Ab Urbe Condita, books 26-27 - 26
- 1
Book XXVI GNAEUS FULVIUS CENTUMALUS and Publius Sulpicius Galba, the consuls, having entered upon office on the Ides of March, summoned the senate to the Capitol and consulted the fathers in regard to the state, the conduct of the war, and the provinces and armies. the military authority of Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, consuls of the previous year, was continued, and the armies which they had were assigned to them, with orders in addition that they were not to withdraw from Capua, which they were besieging, until they had taken the city. that affair claimed the closest attention of the Romans at the time, not so much because of anger, which has never been more justified against any state, as because a city so important and powerful, which by its revolt had drawn with it a number of communities, in like manner, if recovered, might tum the scale to respect, so it seemed, for the old authority. and for the praetors of the previous year, Marcus Iunius in Etruria, Publius Sempronius in Gaul, their command was continued, with the two legions which each had held; the command of Marcus Marcellus also was continued, that as proconsul in Sicily he might finish the remainder of the war with the army which he had. if he should need reinforcements, he should provide them from the legions which Publius Cornelius, the propraetor, commanded in Sicily, provided he did not enlist any soldier from the number of those to whom the senate had refused a discharge and a return to their home towns before the end of the war. to Gaius Sulpicius, to whom Sicily had fallen, were assigned the two legions which Publius Cornelius had held, and reinforcements from Gnaeus Fulvius' army, which in the previous year had been dishonourably cut to pieces and put to flight in Apulia. for this class of soldier the senate had established the same term of service as for the men who were at Cannae. An additional mark of disgrace for both alike was that they were not to winter in towns, nor to construct their winter quarters within ten miles of any city. to Lucius Cornelius in Sardinia were given the two legions which Quintus Mucius had commanded. reinforcements , if necessary, the consuls were bidden to enrol. to Titus Otacilius and Marcus Valerius were assigned the coasts of Sicily and Greece, together with the legions and fleets which they commanded.' Greece had fifty ships and one legion, Sicily a hundred ships and two legions. twenty -three Roman legions carried on the war that year on land and sea. at the beginning of that year, when the letter of Lucius Marcius was brought before the senate, his achievement was thought magnificent; but many were offended by the official title used, since he had written the Propraetor to the Senate, although his command had not been given him by order of the people, nor by authority of the senate. it was a bad precedent, they said, for generals to be chosen by armies, and for the sanctity of elections with the required auspices to be removed instead to camps and the provinces, far from laws and magistrates, at the bidding of reckless soldiers. and when some moved that the matter be laid before the senate, it seemed better to postpone deliberation on that point until the knights who had brought the letter from Marcius should depart. in regard to grain and clothing for the army, it was voted to reply that both matters would receive the attention of the senate, but not to address it to the Propraetor Lucius Marcius, for fear he should get, as though already decided, the very thing which they had left to be considered. when the knights had been sent away, the consuls brought up that matter first of all, and there was complete unanimity that the tribunes of the plebs should be persuaded to bring before the plebs at the earliest possible moment the question as to whom they preferred to send with full authority to Spain and the army of which Gnaeus Scipio had been the commander —in —chief. the matter was arranged with the tribunes and due notice given; but a different dispute had claimed men's attention. Gaius Sempronius Blaesus, having named a day for the trial, was inveighing against Gnaeus Fulvius in harangues, because of the loss of his army in Apulia, insisting that many generals out of recklessness and lack of experience had led their armies into a dangerous place; but that no one except Gnaeus Fulvius had ruined his legions with every vice before he betrayed them. and so it could be truly said that they were lost before they saw the enemy, and that they were defeated, not by Hannibal, but by their own commander. no one, in casting his vote, he said, clearly saw to what sort of man he was entrusting a command and an army. what had been the difference between Tiberius Sempronius and Gnaeus Fulvius? Tiberius Sempronius, though he had been given an army of slaves, by his training and authority had soon brought it about that no one of them in battle remembered his class and origin, and that they were a defence to allies, a terror to enemies. they had rescued Cumae, Beneventum and other cities out of the jaws of Hannibal, as it were, and restored them to the Roman people. but Gnaeus Fulvius, having an army of Roman citizens, men well born and brought up as free men, had steeped them in the vices of slaves. consequently this was what he had accomplished: that they were overbearing and turbulent in their dealings with allies, cowardly and unwarlike towards the enemy, and unable to withstand even the battle —cry of the Carthaginians, to say nothing of their attack. and surely it was no wonder that the soldiers had given way in battle, when their commander was the first of all to flee. he wondered more, he said, that some had fallen where they stood, and that not all had shared the consternation and flight of Gnaeus Fulvius. Gaius Flaminius, Lucius Paulus, Lucius Postumius, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio had preferred to fall in battle —line rather than to desert their entrapped armies. but Gnaeus Fulvius, almost the only man to report the destruction of his army, had returned to Rome. it was a shameful thing that the army of Cannae, for having escaped from the battle —line, had been deported to Sicily, not to be relieved of service there until the enemy withdrew from Italy, and that the same action had been taken recently in the case of Gnaeus Fulvius' legions; that the flight of Gnaeus Fulvius from a battle begun by his own recklessness should have gone unpunished, and he should be expecting to spend his old age in cook —shops and brothels in which he passed his youth, whereas the soldiers, whose only fault was that they were like their commander, had been all but exiled and were enduring military service in disgrace. so different was freedom at Rome for the rich and the poor, for the man who had held and the man who had not held public office! the defendant shifted the blame from himself to the soldiers. they had been fiercely clamouring for battle, he said, when they were led out into line, not on the day they wished, since it was too late, but on the following day, and although drawn up at a favourable time and place, they failed to withstand the reputed or the real strength of the enemy. when they were all fleeing in disorder, he too was carried away by the crowd, as Varro in the battle of Cannae, as many other generals. how , he said, could he have been of service to the state by resisting all alone, unless his death was to be a remedy for national disasters? it was not that for lack of supplies he had been imprudently led into an unfavourable position; it was not that while advancing in column without reconnoitring he had been surprised and surrounded; it was by an open attack, by arms, by a battle —line that he had been defeated. neither the spirit of his own men nor that of the enemy had been under his control: every man's own temperament, he said, produces boldness or consternation. twice he was accused and a fine required; at the third hearing witnesses were furnished, and he was not only loaded with every kind of reproach, but also many swore that the beginning of flight and panic was made by the praetor; that the soldiers, deserted by him, in the belief that the general's fear was not unfounded, had retreated. thereupon such anger was kindled that the assembly shouted that the magistrate must demand a capital penalty. on that point also a fresh dispute began. for when the accuser, having twice demanded a fine, said at the third hearing that he demanded capital punishment, the tribunes were appealed to. and they said that they would not stand in their colleague's way, to prevent him from doing what was permitted him by ancestral custom, that is, from making his demand either according to the laws or according to custom, as he preferred, until he should condemn the defendant either to capital punishment or to pay a fine. upon that Sempronius said he judged Gnaeus Fulvius guilty of treason and asked of Gaius Calpur-. nius, the city praetor, a day for the assembly. then the defendant had recourse to another hope, in case his brother Quintus Fulvius might be able to attend at the trial, as he was then influential both from the fame of his successes and from the hope, now almost fulfilled, of taking Capua. after Fulvius had written a pitiful letter in that sense on behalf of his brother's life, and the senators had declared that leaving Capua was not to the interest of the state, when the day for the assembly was at hand Gnaeus Fulvius went into exile at Tarquinii. the plebs voted that his exile was legal. meanwhile the whole effort of the war had been directed against Capua. but it was rather an intensive blockade than a series of assaults, and the slaves and commoners were unable either to endure hunger or to send messengers to Hannibal through guards so near to each other. a Numidian was discovered who took a letter, declared that he would make his way out, and kept his promise. going out right through the Roman camp at night he inspired in the Capuans the hope that, while they still had some strength left, they might attempt a sally in all directions. but in the many engagements they were as a rule successful in cavalry battles, while in infantry they were worsted. to be victorious, however, was by no means so cheering as it was depressing to be vanquished at any point by a beleaguered and almost captured enemy. at length a method was devised, so that what was lacking to their strength might be compensated by skilful tactics. out of all the legions were picked young men who by reason of strength and lightness of build were the swiftest. these were furnished with round shields of smaller size than those used by cavalry, and seven javelins apiece four feet long and having iron heads such as are on the spears of the light —armed troops. the horsemen would each of them take one of these men on to their own horses, and they trained them both to ride behind and to leap down nimbly when the signal was given. when thanks to daily practice they seemed to do this with sufficient daring, they advanced into the plain which was situated between the camp and the city wall in the face of the Capuan cavalry in battle —line. and when they had come within range, at a given signal the light —armed leaped to the ground. thereupon an infantry line suddenly dashes out from the cavalry at the enemy's horsemen, and while attacking they hurl one javelin after another. by throwing a great number of these against horses and men in all directions, they wounded very many. but more consternation was created by the strange and the unexpected, and the cavalry charging into the frightened enemy caused them to flee with slaughter all the way to the gates. thereafter the Roman side was superior in cavalry also; it was made the practice to have light —armed in the legions. the originator of combining infantry with cavalry they say was Quintus Navius, a centurion, and that for so doing honour was paid him by the general. while matters stood thus at Capua, Hannibal was drawn in opposite directions by the desire to take the citadel of Tarentum and to hold Capua. however , regard for Capua prevailed, a city on which he saw that the attention of all his allies and enemies was concentrated, and one destined to be a striking example, whatever might be the result of its revolt from the Romans. accordingly , leaving in the land of the Bruttii a large part of his baggage and all the heavy —armed, with picked infantry and cavalry he hastened into Campania in the best possible condition for a rapid march. in spite of his swift movement thirty —three elephants managed to follow him. he encamped in a closed valley behind Tifata, a mountain commanding Capua. as he approached, he first captured the stronghold of Galatia, overpowering its garrison, and then directed his march against the besiegers of Capua. and sending word in advance to Capua, stating at what time he proposed to attack the Roman camp, so that they also, making ready for a sally, might at the same time burst out of all the gates, he inspired great alarm. for on one side he himself attacked, on the other all the Capuans, cavalry and infantry, sallied out, and with them the Carthaginian garrison, commanded by Bostar and Hanno. the Romans in their alarm, so as not to leave one point undefended by rushing in the same direction, divided their forces among them as follows: Appius Claudius was placed facing the Capuans, Fulvius facing Hannibal: Gaius Nero, the propraetor, with the cavalry of six legions took his place along the road leading to Suessula, Gaius Fulvius Flaccus, the lieutenant, with the cavalry of the allies in the direction of the river Volturnus. the battle began not only with the usual shouting and uproar, but, in addition to the noise of men and horses and arms, the non —combatant populace of Capua disposed along the walls produced so much shouting, together with the clashing of bronze, such as is usually kept up in the still night of a lunar eclipse, as to divert the attention even of the combatants. Appius was easily keeping the Capuans away from the earthwork of the camp; on the other side a larger force, Hannibal and the Carthaginians, were pressing Fulvius. there the sixth legion gave way, and after it had been forced back, a cohort of Spaniards with three elephants managed even to reach the earthwork, and had broken through the Roman centre, and wavered between the hope of breaking through into the camp and the danger of being cut off from their own troops. Fulvius , on seeing the alarm of the legion and the danger to the camp, bade Quintus Navius and other first centurions to attack the cohort of the enemy fighting beneath the earthwork. he said that it was a very critical moment; that either they must be allowed to pass —and it would be less of an effort for them to burst into the camp than it had been to break through the solid line —or else they must be disposed of beneath the earthwork. also that it would not involve much fighting; they were few and cut off from their own men; and if the battle —line, which in the panic of the Romans seemed to have been broken through, should face against the enemy from both sides, it would enclose them between two fronts. Navius , on hearing these words of the commander, snatched a standard of the second maniple of the hastati from the standard —bearer and carried it towards the enemy, threatening that he would throw it into their midst if the soldiers did not quickly follow him and take a hand in the battle. a huge frame he had, and his arms added distinction; and the standard held aloft had attracted citizens and enemies to the sight. but when he had pushed through to the standards of the Spaniards, spears were then hurled at him from every side, and almost the entire line turned against him alone. but neither the numbers of the enemy nor the mass of weapons could beat off the attack of such a man. and Marcus Atilius, the lieutenant, started to carry the standard of the first maniple of the prin- cipes of the same legion towards the cohort of Spaniards, and at the same time Lucius Porcius Licinus and Titus Popilius, the lieutenants in command of the camp, fought with spirit on the earthwork and slew the elephants directly on the wall, as they were trying to cross. when the trench was filled with their bodies, it furnished the enemy with a passage, just as if an embankment or a bridge had been thrown over it. there , all over the heap of fallen elephants, a terrible slaughter ensued. on the other side of the camp the Capuans and the Carthaginian garrison had already been repulsed, and fighting was going on just outside the gate of Capua leading toward Volturnum. and it was not so much the armed men that were resisting the Romans trying to burst in, as that the gate, armed with larger and smaller artillery, kept the enemy back by missiles hurled from a distance. the attack of the Romans was further checked by the wounding of Appius Claudius, the general encouraging his men at the front, when the upper part of his chest was struck by a javelin below the left shoulder. nevertheless a great number of the enemy were slain before the gate, and the rest driven in disorder into the city. Hannibal likewise, seeing the slaughter of the Spanish cohort, and that the enemy's camp was being defended with the utmost vigour, gave up the attack upon it and began to recall his standards and to make his advancing infantry retreat, while interposing his cavalry in the rear, to prevent the enemy from pursuing. the legions showed great eagerness to pursue the enemy; but Flaccus ordered the recall to be sounded thinking that enough had been accomplished for both purposes —that the Campanians should appreciate how little defence they had in Hannibal, and that Hannibal himself should be aware of it. some of the authorities on this battle relate that eight thousand men were slain in Hannibal's army, three thousand in the Campanian, and that fifteen standards were taken from the Carthaginians and eighteen from the Campanians. in other writers I have found that the battle was by no means on such a scale, but that there was more panic than fighting, when Numidians and Spaniards with elephants had burst into the Roman camp unexpectedly, and while the elephants, on their way straight through the camp, were causing wreckage of tents in the midst of a terrible din, and making the beasts of burden break their halters and flee; that, in addition to the uproar, there was also a ruse; for Hannibal sent in men in Italian dress and acquainted with the Latin language, to bid the soldiers, in the name of the consuls, each for himself to flee to the neighbouring mountains, since the camp had been taken; but that the ruse was quickly recognized and frustrated with great loss to the enemy; that the elephants were driven out of the camp by the use of fire. in whatever way it began and ended, this was the last battle before the surrender of Capua. as medix tuticus, which is the highest office among the Campanians, Seppius Loesius was serving that year, though born in a humble station and having slender means. they say that his mother on his behalf as a minor was once expiating a household portent, and when the soothsayer had given his answer that the very highest authority at Capua would come to that boy, she, finding nothing to justify that hope, said surely you mean the ruin of the Campanians, when the highest office shall come to my son. that mockery of a true prediction also came true. for when they were hard pressed by starvation and the sword, and there remained no hope that they could hold out, while those who were born to the expectation of public offices were refusing them, Loesius, who complained that Capua had been abandoned and betrayed