereas at the time when the men of Iliturgi had committed their crime, after the slaughter of the two commanders-in-chief and the two armies, the Roman name had been defended and the province retained by their own courage, yet, while the Iliturgians now had a due punishment for their crime, there was no one to reward their own good deeds. In reply the tribunes said that those who complained of such matters only were making just pleas, and they would report them to the commander-in-chief. They were glad that there was nothing more serious nor more incurable; and by favour of the gods Scipio and the republic, they said, were in a position to show gratitude. Scipio, who was familiar with wars but unacquainted with the gusts of mutinies, was kept in a state of concern lest either the army should go to excess in wrong-doing or he himself in punishing them. For the present he decided to use gentle measures, as he had begun to do, and to bring the hope of pay nearer by sending collectors round the tributary states. Next an edict was posted up that they should assemble at (New) Carthage to get their pay, whether they preferred to do so as separate units or all together. The mutiny, already of itself on the wane, was quelled by sudden peace on the part of the rebellious Spaniards. For Mandonius and Indibilis had abandoned their project and retired to their borders when they had news that Scipio was alive. Nor was there either a fellow-citizen or foreigner any longer with whom the soldiers might share their madness. On surveying all possible plans they had nothing left except a not altogether safe retreat from criminal designs, namely, to give themselves up either to the commander's well-grounded anger or to his mercy, as not beyond their hopes. He had pardoned even enemies, they said, with whom he had fought with the sword; their mutiny had been free from wounds, free from bloodshed, and neither in itself savage nor meriting a savage punishment. So unduly eloquent is human nature in minimizing one's own guilt. The only question was whether to go in separate cohorts to get their pay, or all together. Their decision was that all should go together, which they thought safer. During the days on which they were thus deliberating there was a war-council in regard to them at (New) Carthage, and a conflict of opinions as to whether the leaders only of the mutiny —and they were not more than thirty-five in number — should be punished, or whether punishment of a larger number was required in penalizing, not a mutiny but rather a rebellion which set so terrible an example. The milder opinion prevailed, that punishment should be limited to those with whom the breach of discipline had begun, whereas for the mass a reprimand was enough. After the dismissal of the council, to give the impression that this was the matter discussed, an expedition against Mandonius and Indibilis was announced to the army which was at (New) Carthage, and they were ordered to make ready their rations for several days. The seven tribunes who had already gone to Sucro to repress the mutiny and were now sent to meet the army had each of them the names of five leaders of the mutiny assigned him, to have them invited with kindly countenance and words by suitable men to be their guests, lulled to sleep by wine and then bound. The mutineers were now not far from (New) Carthage when the news, heard from those they met, that on the next day the entire army would set out under Marcus Silanus against the Lacetani, not only relieved them of all fear which remained unexpressed in their minds, but caused great rejoicing that they would have the commander alone, rather than be themselves in his power. At sunset they entered the city and saw the other army making every preparation for the march. Received with studied words of welcome —that their coming was a happy and timely thing for the general, in that they had arrived at the very time the other army was leaving —they took refreshment and rest. The tribunes, without causing any commotion, had the promoters of the mutiny brought by suitable persons to their hospitable quarters, then seized and bound. At the fourth watch the baggage of the army which, it was pretended, was to march away began to take the road. By daybreak the standards were in motion, but at the gate the column was halted and guards were sent round to all the gates, that no one should leave the city. Then the men who had arrived the day before, on being summoned to an assembly, rushed fiercely into the open space and up to the general's platform, intending actually to intimidate him by their interruptions. At the same moment that the general mounted the platform the armed men brought back from the gates surrounded the unarmed assembly from the rear. Then all their fierceness failed them and, as they afterwards admitted, nothing alarmed them so much as the unexpected strength and healthy colour of the general whom they had believed they would see as an invalid, also an expression of his face such as, they said, they never remembered even in battle. He sat in silence for a moment, until the report reached him that the promoters of the mutiny had been brought into the open space and that everything was ready. Then, when the herald had enforced silence, Scipio began as follows: "Never have I supposed that language with which to address my army would fail me; not that I have ever occupied myself with words rather than deeds, but because, having lived in camps almost from boyhood, I was familiar with the minds of soldiers. But how to speak to you —for that both thoughts and language fail me. I do not know even by what name I ought to address you. Citizens? when you have revolted from your country? Or soldiers? when you have rejected the high command and the auspices, have broken the sanctity of your oath? Enemies? I recognize the bodies, faces, clothing, appearance of citizens, but the deeds, the words, the plans, the spirit of enemies. For what else did you either wish or hope for but the same as the Ilergetes and the Lacetani? And yet they followed Mandonius and Indibilis, men of royal rank, as leaders in their madness. You conferred the auspices and high command upon the Umbrian Atrius and the Calenian Albius. Say that not all of you did that, soldiers, or wished it done; that it was the frenzy and folly of a few; I will gladly accept your denial. For the acts committed were such that, if they were shared by the entire army, they cannot be expiated without atonements on a great scale. "Unwillingly do I handle such misdeeds, as if they were wounds. But unless handled and treated they cannot be healed. As for myself, after the Carthaginians were driven out of Spain I did not believe there was in the entire province any place, any people, where my life was hated; so had I borne myself not only towards allies, but also towards enemies. Behold! here in my own camp —how mistaken I was! —a rumour of my death was not only believed but even waited for. Not that I should wish the crime to be shared by all. For my part, if I believed that the whole of my army had desired my death I should die here at once before your eyes, nor would a life hated by my fellow-citizens and my soldiers give me pleasure. But every crowd is in itself motionless, as is the natural state of the sea; rather do winds and breezes ruffle it. So among you there is either calm or sudden storms. And the cause and source of every madness is chargeable to its promoters; your insanity came by contagion. Even today you do not seem to me to know what a pitch of frenzy you have reached, what a crime you have dared to commit against me, against your country and parents and children, against the gods, witnesses of your oath, what a crime as regards the auspices under which: you are serving, or the custom of the service and the discipline of your ancestors, or the dignity of the supreme command! "Of myself I say nothing, granting that you were hasty rather than eager in believing, granting in short that I am a man whose authority irks an army, and no wonder. But the country, what evil had she done you, when you were betraying her by sharing your designs with Mandonius and Indibilis? What harm had the Roman people done you when you took away the command from tribunes elected by vote of the people and conferred it upon private persons, when, not even satisfied with having them as tribunes, you, a Roman army, bestowed the fasces of your commander upon men who had never had a slave to whom they might give orders? In the headquarters were lodged Albius and Atrius; at their tent sounded the trumpet, men came to them for the watchword; they sat on Publius Scipio's tribunal. A lictor attended them; the way was cleared before they proceeded; fasces with their axes were borne before them. Showers of stones and thunderbolts hurled from the sky and animals bringing forth strange offspring you reckon portents; here we have a portent which cannot be expiated by any victims, by any set days of prayer, without the blood of those who have dared so great a crime. "And although no crime has a reasonable ground, nevertheless I should like to know what was your purpose, what your plan, seeing that we are dealing with a flagrant offence. A legion formerly sent as a garrison to Regium, after foully slaying the leading men of the state, held that wealthy city for ten years. For that crime the entire legion, four thousand men, were beheaded in the Forum at Rome. But in the first place they did not follow the lead of Atrius the