← Library

Ab Urbe Condita, books 23-25 - 25

Perseus Latin · Perseus Latin · 1 sections

1. 1

   Book XXV WHILE these things were being done in Africa and Spain, Hannibal spent the summer in the Sallentine region, in the hope of getting possession of the city of Tarentum through treachery. Meantime, however, Sallentine cities of no importance went over to his side. At the same time among the Bruttians, out of twelve states which in the previous year had revolted to the Carthaginians, Consentia and Taurianum returned to their allegiance to the Roman people; and more would have returned if a prefect of the allies, Titus Pomponius Veientanus, who by successfully ravaging Bruttian territory a number of times gained the appearance of a regularly appointed general, had not gathered a hastily mustered army and engaged Hanno. A great many men were slain or captured there, an ill-organized mass, however, of rustics and slaves. It was the smallest part of the loss that, along with the rest, the prefect was captured, who was responsible at that time for a reckless battle, and had previously been a tax-farmer possessed of all the dishonest devices, faithless and ruinous both to the state and to the companies. Sempronius, the consul, fought many small engagements in Lucania, not one worthy of record, and took by storm a number of unimportant Lucanian towns. The longer the war dragged on and success and failure altered the situation, and quite as much so the attitude of men, superstitious fears, in large part foreign at that, invaded the state to such a degree that either men or else gods suddenly seemed changed. And now not only in secret and within the walls of houses were Roman rites abandoned, but in public places also and in the Forum and on the Capitol there was a crowd of women who were following the custom of the fathers neither in their sacrifices nor in prayers to the gods. Petty priests and also prophets had taken hold on men's minds. And the number of these was increased by the mass of rustics forced by want and fear into the city from their farms neglected and endangered because of the long war, and by easy profit from the delusion of others-a trade which they plied as though it were sanctioned. At first good men's indignation was voiced in private; then the matter reached the senate and now even official complaints. The aediles and the three police magistrates were roundly censured by the senate because they did not stop it; and after they had attempted to drive that crowd out of the Forum and to scatter the properties required for the rites, they narrowly escaped violence. Now that the disorder appeared to be too strong to be quelled by the lower magistrates, the senate assigned to Marcus Aemilius, the city praetor, the task of freeing the people from such superstitions. He read the decree of the senate in an assembly, and also issued an edict that whoever had books of prophecies or prayers or a ritual of sacrifice set down in writing should bring all such books and writings to him before the first of April, and that no one should sacrifice in a public or consecrated place according to a strange or foreign rite. A number of priests of the state died that year: Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, pontifex maximus, and Gaius Papirius Masso, son of Gaius, a pontifex, and Publius Furius Philus, an augur, and Gaius Papirius Masso, son of Lucius, a decemvir in charge of rites. In place of Lentulus they made Marcus Cornelius Cethegus a pontiff and Gnaeus Servilius Caepio in that of Papirius; Lucius Quinctius Flamininus was named augur, Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, decemvir in charge of rites. For the consular elections the time was now approaching, but because the consuls were occupied with the war and it was not thought advisable to call them away, Tiberius Sempronius, the consul, named Gaius Claudius Cento dictator to hold the elections. He in turn named Quintus Fulvius Flaccus master of the horse. On the first day available for elections the dictator announced the choice as consuls of Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, master of the horse, and Appius Claudius Pulcher, who as praetor had had Sicily as his province. Then the following were elected praetors: Gnaeus Fulvius Flaccus, Gaius Claudius Nero, Marcus Junius Silanus, Publius Cornelius Sulla. Having finished the elections, the dictator laid down his office. Curule aedile that year, together with Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, was Publius Cornelius Scipio, who was later called Africanus. When he was a candidate for the aedileship, and the tribunes of the plebs tried to oppose him, saying that he ought not to be considered because he did not have the legal age for candidacy, he said, If all the citizens want to make me aedile I have years enough. Thereupon with such enthusiasm they separated to form by tribes in order to cast their votes, that the tribunes suddenly gave up their attempt. The generosity of the aediles consisted in celebrating the Roman Games splendidly, for the resources of that time, and in repeating them for one day; also in giving ... measures of oil for each precinct. Lucius Villius Tappulus and Marcus Fundanius Fundulus as plebeian aediles brought before the people charges of immorality against a number of matrons. Some of these being convicted, they drove them into exile. The Plebeian Games were repeated for two days, and on account of the festival a banquet for Jupiter was held. Quintus Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius entered upon their consulship, the former for the third time. And the praetors received by lot the following assignments: Publius Cornelius Sulla, the duties of praetor urbanus and praetor peregrinus, previously two separate offices; Gnaeus Fulvius Flaccus, Apulia, Gaius Claudius Nero, Suessula, Marcus Junius Silanus, Etruria. To the consuls were assigned by decree the war with Hannibal and two legions each. The one was to take over his troops from Quintus Fabius, consul in the previous year, the other from Fulvius Centumalus. Of the praetors, Fulvius Flaccus was to have the legions which had been at Luceria under the praetor Aemilius, Nero Claudius the one which had been in the Picene district under Gaius Terentius. They were themselves to enlist more recruits for the same. To Marcus Junius the city legions of the previous year were given for Etruria. For Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and Publius Sempronius Tuditanus their commands and provinces, Lucania and Gaul, with their armies, were continued. And the same was done for Publius Lentulus, within the limits of the old province in Sicily, and for Marcellus, whose province was Syracuse and up to the former boundaries of Hiero's kingdom. The fleet was assigned to Titus Otacilius, Greece to Marcus Valerius, Sardinia to Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the Spanish provinces to Publius and Gnaeus Cornelius. In addition to the old armies two city legions were enrolled by the consuls, and the total that year amounted to twenty-three legions. The consular levy was hampered by the conduct of Marcus Postumius of Pyrgi, which almost occasioned a serious insurrection. Postumius was a tax-farmer, who in many years had had no equal in dishonesty and avarice in the state, except Titus Pomponius Veientanus, whom the Carthaginians under Hanno's command had captured in the preceding year, while he was rashly ravaging the country in Lucania. These men, since the state assumed the risk from violent storms in the case of shipments to the armies, had falsely reported imaginary shipwrecks, and even those which they had correctly reported had been brought about by their own trickery, not by accident. They would put small cargoes of little value on old, battered vessels, sink them at sea, after taking off the crews in small boats that were in readiness, and then falsely declare that the shipments were far more valuable. This dishonesty had been reported in the previous year to Marcus Aemilius, the praetor, and by him brought before the senate, but it was not branded by any decree of the senate, because the senators were unwilling to offend the tax-farmers as a class at such a crisis. The people proved a more unsparing avenger of dishonesty; namely, two tribunes of the plebs, Spurius and Lucius Carvilius, were at length aroused, and seeing that the affair was unpopular and notorious, imposed a fine of two hundred thousand asses upon Marcus Postumius. When the day for his protest against this fine arrived, the assembly of the commons was so large that the open space on the Capitol could scarcely contain the crowd. After the arguments were concluded, there seemed to be but one hope, namely, if Gaius Servilius Casca, a tribune of the plebs who was a blood-relative of Postumius, should interpose his veto before the tribes should be called to vote. The tribunes provided witnesses, cleared the people away, and the urn was brought, that they might determine by lot in which tribe the Latins should vote. Meantime the tax-farmers pressed Casca to adjourn that day's hearing before the assembly. The people protested; and it so happened that the first seat at the end of the platform was occupied by Casca, whose mind was swayed at once by fear and shame. Finding in him no sufficient protection, the publicans, in order to prevent action, rushed in a wedge through the space cleared by removal of the crowd, while at the sametime