by its leading men, was the last of all the Campanians to receive their highest magistracy. but Hannibal, seeing that it was impossible either to tempt the enemy into battle again, or to break a way through their camp to Capua, for fear the new consuls should cut off his supplies also, resolved to retire without accomplishing his undertaking and to move his camp away from Capua. while carefully considering whither he should remove, the impulse came to him to proceed to Rome, the very centre of the war. it was something which he had always desired to do, but after the battle of Cannae he had let the opportunity pass, as others commonly complained, and as he himself frequently admitted. in unexpected alarm and confusion it need not be beyond his hopes that some part of the city could be seized. and if Rome should be in danger, he thought that either both of the Roman commanders or one of them would at once abandon Capua; and that if they should divide their forces, each being weakened would give either himself or the Capuans the chance of success. only one concern tormented him, the fear that as soon as he had withdrawn, the Capuans might at once be surrendered. a Numidian who was ready to dare and do anything was induced by Hannibal's gifts to take a letter, enter the Roman camp under the guise of a deserter, and then from the other side of the camp make his way in secret to Capua. and the letter was filled with encouragements. his departure, Hannibal said, which would be of advantage to them, would draw off the Roman generals and armies from the siege of Capua to the defence of Rome. they should not be downcast; by holding out for a few days they would cause the entire blockade to be raised. he then ordered that boats on the Volturnus should be seized and rowed up to the fort which he had previously built for a defence. and when word came that the number of these was such that his army could be ferried across in a single night, he had food prepared for ten days, led his legions down to the river by night, and transported them across before daylight. before this happened Fulvius Flaccus had learned from deserters that it was to be done, and had so written to the senate at Rome; whereupon men's feelings were differently stirred according to their several natures. as was natural in so alarming a situation, the senate was at once summoned, and Publius Cornelius, surnamed Asina, with no thought of Capua or of anything else, was for recalling all the generals and armies from the whole of Italy for the defence of the city. but Fabius Maximus thought it a shameful thing to withdraw from Capua, to be frightened and led about at the beck of Hannibal and in response to his threats. to think, he said, that the man who, though victor at Cannae, had not ventured to go to the city, on being beaten back from Capua should have conceived the hope of capturing the city of Rome! it was not to besiege Rome that he was on the march, but to raise the siege of Capua. as for Rome, Jupiter, witness of the treaties broken by Hannibal, and the other gods would defend her with the aid of the army stationed at the city. these conflicting motions were defeated by the compromise of Publius Valerius Flaccus, who, mindful of both situations, proposed that they write to the generals at Capua, informing them what forces there were to defend the city; on the other hand, what forces Hannibal was taking with him or how large an army was needed for the siege of Capua they themselves knew. if one of the two generals and a part of the army could be sent to Rome, provided Capua should be duly besieged by the general and army remaining, then let Claudius and Fulvius arrange between them which of the two must besiege Capua, and which must come to Rome to prevent a siege of their native city. when this decree of the senate was brought to Capua, Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, who, since his colleague was disabled by a wound, was obliged to return to Rome, after picking soldiers from three armies, led about fifteen thousand infantry and a thousand horsemen across the Volturnus. thence , on learning definitely that Hannibal would march along the Latin Way, he himself sent word in advance to the towns along the Appian Way and such as are near that road, Setia, Cora, Lavinium, that they should have supplies on hand in the cities and also bring them down from farms at a distance to the road, and draw in garrisons for the cities, so that each might have the defence of its public interests in hand. Hannibal on the day that he crossed the Volturnus pitched camp not far from the river; on the next day he made his way past Cales into the region of the Sidicini. there he lingered one day devastating the country, and then led along the Latin Way through the territory of Suessa, Allifae and Casinum. before Casinum he remained encamped two days, and ravaged the country in all directions. then passing Interamna and Aquinum he came into the region of Fregellae as far as the river Liris, where he found the bridge broken down by the men of Fregellae, to delay his march. Fulvius too had been detained by the river Volturnus, as the boats had been burned by Hannibal, and he had difficulty in getting together rafts for the transporting of his army, owing to the great scarcity of timber. after the army had been carried across on rafts, the rest of Fulvius' march was unhampered, as supplies had been generously set out for them not only in the cities, but also by the roadside. and the eager soldiers kept encouraging one another to quicken their pace, remembering that they were marching to defend their native city. to Rome a messenger from Fregellae, riding on for a day and a night, brought great alarm. still greater confusion than at its first reception was occasioned by news of the danger spread by men who ran about, adding unfounded reports to what they had heard, and it stirred the entire city. the wailings of women were heard not only from private houses, but from every direction matrons pouring into the streets ran about among the shrines of the gods, sweeping the altars with their dishevelled hair, kneeling, holding up their palms to heaven and the gods, and praying them to rescue the city of Rome from the hands of the enemy and to keep Roman mothers and little children unharmed. the senate awaited the magistrates in the Forum, in case they wished its advice about anything. some received commands and departed each to the duty assigned him; others volunteered, in case of any need of their services. garrisons were posted on the Citadel, on the Capitol, on the walls, around the city, even on the Alban Mount and on the citadel of Aefula. in the midst of this turmoil word came that Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, had set out from Capua with an army. and that his military power might not be annulled if he came into the city, the senate decreed that Quintus Fulvius should have equal authority with the consuls. Hannibal , after laying waste the territory of Fregellae more ruthlessly on account of the breaking down of the bridges, came through the districts of Frusino and Ferentinum and Anagnia into that of Labici. then over Mount Algidus he went to Tusculum, and not being admitted to the city, he descended toward the right below Tusculum to Gabii. thence he led his army down into the Pupinian district and pitched camp eight miles distant from Rome. the nearer the enemy approached the greater was the slaughter of fugitives, as the Numidians were in the lead, and the greater was the number of the captured of every class and age. in this confusion Fulvius Flaccus entered Rome with his army by the Porta Capena, and hastened through the centre of the city by way of the Carinae to the Esquiline. then going out he pitched his camp between Porta Esquilina and Porta Collina. the plebeian aediles brought supplies thither; the consuls and the senate came to the camp; there they deliberated on the most important matters of state. it was decided that the consuls should pitch their camps near the gates, Collina and Esquilina; that Gaius Calpurnius, the city praetor, should be in command of the Capitol and the Citadel, and that the senate in full numbers should be kept in the Forum, in case there might be need of deliberation in such an emergency. meanwhile Hannibal moved his camp to the river Anio, three miles from the city. there he established a permanent camp and himself with two thousand horsemen advanced toward Porta Collina as far as the Temple of Hercules, and riding up surveyed the walls and situation of the city from the nearest possible point. that he should do so with such freedom and so at his leisure seemed to Flaccus a shame. accordingly he sent his horsemen against him and ordered that the cavalry of the enemy be driven away and back into their own camp. after the engagement had begun, the consuls ordered the Numidian deserters, of whom there were at that time on the Aventine about twelve hundred, to pass through the centre of the city across the Esquiline, thinking that none were better suited to do battle in the valleys and around buildings in gardens, among tombs and along roads hemmed in on every side. when some men on the Citadel and the Capitol saw them riding down the Clivus Publicius, they shouted that the Aventine had been captured. that caused so much confusion and flight that, if there had not been a Carthaginian camp outside the city, the whole panic —stricken multitude would have poured out. as it was they fled to their homes and into buildings, and as their own people roamed the streets, they would hurl stones and javelins at them, as though they were enemies. nor could the uproar be checked and their mistake revealed, since the roads were clogged by the crowd of rustics and the cattle that sudden alarm had driven into the city. the cavalry battle was successful and the enemy driven away. and because in many places disturbances which arose without reason had to be checked, it was decreed that all who had been dictators, consuls or censors should have full military power until the enemy should have retired from the walls. and in fact during the rest of the day and the following night many disturbances were provoked without reason and were checked. on the next day Hannibal crossed the Anio and led all his forces out into line, and Flaccus and the consuls did not refuse battle. after the armies had been drawn up on both sides for the issue of a battle in which the city of Rome was to be the prize for the victor, a great downpour mingled with hail so confused both battle —lines that, holding on to their arms with difficulty, they returned to camp, fearing everything more than the enemy. and the following day, when the lines were drawn up on the same spot, the same bad weather parted them. on both days, when they had retired to their camps, to their astonishment there came a clear sky with a calm. for the Carthaginians it became a solemn warning, and it is reported that Hannibal was heard to say that at one time the purpose to take Rome, at another the chance, was denied him. two other things, small and great, further diminished his hope. the important thing was that he heard that, although he was sitting armed before the walls of the city of Rome, detachments had set out under their colours to reinforce Spain; and the unimportant circumstance was that he learned from a prisoner that about this time the land on which he had his camp chanced to have been sold, with no reduction in price on that account. but it seemed to him so arrogant and such an indignity that a purchaser should have been found at Rome for the ground which he had seized in war and was himself its occupier and owner, that he forthwith summoned a herald and ordered the bankers' shops which were round the Roman Forum to be sold. influenced by these circumstances he moved his camp back to the river Tutia, six miles from the city. thence he proceeded to the grove of Feronia, a shrine which at that time was noted for its wealth. the people of Capena and others who lived near it used to carry thither first —fruits and gifts in addition according to their means, and had kept it richly adorned with gold and silver. of all those gifts the temple was at that time despoiled. Great heaps of bronze were found after the departure of Hannibal, since the soldiers inspired by religious fear deposited crude lumps. as to the spoiling of this temple there is no uncertainty among the historians. coelius relates that on his way to Rome Hannibal turned aside to it from Eretum, and traces his march from Reate and Cutiliae and Amiternum. he says that from Campania he came into Samnium, thence into the land of the Paelignians, and passing the town of Sulmo, over into the country of the Marrucini; thence through the territory of Alba into that of the Marsians, and then to Amiternum and the village of Foruli. and the uncertainty is not because the traces of so great a commander and so large an army could within the memory of so short a period have become confused, for it is agreed that he passed that way. the only difference is whether he came to the city by that route, or returned by it from the city into Campania. but the Romans' persistence in pressing the siege of Capua was not matched by that of Hannibal in defending it. for through Samnium and Apulia and Lucania he hastened into the Bruttian region, to the strait and Regium, at such a pace as almost to overwhelm them unawares by arriving suddenly. Capua , although during that time it had been besieged with no less spirit, nevertheless was aware of the coming of Flaccus, and began to wonder that Hannibal had not returned at the same time. then by conversing with the enemy they learned that they had been deserted and abandoned, and that the hope of retaining Capua had been given up by the Carthaginians. there was also an edict of the proconsuls, posted and published among the enemy in accordance with a decree of the senate, that any Capuan citizen who changed sides before a certain date should suffer no penalty. and yet there was no changing of sides, for fear restrained them more than honour, because in their revolt they had committed offences too serious to be pardoned. but just as no one of his own motion went over to the enemy, so they made no promising plans for the common interest. the nobility had deserted the state and could not be brought together in the senate. in the office of magistrate was a man who had not gained additional honour for himself, but by his own unworthiness had taken away power and authority from the office which he was holding. no longer did any one of the foremost citizens show himself even in the forum or any public place. shut up in their houses they were awaiting from day to day the fall of their native city and their own destruction. the chief responsibility had fallen wholly to Bostar and Hanno, commanders of the Carthaginian garrison, and they were concerned only for their own danger, not that of their allies. they wrote a letter to Hannibal in terms not only outspoken, but also bitter, in which they charged that it was not Capua alone that had been delivered into the hands of the enemy, but that they themselves also and the garrison had been abandoned to every kind of torture; that he had gone away to the land of the Bruttii, as though turning his back so that Capua should not be captured before his eyes. but assuredly, they said, the Romans could not be drawn away from besieging Capua even by an assault upon the city of Rome; so much more steadfast was the Roman as an enemy than the Carthaginian as a friend. if he should return to Capua and there concentrate the whole war, they and the Capuans likewise would be ready for a sally. it was not to wage war with the people of Regium and Tarentum that they had crossed the Alps. where the Roman legions were, there ought the Carthaginian armies also to be. Thus at Cannae, thus at Trasumennus, by coming to grips and pitching camp near the enemy, by trying their luck they had met with success. a letter to this effect was given to Numidians who with a reward set before them promised to perform that service. posing as deserters they had come before Flaccus in his camp, with the intention of choosing the right moment and then departing —and the famine which had lasted so long at Capua gave every man a plausible reason for deserting —when suddenly a Campanian woman, mistress of one of the deserters, came into the camp and informed the Roman general that the Numidians by agreement had pretended to change sides and were bearing a letter to Hannibal: that she was prepared to prove that charge against one of their number who had revealed the matter to her. on being produced, he at first quite firmly pretended that he did not know the woman. then by degrees he was overpowered by the facts, and seeing that they were demanding and preparing torture, he admitted that it was true, and the letter was produced. she added to her information what they were trying to conceal, namely, that other Numidians also were abroad in the Roman camp playing the part of deserters. over seventy of them were arrested, and together with the new deserters they were scourged with rods, and after their hands had been cut off they were sent back to Capua. the sight of so merciless a punishment broke the spirit of the Capuans. a gathering of the people before the Senate House compelled Loesius to summon the senate. and they openly threatened the leading citizens, who for a long time had been absent from public deliberations, that if they did not come into the senate, they would make the rounds of their homes and forcibly bring them all out into the streets. the fear of that gave the magistrate a full session of the senate. there , while all the rest were speaking of sending legates to the Roman generals, Vibius Virrius, who had proposed rebellion from Rome, on being asked for his opinion, said that the men who were speaking of embassies and of peace and surrender did not recall either what they would have done, if they had had the Romans in their power, or what they themselves must suffer. tell me, he said, do you suppose it will be the same kind of surrender as that under which we once gave up ourselves and all our possessions to the Romans, that we might obtain their aid against the Samnites? have you already forgotten in what a critical moment and in what a situation for the Roman people we have revolted from them? have you already forgotten how at the time of our revolt we with torture and as an insult put to death a garrison which we might have let go? or how often and with what bitterness we have made a sally against the besiegers, have beset their camps, have called in Hannibal to overpower them? or how —this the most recent occurrence —we have sent him away to lay siege to Rome? and now for the other side, recall what have been their acts of hostility towards us, that by so doing you may know what you have to expect. when a foreign enemy —was in Italy, and that enemy Hannibal, and when everywhere were the flames of war, neglecting everything, neglecting even Hannibal, they sent both consuls and two consular armies to besiege Capua. now for the second year they are wasting us away by starvation, shut up inside their contravallation, while they too like ourselves have endured the utmost dangers and most serious hardships, have been slain, many of them, about their earthworks and trenches, and have at last had their camp almost taken. but I pass over these things; to suffer hardships and dangers in besieging a city of the enemy is an old and familiar story. i proceed to proof of anger and hatred that are unspeakable. Hannibal with immense forces of infantry and cavalry besieged and partly captured their camp: by such danger they