Umbrian, half-soldier half-sutler, with an ominous name also, but of Decimus Vibellius, a tribune of the soldiers; neither did they ally themselves with Pyrrhus, nor with the Samnites and Lucanians, enemies of the Roman people. You have shared your plans with Mandonius and Indibilis and were to have been their comrades in arms as well. The legion would have held Regium as its permanent abode, just as the Campanians held Capua, wrested away from its former Etruscan inhabitants, just as the Mamertines held Messana in Sicily; and it would not have gone so far as to attack the Roman people or allies of the Roman people. Was Sucro to have been your domicile? If I had left you there when as general-in-command I was retiring from my province completely subdued, it would have been right for you to implore the help of gods and men because you were not returning to your wives and children. "But granted that you have banished their memory also from your minds, as you have that of your country and of myself, I wish to follow up the outcome of your plan, a criminal one but not utterly insane. If I lived and the rest of the army was intact with which I captured (New) Carthage in a single day and with which I routed, put to flight, drove out of Spain, four generals, four armies of the Carthaginians, would you —eight thousand men, all of you certainly of less consequence than Albius and Atrius, to whom you submitted yourselves —would you really have intended to wrest the province of Spain from the Roman people? Suppose I take no account whatever of my name — granted that I have not been wronged by you except in your readiness to believe me dead, tell me, if I had been dying would the state have breathed its last with me, would the empire of the Roman people have fallen with me? May Jupiter the best and greatest forbid that the city, founded with due auspices and favour of the gods to endure forever, should live no longer than this frail, mortal body! Although Flaminius, Paulus, Gracchus, Postumius Albinus, Marcus Marcellus, Titus Quinctius Crispinus, Gnaeus Fulvius, my Scipios —so many generals and so distinguished —have perished in one war, the Roman people survives and will survive, although a thousand others die, now by the sword, now by disease. At my funeral —one man's —would the republic have been borne to its tomb? You yourselves here in Spain, after the slaying of my father and uncle, two generals, appointed Septimus Marcius as your commander against the Carthaginians, who were overjoyed by their recent victory. And I am speaking just as if the Spanish provinces would have been without a commander. But would Marcus Silanus, who was sent with me into the province with the same authority, the same command, would my brother Lucius Scipio and Gaius Laelius, my lieutenants, have failed to avenge the dignity of the high command? Could army have been compared with army, or generals with generals? Could rank or cause have been matched? If in all these respects you had been superior, would you have borne arms against your country, against your fellow-citizens? Would you have wished Africa to rule over Italy, Carthage over the city of Rome? For what offence on the part of your country? Coriolanus was once impelled by an unjust condemnation, a wretched and undeserved banishment, to set out to besiege his native city. Nevertheless family devotion recalled him from foul treason to the state. In your case what grievance, what anger spurred you on? Was delay of a few days in receiving your pay owing to the illness of your general a sufficient reason why you should declare war on your country, why you should revolt from the Roman people to the Ilergetes, why not one thing divine or human should be to you inviolable? Insane you surely were, soldiers, and no more critical ailment attacked my body than your minds. I shrink from recalling what men believed, what they hoped, what they desired. Let forgetfulness carry away and cancel everything if possible; if not, let silence somehow cover it all. I would not deny that my speech has seemed to you severe and cruel; how much more cruel do you believe your acts are than my words? And you think I ought patiently to bear what you have done: on your side can you not bear patiently even the telling of the whole story? But even those acts themselves will not be the subject of further reproaches. May you forget them as easily as I shall forget them! Accordingly, so far as the mass of you are concerned, if you repent of your mistake, that is to me a quite sufficient punishment. Albius of Cales and Atrius the Umbrian and the rest of those who brought about a wicked mutiny will atone with their blood for what they have done. To you the spectacle of their punishment, if your minds have returned to health, ought not only to bring no bitterness but even joy. For there are no men whom they have treated in a more hostile and unfriendly spirit than yourselves. Scarcely had he made an end of speaking when, in accordance with previous orders, their eyes and ears were assailed by terrifying sights and sounds everywhere. The troops who had encircled the assembly crashed swords against shields. The herald's voice was heard, calling out the names of those condemned in the war-council. They were being dragged out into the centre stripped, and at the same time everything requisite for punishment was being brought out. Bound to a stake they were scourged and beheaded, while the spectators were so paralysed by fear that not only was no fierce protest against the severity of the punishment heard, but not even a groan. Then all the bodies were dragged away from the centre, and after the ground had been cleansed the soldiers, summoned by name, in the presence of the military tribunes, swore allegiance to Publius Scipio; and as each man was called his pay was counted out to him. Such was the end and outcome of the mutiny of the soldiers which began at Sucro. About the same time along the Baetis River Hanno, Mago's prefect, who-had been sent from Gades with a small force of Africans, enlisting Spaniards for pay, armed about four thousand young men. Then stripped of his camp by Lucius Marcius, while the largest part of his troops were lost in the confusion of its capture, some also lost in the flight, since the cavalry pursued the scattered fugitives, Hanno himself with a small number only escaped. While these things were going on along the Baetis River, Laelius meantime sailed down the strait into the Ocean and came with his fleet to Carteia. This city is situated on the coast of the Ocean, where the sea begins to open out after the narrow entrance. Of Gades, as has been said above, he had hoped without a battle to gain possession by betrayal, since men actually came into the Roman camp to make such a promise. But the betrayal was prematurely revealed, and Mago arrested all the conspirators and turned them over to Adherbal, the magistrate, to be transported to Carthage. Adherbal placed the conspirators on a quinquereme and after sending it in advance, because it was slower than a trireme, himself followed with eight triremes at no great distance. The quinquereme was already entering the strait when Laelius, also on a quinquereme, sailed out from the harbour of Carteia followed by seven triremes, and steered for Adherbal and his triremes, feeling quite sure that the quinquereme, caught in the swift current of the strait, could not reverse its course in the face of the tide. The Carthaginian in the unexpected situation was troubled for the moment and uncertain whether to follow his quinquereme or to turn his prows towards the enemy. That hesitation in itself deprived him of the power to refuse a battle; for they were already within range and the enemy was pressing them from all sides. The tide also had deprived them of control of their ships. Nor was the fight like a naval battle; for here there was no initiative, no skill or strategy. The nature of the strait and its tide alone controlled the entire engagement, carrying men, vainly struggling to row in the opposite direction, against their own ships or those of the enemy. And one might have seen a fleeing ship swung about by a swirl and borne against the victors, and a pursuing ship, if it chanced upon an opposite current, turning away as if in flight. In actual combat now one ship, aiming to ram a ship of the enemy with its beak, turning aslant would itself receive the blow of the other's beak. Another ship, exposing its beam to the enemy, would suddenly be swung and turned bow foremost. While- between the triremes an indecisive battle controlled by chance was in progress, the Roman quinquereme, whether because she was steadier by reason of her weight or more easily steered as her more numerous banks of oars cleft the whirling waters, sank two triremes and shooting past another swept away the oars on one side. In addition she would have seriously damaged the rest of the ships with which she had closed, had not: Adherbal with five remaining ships crossed over to Africa under sail. Laelius as victor sailed back to Carteia, and on hearing of the occurrences at Gades —that the betrayal had been revealed and the conspirators sent to Carthage; that the hope in which they had come to him had been frustrated —he sent messengers to Lucius Marcius, saying that unless they wished to waste time to no purpose in idling before Gades, they must return to the commander-in-chief. As Marcius agreed, they both returned after a few days to (New) Carthage. Upon their departure Mago was not