they reviled the people and the tribunes. And it had almost come to a battle when Fulvius, the consul, said to the tribunes, Do you not see that you are reduced to the ranks, and that this means an insurrection if you do not promptly dismiss the popular assembly? The assembly being dismissed, the senate was summoned and the consuls brought up the matter of the disturbance in the popular assembly owing to the violence and audacity of the publicans. Marcus Furius Camillus, it was said, a man whose exile would have been followed by the ruin of the city, had allowed himself to be condemned by the angry citizens; that before his time the decemvirs, under whose laws they were then still living, and later many leading men in the state, had submitted to the judgment of the people in their cases; that Postumius of Pyrgi had wrested the vote from the Roman people, had brought to naught an assembly of the plebs, reduced the tribunes to the ranks, drawn up a battle-line against the Roman people, had taken his position, to separate the tribunes from the people and to prevent the tribes from being summoned to vote. Nothing had restrained men from slaughter and battle but the forbearance of the magistrates in yielding for the moment to the mad audacity of a few men, and in allowing themselves and the Roman people to be worsted, also in that, as regards the voting, which the defendant would have prevented by force of arms, they had of their own accord suspended it, to avoid giving excuse to those eager for the fray. These words were interpreted by all the best citizens as deserved by an outrageous occurrence, and the senate declared that this violence had been employed against the state, setting a dangerous precedent. Thereupon the Carvilii, tribunes of the people, in place of the procedure to fix the amount of the fine, at once named a day for Postumius' appearance on a capital charge, and ordered that if he did not furnish sureties he should be seized by an attendant and taken to prison. Postumius furnished sureties, but did not appear. The tribunes put the question to the plebs and the plebs ordained that, if Marcus Postumius should not appear before the first of May, and on being summoned on that day should not reply nor be excused, it should be understood that he was in exile, and be decided that his property should be sold and himself refused water and fire. The tribunes then began to name a day for the appearance on a capital charge of each of those who had been instigators of riot and sedition, and to demand sureties from them. At first they threw into prison those who did not give security, and then even those who were able to do so. Avoiding this danger many went into exile. V. Such was the outcome of dishonesty on the part of the publicans and of audacity seeking to cover dishonesty. Next was held an election for the choice of a pontifex maximus. This election was conducted by a new pontiff, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus. Three men canvassed with great rivalry: Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, the consul, who had been consul twice before and also censor, and Titus Manlius Torquatus, likewise distinguished by two consulships and a censorship, and Publius Licinius Crassus, who was only about to be a candidate for a curule aedileship. This young man defeated in that contest old men who had held high offices. Before him for a hundred and twenty years no one who had not occupied a curule chair had been elected pontifex maximus, except Publius Cornelius Calussa. The consuls were finding it difficult to complete the levy, since the scant supply of young men was hardly sufficient for the two purposes, enrollment of new legions for the city and replacements for the old ones. The senate accordingly forbade them to give up the attempt and ordered the appointment of two commissions of three officials each, to inspect in rural districts, market-towns and local centres all possible freeborn men within fifty miles, the other beyond that distance, and any that seemed to them strong enough to bear arms, even if not yet of military age, they were to recruit. The tribunes of the plebs, if they should see fit, were to bring before the people a bill that, in the case of those who had taken the military oath at less than seventeen years, their campaigns should run just as if they had been recruited at seventeen years or older. In accordance with this decree of the senate two commissions of three members each were appointed and they conducted the search for freeborn men in the country. At the same time a letter from Marcus Marcellus in Sicily was read in the senate concerning demands of the soldiers serving under Publius Lentulus. This army was the remnant of the disaster at Cannae, and, as has been said above, was relegated to Sicily, not to be brought back to Italy before the end of the Punic War. These men with Lentulus' permission sent their leading knights and centurions and picked men from the infantry of the legions to Marcus Marcellus at his winter quarters as their representatives, and one of them, receiving permission to speak, said: In your consulship, Marcus Marcellus, and in Italy we should have come to you already, directly after the senate made in our case a decree that, if not unjust, was surely severe, had it not been our hope that we were being sent into a province thrown into confusion by the death of its kings, to carry on a serious war against Sicilians and Carthaginians combined, and that by our blood and wounds we were to give satisfaction to the senate, just as in the time of our fathers the men who had been captured by Pyrrhus at Heraclea had done by fighting against Pyrrhus himself. And yet for what desert of ours have you been angry at us, conscript fathers, or are now angry? It seems that I am looking at both consuls and the entire senate when I look at you, Marcus Marcellus. If we had had you as consul at Cannae the lot of the state, and of ourselves as well, would be a better one. Before I complain of our plight, permit us, I pray, to clear ourselves of the offence of which we are charged. If it was not by anger of the gods nor by Fate, according to whose law the chain of human events is unalterably linked, but by a fault that we were undone at Cannae, whose fault, pray, was it? Of the soldiers or of the generals? For my part I, a soldier, will never say anything about my general, especially since I know that he was thanked by the senate because he did not lose hope for the state, and that after the flight from Cannae his command was continued year after year. The others too who survived that disaster, the men whom we had as our tribunes of the soldiers, canvass for offices, we have heard, and hold them, and govern provinces. Can it be, conscript fathers, that you readily pardon yourselves and your sons, but are cruel to these creatures of no account? And while it was no disgrace to the consul and other leading men in the state to flee, since there was no other hope, did you send your common soldiers into battle to die inevitably? At the Allia almost the entire army fled; at the Caudine Forks, without even attempting a battle, the army surrendered its weapons to the enemy, not to mention other shameful defeats of armies. But so far were men from devising any disgrace for those armies that the city of Rome was recovered by the army which had fled from the Allia over to Veii, and the Caudine legions, which had returned to Rome without their arms, were sent back armed into Samnium and sent under the yoke that same enemy who had exulted in a disgrace now their own. But at Cannae can any one accuse the army of panic and fright, where more than fifty thousand men fell, whence the consul fled with seventy horsemen, and of which no one survives except the man whom the enemy, tired of slaying, spared? At the time when ransom was refused to captives, men were everywhere praising us because we had saved ourselves for the state, had returned to the consul at Venusia and had formed the semblance of a regular army. But now we are in a worse situation than in our fathers' time were captives. For in their case only their arms and their rank and the position of their tents when in camp were changed. These, however, they recovered by a single service rendered to the state and one victory. Not one of them was sent into exile, not one of them was deprived of the hope of serving out his term; in fine they were given an enemy, so that in battle with him they might once for all end either life or disgrace. But we, against whom no charge can be brought except that we are to blame for the survival of any Roman soldier from the battle-line at Cannae, have been sent far away, not only from our native city and Italy, but also from the enemy, that there we may grow old in exile, that we may have no hope, no opportunity of wiping out disgrace, none of appeasing the anger of our citizens, none even of dying bravely. It is neither an end of our disgrace nor a reward for our courage that we ask. Only let us prove our spirit and put our courage into practice. It is for hardship and danger we are asking, that we may do the duty of men and soldiers. The war in Sicily has now been carried on with intensity for two years. Some cities are being stormed by the Carthaginian, some by the Roman. Infantry and cavalry clash in battle-line. At Syracuse the war goes on by land and by sea. The cries of men in battle and the din of arms can be heard by us, who are ourselves