were not moved at all to give up the siege. setting out across the Volturnus he ravaged the territory of Cales with fire: by such a disaster to allies they were in no wise called away. he ordered his hostile standards to be carried to the city of Rome itself: that impending storm also they scorned. crossing the Anio he pitched camp three miles from the city, finally came close to the very walls and gates, showed that unless they should leave Capua he would take Rome away from them: they did not leave Capua. wild beasts, though excited by blind impulse and fury, can be diverted to bring help to their young, if one goes towards their lairs and their whelps. as for the Romans, the siege of Rome, their wives and children, whose wailing could almost be heard from here, their altars and hearths, the shrines of their gods, the desecrated and profaned tombs of their ancestors did not divert them from Capua. such is their ardour in demanding punishment, such their thirst to drink our blood. and perhaps not without reason; we too should have done the same, had the chance been given us. therefore since the immortal gods have made a contrary decision, inasmuch as I ought under no circumstances to refuse death, I, while free and my own master, can escape tortures and insults which the enemy is preparing, by a death which is not only honourable, but also gentle. i shall not see Appius Claudius and Quintus Fulvius, emboldened by their insolent victory, nor shall I be dragged in chains through the city of Rome as a spectacle in a triumph, so that I may then breathe my last in the prison, or else, bound to a stake, with my back mangled by rods, may submit my neck to the Roman axe. nor shall I see my native city destroyed and burned, nor Capuan matrons and maidens and free —born boys carried off to be dishonoured. Alba , from which they had themselves sprung, they levelled with its foundations, that their stock, that the memory of their origin, might not survive; much less am I to believe that they will spare Capua, to which they are more hostile than to Carthage. accordingly , as many of you as are minded to yield to fate before they see all these sights that are so bitter, for such in my house a feast is spread and in readiness today. when we have had our fill of wine and food, the same cup which has been served to me shall be carried round. that draught will defend the body from torture, the mind from insults, eyes and ears from seeing and hearing all the bitter and unseemly things which await the vanquished. men will be ready to light a great pyre in the court of the house and throw our lifeless bodies upon it. this is the one way, at once honourable and independent, that leads to death. even our enemies will admire our courage, and Hannibal will also know that they were brave allies whom he has abandoned and betrayed. this speech of Virrius more men heard with approval than had the courage to carry out what they commended. the majority of the senate, not doubting that the clemency of the Roman people, known to them frequently in many wars, would be forgiving to them also, voted and sent legates to surrender Capua to the Romans. about twenty —seven senators followed Vibius Virrius home; and after they had feasted with him, and so far as possible had deadened their minds with wine to the sense of impending misfortune, they all took the poison. then at the end of the feast they gave each other the right hand and a last embrace, and weeping for their own fate and that of their native city, some remained, that they might be cremated on the same pyre, the rest left for their several homes. filled with food and wine, their veins made the poison less effectual in hastening death. and so, although most of them were in the throes through the whole of the night and part of the following day, all of them, however, died before the gates were opened to the enemy. on the next day the Jupiter Gate, which faced the Roman camp, was opened by order of the proconsuls. by that gate one legion was admitted and two alae with Gaius Fulvius, the lieutenant. he first of all saw to it that the arms and weapons that were in Capua should be brought to him; then posting sentinels at all the gates, that no one might be able to go out or be sent out, he seized the Carthaginian garrison, and ordered the Capuan senate to go to the Roman generals in the camp. arrived there, they were all put in chains and bidden to bring to the quaestors what gold and silver they had. the amount of gold was two thousand and seventy pounds, of silver thirty —one thousand two hundred pounds. of the senators known to have especially promoted revolt from the Romans twenty —five were sent to Cales to be imprisoned, twenty —eight to Teanum. on the punishment of the Capuan senators there was no kind of agreement between Fulvius and Claudius. ready to hear a plea for pardon was Claudius; more inflexible was Fulvius' opinion. accordingly Appius was inclined to refer the entire decision of the case to the senate at Rome. furthermore he thought it right that the fathers should be given authority to enquire of these men whether they had shared their plans with some of the Latin allies, and whether they had been helped by them in the war. but Fulvius said that they must on no account run the risk of troubling the feelings of faithful allies by unsubstantiated charges and of exposing them to informers, who never had had any scruple as to what they were saying or what they were doing; hence he would quash and suppress that investigation. when they had separated directly after this speech, Appius had no doubt that his colleague, in spite of his fierce words, would wait, however, for a letter from Rome on a matter of such importance. but Fulvius for fear that very thing might hinder his project, dismissed the council, and ordered the tribunes of the soldiers and the prefects of allies to instruct two thousand picked cavalry —to be ready at the bugle —call of the third watch. setting out by night for Teanum with this cavalry, he entered the gate at dawn and proceeded to the forum. at the first entry of the horsemen a crowd gathered, and he bade that the Sidicinian magistrate be summoned, and ordered him to bring out the Capuans whom he had under arrest. all were brought out, scourged with rods and beheaded. thence he hastened at full speed to Cales. there , after he had taken his seat on the tribunal and the Capuans were brought out and were being bound to stakes, came a horseman post haste from Rome and handed to Fulvius a letter from Gaius Calpurnius, the praetor, and a decree of the senate. beginning at the tribunal a rumour spread through the whole assembly that the case of the Capuans was reserved for decision by the senators. Fulvius also thought that was the case, took the letter, but without breaking the seal, and having placed it in his bosom, commanded a herald to order the lictor to carry out the legal punishment. Thus was punishment visited upon those also who were at Cales. then the letter was read and the decree of the senate, too late to prevent an action which had been hastened by every means, that prevention might be impossible. just as Fulvius was rising from his seat, Taurea Vibellius the Capuan, striding through the middle of the crowd, called him by name, and when Flaccus, wondering what he wished of him, had sat down again, Vibellius said order me also to be slain, that you may be able to boast that a much braver man than you are yourself has been slain by you. when Flaccus said that the man was doubtless of unsound mind, and then added that, if he wished to do so, he was forbidden by the decree of the senate, thereupon Vibellius said since indeed, although my native city has been taken, my relatives and friends lost, and with my own hand I have killed my wife and children, that they might suffer no indignity, for myself there is not the same possibility even to die that these my fellow —citizens have had, let courage give me a release from this odious life. and so with a sword which he had concealed under his clothing he ran himself directly through the breast and fell dying at the feet of the general. because all that had to do with the punishment of the Capuans and many other things were done by the decision of Flaccus alone, some relate that Appius Claudius died just before the surrender of Capua. further , they say that Taurea himself did not voluntarily come to Cales, and was not slain by his own hand, but that while he was being bound along with the rest to a stake, because what he was shouting could not be heard clearly for the noise, Flaccus ordered silence; that then Taurea, as has been stated above, said that he, the bravest of men, was being killed by one who was in no way his equal in courage; that after these words the herald by order of the proconsul proclaimed lictor , give the brave man a beating; on him first the legal penalty! some authorities say that the decree of the senate also was read before he beheaded them; but that, because in the decree of the senateit was added that, if he saw fit, he should refer the decision to the verdict of the senate, he interpreted it that they allowed him to decide which course he thought more to the interest of the state. from Cales they returned to Capua, and the surrender of Atella and Calatia was received. there also punishment was inflicted on the responsible leaders. Thus about seventy prominent senators were put to death; some three hundred noble Campanians who were put in prison, and others who were distributed among cities of Latin allies to be guarded, met death in different ways. the remaining mass of Campanian citizens were sold. in regard to the city and its territory discussion continued, inasmuch as some thought a city very powerful, near, and unfriendly should be destroyed. but immediate advantage prevailed. for on account of the territory, which was well known to be foremost in Italy in all that the fertile soil produced, the city was preserved, that the tillers of the land might have some abode. to people the city the multitude of resident aliens and freedmen and petty tradesmen and artisans was retained. the whole territory and the buildings became public property of the Roman people. but it was decided that Capua, as a nominal city, should merely be a dwelling —place and a centre of population, but should have no political body nor senate nor council of the plebs nor magistrates. they thought that the multitude, without a public council, without military authority, having nothing in common amongst them, would be incapable of agreement; the Romans would send out every year a prefect to administer justice. Thus matters concerning Capua were settled according to a plan that was in every respect praiseworthy. stern and prompt was the punishment of the most guilty; the mass of citizens were scattered with no hope of a return; no rage was vented upon innocent buildings and city —walls by burning and demolition. and along with profit they sought a reputation among the allies as well for clemency, by saving a very important and very rich city, over whose ruins all Campania, all the neighbouring peoples on every side of Campania, would have mourned. the enemy were forced to acknowledge what power the Romans possessed to exact punishment from faithless allies, and how helpless Hannibal was to defend those whom he had taken under his protection. at Rome the senate, having discharged its responsibilities so far as concerned Capua, voted to assign to Gaius Nero six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry of his own choosing, from the two legions which he had had before Capua, and from the Latin allies the same number of infantry and eight hundred cavalry. this army Nero embarked at Puteoli and transported to Spain. arrived at Tarraco by sea, he there disembarked his troops, beached the ships, and armed even the crews, to increase his numbers. then setting out for the river Ebro, he took over the army from Tiberius Fonteius and Lucius Marcius. he thereupon proceeded against the enemy. Hasdrubal , the son of Hamilcar, was encamped at the Black Rocks. the place is in the country of the Ausetani, between the towns of Iliturgis and Mentissa. Nero occupied the entrance to this pass. Hasdrubal , to avoid being entrapped, sent a herald to promise that if he should be allowed to get away, he would transport his entire army out of Spain. the Roman accepted the proposal with joy, and Hasdrubal asked for the next day for a conference, that in person they might draw up the terms for the surrender of the citadels of cities and fix a date before which the garrisons were to be evacuated, and the Carthaginians might remove all their property without molestation. having gained that request, Hasdrubal at once gave orders that at dusk and then all through the night the heaviest troops should escape from the pass by any possible way. Great pains were taken not to have many leave that night, that even their small numbers might be better suited both to escaping the enemy's notice by silence and to making their way out by narrow and difficult paths. next day they came to the conference; but by speaking at unnecessary length and by purposely writing what was not to the point the day was spent, and postponement taken to the next day. the addition of the following night gave them time to send out others as well; and on the following day the business did not reach an end. Thus several days were spent in arguing openly about terms, and several nights in secretly sending Carthaginians away from the camp. and after the larger part of the army had been sent away, they ceased any longer to stand by even what they had been the first to propose. and there was less and less agreement, as honesty declined along with fear. by this time nearly all the infantry forces had escaped from the pass when at daybreak a dense fog covered the whole pass and the adjacent plain. Hasdrubal on noticing that, sent a messenger to Nero, to postpone the conference until the next day: that day was banned among the Carthaginians, he said, for the doing of anything serious. as even then fraud was not suspected, excuse for that day was granted, and forthwith Hasdrubal with his cavalry and elephants left camp, and without any noise escaped to a place of safety. at about the fourth hour the burning away of the fog by the sun cleared the air, and the Romans caught sight of the empty camp of the enemy. when Claudius, who until then did not recognize the Punic deception, perceived that he had been tricked, he pressed the pursuit of a departing enemy, he being all ready to engage in pitched battle. but the enemy refused to fight. and yet there were slight engagements between the rear of the Carthaginian column and the advance guard of the Romans. meanwhile of the peoples of Spain none who had revolted after the disaster occurred were returning to the Romans, and at the same time no new nations were revolting. and at Rome, after the recovery of Capua, senate and people were no longer more concerned about Italy than about Spain. they favoured an increase of the army and the sending of a commander —in —chief; nor were they so well agreed whom to send, as they were on this point, that, where two great commanders had fallen within thirty days, there a successor to both must be chosen with unusual care. while some were naming one man, others another, finally they had recourse to the holding of an election to name a proconsul for Spain; and the consuls announced a date for the election. at first people had waited for those who thought themselves deserving of so important a command to hand in their names. when that hope was disappointed, grief for the disaster they had suffered was renewed, and regret for the lost generals. and so the citizens mourned, being almost devoid of any plan; nevertheless on the election day they went down into the Campus. and turning towards the magistrates they scanned the faces of the leading men, who were looking at one and another of their number, and there were complaints that the situation was so desperate and hope for the state so given up that no man ventured to accept the command for Spain, when suddenly Publius Cornelius, son of that Publius Cornelius who had fallen in Spain, being about twenty —four years of age, declared that he was a candidate, and took his place on higher ground from which he could be seen. all faces were turned towards him, and then by their shouts of approval they at once predicted a fortunate and auspicious command. thereupon , bidden to cast their votes, not only all the centuries, but also every single man voted that Publius Scipio should have the command in Spain. but after the thing was done, now that impulsiveness and enthusiasm had subsided, there came a sudden silence and they thought to themselves, What had they done? had not partiality outweighed reasoning? it was his youth that they especially regretted. some also shrank from the destiny of the house, and from the name of one who was setting out from two afflicted families for provinces where his campaign must be about the tombs of his father and his uncle. when he noticed this anxiety and concern, following an action taken with such impulsiveness, Scipio called an assembly, and discoursed with such elevation of spirit on his age and the command entrusted to him and the war to be waged, that he again awakened and revived the ardour which had cooled, and filled men with a more assured hope than belief in a man's promise or reasoning based upon confidence of his success usually inspires. for Scipio was remarkable not only for his real abilities, but thanks to a certain skill also had from his youth adapted himself to their display, doing most of his actions before the public either as if they were prompted by visions in the night or inspired by the gods, whether because he also was possessed by a certain superstition, or in order that men might carry out without hesitation his commands and advice, as though emanating from an oracular response. more than that, preparing men's minds from the very beginning, from the time when he put on the manly gown, there was not a day on which he did any business public or private without going first to the Capitol, and after he had entered the temple, sitting down and usually passing the time there alone in seclusion. this custom, which he maintained throughout his lifetime, confirmed in some men the belief, whether deliberately circulated or by chance, that he was a man of divine race. and it revived the tale previously told of Alexander the Great and rivalling it as unfounded gossip, that his conception was due to an immense serpent, and that the form of the strange creature had very often been seen in his mother's chamber, and that, when persons came in, it had suddenly glided away and disappeared from sight. he himself never made light of men's belief in these marvels; on the contrary it was rather promoted by a certain studied practice of neither denying such a thing nor openly asserting it. many other things of the same sort, some true, some pretended, had passed the limits of admiration for a mere man in the case of this youth. such were the things on which the citizens relied when they then entrusted to an age far from mature the great responsibility of so important a command. to the forces which Spain had from the old army, and those which had been transported under Gaius Nero from Puteoli, were added ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry. and Marcus Iunius Silanus, the propraetor, was assigned to aid in the conduct of the war. so with a fleet of thirty ships (and they were all quinqueremes ) Scipio set out from the mouth of the Tiber, sailed along the coast of the Tuscan Sea and past the Alps . . . and the Gallic Gulf, and then rounding