only relieved, since he was beset by a two-fold source of alarm, by sea and by land, but when he heard of the defection of the Ilergetes he conceived the hope also of recovering Spain. Accordingly he sent messengers to the senate at Carthage, to exaggerate at the same time both the mutiny of citizens in the Roman camp and the rebellion of allies, and to urge them to send auxiliaries, by whose help rule over Spain, which they had inherited from their fathers, could be recovered. Mandonius and Indibilis returned into their own territory and for a time remained quietly on the alert, until they should know what decision was reached in regard to the mutiny, not without confidence that, if a misunderstanding on the part of Roman citizens should be pardoned, they themselves also might possibly be pardoned. After the harsh punishment came to be generally known, they thought that their guilt likewise was reckoned as deserving the same penalty. Recalling the men of their tribe to arms and assembling their previous auxiliaries, with twenty thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry they crossed into the land of the Sedetani, where they had maintained a permanent camp at the beginning of the rebellion. Scipio by his conscientiousness in paying all his men, guilty and innocent alike, and more by his countenance and speech showing no resentment against any one, easily won the hearts of his soldiers. Before moving his camp away from (New) Carthage he summoned an assembly. There after inveighing at great length against the treachery of the chiefs in rebellion, he declared that in order to punish their crime he was setting out in a very different spirit from that in which he recently cured a misunderstanding on the part of citizens. At that time, he said, with sighing and tears, just as though he were cutting into his own vital organs, he had atoned by the lives of thirty men for the folly, or it might be the guilt, of eight thousand. But now with joy and exaltation of spirit he was advancing to the slaughter of the Ilergetes. For they had not been born in the same land, nor were they linked by any alliance with himself. The only bond which once existed, that of loyalty and friendship, they had themselves broken by their crime. As for his own army, he was stirred on seeing all the men in it citizens or allies and Latins, and also because there was hardly a soldier who had not been brought from Italy either by his uncle Gnaeus Scipio, who was the first of the Romans to come into that province, or by his father as consul, or by himself. They were all of them accustomed to the name and auspices of the Scipios, being men whom he would like to bring home to their country for a well-earned triumph, men who he hoped would support his canvass for the consulship, just as if an honour shared by all alike were at stake. So far as concerned the enterprise now impending, he said, any man who considered it a war was forgetting their own achievements. Mago surely, who fled with a few ships beyond the known world to an island surrounded by the Ocean, was a greater concern to him than the Ilergetes. For there it was a Carthaginian general and also a Punic force however small; here there were brigands and brigand chiefs, who might, to be sure, have considerable strength for ravaging the lands of neighbouring tribes and for burning houses and stealing cattle, but none at all in battle-line and when standards faced standards. In battle they would rely more upon swiftness in flight than upon arms. Accordingly it was not because he saw any danger from them or the seed of a greater war, that he had thought the Ilergetes must be overpowered before he left his province. It was in the first place in order that so criminal a rebellion might not go unpunished, and then that it might not possibly be said that any enemy had been left in a province which had been thoroughly conquered by such courage combined with such success. Wherefore with the kind aid of the gods let them follow him, not so much to carry on a war —for it was no conflict with a well-matched enemy —as to exact punishment from criminals. Dismissing them after this speech, he ordered them to make ready for the march on the morrow; and setting out he came in ten stages to the river Hiberus. Then crossing the river, he pitched camp on the fourth day in sight of the enemy. In front was level ground hemmed in on this side and that by mountains. Into that valley Scipio first ordered men to drive cattle —mostly booty from the enemy's own farms-to tempt the barbarians' love of pillage, and then sent light —armed troops to their assistance. When these had begun the battle with a charge, he ordered Laelius to make an attack with cavalry from an ambush. A hill conveniently projecting concealed the ambsucade of cavalry, and the battle began without delay. The Spaniards, catching sight of cattle in the distance, dashed upon them, the light-armed upon the Spaniards busy with their plunder. At first they inspired alarm by their missiles; then abandoning their light weapons, which could provoke rather than decide the battle, they drew their swords and began fighting at close quarters. And the infantry battle would have remained doubtful if the cavalry had not arrived. Not only did they trample down those they met by a frontal attack, but some also rode round along the lowest part of the slope and made an attack in the rear, so that they cut off a good many; and the slaughter was greater than unimportant skirmishes usually cause. This defeat kindled the anger of the barbarians, instead of diminishing their courage. Consequently, not to appear daunted, they went out into battle-line at daybreak the next day. The valley being narrow, as stated above, had no room for all the forces. About two-thirds of the infantry and all the cavalry came down into line. The remainder of their infantry they stationed on the slope of the hill. Scipio, who thought the limited space was to his advantage, both because a battle at close range seemed likely to be better suited to the Roman than to the Spanish soldier, also because the enemy's line had been enticed down into a position which did not have room for all of their multitude, turned his attention to a further new plan. He could not place his cavalry on the wings, he thought, in so limited a space, and the enemy would have no use of the cavalry they had brought down with their infantry. Therefore he ordered Laelius to lead his cavalry about over the hills, taking the road that was best hidden, and to separate the cavalry battle, so far as he could, from that of the infantry. As for himself, he made all his infantry units face the enemy; four cohorts he placed in the front line, since he was unable to extend his line to a greater length. He did not delay beginning the engagement, in order to divert attention by the battle itself from the sight of the cavalry crossing over the hills; and they were not aware that the horsemen had outflanked them until they heard the din of a cavalry battle in their rear. Thus there were two distinct battles; two infantry lines, two cavalry forces, were fighting down the length of the level ground, since the narrow space did not permit a battle that combined both arms. On the Spanish side neither did infantry aid cavalry nor cavalry infantry; the foot-soldiers, who in reliance upon the cavalry had been rashly posted on the level ground, were cut to pieces; the cavalry, being outflanked, were neither withstanding Roman infantry in front —for their own infantry were already overwhelmed —nor Roman cavalry in the rear. Consequently the horsemen also, after they had formed a circle and with their horses at a standstill had defended themselves for a long time, were all slain to a man; and not one of their foot or horse that fought in the valley survived. Only a third of them, having stood on the hill, to look on in safety rather than to take part in the battle, had both a suitable position and time for flight. Among them the princes also fled, having slipped away in the confusion before the entire line should be surrounded. The camp of the Spaniards was captured the same day, with about three thousand men in addition to other booty. Of the Romans and allies about twelve hundred fell in that battle; more than three thousand men were wounded. The victory would have been less bloody if the battle had been fought on a more open ground affording an easy escape. Indibilis, having discarded his plans for war, thought no refuge safer in his distress than Scipio's honesty and mercy, of which he had had experience, and sent his brother Mandonius to him. Mandonius, clasping Scipio's knees, laid the blame upon the fateful madness of a time in which some pestilent epidemic had frenzied not merely the Ilergetes and Lacetani but also a Roman camp. As for himself, -indeed, and his brother and the rest of their countrymen, such was their situation that they should either give back to Publius Scipio, if he approved, the life they had received also from him, or, if spared twice, they should perpetually devote to him the lives they owed to him alone. Formerly, when they had as yet no experience of his mercy, they had confidence in their cause. Now, however, they had no hope, he said, in their cause, but rested it all on the pity of the victor. The old custom of the Romans in establishing peaceful relations with a people neither on the basis of a treaty nor on equal terms had been this: not to exert its authority over that people, as now pacified, until it