unemployed and listless, as if we had neither hands nor weapons. With legions of slaves Tiberius Sempronius, the consul, has engaged the enemy again and again in battle formation. As a reward for their service they have freedom and citizenship. Reckon us at least slaves purchased for this war; let us engage the enemy and by fighting earn freedom. Do you wish, sir, to test our courage on sea, on land, in battle-line, in besieging cities? We demand all the worst in hardship and danger, in order that what should have been done at Cannae be done as soon as possible, since every day that we have since lived has been marked for disgrace. At the close of this speech they fell at Marcellus' knees. Marcellus said the matter was neither within his competence nor his authority; he would write to the senate and do everything, according to the opinion of the fathers. The letter was delivered to the new consuls and by them read in the senate. And after discussion of the letter the senate decreed as follows: that to soldiers who had deserted their comrades in battle at Cannae the senate saw no reason why the welfare of the state should be entrusted. If Marcus Claudius, the proconsul, should take a different view, he should do what he thought to accord with the interest of the state and his own conscience, provided that no one of them should be exempt from duties, or be decorated for valour, or be brought back to Italy, so long as the enemy should be in the land of Italy. Elections were then held by the praetor urbanus in accordance with a decision of the senate and a plebiscite, and at these there were elected five commissioners for the restoration of the walls and towers, and two boards of three, one to recover sacred vessels and register temple gifts, the other to rebuild the Temple of Fortune and that of Mater Matuta inside Porta Carmentalis, and that of Hope outside the gate —temples that had been destroyed by fire the preceding year. There were terrible storms; on the Alban Mount it rained stones steadily for two days. Many things were struck by lightning: two temples on the Capitol, the embankment of the camp above Suessula in many places, and two sentries were killed. At Cumae the wall and certain towers were not merely struck by the bolts but even thrown down. At Reate a huge stone seemed to fly, the sun to be redder than usual and of a bloody colour. On account of these prodigies there was a single day of prayer, and for several days the consuls devoted themselves to religious rites; and about the same time there was a nine days' observance. While a revolt of the Tarentines had long been hoped for by Hannibal and suspected by the Romans, a reason for expediting the same happened to come from without. Phileas of Tarentum, a man of restless spirit and quite unable to endure the long inactivity in which he seemed to be losing his powers, had been at Rome for a long time, nominally as an ambassador. Thus he found means of access to the hostages from Tarentum and Thurii. They were kept under guard in the Atrium Libertatis, with less watchfulness because it was to the interest neither of the hostages themselves nor of their states to outwit the Romans. Phileas worked upon them by frequent conferences, and after bribing two temple-wardens brought them out of confinement at nightfall. Then he himself fled, sharing their secret journey. At daybreak their flight was reported everywhere in the city, and the men sent to pursue them arrested and brought them all back from Tarracina. They were led into the Comitium, scourged with rods with the approval of the people, and thrown down from the Rock. The relentlessness of this punishment outraged two of the most important Greek cities in Italy, both as states and personally as well, whenever individuals were connected either by relationship or friendship with those who were so cruelly executed. Of those so connected some thirteen noble youths of Tarentum formed a conspiracy, and Nico and Philemenus were the leaders. Thinking that they ought to confer with Hannibal before taking any step, these men left the city by night under pretext of hunting and set out to go to him. And when they were not far from his camp, the rest concealed themselves in the woods near the road; but Nico and Philemenus advanced to the outposts, were seized and at their own request brought before Hannibal. After explaining the reasons for their plan and what they were plotting, they were warmly commended and loaded with promises. In order to make their fellow-citizens believe they had left the city to forage, they were bidden to drive to the city cattle belonging to the Carthaginians which had been turned out to graze. Promise was given that they would do so in safety and without a conflict. The young men's booty attracted attention, and less astonishment was caused by their making the same venture again and again. On meeting Hannibal again they had his formal assurance that the Tarentines as free men should have their own laws and all their possessions, and pay no tribute to the Carthaginians nor admit a garrison against their own wish; that houses occupied by Romans should be handed over, together with the garrison, and be assigned to the Carthaginians. So much agreed upon, Philemenus thereafter made it his more constant habit to leave the city and return to it by night. In fact he was noted for his devotion to the chase, and his hounds and other equipment would follow him. Usually he carried back something he had taken or that the enemy had brought him by agreement, and he would give it either to the commandant or to the gate-guards. They believed that he came and went preferably by night for fear of the enemy. When the thing had become so habitual that the gate was opened at whatever hour of the night he gave the signal by a whistle, it seemed to Hannibal to be the time for action. He was at a distance of three days' march, and there he played the invalid, that his keeping a fixed camp so long in one and the same place might cause less wonder. ' The Romans also on garrison duty at Tarentum had ceased to find such prolonged inaction suspicious. Once he had determined, however, to go to Tarentum, he picked ten thousand infantry and cavalry —the men whom he thought best suited to the enterprise on account of swiftness of foot and lightness of arms —and at the fourth watch of the night got in motion. And he ordered some eighty Numidian horsemen, who were sent in advance, to scour the country near the roads and keep an eye in every direction, that no farmer in the distance might observe the column without being noticed. They were to hold up those ahead of them and slay those they met, so that people living near by might have- the impression of foragers rather than of an army. He himself, after a forced march, pitched camp at a distance of about fifteen miles from Tarentum. And not even there did he announce whither they were going. He merely summoned the soldiers and bade them all to keep to the road and not allow anyone to turn aside or leave his place in the column; and to be especially alert to hear commands and not to do anything without orders from their officers. He would in due time inform them what he wished to have done. About the same hour a rumour had preceded him to Tarentum that a- few Numidian horsemen were ravaging the farms and had inspired widespread alarm among the rustics. On receiving this news the Roman commandant was only so far aroused- as -to command part of the cavalry to go out the next day at dawn, in order to prevent depredations of the enemy. For the rest his attention was so little aroused that on the contrary the raid of the Numidians was to him a proof that Hannibal and the army had not stirred from their camp. Hannibal broke camp early in the night. His guide was Philemenus with his usual load of game. The rest of the traitors were waiting for acts previously arranged. It had been agreed, namely, that Philemenus, as he brought in his game by the usual postern, should lead in armed men, while on another side Hannibal should approach the Temenitis Gate. That quarter is toward the inland, facing east; tombs occupy a considerable space inside the walls. As he approached the gate the fire signal was given by Hannibal according to agreement, and in reply from Nico the same signal blazed; then on both sides the flames were extinguished. Hannibal was leading his men silently to the gate. Nico unexpectedly attacks the sleeping sentries in their beds, slays them and opens the gate. Hannibal with his infantry column enters, orders the cavalry to halt, so that they can meet the enemy in the open, in whatever direction the situation may require. And Philemenus on another side of the city was approaching the postern by which he was accustomed to come and go. His well-known voice and the now familiar signal having aroused a sentry, the little gate was opened for Philemenus, just as he was saying they could scarcely carry the weight of a huge beast. While two young men were carrying in the boar, he himself followed them with a huntsman who was unencumbered, and as the sentry, thrown off his guard by its marvellous size, faced the men who were carrying it, Philemenus ran him through with a hunting spear. Then about thirty armed men entered, cut down the rest of the sentries and broke open the neighbouring gate; and the column with its standards at once rushed in. Thence they were marched in silence to the market-place and joined Hannibal. The Carthaginian