the promontory of the Pyrenees, landed his troops at Emporiae, a Greek city, for they also are sprung from Phocaea. then ordering the ships to follow, and proceeding by land to Tarraco, he held an assembly of all the allies; for on hearing of his coming embassies had poured out from the entire province. there he ordered the ships to be beached, while he sent back four triremes of the Massilians which out of courtesy had escorted him from their home. then he began to give answers to the embassies which were in suspense owing to the repeated changes of fortune, and that with high spirit indeed, due to his great faith in his own abilities, yet so that no over —confident word slipped from his lips, and that in all he said there was not only great dignity but also great sincerity. setting out from Tarraco he visited cities of the allies and also winter quarters of the army, and warmly praised the soldiers because, after suffering two such disasters in succession, they had held the province, and not allowing the enemy to feel any benefit from their successes, had kept them out of the whole region this side of the Ebro, and had loyally protected the allies. Marcius he kept by him in so much honour as to make it clear that he had not the least fear that anyone would stand in the way of his own fame. then Silanus succeeded Nero, and the new soldiers were led into winter quarters. Scipio , having promptly visited all the necessary places and having done all that was to be done, retired to Tarraco. not a whit less was Scipio's fame among the enemy than among citizens and allies, and there was a certain presentiment of the future, inspiring the greater fear in proportion as they were the less able to account for their unreasoned apprehension. they had withdrawn in different directions into winter quarters, Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, as far as the Ocean and Gades, Mago into the interior, especially beyond the Forest of Castulo. Hasdrubal , the son of Hamilcar, was the nearest to the Ebro in his winter quarters near Saguntum. at the end of the summer in which Capua was taken and Scipio came to Spain a Carthaginian fleet was summoned from Sicily to Tarentum to cut off the supplies of the Roman garrison which was in the citadel of Tarentum, and it had indeed closed every approach to the citadel from the sea, but by lying there for a long time it was making the grain supply more limited for their allies than for the enemy. for it was impossible for such a quantity of grain to be brought to the townspeople by way of the peaceful shores and open harbours, under the protection of the Carthaginian ships, as the fleet itself was consuming, with its swarming crews, including men of every race. the result was that, while the garrison of the citadel, as being few in number, could be supported from previous stores without importation, for the Tarentines and the fleet even the imported grain was insufficient. in the end the departure of the fleet was more welcome than had been its coming. the scarcity had not been much relieved, because, with the removal of naval protection, grain could not be brought in. at the end of the same summer, upon the arrival of Marcus Marcellus at the city from his province of Sicily, a session of the senate in the Temple of Bellona was granted him by Gaius Calpurnius, the praetor. there after speaking of his achievements he complained gently, not more on his own account than that of the soldiers, because even after completing his task in the province, he had not been permitted to bring home his army, and he demanded that he be permitted to enter the city in triumph. that request was not granted. there was first a wordy discussion whether it was more illogical that he in whose name, though absent, a thanksgiving for successes gained under his command had been decreed and honour rendered to the gods, should be denied a triumph when present, or on the other hand that he whom they had ordered to tum over his army to a successor —a vote which was not taken except when a war still remained in the province —should triumph just as though the war were finished, and in spite of the absence of the army to witness his triumph as deserved or undeserved. thereupon they adopted a compromise, that he should enter the city in an ovation. the tribune of the plebs on the authority of the senate brought before the people the proposal that Marcus Marcellus should have full military power on the day on which he entered the city in an ovation. on the day before his entry into the city he triumphed on the Alban Mount. then in his ovation he caused a great amount of booty to be carried before him into the city. together with a representation of captured Syracuse were carried catapults and ballistae and all the other engines of war, and the adornments of a long peace and of royal wealth, a quantity of silverware and bronze —ware, other furnishings and costly fabrics, and many notable statues, with which Syracuse had been adorned more highly than most cities of Greece. as a sign of triumph over Carthaginians as well, eight elephants were in the procession. and not the least spectacle, in advance of the general and wearing golden wreaths, were Sosis of Syracuse and Moericus the Spaniard. with one of them as guide at night Syracuse had been entered; the other had betrayed Nasus and the garrison there. to both of these citizenship was granted and five hundred iugera of land; to Sosis, in the territory of Syracuse, land which had either belonged to the king or to enemies of the Roman people, and a house at Syracuse, to be chosen by him from those owned by men whom they had punished by the law of war. to Moericus and the Spaniards who had changed sides with him a city and land in Sicily were ordered to be given, chosen from among those who had revolted from the Roman people. instructions were given to Marcus Cornelius to assign them a city and land wherever he saw fit. in the same region four hundred iugera of land were voted to Belligenes, by whom Moericus had been induced to change sides. after Marcellus' departure from Sicily a Carthaginian fleet landed eight thousand infantry and three thousand Numidian cavalry. to them the cities of Murgentia and Ergetium revolted. their rebellion was followed by that of Hybla and Macella and some others of less importance. and the Numidians, roaming everywhere in Sicily under their prefect Muttines, burned over lands of allies of the Roman people. in addition the Roman army, being indignant, partly because it had not been transported out of the province along with its commander, and partly because they had been forbidden to winter in towns, was serving without spirit. and what they lacked for a mutiny was a leader rather than the inclination. in the midst of these difficulties Marcus Cornelius, the praetor, quieted the soldiers' excitement, now by consoling, now by censuring them; likewise he reduced to subjection all the city —states which had revolted. and of these he assigned Murgentia to the Spaniards to whom a city with its territory was due in conformity with a decree of the senate. since both consuls had Apulia as their province, and there was now less alarm from the Carthaginians and Hannibal, they were ordered to cast lots for Apulia and Macedonia as their provinces. Macedonia fell to Sulpicius, and he succeeded Laevinus. Fulvius was summoned to Rome for the election, and while he was conducting the election for the choice of consuls, the century of the younger men of the Voturia tribe, having the right to vote first, declared in favour of Titus Manlius Torquatus and Titus Otacilius as consuls, the latter being absent. when a crowd gathered before Manlius, who was present, in order to congratulate him, and the approval of the people was unquestioned, surrounded by a great crowd he came to the tribunal of the consul, begged him to hear a few words from him, and bade him recall the century which had cast its vote. while all were in suspense, waiting to know what he was going to demand, he gave the condition of his eyes as an excuse. shameless , he said, was a pilot and a general too, who, though he must use other men's eyes for everything he did, demanded that the lives and fortunes of others be entrusted to him. therefore , if Fulvius approved, let him order the Voturia century of the younger men to vote again, and in electing consuls to remember the war that was in Italy and the critical times for the state. their ears had hardly yet had a respite from the noise and uproar of the enemy when the city of Rome had been all but ablaze a few months before. after these words the whole century cried out that they refused to make any change in opinion, and would vote for the same men as consuls. thereupon Torquatus said: neither shall I as consul be able to put up with your manners, nor will you with my authority. vote again, and reflect that a Punic war is in Italy and the commander of the enemy Hannibal. then the century, moved by the prestige of the man and the expressions of admiration on all sides, begged the consul to summon the Voturia century of the older men. they wished, they said, to confer with their elders and on their authority to name consuls. when the older men of the Voturia had been summoned, time for a secret conference with them was granted in the Sheepfold. the elders said that they must deliberate in regard to three men, two of them already full of honours, Quintus Fabius and Marcus Marcellus, and if they were quite decided to elect some new man as consul to face the Carthaginians, Marcus Valerius Laevinus; that he had carried on the war brilliantly against King Philip on land and sea. so after deliberation in regard to the three men had been allowed, the elders were sent away, and the younger men cast their vote. they voted for Marcus Claudius, at that time resplendent in the light of his conquest of Sicily, and Marcus Valerius as consuls, both being absent. the authority of the leading century was followed by all the rest. let men now make sport of those who admire what is old. for my part, if there should be a city —state of sages, such as philosophers imagine rather than actually know, I am inclined to think that neither could leading men possibly be of more solid worth and more self —controlled as regards the lust for power, nor could the populace show a higher character. but that a century of the younger men wished to confer with their elders on the question to which persons they should, by their vote, entrust a high command, should seem to us scarcely credible —this is due to the cheapened and diminished authority even of parents over their children in our day. then an election for the praetorships was held. Publius Manlius Volso and Lucius Manlius Acidinus and Gaius Laetorius and Lucius Cincius Alimentus were elected. it was after the election, as it happened, that news came of the death in Sicily of Titus Otacilius, whom the people in his absence would, it seemed, have given as a colleague to Titus Manlius, if the course of the election had not been interrupted. the festival of Apollo had been observed in the previous year, and in order that it might be observed in this year also, the senate, on motion of Calpurnius, the praetor, decreed that it be vowed as a permanency. in the same year a number of prodigies were seen and reported. at the Temple of Concord a Victory which stood on the pediment was struck by lightning, and being dislodged, it caught upon the Victories which were among the antefixes and did not fall farther. and at Anagnia and at Fregellae the wall and gates were reported to have been struck by lightning; and that at Forum Subertanum there had been streams of blood for a whole day; and that at Eretum there was a shower of stones; and that at Reate a mule had foaled. these prodigies were atoned for with full —grown victims, and a single day of prayer was proclaimed to the people and nine days of ceremonies. a number of public priests died that year, and new priests were appointed; in place of Manius Aemilius Numida, a decemvir in charge of rites, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was appointed, in place of Marcus Pomponius Matho, a pontifex, Gaius Livius, in place of Spurius Carvilius Maximus, an augur, Marcus Servilius. since Titus Otacilius Crassus, a pontifex, had died at the end of the year, no one was named to take his place. Gaius Claudius, flamen of Jupiter, abdicated his office because of an error in his placing the entrails. about the same time Marcus Valerius Laevinus, who had previously sounded the leading men in secret conferences, came on a swift sailing fleet to a council of the Aetolians already appointed for that very purpose. there he first set before them the capture of Syracuse and Capua, to convince them of success in Italy and Sicily, and in addition referred to the customary good treatment of allies as handed down to the Romans by their ancestors. some of the allies, he said, they had admitted to citizenship and to the same rights as themselves, others they kept in so favoured a situation that they preferred to be allies rather than citizens; the Aetolians would be held in all the higher honour inasmuch as they had been the first of the peoples across the sea to enter their friendship; Philip and the Macedonians were their oppressive neighbours, whose might and over —confidence he had already broken and would further reduce to such a pass that they would not only retire from the cities which they had forcibly taken from the Aetolians, but also would find Macedonia itself continually endangered. and as for the Acarnanians, whose forcible separation from their federation the Aetolians resented, he said he would restore them to the old written basis, establishing both the rights and the supremacy of the Aetolians. these statements and promises by the Roman general were confirmed by the authority of Scopas, then magistrate of the tribe, and of Dorimachus, a leading man of the Aetolians; while extolling the might and majesty of the Roman people they used less restraint and brought more conviction. but most effective was the hope of - getting possession of Acarnania. accordingly the terms were written down under which they should enter friendship and alliance with the Roman people; furthermore that, if so disposed and willing, the Eleans and Lacedaemonians and Attalus and Pleuratus and Scerdilaedus should have the same rights of friendship, Attalus being king of Asia and the last mentioned kings of the Thracians and Illyrians; that the Aetolians should at once wage war against Philip by land; that the Roman should assist with a fleet having not less than twenty —five quinqueremes; that, of the cities between the Aetolian border and Corcyra the soil and buildings and city —walls, together with their territory, should belong to the Aetolians, all the rest of the booty to the Roman people; and that the Romans were to see to it that the Aetolians should have Acarnania. if the Aetolians should make peace with Philip they were to append to the treaty that the peace would be valid only in case Philip should refrain from war with the Romans and their allies and those who were subject to the latter. in like manner, if the Roman people should make a treaty with the king, they should take care that he have no right to invade the land of the Aetolians and their allies. these terms were agreed upon, and not until two years later were the texts set up, at Olympia by the Aetolians, on the Capitol by the Romans, that they might be attested by consecrated records. the reason for the delay had been the retention of the Aetolian envoys for a long time at Rome. and yet that did not hinder active measures. on the one hand the Aetolians at once began the war against Philip, on the other Laevinus captured Zacynthus. this is a small island, near Aetolia, and has one city of the same name as the island itself; that city he took by storm, except for its citadel. and after capturing Oeniadae and Nasus, belonging to the Acarnanians, he annexed them to Aetolia. thinking that Philip also was sufficiently involved in a war with neighbours to prevent him from having any possible thought of Italy and the Carthaginians and treaties with Hannibal, he himself retired to Corcyra. as Philip was wintering at Pella, the estrangement of the Aetolians was reported to him. accordingly , because he intended at the beginning of spring to move his army into Greece, in order that Macedonia should keep the Illyrians in her rear and the cities near them intimidated, he made a sudden incursion into the territories of Oricum and Apollonia, and when the Apollonians came out of their city, he drove them inside their walls, causing great panic and alarm. after ravaging the nearest parts of Illyricum, he changed the direction of his march with the same speed into Pelagonia. then he captured a city of the Dardanians, Sintia, as likely to afford a passage for the Dardanians into Macedonia. so much having been done in haste, mindful of the Aetolian war and the Roman war combined with it, he came down through Pelagonia and Lyncus and Bottiaea into Thessaly, believing that men could be aroused to join him in undertaking a war against the Aetolians, and leaving Perseus at the pass into Thessaly with four thousand armed men, to prevent the Aetolians from entering, he led his army, before he should be engaged in more important matters, into Macedonia and thence into Thrace and against the Maedi. that tribe had been in the habit of making raids into Macedonia, whenever it knew that the king was engaged in a foreign war and the kingdom unprotected. therefore to break its power he began at the same time to lay waste the country and to besiege the city of Iamphorynna, the capital and citadel of Maedica. Scopas , on learning that the king had gone into Thrace and was there occupied with a war, armed all the young men among the Aetolians and prepared to invade Acarnania. against these the Acarnanian tribe, inferior in strength, and at the same time seeing Oeniadae and Nasus lost and a war with Rome impending in addition, prepared for war out of resentment rather than calculation. sending away wives and children and the older men above sixty years to the nearest part of Epirus, from fifteen years of age up to sixty they took an oath that they would not return except as victors; should any man come out of the battle defeated, they drew up a dreadful curse upon their countrymen, a most solemn adjuration addressed to their hosts: that no one should receive that man into the city, into his house, to his table, to his hearth. and at the same time they besought the Epirotes to cover under one mound all of their men who were to fall in battle, and to set up this inscription for those they had buried: here lie the Acarnanians who, fighting for their country against the violence and injustice of the Aetolians, have met their death. having aroused their spirits by these means, they pitched camp facing the enemy at their very frontier. sending messengers to Philip to inform him how great was the danger, they compelled him to give up the war which he had on hand, after the surrender of Iamphorynna and in spite of his other successes. the Aetolians' attack was delayed at first by the report of the oath of the Acarnanians, and then news of Philip's approach forced them to retire far back into the interior. and Philip, although he had been making forced marches to prevent the Acarnanians from being overpowered, did not advance beyond Dium. thence , on hearing that the Aetolians had returned from Acarnania, he too returned to Pella. Laevinus at the beginning of spring set out by ship from Corcyra, rounded the promontory of Leucata, and on reaching Naupactus, made it known by an edict that he would proceed to Anticyra, and