had surrendered everything divine and human, until hostages had been received, arms taken away and garrisons posted in its cities. Scipio, however, after inveighing at length against Mandonius, who was present, and the absent Indibilis, said that in consequence of their own misdeeds they had surely deserved to die; that they should live by his kindness and that of the Roman people. But he would not take away their arms nor demand hostages; for those were the pledges for men who feared a rebellion, whereas he was leaving them their arms without restriction, their minds relieved of fear. And if they should revolt his wrath would be directed, not against innocent hostages, but against themselves, and he would exact punishment, not from an unarmed, but from an armed enemy. As they had known both kinds of fortune, he gave them their choice, whether they preferred to find the Romans kindly disposed or angry. Thus Mandonius was dismissed with no other demand than money, that the soldiers might receive their pay. After sending Marcius ahead into Farther Spain and Silanus back to Tarraco, Scipio delayed a few days for the Ilergetes to pay the whole amount demanded, and then with an unencumbered force overtook Marcius as he was now approaching the Ocean. Dealings which had to do with Masinissa, begun even before this time, had been postponed on one pretext or another because the Numidian desired in any case to meet Scipio in person and to ratify the agreement by clasping his hand. That was Scipio's reason at this time for a march so long and so circuitous. Masinissa, being at Gades and informed by Marcius of Scipio's approach, pretended that the horses, being shut up on an island, were deteriorating and not only causing a general scarcity for the rest but also themselves suffering from it. Adding that the horsemen were losing their vigour from inaction, he prevailed upon Mago to permit him to cross over to the mainland in order to lay waste the nearest lands in Spain. After crossing over he sent three prominent Numidians in advance to fix a time and place for a conference. He gave instructions that two were to be kept by Scipio as hostages. When the third had been sent back to conduct Masinissa to the place indicated in the order, they came with a small escort to the conference. The Numidian had already been filled with admiration for the man in consequence of his reported achievements, and had conjured up in mind an ideal figure, tall and stately. But greater still was the reverence that possessed him for the man in his presence; and while Scipio had great natural dignity, long hair added charm, as did a general appearance not due to studied elegance, but truly masculine and soldierly; and his age was exactly at the height of physical strength, amplified and made more dazzling by the youthful bloom which appeared to have been renewed after his illness. Almost dazed by merely meeting him, the Numidian thanked him for sending home his nephew. From that time on, he said, he had sought the opportunity which he did not let slip when at last it was. presented him by the favour of the immortal gods. He was eager to give such services to Scipio and the Roman people that no individual foreigner would have aided the Roman state with more ardour. That aid, although he had long wished to give it, he had been unable to furnish in Spain, a foreign and unknown land. But in the land in which he had been born and brought up in the hope of inheriting his father's kingdom, he would easily furnish it. If indeed the Romans should send Scipio as commander into Africa as well he was quite confident that Carthage would be very short-lived. Scipio was glad to see and hear him, since he knew that in the entire cavalry of the enemy Masinissa had been the soul of everything, and in himself the young man showed clear evidence of his spirit. After giving and receiving promises Scipio set out on the return to Tarraco. Masinissa by permission of the Romans, that he might not appear to have crossed to the mainland without reason, devastated the nearest lands and returned to Gades. Just as Mago, who had despaired of success in Spain —a hope to which first the mutiny of the soldiers and then the rebellion of Indibilis had raised his spirits —was preparing to cross over to Africa, word reached him from Carthage that the senate commanded him to take the fleet which he had at Gades over to Italy. There he was ordered to hire the greatest possible number of young Gauls and Ligurians, to join Hannibal and not permit a war that had been begun with the greatest vigour and even greater good fortune to decline now. For that purpose money was brought to Mago from Carthage, and in addition he himself exacted all that he could from the citizens of Gades by plundering not merely their treasury but also the temples, and by compelling all private owners to contribute gold and silver to the public funds. As he was sailing along the coast of Spain he landed soldiers not far from New Carthage and laid waste the nearest farms; then he brought his fleet up to the city. There after keeping the soldiers on shipboard during the day, he landed them on the shore by night and led them to that part of the wall where (New) Carthage had been stormed by the Romans. For he thought the city was not held by a garrison of sufficient strength, also that with the prospect of changing sides many of the townspeople would take an active part. But messengers coming in alarm from the country had brought news at the same time of lands laid waste and farmers fleeing and the enemy approaching. By day the fleet also had been seen, and it was evident that an anchorage before the city had not been chosen without reason. Accordingly the men were kept drawn up under arms inside the gate which faced the lagoon and the sea. When the enemy pouring out of the ships —a mob of sailors mingling with the soldiers —approached the walls with an uproar out of proportion to their power the Romans suddenly opened the gate and burst out with a shout, threw the enemy into confusion, routed them at the first charge and the first volley of their missiles and pursued them down to the shore with great slaughter. And if the ships moored to the shore had not received them in their alarm not a man would have survived the flight and the battle. Even on the ships also there was confusion while, to prevent the enemy from dashing on board along with their own men, they were drawing in the ladders and cutting hawsers and cables, to avoid delay in getting away. And many perished miserably while swimming towards the ships, as in the darkness it was not clear what they should make for and what they should avoid. On the next day, when the fleet had slipped away, returning towards the Ocean from which it had come, about eight hundred bodies and some two thousand weapons were found between the wall and the shore. XXXVII. Mago, upon his return to Gades finding himself shut out of the city, put in with his fleet to Cimbii, a place not far from Gades. He sent emissaries and complained because the gates had been closed against him, an ally and friend. The Gaditani tried to excuse themselves, saying it was done by a mob enraged on account of some looting committed by the soldiers as they were embarking. He thereupon enticed their sufĕtes —the highest magistrates among the Phoenicians —together with the treasurer to a conference and ordered them to be scourged and crucified. Then he crossed over on his ships to the island of Pityusa, about a hundred miles from the mainland. Carthaginians at that time inhabited the island; consequently the fleet was received on friendly terms, and not only were supplies generously furnished but young men to recruit the fleet, and arms also were given. Relying upon these the Carthaginian crossed over to the Balearic Islands, fifty miles away. There are two Balearic Islands, one larger and richer in arms and men. It has a harbour also, where Mago —and it was now the end of autumn —believed he could winter comfortably. But an attack was made on the fleet, just as if the inhabitants of the island were Romans. The sling, now their most used weapon, was then their only one, and not a single man in any other tribe so excels in the art of using it as do all the Balearic Islanders in comparison with other peoples. Accordingly such a volley of stones, like the densest hail, was rained upon the fleet now approaching land that, not venturing to enter the harbour, they headed their ships out to sea. Thereupon they crossed over to the smaller of the Balearic Islands, fertile in its land, not so strong in men and arms. Disembarking, therefore, they pitched camp in a strong position above the harbour. And having gained possession of the city and its territory without a battle they enlisted two thousand auxiliaries from there, sent them to Carthage and beached their ships to spend the winter. After Mago's retirement from the coast of the Ocean Gades surrendered to the Romans. Such were the results in Spain under the command and auspices of Publius Scipio. Turning over the province to Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus, the propraetors, Scipio himself returned to Rome with ten ships. And when a session of the senate was granted him in the Temple of Bellona outside the city, he set forth his achievements in Spain; how many times he had fought pitched battles; how many towns he had taken by force from the enemy; what tribes he had subjected to the sway of the Roman people. He had gone to Spain, he