then sent two thousand Gauls, divided into three units, through the city, and to each he attached two Tarentines as guides. He ordered them to occupy the most frequented streets, and when the uproar had begun, to slay the Romans everywhere, to spare the townspeople. But to make this possible he instructed the young Tarentines, whenever they saw one of their own people in the distance, to bid him be quiet and say nothing and be of good cheer. Already there was such uproar and shouting as is usual in a captured city, but what it was about no one quite knew for certain. The Tarentines believed the Romans had surprised them, in order to plunder the city; the Romans thought it was some kind of uprising treacherously started by the townspeople. The commandant, aroused by the first uproar, escaped to the harbour; picked up by a skiff, he was rowed around from there to the citadel. Confusion was caused also by the sound of a trumpet from the theatre. For it was a Roman trumpet, furnished by the traitors for this very purpose; and in addition, being unskillfully sounded by a Greek, it left it uncertain who was giving the signal and to whom. When day broke the Punic and Gallic arms, now recognized, relieved the Romans of their uncertainty, and at the same time the Greeks, seeing slain Romans everywhere, were aware that the city had been captured by Hannibal. When it was no longer twilight and the Romans who survived the slaughter had fled to the citadel, and the uproar was gradually being stilled, Hannibal then gave orders to summon the Tarentines without arms. They all assembled, except those who had followed the Romans in their retreat to the citadel, to share with them any outcome. Thereupon Hannibal had kind words for the Tarentines and called to mind what he had done for their fellow-citizens whom he had captured at Lake Trasumennus or at Cannae. At the same time he inveighed against the haughty rule of the Romans and ordered them to go each to his own house and to write his name on the door. He would order that at a given signal such houses as were not marked should at once be plundered. If any one should write his name on the quarters of a Roman citizen —now they were occupying vacant houses —he would regard such a man as an enemy. After the assembly had been dismissed and the marking of doors had distinguished the house of a citizen from that of an enemy, the signal was given and they scattered in all directions to plunder the Roman dwellings; and the booty was considerable. On the next day he led his men to an attack upon the citadel. He saw that not only was this defended by very high cliffs on the side towards the sea, which surrounds the larger part of it as a peninsula, but on the side toward the city itself by a wall and a great fosse, and hence could not be taken by assault nor by siege-works. Accordingly, to avoid either keeping himself from larger operations in his effort to protect the Tarentines, or else letting the Romans, whenever they pleased, make an attack from the citadel upon the Tarentines if he left them without a strong garrison, he decided to wall off the city from the citadel by an earthwork. He was not without the hope also that he could engage the Romans if they tried to prevent the work, and that, if they should make a furious sally, the strength of the garrison would be so reduced by serious losses that the Tarentines by themselves could easily defend the city against them. After fortification began, a gate was suddenly opened and the Romans made an attack upon the men at work. And the outpost stationed in advance of the work allowed itself to be driven back, that boldness might grow with success and a larger number might pursue the repulsed and to a greater distance. Then at a given signal the Carthaginians, whom Hannibal had kept drawn up for this purpose, rose up on all sides. And the Romans did not withstand the attack, but limited space and ground obstructed partly by the work already begun, partly by preparations for the work, kept them from a disorderly flight. Very many leaped into the fosse, and more were slain in flight than in battle. Then even fortification began to proceed, with no one attempting to prevent. A great fosse was carried along, and inside of it an earthwork was raised; and at a short distance he prepared to add a stone wall likewise in the same direction, so that even without a garrison they could protect themselves against the Romans. He did, however, leave a garrison of moderate size, to aid as well in the completion of the wall. He himself set out with the rest of his forces and pitched camp at the river Galaesus, which is five miles from the city. On returning from this permanent camp to inspect, inasmuch as the work had progressed with considerably more speed than he had anticipated, he hoped that the citadel also could be taken by storm. And it is not defended by height, as other citadels are, but is on level ground and separated from the city merely by a wall and a fosse. While the attack was now in progress with engines of every kind and with siege-works, a garrison sent from Metapontum encouraged the Romans to make a surprise attack by night upon the works of the enemy. Some of these they pulled apart, others they ruined by fire; and this was the end of Hannibal's attack upon the citadel from that side. His remaining hope was in a blockade, and that was not very effectual, because the occupants of the citadel, which is situated on a peninsula and commands the harbour mouth, had the sea at their disposal, while the city on the other hand was shut off from supplies by sea and the besiegers were nearer to starvation than the besieged. Hannibal summoned the leading men of Tarentum and laid before them all the difficulties of the situation, saying that he neither saw a way to take so well fortified a citadel by storm, nor had any hope in a blockade, so long as the enemy had command of the sea. But if he should have ships with which to prevent the bringing in of supplies, the enemy would at once either withdraw from the citadel or surrender. The Tarentines assented, but thought that the giver of advice must give aid also to carry it out. For Carthaginian ships, summoned from Sicily, they said, could do it. As for their own ships, which were shut up inside a very small bay, while the enemy held the key to the harbour, how were they to get out into the open sea? They will get out , said Hannibal; many things which are naturally difficult are solved by ingenuity. You have a city situated in a plain. Level streets of ample breadth lead in all directions. Along the street that is carried across from the harbour through the centre of the city to the sea I shall transport ships on wagons with no great difficulty, and the sea, which the enemy now possess, will be ours, and we shall besiege the citadel on that side by sea, on this side by land; or rather we shall soon either take it, abandoned by the enemy, or take it enemy and all. This speech produced not merely the hope of success, but great admiration for the general as well. At once wagons were assembled from everywhere and joined together, and the tackle brought to draw up the ships, and the roadway paved, that the wagons might be easier to move, and the difficulty of transport lessened. Then mules and men were brought together and the work was begun with energy. And so a few days later a fleet furnished and equipped sailed around the citadel and cast anchor at the very mouth of the harbour. Such was the state of things which Hannibal left at Tarentum when he himself returned to his winter quarters. But whether the rebellion of the Tarentines took place in the previous year or in this year, authorities differ. More of them and those nearer in time to men who remembered the events relate that it occurred in this year. At Rome the consuls and praetors were detained by the Latin festival until the 26th of April. After performing the rites on that day on the Mount, each set out for his assignment. Then fresh religious scruples were aroused by the verses of Marcius. A noted seer had been this Marcius, and when in the preceding year search was being made by decree of the senate for such books, they had come into the hands of Marcus Aemilius, the praetor urbanus, who was in charge of the matter. He had immediately turned them over to the new praetor, Sulla. Of the two prophecies of this Marcius the authority of one, made known after the event, was confirmed by the outcome and lent credibility to the other also, whose time had not yet come. In the earlier prophecy the disaster at Cannae had been predicted in such terms as these: Flee the river Canna, thou descendant of Troy, that foreigners may not compel thee to do battle in the Plain of Diomed. But thou wilt not believe me until thou hast filled the plain with blood, and many thousands of thy slain will the river bear from the fruitful land down to the great sea. To fishes and birds and beasts that dwell on the land thy flesh shall be meat. For thus hath Jupiter declared to me. And those who had fought in that region recognized the plains of the Argive Diomed and the river Canna no less than the disaster itself. Then the second prophecy was read, being not only more obscure because the future is more uncertain than the past, but more difficult also in the way it was written. If you wish, Romans, to drive out enemies, the sore which has come from afar, I propose that a festival be vowed to Apollo, to be observed with good cheer