that Scopas and the Aetolians should meet him there. Anticyra is situated in Locris, on the left as one enters the Gulf of Corinth. it is a short journey by land, a short sail thither from Naupactus. about two days later the siege began from both sides. more serious was the attack from the sea, because the artillery and engines of all kinds were on the ships, also because it was the Romans who were besieging from that side. and -so within a few days the city surrendered and was turned over to the Aetolians, while the booty fell to the Romans in accordance with the agreement. a letter was delivered meanwhile to Laevinus informing him that in his absence he had been declared consul, and that his successor, Publius Sulpicius, was on the way. but contracting a long illness there, he came to Rome later than anyone had anticipated. Marcus Marcellus, having entered upon his consulship on the Ides of March, held a session of the senate on that day merely as a matter of custom, declaring that in the absence of his colleague he would do nothing concerning either the state or the provinces. he knew, he said, that a large number of Sicilians were near the city at the country —places of his detractors; that so far was it from being true that these men were not permitted by him to noise abroad openly at Rome the charges emanating from his personal foes, that he would himself immediately have given them a hearing in the senate but for their pretending no little fear to speak of the consul in the absence of his colleague. when indeed his colleague should arrive, he said, he would not allow any business to be taken up prior to the question of bringing the Sicilians before the senate. it was almost a levy that Marcus Cornelius had conducted all over Sicily, in order that as many as possible might come to Rome to complain of himself. he added that Cornelius had also filled the city with letters falsely stating that there was a war in Sicily, in order to detract from the praise of the speaker. after winning a reputation for moderation on that day, the consul dismissed the senate. and it seemed that public business would be almost at a standstill until the other consul should come to the city. inaction , as usual, stirred up talk among the common people. they kept complaining of the duration of the war and of the devastation of farms around the city, wherever Hannibal had passed with his hostile army; of the draining of Italy by levies, and of armies cut to pieces almost every year; and of the election to both consulships of men of war, with an excess of spirit and confidence, who even in unruffled peace were capable of stirring up war, and were still less likely in time of war to allow the state a breathing —spell. such utterances were interrupted on the night before the Quinquatrus by a fire which broke out in several places at once about the Forum. at the same time the seven shops which later were five, and the bankers' offices, now called Tabernae Novae, caught fire; then private houses took fire —for there were no basilicas then, —the quarter of the Quarries took fire, and the Fish Market and the Atrium Regium. the Temple of Vesta was saved with difficulty chiefly by the aid of thirteen slaves, who were purchased by the state and manumitted. the fire held on night and day, and no one doubted that it was the work of incendiaries, since the flames had burst out in several places at once, and places not adjacent at that. accordingly the consul on the authority of the senate declared before an assembly that any man who made known through whose action the fire had been kindled should have, if a freeman, money as his reward, if a slave, his freedom. led by that reward a slave of the Capuan Calavii —his name was Manus —declared that his masters, and in addition five young men, Capuan nobles, whose fathers had been beheaded by Quintus Fulvius, had set that fire, and would set others everywhere if they were not arrested. they were arrested, themselves and their slaves. and at first they tried to discredit the informer and the information. it was said that, having been punished by scourging the day before, he had left his masters; that owing to anger and worthless character he had made up a charge out of a chance occurrence. but when they were accused in the presence of the informer, and an examination of those who had served them in the crime began in the centre of the Forum, they all confessed, and punishment was visited upon the masters and their slave accomplices. the informer was given his liberty and twenty thousand asses. as the consul Laevinus was passing Capua, a multitude of Capuans flocked about him, begging him with tears to be permitted to go to the senate at Rome, to plead with them, if they could at last be touched by any sense of pity, not to proceed utterly to destroy them, and not to allow Quintus Flaccus to wipe out the Capuan people. Flaccus said that he had no personal quarrel with the Capuans; his enmity was national, and would be as long as he knew they were so disposed toward the Roman people. for no nation, no people in the world was more hostile to the Roman people. he was keeping them shut up inside the walls for the reason that, if any escaped in some way, they roamed like wild beasts over the country and mangled and slew all that met them. some had deserted, he said, to Hannibal, others had gone to set Rome on fire. in the half —burned Forum the consul would find traces of the crime of the Capuans. Vesta 's temple had been the object of attack, and the eternal fires, and, hidden away in its holy place, the fateful pledge of Roman rule. he did not think it at all safe to give the Capuans permission to enter the walls of Rome. after Flaccus had required the Capuans to take an oath that they would return to Capua on the fifth day after they should receive the senate's answer, Laevinus bade them follow him to Rome. surrounded by this multitude, while at the same time the Sicilians came out to meet him and followed him into Rome, he bore the appearance of a man grieving for the destruction of two very famous cities, and bringing into the city the vanquished in war to be the accusers of men of the greatest eminence. nevertheless it was in regard to the state and the provinces that the two consuls first introduced business into the senate. there Laevinus explained how matters stood with Macedonia and Greece, the Aetolians, Acarnanians and Locrians, and what had been his own achievements there by land and sea; that when Philip was on the point of invading Aetolia, he had driven him back into Macedonia, retiring into the very heart of his kingdom; and that the legion could be withdrawn from that country; that the fleet was enough to keep the king away from Italy. so much did the consul report in regard to himself and the province, his late command. then they both brought up the question of the provinces. the senate decreed that Italy and the war with Hannibal should be the province of one consul, that the other should have the fleet which Titus Otacilius had commanded and Sicily as his province, with Lucius Cincius, the praetor. to the consuls were assigned the two armies which were in Etruria and Gaul; these were four legions. the two city legions of the previous year were to be sent into Etruria; the two which Sulpicius had commanded as consul, into Gaul. Gaul and its legions were to be under the command of the man appointed by the consul whose province was Italy. Gaius Calpurnius was sent into Etruria after his praetorship, with his command extended for a year. and Capua was assigned as his province to Quintus Fulvius, his command also being extended for a year. a reduction in the army of citizens and allies was ordered, so that out of two legions should be formed one, five thousand infantry and three hundred horsemen, while those who had the largest number of campaigns were discharged; and of the allies there should remain only seven thousand infantry and three hundred horsemen, with the same reckoning of campaigns in discharging old soldiers. for Gnaeus Fulvius, consul in the previous year, no change was made either in regard to his province of Apulia, or as to the army he had held; his command was merely extended for a year. Publius Sulpicius, his colleague, was bidden to discharge his entire army, except the marines. from Sicily in the same way the army which Marcus Cornelius commanded was ordered to be discharged as soon as the consul should reach the province. in order to hold Sicily the soldiers from Cannae, amounting to about two legions, were given to Lucius Cincius, the praetor. the same number were assigned for Sardinia to Publius Manlius Volso, the praetor —legions which Lucius Cornelius had commanded in the same province the preceding year. as for the city legions, the consuls were ordered to enrol them, with the restriction that they should not enlist any man who had been in the army of Marcus Claudius, Marcus Valerius, or Quintus Fulvius, and that there should not be in that year more than twenty —one Roman legions. after these decrees of the senate were completed, the consuls cast lots for their provinces. Sicily and the fleet fell to Marcellus, Italy with the war against Hannibal to Laevinus. that allotment, just as if Syracuse had again been captured, so badly frightened the Sicilians, who were standing before the eyes of the consuls while awaiting the result, that their lamentation and tearful voices at once attracted the eyes of men and later occasioned remark. for they went the rounds of the senators' houses in mourning garb, asserting that they would not only leave, each group of them, their native city, but all Sicily, if Marcellus should return again in command. for no fault of theirs he had before been merciless to them; what would he do when angry, knowing that Sicilians had come to Rome to complain about himself? it was better for that island to be overwhelmed by the fires of Aetna or sunk in the strait than to be handed over as it were to a personal foe for punishment. these complaints of the Sicilians, at first circulated in the homes of the nobles, and repeated in conversations inspired partly by pity for the Sicilians, partly by antagonism to Marcellus, even reached the senate. it was demanded of the consuls that they raise in the senate the question of an exchange of provinces. Marcellus said that, if the Sicilians had already been heard by the senate, his opinion would perhaps have been different. as it was, to prevent any one from saying that they were restrained by fear from freely complaining about the man in whose power they would presently be, he was ready, if it was of no consequence to his colleague, to exchange his province. he deprecated, he said, a verdict from the senate in advance; for, granted that it would have been unfair for the choice of a province to be given to his colleague without casting lots, how much greater was the injustice, or rather the insult, if his own allotment should be transferred to that colleague? accordingly the senate adjourned, after showing what it favoured, but making no such decree. between themselves the consuls made an exchange of provinces, for Fate was sweeping Marcellus in the direction of Hannibal. the result was that he who, after the greatest reverses, had been the first to win from Hannibal the glory of a battle that was not a reverse, added to his opponent's fame, being the last of the Roman commanders to fall, at the very moment of success in the war. after the exchange of provinces the Sicilians were introduced into the senate, and spoke at length on the invariable loyalty of King Hiero towards the Roman people, laying that to the credit of the state. as for Hieronymus, and later, Hippocrates and Epicydes, the tyrants, they said they had themselves hated them for other reasons and especially because of their desertion from the Romans to Hannibal. on that account Hieronymus had been slain by the foremost of the young men, almost as if by a verdict of the people. and also to bring about the death of Epicydes and Hippocrates a conspiracy of seventy young men of the highest rank had been formed. these men, they said, had been left in the lurch by the delay of Marcellus, in that he had not brought up his army to Syracuse at the time named in advance, and when an informer appeared, they had all been slain by the tyrants. that tyranny also of Hippocrates and Epicydes had been provoked by Marcellus' cruel plundering of Leontini. after that, they said, leading men among the Syracusans had never ceased going over to Marcellus and promising that, whenever he wished it, they would tum the city over to him; but that at first he had preferred to take it by force; then, when after all his efforts he had proved unable to do so either by land or by sea, he had preferred to have the coppersmith Sosis and the Spaniard Moericus advocating the surrender of Syracuse, rather than the leading Syracusans, although these volunteered again and again to do so, but to no purpose. his motive, of course, was to have the more reasonable excuse for slaughtering and plundering the oldest allies of the Roman people. if it had been not Hieronymus that went over to Hannibal, but the Syracusan people and senate, if it had been the Syracusans that by an act of the state closed the gates to Marcellus, and not rather their tyrants, Hippocrates and Epicydes, after overpowering the Syracusans, if with the animus of Carthaginians they had waged war against the Roman people, what hostile deed could Marcellus have done beyond what he did do, unless it be to destroy Syracuse? certainly apart from the city —walls and the emptied houses and the sanctuaries of the gods, broken open and despoiled by removal of the statues of the gods themselves and their adornments, nothing had been left at Syracuse. their landed property also had been taken away from many, so that they could not support themselves and their families, even on the bare soil, with the help of what was left of their plundered possessions. they implored the conscript fathers, they said, if it was impossible for them to restore everything, to order that at least what was visible and could be identified be returned to the owners. after they had uttered such complaints and Laevinus had ordered them to leave the temple, that the fathers might be able to deliberate in regard to their demands, no , no, said Marcellus, let them wait, that I may answer them to their faces, since such are the terms on which we wage war in your behalf, conscript fathers, that we have men vanquished by our arms as accusers, and of the two cities captured this year Capua has Fulvius as its defendant, Syracuse has Marcellus. when the legates had been led back into the Senate House, the consul said: not so forgetful have I been of the majesty of the Roman people and of this authority of mine, conscript fathers, that if it were a question of a charge brought against me, I as consul would have pleaded my case with Greeks as my accusers. but it is not what I have done that is to be inquired into —for whatever I did in the case of enemies is defended by the law of war —but what they deserved to suffer. if they have not been enemies, it makes no difference whether it was recently or in the time of Hiero that I desolated Syracuse. but if they rebelled against the Roman people, if they attacked our ambassadors with sword and arms, closed their city and walls, defended them against us with an army of Carthaginians, who is indignant because they suffered hostile acts, when they have committed them? when leading men among the Syracusans tried to surrender the city, I rejected them; I preferred Sosis and Moericus the Spaniard as the men to whom I should entrust so important a matter. you are not Syracusans of the lowest rank, inasmuch as you reproach others with their humble station. who is there among you who promised that he would open the gates to me, that he would admit my soldiers under arms into the city? you hate and curse those who did so, and even here you do not refrain from uttering insults against them. so far is it from the truth that you also would have done anything of the sort. their humble rank, conscript fathers, of which those men make a reproach, is itself the strongest proof that I did not tum my back upon any man who wished to serve our state. before I laid siege to Syracuse, I endeavoured, now by sending embassies, now by going to a conference, to secure peace; again, it was not until after they showed no shame in injuring ambassadors, and no answer was given even to myself, when I met with their leading men at the gates, that, having endured many hardships on land and sea, I at last captured Syracuse by force of arms. of what befell the captured it is more reasonable for them to complain in the presence of Hannibal and the defeated Carthaginians than in the senate of a victorious nation. for myself, conscript fathers, if I had been intending to deny the despoiling of Syracuse, I should never be using its spoils to adorn the city of Rome. but in what I as victor either took from individuals or gave to them, I am quite sure that I acted both according to the law of war and in accordance with each man's desert. whether you confirm those acts, conscript fathers, or not, concerns the state more than myself. for my duty has been fully discharged; it is to the interest of the state that you do not make other commanders less energetic for the future by annulling my acts. and seeing that you have heard face to face the words of the Sicilians, and mine as well, conscript fathers, we shall leave the temple at the same time, so that in my absence the senate can deliberate with greater freedom. so the Sicilians were dismissed, and he himself withdrew to the Capitol to conduct the levy. the other consul laid the matter of the Sicilians' demands before the fathers. among them for a long time there was a conflict of opinions, and many senators, with Titus Manlius Torquatus as spokesman for that opinion, thought that they should have gone to war with the tyrants, enemies both of the Syracusans and of the Roman people, and that the city ought to have been taken over, not captured, and once taken over, should have been confirmed in the possession of its former laws and its freedom, not crushed by war when already exhausted by a pitiful slavery. they said that in the conflicts between the tyrants and the Roman commander the most beautiful and famous of cities, set up in the midst as a prize for the victor, had been destroyed, the granary and treasury formerly of the Roman people, for by its generous gifts on many occasions, and last of all in this very Punic war, the republic had been aided and enriched. if King Hiero, most faithful in his devotion to the Roman empire, should rise from the lower world, with what face could they show him either Syracuse or Rome, when after a backward look at his native city, half —ruined and despoiled, upon entering Rome he was to see in the forecourt of the city, almost at the gate, the spoils of his own city? although these words and others to the same effect were spoken in order to arouse hatred against the consul and pity for the Sicilians, the senate nevertheless adopted a milder decree: that the acts of Marcus Marcellus, during his conduct of the war and as victor, were to be ratified; for the future the Syracusan state would be cared for by the senate, and they would instruct the consul Laevinus to take measures for the property of its citizens, so far as could be done without loss to the republic. two senators were sent to the consul on the Capitol, that he should return to the Senate House; and after the Sicilians had been brought in, the decree of the senate was read. and the legates, dismissed with kind words, threw themselves down before the knees of