said, against four generals-in-command, against four victorious armies; he had left not a Carthaginian in that country. For these achievements he sought the desired triumph but did not make an insistent demand, because it was established that down to that time no one who had commanded without being a magistrate had triumphed. The senate having adjourned, he entered the city on foot, and before him he caused fourteen thousand three hundred and forty-two pounds of silver to be carried to the treasury, and a great number of silver coins. Then an election for the choice of consuls was conducted by Lucius Veturius Philo, and all the centuries with great enthusiasm named Publius Cornelius Scipio consul. As his colleague he was given Publius Licinius Crassus, the pontifex maximus. The election was thronged, it is further related, by greater numbers than any other during that war. From every side they had come together, not only to vote but also to get a sight of Publius Scipio, and they flocked in large numbers both to his house and to him on the Capitol as he was sacrificing, offering up to Jupiter the hundred oxen he had vowed in Spain. They promised themselves also that, just as Gaius Lutatius had finished the former Punic war, so Publius Cornelius would finish the war that was upon them; and that as he had driven the Carthaginians entirely out of Spain, so he would drive them out of Italy; further assuring themselves that Africa should be his province, just as if the war in Italy were over. Then the election of praetors was held. Two who at that time were plebeian aediles were elected, Spurius Lucretius and Gnaeus Octavius, and from private life Gnaeus Servilius Caepio and Lucius Aemilius Papus. In the fourteenth year of the Punic war, at the time Publius Cornelius Scipio and Publius Licinius Crassus entered upon their consulship, the consuls' provinces were designated, Sicily for Scipio — without casting lots, as his colleague gave way because the charge of religious rites kept a pontifex maximus in Italy —and the land of the Bruttians for Crassus. Then the praetorian assignments were determined by lot. The city praetorship fell to Gnaeus Servilius, Ariminum —so they used to designate Gaul —to Spurius Lucretius, Sicily to Lucius Aemilius, Sardinia to Gnaeus Octavius. The senate met on the Capitol. There, the question being raised by Publius Scipio, a decree of the senate was passed that the games which he had vowed during the mutiny of the soldiers in Spain should be celebrated by him, drawing upon the money which he had himself brought into the treasury. Thereupon he presented the ambassadors from Saguntum. The eldest of these spoke as follows: "Although no calamity exists which goes beyond what we have suffered, conscript fathers, in our desire to keep our faith with you to the very end, nevertheless, such have been your services and those of your generals towards us that we do not regret our disasters. You undertook the war on our account; having undertaken it you have carried it on with such persistence through thirteen years that often you yourselves reached the extreme of danger and brought the Carthaginian people often to the same pass. Although in Italy you had so terrible a war and Hannibal as your enemy, you sent a consul with his army into Spain, as if to gather up the flotsam of our shipwreck. Publius Cornelius and Gnaeus Cornelius from the time when they came into the province never ceased doing what was in our favour and against our enemies. First of all they restored our city to us; they sent men all over Spain in search of our citizens who had been sold and out of slavery restored them to freedom. When now we had almost attained an enviable lot after the utmost misery, Publius Cornelius and Gnaeus Cornelius, your generals, brought almost more sorrow to us than to you by their death. ."Then indeed we seemed to ourselves to have been dragged back from distant places to our former abode merely to perish again and to witness a second destruction of our native city. We were thinking also that there was no need whatever of a Carthaginian general or army for our ruin, that we could be wiped out by the Turduli, our oldest enemies, who had been responsible for our former destruction as well, when suddenly and unexpectedly you sent us this Publius Scipio. In seeing him declared consul and in reporting, as we intend, to our citizens that we have seen him, our hope, our help, our safety, so elected we deem ourselves the most fortunate of all the Saguntines. On capturing many cities of your enemies in Spain he everywhere separated Saguntines from the number of captives and sent them back to their native city. Finally, as for Turdetania, which was so hostile to us that Saguntum could not stand if that tribe was preserved, he so crushed it in war that not only we, but even our descendants do not need to fear it —without boasting be it said! We see the ruined city of a people to favour whom Hannibal had destroyed Saguntum. We receive from their territory a revenue which is not more welcome to us as income than as vengeance. For these things —and we could not hope or pray for greater things from the immortal gods —the senate and people of Saguntum have sent us, ten ambassadors, to you to express our thanks, at the same time to congratulate you because for these years you have so conducted the war in Spain and in Italy that you hold Spain subdued by arms, not merely so far as the river Hiberus, but even where Ocean sets bounds to the most distant lands, and have left the Carthaginian only so much of Italy as the fortification of his camp encircles. To Jupiter greatest and best, defender of the Capitoline citadel, we have been bidden not merely to render thanks for all this but with your permission to carry this gift of a golden wreath also to the Capitol on account of your victory. We beg you to permit this, and if it seems best to you, that you ratify and perpetuate by your authority those advantages which your generals have bestowed upon us. The senate replied to the Saguntine ambassadors that the destruction and restoration of Saguntum would be to all nations an example of a loyalty which both allies have maintained; that its generals had been entirely right and had complied with the wish of the senate in restoring Saguntum and rescuing the citizens of Saguntum from slavery; and that where ever the generals had treated them with consideration the senate had approved of such action; that they permitted them to deposit their gift on the Capitol. It was then ordered that lodgings and comforts be provided for the ambassadors, and that to each of them be presented not less than ten thousand asses as a gift. Then the rest of the embassies were introduced into the senate and had their hearing. And upon request of the Saguntines that they might make a tour of Italy so far as they could safely do so, guides were furnished them and letters sent to the different towns, bidding them to receive the Spaniards hospitably. Thereupon the senate took up matters concerning the state, the enrolment of armies, the assignment of posts. While it was commonly reported that without casting lots Africa was to be assigned to Publius Scipio as a new province, he himself, no longer satisfied with moderate fame, kept saying that he had been named consul not only to carry on the war but also to finish it. This was impossible unless he should himself transport his army to Africa, he said, openly declaring that he would accomplish that result by popular vote if the senate should oppose. This plan being by no means approved by the leading senators, while because of fear or else to curry favour, all the rest failed to speak out, Quintus Fabius Maximus, when asked his opinion, said: "I know that many of you, conscript fathers, hold that we are today debating a closed question, and that whoever expresses an opinion on Africa as a province, just as if it were an open question, will be speaking to no purpose. For myself, however, in the first place I do not understand how Africa is already definitely assigned to that brave and energetic man, the consul, since neither has the senate voted nor the people commanded that it be a province for this year. In the second place, if it is his, I think that the consul who mocks the senate by pretending to bring before the house business upon which action has been taken is at fault, not a senator who in his proper order states his opinion on the matter under consideration. And I am quite certain that in opposing such haste to cross over into Africa I must expose myself to two charges, first, of an inborn habit of delay, which young men are free to call fear and lack of spirit, provided there are as yet no regrets that other men's policies have always appeared at first sight more attractive, mine the better in practice. Secondly, they will accuse me of carping criticism and envy towards the daily increasing fame of a very brave consul. From this suspicion if neither my past life and my character nor my dictatorship and five consulships can defend me, together with so much glory won in the field and at home that I tend to be sated rather than to crave it, may my years at least bring exemption. For what rivalry can I have with a man who is not even my son's contemporary? In my dictatorship, although I was still at the height of my powers and in the stream of great events, no one heard me refuse either in the senate or before the people to have the command of my master of the horse, who was inveighing against me, made