in honour of Apollo every year. When the people shall have given a part out of the treasury, private citizens shall contribute on their own behalf and that of their families. In charge of the conduct of that festival shall be the praetor who is then chief judge for the people and the commons. The decemvirs shall offer the victims according to Greek rite. If ye will do this rightly ye shall forever rejoice, and your state will change for the better. For that god who graciously nurtures your meadows will destroy your enemies. For the interpretation of the prophecy they took one day. On the next day the senate made a decree that in regard to the festival to be held and the sacrifices in honour of Apollo the decemvirs should consult the books. Those passages having been consulted and reported to the senate, the fathers voted that a festival should be vowed and held in honour of Apollo, and after the festival had been held the sum of twelve thousand asses should be given to the praetor for the ceremonies, and two full-grown victims. A second decree of the senate was made, that the decemvirs should offer sacrifice according to Greek rite and with these victims: to Apollo an ox with gilded horns and two white she-goats with gilded horns, to Latona a cow with gilded horns. When the praetor was about to open the festival in the Circus Maximus, he ordered by edict that during that feast the people should make their contribution to Apollo according to their means. Such is the origin of the festival of Apollo, vowed and kept to secure victory, not health, as most think. The people wore garlands at the spectacles, the matrons offered prayers, everybody feasted in the atrium with open doors, and the day was kept with every kind of ceremony. While Hannibal was near Tarentum, and both consuls were in Samnium but seemed about to invest Capua, already the Campanians were suffering hunger (the usual hardship of a long investment), because the Roman armies had prevented them from sowing. And so they sent legates to Hannibal, praying that, before the consuls should lead the legions into their lands and all the roads should be blocked by forces of the enemy, he should order grain to be brought from neighbouring places to Capua. Hannibal ordered Hanno to march with his army from the land of the Bruttii over into Campania, and to see to it that the Campanians should have a supply of grain. Hanno set out from the land of the Bruttii with his army, avoided camps of the enemy and the consuls, who were in Samnium, and when he was now nearing Beneventum, pitched camp on high ground three miles from the city itself. Then he ordered grain to be brought into camp from allied peoples of the neighbourhood, among whom it had been garnered in the summer; and he furnished troops to escort the supplies. Then he sent word to Capua, naming a day on which they should appear at the camp to get their grain, after bringing together from the farms on all sides every kind of vehicle and beast of burden. This order was carried out by the Campanians with their usual carelessness and indifference. Little more than four hundred vehicles were sent, and a few beasts of burden besides. For this they were censured by Hanno, that not even hunger, which, as he said, inflames even dumb brutes, could spur their diligence; and another day was assigned for getting their grain with ampler means of transport. When all this was reported, just as it happened, to the Beneventans, they at once sent ten legates to the consuls, the camp of the Romans being near Bovianum. The consuls, on hearing what was going on near Capua, mutually arranged that one of them should lead his army into Campania, and Fulvius, to whom that assignment had fallen, set out and entered the walls of Beneventum at night. Being near now, he learned that Hanno had gone with a part of his army to procure grain; that through his quaestor grain had been furnished to the Campanians; that two thousand wagons and in addition a mixed and unarmed multitude had arrived; that everything was being done in confusion and excitement, and that the arrangement of the camp and military routine had been broken down by the influx of rustics, foreigners at that. These facts being sufficiently established, the consul ordered the soldiers to make ready their standards and arms, and nothing else, for the following night; they must attack the Carthaginian camp. Setting out at the fourth watch, leaving all their packs and baggage at Beneventum, they reached the camp shortly before daylight and inspired such panic that, if the camp had been placed on level ground, it could undoubtedly have been taken by the first assault. The lofty situation protected it, also the fortifications, which could not be approached from any side except by a steep and difficult slope. At daybreak a great battle blazed up. And the Carthaginians not only defended the earthwork but, as they had the more favourable situation, pushed down the enemy struggling up the steep slope. Nevertheless obstinate courage surmounted everything, and so the earthwork and the trenches were reached in several places at once, but with many wounds and heavy loss of men. Accordingly the consul called together his lieutenants and tribunes of the soldiers and told them he must give up his rash undertaking; that it seemed to him safer to lead the army back that day to Beneventum, and then on the following day to pitch camp close to that of the enemy, so that the Campanians might not be able to leave it nor Hanno to return. To accomplish that more readily, he would summon his colleague also and his army, and they would focus the entire war upon that point. These plans of the general were disrupted, when he was already sounding the recall, by the shouts of the soldiers rejecting an order so lacking in spirit. Nearest to the enemy happened to be a Paelignian cohort, whose prefect Vibius Accaus seized the banner and threw it over the enemy's earthwork. Then, with a curse upon himself and the cohort if the enemy should get possession of that banner, he was himself the first to dash over the trench and wall into the camp. And already the Paelignians were fighting inside the wall, when from the other side of the camp, while Valerius Flaccus, tribune of the soldiers of the third legion, was reproaching the Romans for their cowardice in yielding to allies the honour of capturing the camp, Titus Pedanius, first centurion of the principes, took a standard away from the standard-bearer and said This standard and this centurion will in a moment be inside the enemy's wall. Let those follow who are to prevent the standard from being captured by the enemy. First the men of his own maniple followed him as he crossed the trench, then the whole legion. And now the consul at the sight of men crossing the wall changed his plan, turned from recalling his soldiers to arousing and encouraging them, and pointed out to them in what a critical and perilous situation were the bravest cohort of the allies and a legion of their fellow-citizens. And so, each doing his best, over ground favourable and unfavourable, while javelins were being hurled from every side and the enemy were interposing weapons and their bodies, they made their way and burst in. Many wounded men, even those whose strength and blood were ebbing, strove to fall inside the enemy's wall. And so in a moment's time the camp was captured, just as if pitched on level ground and not strongly fortified. Then came slaughter, no longer mere battle, since everything inside the wall was in confusion. Over six thousand of the enemy were slain, over seven thousand men captured, including the Campanians who came for grain, and the entire train of wagons and mules. In addition there was the immense booty which Hanno, having set out to plunder far and wide, had taken from farms of allies of the Roman people. Then after destroying the enemy's camp they returned to Beneventum, and there the two consuls —for Appius Claudius came there a few days late —sold and divided the booty. And the men by whose efforts the camp of the enemy had been captured, were rewarded, first of all Accaus the Paelignian and Titus Pedanius, first centurion of the third legion. Hanno, leaving Cominium Ocritum, where he received news of the disaster at the camp, with the few men he happened to have with him to get grain, returned in what resembled a flight rather than a march to the land of the Bruttii. And the Campanians, hearing of what was a disaster as much to themselves as to their allies, sent legates to Hannibal to report that the two consuls were at Beneventum, a day's march from Capua; that the war was all but at their gates and walls; and that, if he did not come to their aid in haste, Capua would fall into the power of the enemy more promptly than Arpi. They said that not even Tarentum, to say nothing of its citadel, ought to be of such importance that he should hand over to the Roman people the deserted and undefended Capua, which he had usually compared with Carthage. Hannibal, promising that the Campanian cause would be his concern, for the present sent two thousand horsemen with his lieutenants, that with this force they might be able to protect their farms from devastation. The Romans meantime were concerned among other things for the citadel of Tarentum and the garrison there besieged. Gaius Servilius, who as lieutenant had been sent by Publius Cornelius, the praetor, into Etruria by authority of the senate to purchase grain, made