Marcellus, the consul, imploring him to pardon what they had said in lamenting and seeking to mitigate their misfortune, and that he would take them and the city of Syracuse under his protection and patronage. making this promise the consul spoke to them gently and dismissed them. the Campanians then had their hearing in the senate, and their speech was more pitiful, their case more difficult. for they could not deny that punishment had been deserved, nor were there tyrants on whom they could throw the blame. but they believed that a sufficient penalty had been paid, since so many senators had been carried off by poison, so many executed by beheading; that few of the nobles survived, whom neither their conscience had prompted to do violence to themselves, nor an angry victor had condemned to death. those were the men who were begging, they said, for freedom for themselves and their families and for some part of their property, being Roman citizens, linked to them in many cases through relations by marriage, and now by close blood relations in consequence of their long —established right of intermarriage. then after they had been conducted out of the temple, there was for a short time hesitation whether Quintus Fulvius should be summoned from Capua —for Claudius, the consul, had died after the capture of the city —in order that the discussion might go on in the presence of the general who had conducted the campaign, just as it had been carried on between Marcellus and the Sicilians. then , when they saw Flaccus' lieutenants in the senate, namely his brother Gaius Fulvius and Marcus Atilius, also Claudius' lieutenants, Quintus Minucius and Lucius Veturius Philo, men who had witnessed everything that was done, and they did not wish Fulvius to be recalled from Capua nor the Campanians to be put off, Marcus Atilius Regulus, who had the greatest influence of all the men who had been at Capua, was asked his opinion. i testify, he said, that I was one of the advisers to the consuls when, after the capture of Capua, the question was raised whether there was anyone of the Campanians who had deserved well of our republic. it was ascertained that there were two women only, Vestia Oppia, of Atella, domiciled at Capua, and Pacula Cluvia, who had formerly been a harlot; that the former had sacrificed every day for the safety and victory of the Roman people, and the latter had secretly supplied food to needy captives; that all the rest of the Campanians had had the same feelings towards us as had the Carthaginians; and those beheaded by Quintus Fulvius were the men whose rank rather than their guilt was conspicuous among the others. i do not see that it is possible for action to be taken by the senate in regard to the Campanians, who are Roman citizens, without the command of the people; and I see that in the time of our ancestors also the procedure in the case of the Satricani, after their revolt, was that Marcus Antistius, tribune of the plebs, first introduced a bill, and the plebs voted that the senate should have the right to pronounce judgment upon the men of Satricum. accordingly I think that we must persuade the tribunes of the plebs that one or more of them should propose to the plebs a bill by which we should be given the right to decide in regard to the Campanians. Lucius Atilius, tribune of the plebs, by authority of the senate brought before the plebs a bill in these terms: all the Capuans, Atellani, Calatini, Sabatini, who under Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, surrendered themselves to the will and authority of the Roman people, and the menwhom they have surrendered along with themselves, and the possessions which they have surrendered along with themselves, the land and the city, property of gods and property of men, and implements or anything else that they have surrendered —concerning those matters, Quirites, I ask you what you wish to be done. the plebs ordered as follows: what the senate under oath, a majority of those present, shall decree, that is our wish and command. in accordance with this plebiscite the senate, on being consulted, restored to Oppia and Cluvia first their property and their freedom: if they wished to request other compensations from the senate, it ordered them to come to Rome. for the Capuans, family by family, decrees were passed, which it is not worth while to recount in full. the property of some of them was to be confiscated, themselves and their children and wives sold, except the daughters who, before they became subject to the authority of the Roman people, had married into other communities. others were to be put in chains and action concerning them considered later. in the case of other Capuans they graded their census rating also, to determine whether their property should be confiscated or not. as for captured cattle, except horses, they decreed that they be restored to their owners, and slaves, except adult males, also everything which was not attached to the soil. all Capuans, Atellani, Calatini, Sabatini, except such of them as had been with the enemy, either themselves or their fathers, were to be free men, it was ordered, with the reservation that no one of them should be a Roman citizen or reckoned a Latin, and that no one of them who had been at Capua while the gates were closed should remain in the city or in the territory of Capua beyond a certain date; that a region across the Tiber, but not touching the Tiber, be given them as a dwelling —place. as for those who during the war had not been in Capua nor in a Campanian city which had revolted from the Roman people, it was voted that these should be removed this side of the Liris river in the direction of Rome; and that those who had come over to the Romans before Hannibal came to Capua should be removed this side of the Volturnus, no one of them to have land or building nearer the sea than fifteen miles. of those removed across the Tiber, neither the men themselves nor their descendants were to acquire or hold anywhere except in the districts of Veii, Sutrium or Nepete, with the provision that no one was to have a larger amount of land than fifty iugera. the property of all senators and of those who had held office at Capua, Atella, Calatia they ordered to be sold at Capua; that the free persons who, it had been voted, should be offered for sale be sent to Rome and sold at Rome. images , statues of bronze, which were said to have been captured from the enemy, they referred to the college of pontiffs, to decide which of them were sacred and which profane. in view of these decrees the Campanians were much sadder when dismissed than when they had come to Rome. and no longer did they lay the blame upon the harshness of Quintus Fulvius towards them, but upon the partiality of the gods and their accursed fortune. the Sicilians and Campanians having been sent away, a levy was held. then , once an army had been enrolled, they began to take up the question of recruiting more oarsmen. for this purpose, inasmuch as there was neither a sufficient supply of men, nor any money at that time in the treasury out of which they might be procured and receive their pay, the consuls in an edict ordered that private citizens according to their census and classes, as before, should furnish oarsmen, with pay and rations for thirty days. in response to that edict there was such protest among the people, such indignation, that what was lacking for an uprising was a leader rather than fuel. next after the Sicilians and Campanians the consuls, they said, had taken upon themselves the task of ruining and destroying the Roman populace. exhausted by tribute for so many years, they had nothing left but the land, bare and desolate. their houses had been burned by the enemy, the slaves who tilled the soil had been taken away by the state, now by purchase at a low price for military service, now by impressing them as oarsmen. if a man had any money in silver or bronze, it had been taken away for the pay of oarsmen and the yearly taxes. as for themselves, they could not be compelled by any force, by any authority, to give what they did not have. let their property be sold, let their bodies —all that remained —be harshly treated; not even for the purposes of a ransom was anything left to them. such were the complaints of a great multitude, not in secret, but openly in the Forum and even before the eyes of the consuls, as they flocked about them. and the consuls, now upbraiding, now consoling, were unable to quiet them. thereupon they said that they gave the people three days for reflection, a time which they themselves employed in looking into the matter and seeking a solution. the following day they held a session of the senate on the recruiting of more oarsmen. there , after setting forth many reasons why refusal on the part of the populace was fair, they so far altered their language as to say that the burden, whether fair or unfair, must be laid upon private citizens. for from what source were they to get crews, when there was no money in the treasury? and without fleets how could either Sicily be held, or Philip kept away from Italy, or the coasts of Italy be safe? when in this difficult situation wisdom faltered, and a kind of lethargy had almost taken possession of men's minds, Laevinus, the consul, said that, as magistrates are superior to the senate in dignity, and as the senate is superior to the people, so ought they to be leaders in shouldering all that was hard and drastic. if there is a duty which you wish to lay upon an inferior, and you first set up the same obligation as against yourself and your family, you more readily find everyone submitting. and the outlay is not burdensome, when they see every prominent man taking upon himself more than his share in it. accordingly , if we wish the Roman people to have fleets and equip them, and private citizens to furnish oarsmen without protest, let us first impose that upon ourselves. gold , silver, coined bronze, let us senators bring it all into the treasury tomorrow, with the reservation that each is to leave a ring for himself and for his wife and his children, and a bulla for a son, and those who have a wife or daughters may leave for each an ounce of gold by weight. of silver those who have occupied curule chairs may leave horse —trappings and one pound each, so that they may keep a salt —cellar and a saucer for offerings to the gods. the rest of the senators may leave only a pound of silver. of coined bronze let us leave five thousand asses to each paterfamilias. all the rest of the gold, silver, coined bronze let us forthwith deposit with the bank commissioners, without first making any decree of the senate, so that a voluntary contribution and competition in helping the republic may stir up to rivalry, first the spirit of the knightly order, and then of the plebeians as well. this is the one way we consuls have found, after conferring together at length; enter upon it with the kind aid of the gods! the commonwealth, if preserved, easily assures the preservation of private wealth also. in betraying what belongs to the commonwealth one tries in vain to save one's own possessions. to these words agreement was so spirited that they actually thanked the consuls. the senate then adjourned, and each man brought his own gold and silver and bronze into the treasury, while such rivalry was aroused to have their names the first or among the first men on the public records, that neither were the commissioners equal to the task of receiving nor the clerks to that of making the entries. the knightly order followed this unanimity of the senate, the populace that of the knights. Thus without an edict, without constraint on the part of any magistrate, the state lacked neither oarsmen to fill the complement nor their pay; also every preparation for war being complete, the consuls set out for their provinces. and there was no other time in the war when Carthaginians and Romans, equally involved in changing fortunes, were in a more uncertain state of hope and fear. that is, for the Romans, in the provinces, defeat in Spain on the one hand, success in Sicily on the other, had mingled sorrow and rejoicing; so also in Italy the capture of Tarentum brought loss and grief, while the retention of the citadel and garrison contrary to expectation brought joy. and the sudden alarm and panic when the city of Rome was beset and attacked was turned into gladness by the taking of Capua a few days later. overseas also were events balanced with a certain alternation: Philip's turning enemy at an inopportune moment, the addition of the Aetolians and Attalus, King of Asia, as new allies, just as if fortune were now pledging to the Romans rule over the East. the Carthaginians likewise balanced the capture of Tarentum against the loss of Capua; and although they made it their boast that they had reached the walls of the city of Rome with no one preventing, yet they were annoyed at the failure of their undertaking and ashamed to find themselves so scorned that, while they were sitting before the walls of Rome, out of another gate marched a Roman army bound for Spain. as for their Spanish provinces, the nearer they had come to the hope that, after the slaughter of two great commanders and armies, the war there was over and the Romans driven out, the more indignation did those very provinces arouse that the victory had been rendered null and void by Lucius Marcius, an emergency commander. Thus with Fortune maintaining the balance, there was general suspense for both sides, hope remaining unchanged, fear unchanged, as though they were then for the first time beginning the war. Hannibal was above all else distressed that Capua, besieged with more persistence by the Romans than it was defended by himself, had estranged from him many peoples in Italy, not all of whom could he hold by garrisons, unless he were willing to parcel out his army in many small detachments, which was not at all to his advantage at that time. nor on the other hand could he by withdrawing his garrisons leave the loyalty of allies free to hope or exposed to fear. naturally inclined to greed and cruelty, his temperament favoured despoiling what he was unable to protect, in order to leave desolated lands to the enemy. that policy was shameful in the beginning, and especially so in the outcome. for not only were those who suffered undeserved treatment alienated, but all the rest as well; for the lesson reached larger numbers than did the suffering. nor did the Roman consul fail to work upon the feelings of cities, if any hope had showed itself from any quarter. at Salapia Dasius and Blattius were leading citizens. Dasius was friendly to Hannibal, Blattius promoted the Roman cause so far as he safely could, and through secret messengers had roused in Marcellus a hope of betrayal. but without the aid of Dasius the matter could not be carried out. after much hesitation for a long time, and even then rather owing to the lack of a better plan than with the hope of success, he addressed himself to Dasius. but Dasius, being not only averse to the project, but also unfriendly to one who was his rival for the highest position, disclosed the matter to Hannibal. when both had been summoned, and Hannibal on the tribune was occupied with certain business, intending presently to hear the case of Blattius, and accuser and defendant were standing there, while the crowd had been cleared away, Blattius addressed himself to Dasius on the treason. Dasius , to be sure, as though the evidence was clear, cried out that before Hannibal's eyes he was being urged to tum traitor. to Hannibal and his assessors the matter seemed less credible as being so bold. it was only their rivalry and hatred surely, they said, and the charge brought was of a sort in which the fabricator had the more freedom because it could not have a witness. so they were discharged. and Blattius did not desist from so bold an undertaking until by dinning the same story into his ears, and by showing how advantageous for themselves and their native city it was, he prevailed upon Dasius to have the Carthaginian garrison —now it consisted of five hundred Numidians —and Salapia surrendered to Marcellus; and it was not without much bloodshed that it could be surrendered. they were far the bravest horsemen in the entire Carthaginian army. accordingly , although the attack was unexpected, and they had no use of their horses in the city, nevertheless catching up their arms in the midst of the uproar, they attempted a sally, and being unable to escape, they fell fighting to the last, and not more than fifty of them came alive into the hands of the enemy. the loss of this regiment of cavalry was considerably more serious for Hannibal than that of Salapia. and at no later time was the Carthaginian superior in cavalry, in which had been easily his greatest strength. about the same time, when in the citadel of Tarentum scarcity was barely endurable, the Roman garrison posted there and Marcus Livius, the commander of the garrison and citadel, had all their hopes in supplies sent from Sicily; and that these might safely pass along the coast of Italy, a fleet of about twenty ships lay at anchor at Regium. commanding the fleet and in charge of supplies was Decimus Quinctius, a man of unknown family, but made famous as a soldier by many brave deeds. at first only five ships, of which the largest were two triremes, had been assigned to him by Marcellus. later , as he repeatedly showed energy, three quinqueremes were added. finally by personally demanding from the allies and from Regium and Velia and Paestum the ships due under the treaty, he formed a fleet of twenty ships, as has been said above. this fleet had sailed from Regium when Democrates with an equal number of Tarentine ships met it off Sapriportis, about fifteen miles from the city. at that time the Roman, as it happened, was approaching under sail, not foreseeing an impending battle. but in the neighbourhood of Croton and Sybaris he had fully manned the ships with oarsmen, and had a fleet remarkably equipped and armed considering the size of the ships. and it happened then that about the same time the wind dropped entirely and the enemy came in sight, with the result that time enough was left to take down the rigging and to get the oarsmen and soldiers ready for the battle that was imminent. seldom have regular fleets ever clashed with such spirit, since they were fighting for a greater issue than themselves. the Tarentines, having regained their city from the Romans after almost a hundred years, fought to free the citadel as well, in the hope that they would cut off the enemy's supplies also, if by a naval battle they should deprive them of their command of the sea; the Romans, in order to show by keeping their hold upon the citadel that Tarentum had been lost, not by force and courage, but by treachery and a surprise. accordingly after the signal had been given on both sides, and they had encountered each other with their beaks and did not reverse their motion with oars nor allow the enemy to cast loose from them, a commander closing in on a ship would throw grappling —irons on it, and they engaged in a battle at such close quarters that they fought not only with missiles, but also with swords, almost man to man. the bows in contact could not detach themselves, the sterns were swung about by the efforts of the enemy's oarsmen. so closely massed together were the ships that hardly a missile fell without effect between them into the sea. forming each a front, like a battle —line on land, they tried to push each other back, and the ships were a highway for the combatants. conspicuous , however, among all the rest was the battle between the two ships which had encountered each other at the head of