equal to mine, a thing which never had been heard of before. By acts rather than words I preferred to gain this result, that one who by the verdict of other men had been made my colleague should presently by his own admission place me above himself. Much less would I, who have filled the high offices, set before me competition and rivalry with a young man in the very flower of his youth, with the intention, of course, of having Africa, if it be denied him, awarded as a province to me, who am now worn out by mere living, not only by cares of state. With such glory as has been already earned must I live and die. I have prevented Hannibal from conquering, in order that you men whose powers are still strong might even conquer him. "One thing it will be right, Publius Cornelius, for you to pardon me —inasmuch as in my own case I have never rated what men say more highly than the state —namely, if I do not prefer your glory, either, to the welfare of the state. If, however, there were no war in Italy, or if the enemy were one from whose defeat no glory was to be earned, only then could a man who kept you in Italy, even if he did so with advantage to the state, be thought to have been bent on taking away the war from you and with it your opportunity for fame. But since Hannibal as an enemy with army intact is occupying Italy for the fourteenth year, will you be dissatisfied with your fame, Publius Cornelius, if in your consulship you shall have driven out of Italy the enemy who has caused us so many losses, so many disasters, and if you shall have the distinction of finishing the present war, just as Gaius Lutatius had that of ending the former Punic war? Unless Hamilcar is to be rated above Hannibal as a general, or that war above this one, or unless that victory was greater and more famous than this one is to be, if only it be our good fortune to win in your consulship. Would you rather have dragged Hamilcar away from Drepana or down from Eryx than have driven the Carthaginians and Hannibal out of Italy? Although you take more delight in glory already won than in glory hoped for, even you would not boast of having rid Spain of the war rather than Italy. "Not yet has Hannibal reached such a pass that the man who preferred some other war would not seem to have feared rather than despised him. Therefore gird yourself for this war, and not employing your roundabout method —crossing first to Africa, and then hoping Hannibal will follow you thither —but rather by a direct march from here aim your campaign at the region where Hannibal is, if you seek your glorious palm for bringing the Punic war to an end. This is also the natural order: first to defend your own possessions, then to proceed to attack those of others. First peace in Italy, then be it war-in Africa! and let our fear abate before we use fear as an offensive weapon against others. If both can be done under your lead and your auspices, after defeating Hannibal here, storm Carthage over there. If one or the other of these two victories must be left to new consuls, the earlier will prove not only greater and more celebrated but the cause as well of the later victory. For at the present time, not to mention that the treasury cannot support two widely separated armies, in Italy and in Africa, not to mention that no resources remain out of which we may maintain fleets, out of which we may be able to furnish supplies, pray tell me, who does not see how great is the danger involved? Publius Licinius will carry on the war in Italy, Publius Scipio in Africa. Tell me, if a victorious Hannibal —may all the gods avert the omen! and my mind even shudders to mention it; but what has happened can happen —if he shall advance towards the city, then and not before, are we to summon you as consul out of Africa, as we summoned Quintus Fulvius from Capua? What of it that in Africa also the fortune of war will make no distinctions? Let your own house be a warning, your father and uncle, slain with their armies within thirty days, and that in a land where for some years by very great achievements on land and sea they won a most honourable name among foreign nations for the Roman people and for your family. Time would fail me if I should attempt to enumerate the kings and generals who have rashly invaded the land of their enemies with disastrous defeats for themselves and their armies. The Athenians, although their state had great foresight, leaving a war at home crossed over to Sicily with a great fleet under the leadership of a young man as energetic as he was noble, and in a single naval battle permanently ruined their prosperous state. "Foreign examples are these that I am recalling and too ancient. Let that same Africa of yours and Marcus Atilius, a striking example of good fortune and bad, be a lesson to us. Verily, Publius Cornelius, when you sight Africa from the sea your Spanish provinces will seem to you to have been mere child's play. For what is there that is comparable? Over an unmolested sea you sailed along the coast of Italy and Gaul, and put in with your fleet at Emporiae, a city of our allies. Landing your troops you led them through country everywhere perfectly safe and reached allies and friends of the Roman people at Tarraco. From Tarraco it was then a march from one Roman post to another. Along the Hiberus were the armies of your father and uncle, which after losing their generals had gained more spirit even from disaster. Their commander also was the well-known Lucius Marcius, irregularly appointed, to be sure, being chosen for an emergency by vote of the soldiers, but if nobility and the normal magistracies added their distinction, equal to famous generals in all the arts of war. (New) Carthage was taken without any interference, since none of the three Punic armies came to the defence of their allies. The rest of your campaign —and I do not belittle it —cannot, however, be compared in any way with a war in Africa, where there is no harbour open to our fleet, no subjugated territory, no allied city, no friendly king, no place anywhere to hold your ground, no place to advance, while wherever you look, the country all about you will be hostile and dangerous. "Can it be that you trust Syphax and the Numidians? Let it suffice to have trusted them once. Not always is rashness successful, and treachery seeks in small matters to ensure trustfulness, so that when it becomes worth while, it may deceive with great profit. The enemy did not overpower your father and uncle by force of arms until the Celtiberian allies had done so by treachery. Nor in your own case was there as much danger from Mago and Hasdrubal, generals of the enemy, as from Indibilis and Mandonius, who had come under your protection. Can you trust the Numidians after experiencing a mutiny of your own soldiers? Both Syphax and Masinissa prefer that they themselves rather than the Carthaginians should be supreme in Africa, and the Carthaginians rather than anyone else. At present rivalry between them and all possible reasons for contention spur them on because the foreigners whom they fear are far away. Show them Roman arms and a foreign-born army, and now they will rush, as it were, to put out a fire that concerns them all. In one fashion those same Carthaginians have defended Spain; in quite another fashion will they defend the walls of their native city, the temples of the gods, their altars and hearths, when as they go out to battle a frightened wife will escort them and little children will throw themselves in their way. "Furthermore, what if the Carthaginians, confidently relying upon the united spirit of Africa, the loyalty of the allied kings, and their own walls, shall take the initiative themselves when they have seen Italy stripped of protection from yourself and your army? What if they either send a new army into Italy from Africa, or order Mago —and it is known that he has crossed from the Balearic Islands on his fleet and is already sailing along the coast held by the Alpine Ligurians —to unite with Hannibal? Surely we shall be in the same panic as we were recently when Hasdrubal crossed into Italy —the man whom you, who are about to invest not merely Carthage but all Africa by your army, allowed to slip out of your hands into Italy. He had been defeated by you, you will say; all the more do I regret —and this for your own sake, not merely for that of the state — that a passage into. Italy was allowed to the defeated. Permit us to attribute to your strategy all that resulted favourably for you and the empire of the Roman people, to ascribe the unfavourable to the uncertainties of war and to fortune. The better and braver man you are the more do your native city and all Italy keep their hold upon so capable a defender. You are unable even yourself to conceal the fact that where Hannibal is, there is the centre and stronghold of this war, since you declare that your reason for crossing over to Africa is in order to draw Hannibal thither. Therefore, be it here, be it there, you will have Hannibal to deal with. Will you, therefore, be stronger, pray, -in Africa when alone, or here, uniting your army with that of your colleague? Do not Claudius also and Livius, the consuls, by a very recent instance prove how great a difference that makes? And tell me, pray, will the remote and secluded Bruttian territory make Hannibal stronger in arms and men, when he: has long been begging in vain for auxiliaries from home, or rather Carthage near at hand and all Africa her ally? What is that plan of yours, to