his way through the enemy's blockade into the harbour of Tarentum with a number of shiploads. Thanks to his coming, the men who until then in their faint hope had often been invited by the enemy in parleys to change sides were actually inviting and urging the enemy to change sides. And the garrison was in fact strong enough, now that soldiers who were at Metapontum had been transferred to defend the citadel of Tarentum. Accordingly the Metapontines were at once relieved of the fear by which they were restrained, and went over to Hannibal. The Thurians also, on the same coast, did the same. What impelled them was not more the revolt of the Tarentines and that of the Metapontines, with whom they were linked by blood as well, being sprung from the same Achaia than anger against the Romans on account of the recent execution of the hostages. Friends and relatives of these sent a letter and messengers to Hanno and Mago, who were not far away in the land of the Bruttii, saying that, if they should bring up an army to their walls, they would themselves deliver the city into their power. Marcus Atinius was in command at Thurii with a garrison of moderate size, and they thought that he could easily be tempted to dash rashly into battle, from his confidence not so much in his soldiers, of whom he had very few, as in the young men of Thurii. He had purposely organized them in centuries and armed them with a view to such emergencies. The Carthaginian generals divided their forces between them and, on entering the territory of Thurii, Hanno, with the infantry column ready to attack, proceeded to the city. Mago with the cavalry halted under cover of hills conveniently interposed to conceal an ambuscade. Atinius, informed of the infantry column alone by scouts, led his troops out into line, he being unaware both of the conspiracy within and of the enemy's ambuscade. The infantry battle was very lacking in spirit, for only a few Romans were fighting in the front line, and the men of Thurii were awaiting the outcome, rather than contributing to it. And the Carthaginian line purposely retreated, in order to draw the heedless enemy to the other side of the hill occupied by their own cavalry. When they reached the place, the cavalry, suddenly attacking with a shout, at once put to flight the mass of the Thurians, which was 399 almost undisciplined and not entirely loyal to the side on which they were fighting. The Romans, though surrounded and hard pressed on one side by the infantry, on the other by the cavalry, nevertheless kept on fighting for some time. Finally they also faced about and fled to the city. There the traitors massed together and admitted the column of their citizens through wide-open gates; but when they saw the routed Romans moving toward the city, they shouted that the Carthaginian was upon them, and unless they hastily closed the gates the enemy also, mingling with them, would make their way into the city. Thus they shut out the Romans and left them to be slain by the enemy. Atinius, however, with a few men was admitted. Then for a short time dissension continued, the other party being of the opinion that they must yield to destiny and surrender the city to the victors. But, as usual, chance and bad advice prevailed. Atinius and his men were brought down to the sea and ships, more because they wished his personal safety, on account of his mild and just rule over them, than out of regard for the Romans, and then they admitted the Carthaginians to the city. The consuls led their legions from Beneventum into the Campanian territory, not merely to ruin the grain, which was by now green, but also to besiege Capua. They thought to make theirs a notable consulship by the destruction of so rich a city, and at the same time to remove a great disgrace from the empire, in that the revolt of a city so near had been unpunished for three years. But, not to leave Beneventum without a garrison, and, with a view to emergencies, if Hannibal should come to Capua, as they had no doubt he would do, to lend aid to his allies, in order that they might be able to withstand the attack of his cavalry, they ordered Tiberius Gracchus to come from Lucania with his cavalry and light-armed troops to Beneventum. He was to put some one in command of the legions and permanent camps, in order to control the situation in Lucania. As Gracchus was sacrificing before leaving Lucania, an unfavourable portent occurred. After the slaying of the victim two snakes gliding stealthily up to the entrails ate part of the liver, and on being noticed vanished suddenly from sight. When for that reason the sacrifice was repeated on the advice of the soothsayers, and while the entrails were being kept with greater care, they relate that the snakes for the second and the third time gliding up tasted the liver and went away unharmed. Although the soothsayers had warned in advance that that portent applied to the general, and that he must beware of men in hiding and of covert plans, still the impending fate could not be averted by any foresight. There was a Lucanian, Flavus, head of that party of the Lucanians which remained on the Roman side, although the other party had revolted to Hannibal. And he was now in the second year of his office, having been elected praetor by that same party. He suddenly changed his intention and, seeking to find favour with the Carthaginian, was not satisfied to change sides himself nor to draw the Lucanians into revolt without ratifying his agreement with the enemy by the life-blood of the general, betrayed though at the same time his guest-friend. He came to Mago, who was in command in the country of the Bruttii, for a secret conference, and received his promise that, if he should surrender the Roman commander into their hands, the Lucanians as free men with their own laws would be accepted as friends. He then led the Carthaginian to a place to which he said he would bring Gracchus with a few men; there Mago should conceal armed infantry and cavalry; and the hiding-place had room, he said, for a very large number. After they had sufficiently examined the spot and reconnoitred all around, a day was settled upon for the execution of the plan. Flavus came to the Roman commander, saying that he had begun an important business for the completion of which he needed Gracchus' own help; that he had persuaded the magistrates of all the peoples which in that general commotion in Italy had gone over to the Carthaginians, to return to the friendship of the Romans, since the Roman state also, which had been nearly destroyed by the disaster at Cannae, was daily improving and increasing, while Hannibal's power was growing feebler and had been reduced almost to nothing. To their old offence, he said, the Romans would not be implacable; no people had ever been more easily entreated and readier to grant forgiveness. How often had a rebellion even of their own ancestors been pardoned! These things he said he had told them; but that they preferred to hear these same statements from Gracchus himself, and to take hold of his right hand there before them, and to carry with them that pledge of his honour. He had appointed for their council a place out of sight, not far from the Roman camp; there in a few words it could be settled that the whole Lucanian people should be under the protection of the Romans and in alliance with them. Gracchus, thinking that both speech and proposal were free from guile, and misled by the plausibility of it, set out from the camp with his lictors and a troop of cavalry, and with a guest-friend as his guide fell into the ambush. The enemy suddenly came out, and, to leave no doubt about his treachery, Flavus joined them. Javelins assail Gracchus and his horsemen from every side. He springs from his horse, bids the rest to do the same and urges them to ennoble by courage the one thing fortune has left open to them. But to a few men surrounded by a multitude, in a valley hedged about by forest and mountains, what was left, he asked, but death? The one thing that mattered was whether they were to submit themselves like sheep to be slaughtered unavenged, or, far from calmly awaiting the outcome, were to be altogether bent on angry attack, and then, daring and doing, drenched by the blood of the enemy, among the heaps of arms and bodies of their dying foes, were to fall. They must all attack the Lucanian traitor and deserter. The man who sent that victim before him to the lower world would find great distinction and for his own death an extraordinary consolation. While thus speaking he wound his general's cloak around his left arm —for they had not taken even shields with them —and attacked the enemy. The battle was out of all proportion to the number of men engaged. The bodies of the Romans were especially unprotected against javelins, and were pierced by them, as they could be thrown from higher ground all around into the hollow valley. Gracchus, who was by this time stripped of his defenders, the Carthaginians strove to capture alive. But catching sight of his Lucanian guest-friend among the enemy, he dashed into the dense ranks with such animosity that he could not be spared without the loss of many lives. Mago at once sent the corpse to Hannibal and ordered it to be placed before the general's tribune together with the captured fasces. If this is the true report, Gracchus perished in Lucania, on the Old Plains, as they are called. There are some who maintain that in the region of Beneventum, by