the columns. on the Roman ship was Quinctius himself, on the Tarentine was Nico, surnamed Perco, who hated the Romans and was hated by them with a hatred that was not only national but also personal, because he was of the party which had betrayed Tarentum to Hannibal. as Quinctius was fighting and at the same time encouraging his men, Nico ran him through with a spear while off his guard. when Quinctius with his weapons fell forward over the bow, the victorious Tarentine boldly crossed over on to the ship thrown into confusion by the loss of its commander; and when he had driven the enemy back, and the bow was now in the hands of the Tarentines, while the Romans, massed together, were vainly defending the stern, suddenly another trireme of the enemy also appeared astern. Thus the Roman ship was caught between them and captured. consequently alarm was inspired on the rest of the ships when they saw the flagship captured. and as they fled in all directions, some were sunk in open water, others were quickly rowed to the shore and presently fell a prey to the men of Thurii and Metapontum. of the transports, which were following with the supplies, very few fell into the power of the enemy. the rest shifted their sails obliquely, now this way, now that, according to the variable winds, and put out to sea. by no means so successful was the fighting at Tarentum during those days. for while about four thousand men who had gone out to get grain were roaming about the country, Livius, who was in command of the citadel and the Roman garrison, was alert for every opportunity of an engagement. he sent out from the citadel Gaius Persius, an active man, with two thousand five hundred armed men. after Persius, attacking men widely dispersed over the farms and wandering about, had for a long time been slaying them everywhere, he drove the few survivors into the city, as in their excited flight they dashed into the half —opened gates. and by that same onslaught the city was all but taken. Thus were issues balanced near Tarentum, the Romans being victors on land, the Tarentines on the sea. the hope of grain —a hope which had been very real —was equally illusory for both sides. about the same time, when a large part of the year had already gone by, Laevinus, the consul, arrived in Sicily awaited by the old and the new allies. accordingly he thought it of the very first importance to settle affairs that were in disorder at Syracuse owing to the short time since the peace. then he led his legions to Agrigentum, being the last remnant of the war and held by a strong garrison of Carthaginians. and in fact fortune favoured the undertaking. Hanno was the general of the Carthaginians, but all their hope continued to rest upon Muttines and the Numidians. roaming all over Sicily, Muttines was carrying off booty from allies of the Romans, and he could neither be shut off from Agrigentum by force or by any ruse, nor be prevented from sallying out whenever he pleased. this distinction of the man, as already eclipsing the reputation even of the general, finally developed into hatred, so that not even successes any longer brought much joy to Hanno on account of the man who was responsible for them. finally he gave Muttines' command of the cavalry to his own son, thinking that with the command he would take away his prestige also among the Numidians. but it turned out quite differently. for by his own unpopularity he even increased the old —time partiality for Muttines. and the latter did not put up with a shameful wrong, but at once sent secret messengers to Laevinus in regard to the betrayal of Agrigentum. these men having reassured the consul and arranged a plan of action, the Numidians seized the gate leading toward the sea, driving away or slaying the guards; whereupon they admitted Romans sent for that very purpose into the city. and when now they were marching in column into the centre of the city and to the market —place with a great uproar, Hanno, thinking it was nothing more than an outbreak and mutiny of the Numidians, as had happened before also, went forth to quell the uprising. but when he caught sight of a crowd in the distance larger than the number of the Numidians, and the shouts of the Romans, by no means unfamiliar, had reached his ears, he took to flight before coming within range of a missile. escaping by the gate farthest from the enemy and taking Epicydes as his companion, with a few men he made his way to the sea. and fortunately finding a small vessel and leaving Sicily, for which the struggle had lasted so many years, to the enemy, they crossed over to Africa. while the rest of the Carthaginians and Sicilians in a body, without even attempting to fight, were blindly fleeing, and ways of escape had been closed, they were slain near the gates. on gaining possession of the town, Laevinus scourged and beheaded the responsible men at Agrigentum, and sold the rest and the booty. all the money he sent to Rome. when the news of the disaster to the Agrigentines had been carried all over Sicily, suddenly there was a general trend towards the Romans. soon after that, twenty towns were betrayed, six taken by assault; by voluntary surrender about forty came under Roman protection. after the consul had bestowed upon the leading men of these states the reward or the penalty that each deserved, and had compelled the Sicilians to lay down their arms at last and tum their attention to tilling the soil, so that the island might not only produce food enough for the inhabitants, but might relieve the grain market of the city of Rome and of Italy, as it had often done on many occasions, he took with him an unruly mob from Agathyrna over into Italy. there were four thousand men, refuse of every kind, exiles, debtors, guilty, many of them, of capital offences, so long as they had lived in their own cities and under the laws; and they were dragging out an existence by highway robbery and plundering, after their common misery, for one reason or another, had concentrated them at Agathyrna. these men Laevinus did not think it quite safe to leave on the island, then for the first time attaining unity under the recent peace, as they furnished fuel for a revolution, and at the same time would prove useful to the men of Regium, who were looking for a band accustomed to brigandage, in order to devastate the Bruttian territory. and so far as concerned Sicily the war was finished that year. in Spain at the beginning of spring Publius Scipio launched his ships, and after summoning the allied auxiliaries to Tarraco by an edict, he ordered the fleet and the transports to sail thence to the mouth of the river Ebro. having ordered the legions to leave their winter quarters and meet at the same point, he himself with five thousand allies set out from Tarraco to join the army. arrived there, and thinking he must address particularly the old soldiers, survivors of defeats so serious, he summoned the men to an assembly and spoke as follows: "No new general in command before me has been able with reason and deservedly to thank his soldiers before he had made use of their services. in my case, before I could see my province or camp, Fortune laid me under obligation to you, in the first place because you have showed such devotion towards my father and uncle, living and dead, and then because, when possession of the province had been lost by so great a disaster, you by your courage have held it intact both for me as their successor and for the Roman people. but now with the favour of the gods we are preparing and striving, not to remain in Spain ourselves, but to prevent the Carthaginians from remaining, and not to stand on the bank of the Ebro and keep the enemy from crossing, but taking the offensive to cross over and shift the scene of the war. consequently I am afraid that that design may seem to some of you too great and too bold to be in keeping either with the memory of disasters recently incurred or with my years. as for the reverses in Spain, there is no man from whose mind it is less possible for them to be effaced than from mine, for my father and uncle fell within the space of thirty days, that for our family one fatality might be piled upon another. but although within the family it is crushing to be all but orphaned and left desolate, yet the destiny of the state and her courage forbid me to despair of the final issue. it is a lot assigned to us by some fate that in all the great wars we have been first defeated and then victorious. " Ancient examples I pass over, Porsenna, the Gauls, the Samnites. i shall begin with the Punic Wars. how many fleets, how many generals, how many armies were lost in the former war! and now in the present war what shall I say has happened? in every disaster I was either present myself, or if absent, I above all others felt them. Trebia , Trasumennus, Cannae, what are they but memorials of Roman armies and consuls fallen? add the revolt of Italy, of the greater part of Sicily, of Sardinia; add that extreme of alarm and panic, a Carthaginian camp pitched between the Anio and the walls of Rome, and the sight of a victorious Hannibal almost at the gates. in this general crash the one thing left standing, intact and immovable, was the courage of the Roman people. it was this that raised and set up all the scattered debris. when Hasdrubal after the rout at Cannae was on his way to the Alps and Italy —and if he had joined his brother even the name of the Roman people would be no more —you were the very first, soldiers, to stand in his path under the command and auspices of my father. and victory here has upheld defeats there. now by the favour of the gods everything in Italy and Sicily is flourishing and successful, more cheering and better from day to day. in Sicily Syracuse and Agrigentum have been captured, the enemy driven out of the entire island, and the recovered province is under the rule of the Roman people. in Italy Arpi has been recovered, Capua taken. the entire road from the city of Rome has been traversed in nervous flight by Hannibal, who, driven into that remotest region, the Bruttian land, now prays the gods for nothing greater than that he may be allowed to retire in safety and leave the enemy's country. what therefore is less consistent, soldiers, than that, while disasters were being piled one upon another and the gods themselves, one might almost say, were on Hannibal's side, you here under my fathers —for let them be coupled in that honourable name also —upheld the wavering fortune of the Roman people, but that at present, when in Italy everything is now favourable and encouraging, you, the same men, should be faint —hearted? recent occurrences also I could wish had been as free from sorrow for me as . . . ... Now the immortal gods, who are protectors of the Roman empire, who inspired all the centuries of the people to order that the command be bestowed upon me, by auguries, auspices and even visions in the night are likewise forecasting only joy and success. my own mind as well, heretofore my greatest soothsayer, foresees that Spain is ours, that soon all the Carthaginians, banished from here, will cover seas and lands with their disgraceful flight. what the mind of itself divines undeluded reasoning also suggests. harassed by them their allies through embassies are begging for our help. three generals, unable to agree, so that they have almost proved disloyal to each other, have dispersed their army in three parts in widely scattered regions. the same fortune which lately crushed us is assailing them. for they are being deserted by their allies, as formerly were we by the Celtiberians, and also they have separated their armies, which was the cause of destruction for my father and uncle. neither will internal strife permit them to unite, nor will they be able singly to resist us. only do you, soldiers, look with favour upon the name of the Scipios, upon the scion of your generals, growing again, as it were, from stems that have been cut down. come now, veterans, lead a new army and a new commander across the Ebro, lead them over into lands often traversed by you with many deeds of bravery. just as now you note in me a resemblance to my father and uncle in face and countenance and recognize the lines of the figure, so I will soon take pains to reproduce for you an image of their minds, of their loyalty and courage, so that each man shall say that there has come back to life, or has been born again, his general Scipio. having fired the spirits of the soldiers by this speech, and leaving for the defence of the region Marcus Silanus with three thousand infantry and three hundred horsemen, all the rest of the forces — and they were twenty —five thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry —he led across the Ebro. there , although some tried to persuade him that, since the Carthaginian armies had withdrawn into three regions so widely scattered, he should attack the nearest of them, he thought there was danger that by doing so he might cause them all to concentrate and one army might not be a match for so many armies. consequently he decided meanwhile to lay siege to New Carthage, a city both itself rich in its own resources and filled with the enemy's warlike equipment of every kind. there were his arms, there his money, there hostages from all Spain. furthermore the city was not only situated favourably for the passage to Africa, but also on a harbour ample enough for the greatest fleet, and perhaps the only port on the coast of Spain where it faces our sea. not a man except Gaius Laelius knew whither they were going. he was sent with the fleet round the headlands, under previous orders so to regulate the speed of his ships that Scipio might display his army on the landward side at the same time that the fleet was entering the harbour. on the seventh day from the Ebro they reached (New) Carthage by sea and land at the same time. camp was pitched opposite the city where it faces the north. at the rear of the camp —for the front was protected by nature —an earthwork was thrown up. for the situation of (New) Carthage is as follows: there is an arm of the sea about half —way down the coast of Spain, a bay that mainly faces the southwest wind and makes inland about two miles and a half, with a breadth of little more than a mile and one —fifth. at the mouth of this bay a small island facing the harbour on the seaward side makes it safe from all winds except the southwest. from the innermost part of the bay a peninsula runs out, the very hill on which the city was built, skirted by sea on the east and the south. on the west a lagoon hems the city in, extending somewhat to the north also; it is of varying depth according as the sea is coming in or going out. with the mainland a ridge about two hundred and fifty paces wide connects the city. although fortification on this side would have involved so little labour, the Roman commander did not throw up an earthwork, whether as proudly displaying his confidence to the enemy, or that, as he repeatedly approached the walls of the city, retirement might be open to him. having completed such other works of fortification as were necessary, he drew up the ships also in the harbour, as though to display a blockade from the sea as well. and making the round of the fleet he reminded the commanders of the vessels to keep a close watch at night, saying that a blockaded enemy at first makes every attempt wherever possible. he then returned to the camp to explain to the soldiers the reason for his plan, in having elected to begin the campaign with the siege of a city, and in order that by encouraging them he might inspire the hope of its capture, called an assembly, and spoke as follows: if any man believes that you have been brought here to besiege a single city, he has justly reckoned your labour, soldiers, rather than the profit. for it is true that you are to attack the walls of a single city, but in that single city you will have taken the whole of Spain. here are the hostages of all the important kings and peoples; and once they are in your power, they will immediately surrender all that is now subject to the Carthaginians. here is all the money of the enemy, without which, inasmuch as they maintain mercenary armies, they are incapable of waging war, while it will be of the greatest service to us in winning the support of the barbarians. here are their artillery, their arms, all their war material, which will equip you and at the same time will strip the enemy. furthermore we shall gain possession of a city very beautiful and very rich, likewise most convenient in its remarkable harbour, from which by land and sea everything which the needs of war demand may be supplied. we shall not only have these great advantages ourselves, but shall deprive the enemy of things much more important. this is their citadel, this is their granary, their treasury, their arsenal, this their storehouse for everything. to this port lies the direct course from Africa; this is the one roadstead between the Pyrenees and Gades; from this Africa menaces the whole of Spain. . . . . . . had provided them with arms. when he saw the preparations for a siege by land and sea, he also disposed his troops as follows: two thousand of the townsmen he stationed against the enemy on that side on which lay the Roman camp; the citadel he garrisoned with five hundred soldiers; five hundred he posted on the hill in the city towards the east; the rest of the multitude he ordered to be on the alert in every direction and to confront the enemy wherever shouting or an emergency should call them. then opening the gate he sent out the men he had drawn up on a street leading towards the camp of the enemy. the Romans, instructed by the general himself, drew back for a short time, that they might be nearer the reinforcements to be sent in the midst of the engagement. and at first the battle —lines stood fairly matched; then reinforcements sent again and again from the camp not only put the enemy to flight, but so pressed upon them in their disorder that, if Scipio had not sounded the recall, they would, it seemed, have mingled with the fugitives, and burst into the city. but the alarm in the battle was no greater than that throughout the city. many positions were deserted in panic and flight, and the walls were abandoned, when the men had leaped down, each taking the shortest way. when this was noticed by Scipio, who had climbed the hill which they call Mercury's Hill, namely, that at many points the walls were stripped of defenders, he gave orders to call all the men out of camp, to advance to the attack upon the city and to bring ladders. he himself, while three strong young men held their shields in front of him —for a great number of missiles of every kind were flying from the walls —came up to the city, gave encouragement and pertinent orders, and, what was of most importance in firing the soldiers' spirits, he was there as witness and spectator of every man's courage or cowardice. and so men dashed on in the face of wounds and missiles, and neither walls nor armed men standing on them could restrain them from vying with each other in the attempt to climb. and at the same time from the ships an attack began upon that part of the city which is washed by the sea. but from that side they were able to create an uproar rather than to launch an attack. in making fast, in hastily landing ladders and men, in their impatience to get ashore, each the shortest way, they hindered one another by their very haste and rivalry. meanwhile the Carthaginian had now fully manned the walls with armed men, and he had a great number of missiles ready at hand out of his immense reserves. but neither men nor missiles nor anything else defended the walls so much as the walls were their