prefer to decide the issue just where your forces are reduced by one-half, the forces of the enemy greatly increased, rather than where two armies have to fight against one exhausted by so many battles and a service so long and so hard? Reflect how different is your plan from that of your father. He as consul had set out for Spain, but he returned to Italy from his province in order to meet Hannibal as he came down from the Alps. You, although Hannibal is in Italy, are preparing to leave Italy, not because you think it to the advantage of the state, but because you hold it great and glorious for yourself. It was thus that leaving province and army, unauthorized by any law or decree of the senate, you, a commanding general of the Roman people, entrusted to two ships the fortune of the state and majesty of the empire, which were at that time endangered in your person. My opinion is that Publius Cornelius was elected consul for the republic and for us, not for himself and his personal ends, and that armies were enlisted for the defence of the city and Italy, not that consuls in the arrogant manner of tyrants may transport them to whatever lands they choose. When Fabius by a speech adapted to the situation, but especially by his prestige and long-established reputation for foresight, had stirred a large part of the senate and in particular the older members, and while more were praising the wisdom of the veteran than the confident spirit of the young man, Scipio is said to have spoken as follows: "Even Quintus Fabius himself at the beginning of his speech, conscript fathers, stated that in his expression of opinion captious criticism might be suspected. Far as I should be from venturing to bring that charge against so great a man, nevertheless such suspicion has certainly not been cleared away, be it the speech or the subject that is at fault. For he has highly extolled his offices and the fame of his achievements in order to refute the charge of envy, just as if it were from men of the lowest rank that there is danger of rivalry for me, and not rather from one who because he rises above all others —a distinction towards which I do not deny that I also am striving —is unwilling to have me compared with himself. He has represented himself as an old man and one who has played his part, and me as younger even than his son, just as if the desire for glory did not reach farther than the span of human life and project in fullest measure into the memory of posterity. Of the greatest minds it is true, I am sure, that they compare themselves not only with the living but with eminent men in every age. For my part I do not deny, Quintus Fabius, that I wish not only to attain to your fame but also —by your good leave —if possible to surpass it. Let us not have such a spirit —you towards me, I towards younger men — that we should be unwilling to have any fellowcitizen come to be like us. For that would be a loss affecting, not only those whom we have envied, but the state also and almost the entire human race. "He called to mind how great a danger I should encounter if I were to cross over to Africa, so that he seemed concerned for me also, not merely for the state and the army. Whence has come this sudden solicitude about me? When my father and uncle had been slain, when their two armies had been all but annihilated, when the Spanish provinces had been lost, when four armies of Carthaginians and four generals held the whole country in the grip of fear and arms, when, though sought for, no commanding general presented himself for that war except myself, no one had dared to put forward his name, when the Roman people had bestowed upon me at the age of twenty-four years its high command, why in such circumstances did no one at that time call to mind my youth, the might of the enemy, the difficulty of the war, the recent disaster to my father and my uncle? Has some greater catastrophe now befallen us in Africa than had been suffered then in Spain? Or are there now larger armies in Africa and more generals and better than there were then in Spain? Or was my age then riper for the conduct of war than it is now? Or is it more suitable to wage war with a Carthaginian enemy in Spain than in Africa? It is easy to disparage my achievements after the rout and flight of four Punic armies, after the storming of so many cities or their subjugation through fear, after a thorough and complete conquest all the way to the Ocean —so many princes, so many warlike nations — after the recovery of all Spain so that no trace of war remains. It will indeed be just as easy if I return as a victor from Africa to disparage precisely the same things which now, in order to hold me back, are magnified by the speaker to make them appear terrible. "He denies that we have any access to Africa, he denies that any harbours are open to us. He states that Marcus Atilius was captured in Africa, as if Marcus Atilius met disaster upon his first landing in Africa. Also he does not recall that even that unfortunate general found the harbours of Africa nevertheless open to him and conducted a remarkable campaign in his first year, and so far as Carthaginian generals are concerned, remained undefeated to the end. You shall not frighten me, therefore, by the example you give. If that disaster had been incurred in this war, not in the former war, if recently and not forty years ago, why after Regulus' capture should I hesitate to cross over to Africa any more than to Spain after the Scipios had fallen? I should not admit that the Spartan Xanthippus' birth had been more fortunate for Carthage than mine for my native city; and my confidence would be increased by the mere possibility of such weight in the ability of a single man. But we must hear likewise of the Athenians, how neglecting a war at home they crossed rashly to Sicily. Why then, since you have time to tell Greek tales, do you not prefer to relate how Agathocles, King of Syracuse, after Sicily had long been ablaze with a Punic war, crossed over into this same Africa and diverted the war to the country from which it had come? "But what is the need of calling to mind by old and foreign examples what it means to make fear an offensive weapon against the enemy, and removing danger from yourself to bring another into peril? Can there be any greater and more effective example than Hannibal? A great difference it makes whether you are seeing the land of others ravaged or your own being burned over and devastated. More spirit has an aggressor than a defender. Besides there is greater dread of things unknown; on entering the territory of the enemy you have a near view of their advantages and disadvantages. Hannibal had not hoped that so many states in Italy would come over to his side as did so after the disaster at Cannae. How much less is anything in Africa to be strong and steadfast for the Carthaginians, faithless as allies, oppressive and arrogant as masters! Furthermore, even when deserted by our allies, we kept our footing by our own forces, our Roman soldiers. The Carthaginians have no forces of their own citizens. They have mercenaries, Africans and Numidians, very inconstant by nature and ready to change their allegiance. If only there is no delay here, at the same moment you will hear that I have crossed and that Africa is ablaze with war, and Hannibal casting off from here, and Carthage blockaded. Look for more cheering news from Africa and more frequent than you used to receive from Spain. Inspiring these hopes in me are the fortune of the Roman people, the gods who witnessed the treaty violated by the enemy, the kings, Syphax and Masinissa, on whose honour I shall rely —but so as to be well protected against treachery. "Many things which, owing to distance, are not now evident the war will reveal. It is the part of a man and a general not to prove wanting when fortune presents herself, and to fit what is offered by chance into his plan. I shall have Hannibal as the antagonist you assign me, Quintus Fabius; but I shall draw him after me, not let him hold me back. In his own land will I compel him to fight, and Carthage is to be the reward of victory, not the half-ruined strongholds of the Bruttians. Meantime, while I am crossing over, while landing my army in Africa, while moving my camp up to Carthage, let the republic suffer no harm here. That service you, Quintus Fabius, were able to guarantee while everywhere in Italy the victorious Hannibal flitted about. Would it not be insulting, with Hannibal now shaken and almost broken, to claim that Publius Licinius, the consul —a very brave man who took no part in the allotment of so distant a province, solely that as pontifex maximus he might not be absent from religious ceremonies —cannot do the same? If in truth the war were not completed any more promptly by the method which I propose, it would nevertheless conduce to the dignity of the Roman people and its reputation among kings and foreign nations to let it be seen that we have the spirit not only to defend Italy but also to invade Africa. Likewise not to have it believed and published abroad that what Hannibal has dared no Roman general dares, and that in the former Punic war, at a time when the stake was Sicily, Africa was attacked so many times by our armies and fleets, but that now, when Italy is the stake, Africa is at peace. Let Italy, so long harried, at length have rest; let Africa in turn be burned over and laid waste. Let Roman camps threaten the gates of Carthage; better so than that we should see