the river Calor, he had gone out of the camp with his lictors and three slaves to bathe, while enemies, as it happened, were hiding among the willows growing on the banks, and was slain, naked and unarmed and defending himself with stones which the river rolls along. There are some writers who say that on the advice of the soothsayers he had gone five hundred paces from the camp to make atonement on an uncontaminated spot for the prodigies mentioned above, and was overpowered by two troops of Numidians who chanced to be in ambush there. So far are both the place and the manner of his death from being established, in spite of his eminence and distinction. In regard to Gracchus's funeral also reports vary. Some relate that he was buried in the Roman camp by his own men, others —and this is the prevalent report —that by Hannibal's order a pyre was erected directly outside the gate of the Carthaginian camp, and that the army defiled under arms, with dances by the Spanish troops and such movements of weapons and bodies as were customary for each tribe, while Hannibal himself honoured the obsequies with every tribute in act and word. These are the statements of those who vouch for its occurrence in Lucania. If you incline to believe those who state that he was slain at the river Calor, the enemy gained possession of Gracchus' head only. This being brought to Hannibal, Carthalo was at once sent by him to bring it to the Roman camp and Gnaeus Cornelius the quaestor. He conducted the funeral of the general in the camp, while the people of Beneventum joined with the army in doing him honour. While the consuls, on entering the Campanian region, were devastating it far and wide, being alarmed and dismayed by a sally of the Capuans and of Mago with his cavalry, they recalled their widely scattered soldiers to the standards, and being routed almost before their line was formed, lost over fifteen hundred men. Upon this the great overconfidence of a people naturally proud was greatly increased, and they sought to provoke the Romans by many battles. But a single engagement incautiously and imprudently begun had made the consuls more careful to be on their guard. One small occurrence, however, restored the courage of one army and lessened the boldness of the other. But in war nothing is so slight as not at times to bring about a great result. Titus Quinctius Crispinus had one Badius, a Campanian, as his guest-friend, linked to him by intimate hospitality. Friendship had grown because in an illness Badius had been generously and kindly nursed at the house of Crispinus at Rome before the rebellion of Campania. This Badius at the time came up to the outposts stationed before the gate and bade them call Crispinus. When this was reported to Crispinus, he went a little beyond the others, thinking a friendly and intimate conversation was wanted, since the memory of a personal tie lingered in spite of the rupture of public treaties. When they had come in sight of each other, I challenge you to battle, Crispinus, said Badius. Let us mount our horses and, with others kept at a distance, decide which is the better warrior. In reply Crispinus said that neither he nor Badius lacked enemies on whom to show his courage. For himself, even if he should meet the other in battle-line, he would avoid him, lest he stain his right hand with the blood of a guest-friend. And he turned and was walking away. Then in truth the Campanian more fiercely reviled the effeminacy and cowardice of Crispinus and hurled reproaches which he himself deserved against an innocent man, calling him a guest-enemy and a man who pretended to spare one to whom he knew he was not equal. If he thought that with the rupture of public treaties private ties had not also been broken, then, he said, Badius the Campanian, openly in the hearing of two armies, renounced the guest-friendship of Titus Quinctius Crispinus the Roman. For himself, an enemy, nothing was hallowed by association, nothing by compact, with him, an enemy, since he had come to attack his native city and the Penates of the state and of the household. If he was a man, let him come on. Crispinus, after long hesitation, was prevailed upon by his comrades not to allow the Campanian to revile him with impunity. And so he delayed only long enough to consult the generals as to whether they permitted him to fight out of ranks against an enemy who challenged him. With their permission he took his arms and mounted his horse, and addressing Badius by name called him out to battle. The Campanian made no delay; riding directly at each other they clashed. Crispinus with his spear pierced Badius' left shoulder above the shield; and after he fell wounded, leaped upon him from his horse, that, now dismounted, he might despatch the fallen. Badius, not to be overpowered, left shield and horse and fled to his own men. Crispinus, decked with spoils and displaying the horse and captured arms and his bloody spear, was conducted with much praise and congratulation on the part of the soldiers to the consuls, and there he was highly praised and rewarded with gifts. Hannibal, having moved his camp from the region of Beneventum to the vicinity of Capua, led his troops out into battle-line on the third day after his arrival. Since in his absence the Campanians had had a successful battle a few days before, he had no doubt whatever that the Romans would be much less able to withstand himself and his repeatedly victorious army. But once the battle had begun, the Roman line was hard pressed, especially by the cavalry charge, being overwhelmed by their darts, until the signal was given to the cavalry to urge their horses against the enemy. Thus a cavalry battle was in progress when the distant sight of the Sempronian army, commanded by Gnaeus Cornelius, the quaestor, inspired in both armies the same fear that fresh enemies were approaching. As if by agreement the signal for recall was given on both sides, and marching back to the camp they separated on almost even terms. Yet a larger number fell on the Roman side because of the first charge of the horsemen. Thereupon the consuls, in order to draw Hannibal away from Capua, marched off the following night in different directions, Fulvius into the region of Cumae, Claudius into Lucania. The next day Hannibal, on being informed that the Roman camp was empty and that they had marched away in different directions in two columns, was at first uncertain which to follow, but pushed on in pursuit of Appius, who after leading the enemy around wherever he pleased, returned by a different road to Capua. Hannibal had another opportunity for success presented to him in this region. There was one Marcus Centenius, with the cognomen Paenula, conspicuous among the centurions of the highest rank for his huge body and his courage. Having finished his military service, he was brought into the senate by Publius Cornelius Sulla, a praetor, and begged the fathers to give him five thousand soldiers. He, being well-acquainted, he said, both with the enemy and the country, would soon accomplish something worth while, and as for the arts by which both our generals and our armies had till then been ensnared, he would use them against their inventor. This was not more stupidly promised than stupidly believed, as if the qualities of soldier and general were the same. Instead of five thousand, eight thousand soldiers were given him, half of them citizens, half allies. And he himself on his march raised a considerable number of volunteers from the farms, and with his army nearly doubled reached Lucania, where Hannibal had halted after vainly pursuing Claudius. The result was never in doubt, as between Hannibal as commander and a centurion, and between armies one of which was a veteran in victory and the other altogether raw, in large part also irregular and half-armed. When the columns were in sight of each other and neither side refused battle, the lines were immediately drawn up. They fought, however, as was to be expected where nothing was fairly matched. For more than two hours the battle continued, since hope inspired the Roman line so long as their commander held his ground. Not only in keeping with his old reputation, but also for fear of future disgrace, if he should survive a disaster brought on by his own rashness, he threw himself upon the weapons of the enemy and fell, whereupon the Roman line was at once routed. But, as all the roads were occupied by cavalry, so far were they from having any route open even for flight that out of so great a multitude barely a thousand escaped, while the rest scattering met death in various forms. The siege of Capua was resumed with intensity by the consuls, and all that was needed for the purpose was being brought together and made ready. Casilinum was the depot for grain. At the mouth of the Volturnus, where there is now a city, a stronghold was fortified, and there and at Puteoli, which Fabius Maximus had previously fortified, a garrison was placed, that the sea in that neighbourhood and the river might be in their power. To these two strongholds by the sea the grain which had been sent recently from Sardinia and that which the praetor Marcus Junius had purchased in Etruria was transported from Ostia, so that the army might have a supply through the winter. But in addition to the disaster incurred in Lucania, the army of slavevolunteers also, which had served with the utmost loyalty while Gracchus lived, abandoned its standards, as if