own defence. for few ladders could reach to their height, and the higher these were the weaker. and so since the highest man could not climb over, but nevertheless others kept coming up, the ladders were breaking by the mere weight. some men, although the ladders stood, owing to the dizziness produced by the height fell to the ground. and while everywhere men and ladders were dropping, and the enemies' boldness and zest were increasing just because of their success, the signal for the recall was given. this gave the besieged not only the hope of present respite from such conflict and effort, but also confidence for the future that the city could not be taken by ladders and encirclement; that siege —works were difficult and would also give time for their generals to bring aid. hardly had the first uproar been stilled when Scipio orders the ladders to be taken from men now weary and wounded, by others who were fresh and uninjured, and that an attack in greater force should be made upon the city. as for himself, having been informed by fishermen of Tarraco who had crossed the lagoon everywhere, now in light vessels, now, when these would go aground, through shallow water, that an easy crossing on foot up to the wall was possible, Scipio, when word was brought to him that the tide was ebbing, led five hundred armed men with him to the place. it was about the middle of the day, and in addition to the draining away of the water of itself as the tide ebbed seaward, a fierce north wind also had sprung up and was carrying the receding lagoon in the same direction as the tide, and had so laid bare the shoals that in one place the water was up to the navel only, in another scarcely reached beyond the knees. what he had ascertained by painstaking and calculation, Scipio represented as a miracle and an act of the gods, who for the passage of the Romans were diverting the sea, he said, and draining lakes and opening up ways never before trodden by man's foot. and he bade them to follow Neptune as their guide on the march, and to make their way straight across the lagoon to the walls. on the landward side it was a very serious task for men approaching the walls; and they were hindered not only by the height of these, but also because the defenders had the attacking Romans doubly exposed to wounds on the right and on the left, so that as they approached their sides were in greater danger than the front of their bodies. but on the other side of the city the five hundred found both an easy passage across the lagoon and then an easy climb to the top of the wall. for it had not been built up to the full height, since they had sufficient confidence in the protection offered by the position itself and by the lagoon, and there was no post of armed men nor a guard to confront them, since all were intent upon bringing aid to any quarter from which danger was indicated. having entered the city without a struggle, they then proceeded with all possible speed to the gate round which the whole battle had been brought on. on that fighting so intent were not only the minds, but also the eyes and ears of all the fighters and spectators and of those who were encouraging the fighters, that no one was aware that the city had been captured in their rear until missiles fell upon their backs and they had the enemy on both front and rear. then as the defenders were panic —stricken, the walls were captured and men began to batter down the gate at the same time from within and from without. and presently, when the gates had been chopped to pieces and dragged off, so as not to block the passage, the armed men charged. a great multitude climbed over the wall also, but they scattered in all directions to slay the townspeople. the regular formation which had entered the gate made its way with its officers and its ranks through the centre of the city even into the market —place. from that point Scipio saw the enemy fleeing down two streets, one party towards the hill facing the east and held by a garrison of five hundred soldiers, the rest into the citadel, into which Mago also with nearly all the armed men who had been beaten back from the walls had fled for refuge. accordingly he sent part of his forces to storm the hill, and himself led a part to the citadel. the hill was taken at the first assault, and Mago, who attempted to defend the citadel, seeing the whole city filled with the enemy and that there was no hope, surrendered himself and the citadel with its garrison. until the surrender of the citadel there was slaughter everywhere throughout the city, and they did not spare any adult who met them. then the signal was given and an end was made of slaughter. the victors turned to the spoils, which were immense and of every kind. of male free men about ten thousand were captured. from that number Scipio released those who were citizens of New Carthage and restored to them their city and also all the property which the war had spared to them. the artisans numbered about two thousand men. these he announced would be public slaves of the Roman people, with the not distant hope of freedom if they should actively exert themselves in providing the equipment for war. the rest of the multitude, made up of young non —citizens and strong slaves, he turned over to the fleet to recruit the oarsmen; and he had enlarged the fleet by eight captured ships. apart from this multitude were the Spanish hostages, who were cared for just as if they were the children of allies. captured also was a vast amount of war material: a hundred and twenty catapults of the largest model, two hundred and eighty —one of the smaller; twenty —three larger ballistae, fifty —two smaller; larger and smaller scorpions and arms and missile weapons, a vast number; seventy —four military standards. of gold also and silver a large quantity was brought to the general. there were two hundred and seventy —six gold paterae, nearly all of them weighing a pound; of silver, the unwrought and coined, there were eighteen thousand three hundred pounds, of silver vessels a large number. all of these, after weighing and counting, were delivered to Gaius Flaminius, the quaestor. of wheat there were four hundred thousand pecks; of barley two hundred and seventy thousand. sixty -three merchantmen were attacked and captured in the harbour, some with their cargoes, grain, arms, also bronze and iron and linen and Spanish broom and ship timber also for the building of a fleet, so that in the midst of these great resources for the war that were captured (New) Carthage itself was the smallest part of it all. on that day Scipio, after ordering Gaius Laelius with the marines to guard the city, himself led the legions back into camp. and as the soldiers were exhausted by all the warlike operations combined in a single day —since they had fought in line of battle, and in taking the city had been involved in such exertion and danger, and after the capture had contended, on unfavourable ground at that, with those who had sought refuge in the citadel —he ordered them to rest. on the following day he called together the soldiers and marines, and first praised and thanked the immortal gods, who had made him master in a single day, not only of the richest of all the cities in Spain, but had previously accumulated there all the resources of Africa and Spain, so that nothing was left to the enemy, while for himself and his men there was abundance of everything. he went on to praise warmly the courage of the soldiers because neither a sally of the enemy, nor the height of walls, nor the unsounded waters of the lagoon, nor the fortress on a lofty hill, nor the very strongly fortified citadel had deterred them from climbing over or bursting through every obstacle. accordingly , although he owed everything to everybody, the special distinction of a mural crown belonged to the man who had been the first to climb the wall; let him who thought himself deserving of that gift declare himself. two came forward as claimants, Quintus Trebellius, a centurion of the fourth legion, and Sextus Digitius, a marine. and these men themselves were not so much hotly competing with one another, as already fanning the partisanship of the men of their respective arms of the service. the marines were supported by Gaius Laelius, admiral of the fleet, the legionaries by Marcus Sempronius Tuditanus. when the strife was verging on mutiny, Scipio announced that he would name three arbiters to hear the claims, and after taking testimony, to decide which of the two had been the first to climb over the wall into the town. then in addition to Gaius Laelius and Marcus Sempronius, who represented this faction and that, he named Publius Cornelius Caudinus, a neutral, and ordered the three arbiters to sit down and hear the case. this was argued with all the more heat because the persons withdrawn, men of such high character, were restraining party feelings rather than representing their factions. whereupon Gaius Laelius left the council, went up to Scipio on his tribune, and informed him that the matter was being debated without limit or self —restraint, and that the soldiers were on the point of laying hands on each other. but he said that, even if there should be no violence, they were nevertheless setting an abominable precedent in seeking by deception and perjury to win a reward for courage. on one side the legionaries were standing, he said, on the other the marines, ready to swear by all the gods rather what they wished to have true than what they knew to be true, and ready to involve not only themselves and their own persons in the perjury, but also the military standards and eagles and the sanctity of the oath of allegiance; that he was making this report to him on the advice of Publius Cornelius and Marcus Sempronius. Scipio warmly praised Laelius, summoned the soldiers to an assembly and declared that he was reliably informed that Quintus Trebellius and Sextus Digitius had climbed to the top of the wall at the same moment, and that for their courage he bestowed mural crowns upon them both. then he rewarded the rest, each according to his desert and his courage. above all the others he placed Gaius Laelius, admiral of the fleet, on a level with himself in every kind of commendation, and also presented him with a golden wreath and thirty oxen. then he ordered the hostages of the states of Spain to be summoned. how great was their number I dislike to state, since in one source I find that they were about three hundred, in another three thousand seven hundred and twenty —four. there is no less disagreement on other matters also between the authorities. one writes that the Carthaginian garrison consisted of ten thousand men, another of seven thousand, another of not more than two thousand. as for the captives, in one writer i find ten thousand persons, in another above twenty —five thousand. i should set down about sixty larger and smaller scorpions as captured, if I were to follow a Greek authority, Silenus, if Valerius Antias, then six thousand of the larger scorpions, thirteen thousand of the smaller; so lacking is any limit to his mendacity. even as to the generals there is no agreement. most say that Laelius commanded the fleet, there are some who say it was Marcus Iunius Silanus. Valerius Antias relates that Arines was in command of the Carthaginian garrison and surrendered to the Romans, other writers that it was Mago. there is no agreement as to the number of ships captured, none as to the weight of gold and silver and of money brought in. if one must agree with some authorities, moderate figures are the most probable. to resume, calling the hostages, Scipio first bade them all to be of good cheer; for they had come into the power of the Roman people, which prefers to bind men by favour rather than by fear, and to keep foreign nations linked by loyalty and alliance, rather than reduced to a harsh slavery. then on learning the names of the states, he made a list of the captives, showing how many belonged to each people, and sent messengers to their homes, bidding that each man come to recover his own children. if ambassadors of any states happened to be there, he restored their hostages to them directly. the task of kindly protecting the rest he assigned to Gaius Flaminius, the quaestor. meanwhile out of the midst of the crowd of hostages came an elderly woman, the wife of Mandonius, who was the brother of Indibilis, prince of the Ilergetes, and weeping she fell at the feet of the general and began to implore him to charge the guards more strictly with the care and comfort of the women. when Scipio said that they would surely lack nothing, the woman then replied: we do not greatly care, she said, for such things; for in our condition what is not sufficient? it is another concern which impels me as I look at these maidens; for as for myself, I am beyond the danger of violence done to woman. and in the bloom of youth and beauty the daughters of Indibilis were standing about her, and others of no less rank, all of whom paid her the honour due a parent. then Scipio said: thanks to my own training and that of the Roman people I would see to it that nothing which is anywhere sacred should suffer violence among us. but as it is, I am moved to an even stricter care in that respect by the courage and dignity of you women also, who even in misfortune have not forgotten what is seemly for a matron. he then handed them over to a man of proved uprightness, and ordered him to protect them with no less respect and modesty than the wives and mothers of guest —friends. then there was brought to him as a captive by the soldiers a grown maiden of a beauty so extraordinary that, wherever she went, she drew the eyes of everyone. Scipio , upon enquiring about her native city and her parents, learned among other things that she had been betrothed to a leading man of the Celtiberians. the young man's name was Allucius. accordingly he at once summoned parents and fiance from home, and as soon as he had arrived, Scipio, having heard meantime that he was desperately in love with his betrothed, addressed him in more studied language than he had used towards the parents. as a young man, he said, i speak to you as a young man — lessen embarrassment between us in this conversation. it was to me that your betrothed was brought as a captive by our soldiers, and I learned of your love for her —d her beauty made that easy to believe. therefore , since in my own case, if it were only permitted me to enjoy the pleasures of youth, especially in a proper and legitimate love, and had not the state preoccupied my attention, I should wish to be pardoned for an ardent love of a bride, I favour what is in my power — your love. your betrothed has been in my camp with the same regard for modesty as in the house of your parents —in —law, her own parents. she has been kept for you, so that she could be given you as a gift, unharmed and worthy of you and of me. this is the only price that I stipulate in return for that gift: be a friend to the Roman people, and if you believe me to be a good man, such as these tribes formerly came to know in my father and uncle, be assured that in the Roman state there are many like us, and that no people in the world can be named to —day which you would be less desirous of having as an enemy to you and yours, or more desirous of having as a friend. the young man, overcome by embarrassment and at the same time by joy, holding Scipio's right hand, called upon all the gods to compensate him on his own behalf, since he was far from having sufficient means to do so in accordance with his own feeling and with what the general had done for him. whereupon the parents and blood —relations of the maiden were summoned. they began to entreat Scipio, because the maiden, for whose ransom they had brought, as they said, a considerable weight of gold, was being restored to them without price, to accept that gift from them, assuring him that they would feel no less gratitude for his acceptance than for the restoration of the maiden unharmed. Scipio , since they so earnestly besought, promised that he would accept it, ordered the gift to be laid before his feet, and calling Allucius to him, said: in addition to the dowry which you are about to receive from your father —in —law, this will be added by me as a nuptial gift to you. and he ordered him to take up the gold and keep it. delighting in this gift and courteous treatment he was sent away to his home, and he filled his countrymen with the well —earned praises of Scipio, saying that there had come a most godlike youth, conquering everything by arms and especially by generosity and favours. and so, after conducting a levy among his clients, he returned within a few days to Scipio with fourteen hundred picked horsemen. Scipio kept Laelius by him until with his advice he should dispose of captives and hostages and the booty. then when everything had been properly arranged, he furnished him with a quinquereme, put on shipboard the captives with Mago and about fifteen senators who had been captured with him, and sent Laelius to Rome to report the victory. he himself spent the few days during which he had decided to remain at (New) Carthage in drilling his naval and land forces. on the first day the legions would run under arms for four miles; on the second they were ordered to take care of their arms and clean them in front of their tents; on the third day with wooden foils they encountered each other after the manner of a regular battle and hurled missile weapons provided with a button at the end; on the fourth day they were given a rest; on the fifth they again ran quickly under arms. this disposition of work and rest they maintained so long as they remained at (New) Carthage. the oarsmen and marines, when the sea was calm, would sail out into open water and test the mobility of their ships in sham naval battles. such training outside the city by land and sea steeled both bodies and minds for war. the city itself rang with preparations for war, since artisans of all kinds were shut up in public workshops. the general inspected everything with the same care; now he was on the fleet and the docks, now he was with the legions as they ran; now he was giving his time to viewing the work that was done from day to day in shops and arsenal and on the docks, with the utmost rivalry, by the great multitude of artisans. having made such a beginning, and having repaired battered parts of the wall, and leaving forces posted to defend the city, he set out for Tarraco, being approached by many embassies in the course of his march. some of these he answered and dismissed without stopping, some he postponed till he reached Tarraco, at which he had announced an assembly for all the allies new and old. and nearly all the peoples dwelling on this side of the Ebro came together, and many also from the farther province. the Carthaginian commanders at first purposely suppressed the news of the capture of (New) Carthage. then , when the matter was too well known to be concealed or masked, their language would minimize it, saying that by a sudden arrival and almost by stealth on a single day a single city of Spain had been seized; and carried away by success on so small a scale, an arrogant youth in an excess of joy had given it the appearance of a great victory; but when he heard that three generals, three victorious armies of the enemy were approaching, there would at once come to him the memory of the losses in his family. such were their remarks in public, but in themselves they were by no means unaware what a mass of resources for every purpose had gone with the loss of (New) Carthage.
Perseus Latin. CTS URN phi0914.phi00126.perseus-eng1. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. Source.