the enemy's earthworks from our walls for the second time. Let Africa be the theatre of the remainder of the war. In that direction may terror and flight be diverted, the devastation also of farms, the desertion of allies, and the other calamities of war which for fourteen years have assailed us. It is enough to have spoken of matters concerning the state and the war now in progress and the provinces which are in question. A long speech it would be and one of no concern to you senators if, after the manner in which Quintus Fabius has disparaged my achievements in Spain, I on my part should be minded to scoff at his fame and to enlarge upon my own. I will do neither, conscript fathers, and if in no other respect, in modesty at least and in control of my tongue I, who am young, will outstrip the older man. Such have been my life and achievements that, although silent, I am quite content with the opinion which of your own accord you have formed and retain. Scipio met with a less favourable hearing because it had been generally reported that, if he should not carry his point in the senate and have Africa decreed him as his province, he would at once bring a bill before the people. And so Quintus Fulvius, who had been consul four times and censor, demanded of the consul that he should frankly state in the senate whether he would permit the senators to make a decree in regard to the provinces and would stand by their vote, or was intending to bring a bill before the people. When Scipio replied that he would act for the best interests of the state, Fulvius said: I was not unaware, when I asked my question, of the answer you would give or of what you would do, since you make it plain that you are sounding the senate rather than consulting it, and since, unless we at once decree for you the province which you have desired, you have a bill ready. Accordingly, tribunes of the people he said I demand of you that you come to my defence if I decline to express an opinion for the reason that, even in case our vote by division should favour a motion of mine, the consul will not consider it valid. Then arose a dispute, the consul maintaining that it was not right for the tribunes to use their veto to excuse a senator from stating his opinion when called upon in his regular order. The tribunes made this decree: If the consul permits the senate to assign the provinces, we decide that he must stand by the vote of the senate, and we will not allow a bill touching that matter to be brought before the people. If he does not permit, we will come to the defence of a man who refuses to express an opinion on that matter. The consul begged for one day to confer with his colleague; on the next day he gave the senate his permission. The provinces were assigned by decree as follows: to one of the consuls Sicily and the thirty war-ships which Gius Servilius had commanded in the previous year; and permission to cross over to Africa was given, if he should consider that to be to the advantage of the state; to the other consul the land of the Bruttians and the war with Hannibal, together with the army which he preferred. Lucius Veturius and Quintus Caecilius were to decide between them by lot or by arrangement which of them was to wage war in the Bruttian land with the two legions which the consul should leave there, and whichever should have that province assigned to him was to have his command continued for one year. And for the rest who were to command armies and provinces —apart from consuls and praetors —their commands were continued. It fell to Quintus Caecilius by lot to wage war together with the consul in the Bruttian land against Hannibal. Scipio's games were then held with great crowds and great approval on the part of the spectators. As ambassadors Marcus Pomponius Matho and Quintus Catius were sent to Delphi to carry a gift from the spoils of Hasdrubal. They took a golden wreath weighing two hundred pounds and representations of spoils made of a thousand pounds of silver. Although he had neither gained consent to hold a levy, nor had been especially insistent, Scipio obtained permission to take volunteers and to receive whatever should be given by the allies towards the construction of new ships, —this because he had stated that the fleet would not be an expense to the state. First the Etruscan communities promised that they would aid the consul, each according to its own resources. The men of Caere promised grain for the crews and supplies of every kind, the men of Populonium iron, Tarquinii linen for sails, Volaterrae the interior fittings of ships, also grain. Arretium promised three thousand shields, an equal number of helmets; and that they would furnish a total of fifty thousand javelins, short spears and lances, with an equal proportion of each type; also axes, shovels, sickles, baskets and hand-mills, as many as were needed for forty war-ships; a hundred and twenty thousand pecks of wheat also; and that they would contribute allowances for petty officers and oarsmen. Perusia, Clusium and Rusellae promised fir for shipbuilding and a great quantity of grain. He used fir also from forests belonging to the state. The communities of Umbria and in addition Nursia and Reate and Amiternum and the whole Sabine district promised soldiers. Marsians, Paelignians and Marrucini in large numbers gave in their names as volunteers for the fleet. Camerinum, although it treated with the Romans on an equal footing, sent an armed cohort of six hundred men. After thirty keels had been laid down, twenty quinqueremes and ten quadriremes, Scipio so pushed the work that on the forty-fifth day after the timber had been brought from the forests the ships, rigged and equipped, were launched. He set out for Sicily on thirty war-ships after embarking some seven thousand volunteers. And Publius Licinius came to the two consular armies in the land of the Bruttians. Of these he took the army which Lucius Veturius had commanded as consul. He allowed Metellus to command the same legions which he had previously commanded, for he thought Metellus would more easily carry on the war with men accustomed to his authority. The praetors also set out in different directions to their provinces. And because there was a lack of money for the war the quaestors were ordered to sell a region of Campania extending from the Fossa Graeca to the sea, it being permitted also to give information as to any land which had belonged to a Campanian citizen, so that it might become public land of the Roman people. For the informant one-tenth of the price of the land reported was established as a reward. And to Gnaeus Servilius, the city praetor, was assigned the task of seeing to it that Campanian citizens should dwell only where in accordance with a decree of the senate it was permitted them severally to dwell, and of punishing those who were dwelling elsewhere. In the same summer Mago the son of Hamilcar embarked upon his fleet picked young men from the smaller of the Balearic Islands, where he had wintered, and brought across to Italy on some thirty war-ships and many transports twelve thousand infantry and about two thousand cavalry. Upon his sudden arrival he also captured Genua, since no forces were guarding the sea-coast. Then he put in with his fleet to the coast belonging to the Alpine Ligurians, in the hope of causing some uprising there. The Ingauni, a Ligurian tribe, were at that time carrying on a war with the Epanterii Montani. Accordingly the Carthaginian, depositing his plunder at Savo, a town at the foot of the Alps, and leaving ten war-ships at anchor to protect it, sent the rest to Carthage to defend the sea-coast, because there was a report that Scipio would cross over. Mago himself made an alliance with the Ingauni, whose friendship he preferred, and set about attacking the Montani. And his army was daily increasing because the Gauls on hearing his name flocked together from all sides. This fact, when it was made known to the senators through a letter of Spurius Lucretius, kindled great anxiety among them, for fear they had rejoiced in vain two years before over the destruction of Hasdrubal and his army, if another equally serious war with only a change of commander should break out from that quarter. So they ordered Marcus Livius, the proconsul, to bring his army of slave-volunteers from Etruria to Ariminum. Also they assigned to Gnaeus Servilius, the praetor, if he thought it to the advantage of the state, the duty of appointing at his discretion a commander for the two city legions and ordering them to be brought up from the city. Marcus Valerius Laevinus brought these legions to Arretium. Just at that time about eighty Carthaginian transports were captured off Sardinia by Gnaeus Octavius, who was in command of that province. Coelius states that they were laden with grain sent to Hannibal and with provisions, Valerius that they were captured while carrying Etruscan booty and captive Ligurians and Montani to Carthage. In the land of the Bruttians virtually nothing notable was done that year. An epidemic, equally disastrous to both, had attacked Romans and Carthaginians, with this difference that in addition to disease hunger also weakened the Carthaginian army. Hannibal spent the summer near the temple of Juno Lacinia, and there he erected an altar and dedicated it together with a great record of his achievements in a Punic and Greek inscription.

Perseus Latin. CTS URN phi0914.phi00128.perseus-eng1. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. Source.