discharged by the death of the general. Hannibal did not wish that Capua should be neglected nor his allies abandoned in such a crisis. But in view of a success due to the rashness of one Roman general he was eager for an opportunity to surprise a second general and army. Apulian legates were informing him that the praetor Gnaeus Fulvius had at first been very active while besieging some Apulian cities which had revolted to Hannibal; but that later, owing to unmerited success, both he himself and his soldiers, who were loaded with booty, had gone to such lengths in licence and indifference that there was no military discipline. Hannibal, who frequently at other times, and particularly within a few days, had discovered what an army is under an incompetent general, moved his camp into Apulia. Near Herdonea were Roman legions and the praetor Fulvius. When the news reached them there that the enemy were approaching, they barely refrained from catching up their standards and going out into battle-line without orders from the praetor. And nothing restrained them more than the hope, now beyond question, that they would do so at their own discretion whenever they pleased. The following night Hannibal, knowing that there had been an uproar in the camp and that many, calling to arms, had over-confidently pressed the commander to give the signal, had no doubt that an opportunity for a victory was offered. He accordingly posted three thousand lightly equipped soldiers in farmhouses near by and in the thickets and the woods, to come out of their hiding-places all at once, when the signal was given. And he ordered Mago and about two thousand horsemen to lie in wait along all the roads in the direction which he believed the flight would take. After making these preparations at night, he led his troops out into line at daybreak. Nor did Fulvius hesitate, dragged into it not so much by any hope of his own as by the haphazard impulse of the soldiers. And so, with the same recklessness with which they went out to form, they drew up even the line of battle according to the whim of soldiers who happened to dash forward and take their stand wherever their own fancy had carried them, and then capriciously or in fear abandoned their positions. The first legion and the left ala were placed in front, and the line was made very long. Although the tribunes shouted that in depth it had no power to resist, and that wherever the enemy should make their attack they would pierce it, the men in line allowed no advice that was helpful to reach even their ears, not to say their attention. And there was Hannibal, surely not that sort of a general, nor with that sort of an army, drawn up in that fashion. Consequently the Romans did not withstand even their shout and the first onset. The general, a match for Centenius in folly and recklessness, but in courage by no means to be compared with him, seeing that the line was giving way and his own men in confusion, seized a horse and with about two hundred horsemen made his escape. The rest of the line, beaten back in front and then surrounded in the rear and on the wings, was so cut to pieces that out of eighteen thousand men not more than two thousand escaped. The camp was occupied by the enemy. When the news of these disasters one after another had reached Rome, great sorrow and alarm, it is true, took possession of the state. Nevertheless because the consuls, to whom fell the supreme command, were up to that time successful, they were less disturbed by these disasters. They sent Gaius Laetorius and Marcus Metilius as legates to the consuls, to inform them that they should carefully gather up the remnants of the two armies, and see to it that in fear and despair they did not surrender to the enemy, as had happened after the disaster at Cannae; also that they should search for the deserters from the army of slave-volunteers. The same duty was given to Publius Cornelius, to whom the levy also had been assigned. And he issued an edict in the market-towns and local centres, that search should be made for the slave-volunteers, and that they be brought back to their standards. All these things were done with the utmost diligence. Appius Claudius, the consul, placed Decimus Junius in command at the mouth of the Volturnus and Marcus Aurelius Cotta at Puteoli, in order that, as fast as ships came in from Etruria and Sardinia, they should send the grain at once to the camps. He himself, on returning to Capua, found his colleague Quintus Fulvius transporting everything from Casilinum and making every preparation for the siege of Capua. Then they both invested the city and summoned the praetor, Claudius Nero, from the Claudian camp at Suessula. He, leaving there only a garrison of moderate size to hold the place, likewise came down with all the rest of his forces to Capua. Thus three headquarters were set up around Capua. There were three armies too that, fell to work on different sides, made ready to encircle the city with a ditch and an earthwork, and erected redoubts at moderate intervals; and at many points at the same time they fought with such success against the Campanians who endeavoured to hinder the works that finally the Campanians remained inside the gates and the wall. But before these siege-works could be made continuous, legates were sent to Hannibal, to complain that Capua had been deserted by him and almost given back to the Romans, and to implore him to bring aid, then at least, to men not only besieged but also encircled by entrenchments. The consuls received a letter from Publius Cornelius, the praetor, ordering that, before enclosing Capua with their works, they should permit such of the Campanians as wished to do so to leave Capua and carry their possessions with them. Those who should leave before the fifteenth of March were to be free men and to keep all their property; those who left after that date and those who remained there were to be reckoned enemies. These terms were published to the Campanians, and were received with such contempt by them that they were actually insulting and made threats. Hannibal had led his legions from Herdonea to Tarentum in the hope of getting possession of the citadel of Tarentum either by force or by ruse. When this did not succeed, he turned aside to Brundisium, thinking that town would certainly be betrayed. While there also he was wasting time, the Campanian legates came to him with complaints and at the same time entreaties. Hannibal replied to them grandly that he had previously raised a siege, and that now also the consuls would not withstand his coming. With this hope the legates were sent away, and it was with difficulty that they were able to return to Capua, now surrounded by two trenches and a double earthwork. Just as Capua was being encircled the siege of Syracuse came to an end, expedited not only by the vigour and valour of the general and the army but also by treachery within. For Marcellus, who at the beginning of the spring had been uncertain whether to shift the war to Agrigentum against Himilco and Hippocrates, or to press the siege of Syracuse, saw indeed that the city, impregnable in its position both on the landward and the seaward side, could not be taken by assault, nor by starvation, inasmuch as it was sustained by almost unhampered supplies from Carthage. Nevertheless, to leave nothing untried, deserters from Syracuse —and there were in the Roman lines some men of highest rank who during the estrangement from the Romans had been driven out because they were averse to a change of policy —were ordered by him to sound men of their faction in conferences, and to give them a pledge that, if Syracuse should be surrendered, they should live as free men and under their own laws. For a conference there was no opportunity, because the suspicious attitude of many men had attracted the attention and the eyes of all, to prevent such an offence from passing unnoticed. A single slave belonging to the exiles was admitted to the city as a deserter and by meeting a few men made a beginning of parleys on a matter of such moment. Then some men were hidden under nets on a fishing vessel, and thus sailed around to the Roman camp and talked with the deserters. And the same men did this repeatedly in the same way, also others and again others. Finally they amounted to about eighty. And when now everything had been arranged for the betrayal, information was brought to Epicydes by one Attalus, who was outraged that the matter had not been confided to him, and they were all put to death with torture. This hope having proved false, another at once took its place. Damippus a Lacedaemonian, who had been sent from Syracuse to King Philip, had been captured by Roman ships. Epicydes was very much concerned to ransom him at any cost, and Marcellus also was not averse, since the Romans were already courting the friendship of the Aetolians, whose allies the Lacedaemonians were. The men sent to confer in regard to the man's ransom thought that the most convenient place for both sides, and just half-way, was at the Trogili Harbour, near the tower called Galeagra. As they came there repeatedly, one of the Romans, observing the wall from near at hand, by counting the courses and making his own estimate of the height of each on its face, measured the height of the wall as nearly as he could by guesswork. And thinking it considerably lower than his own previous estimate of it and that of all the rest, and that it could be scaled by ladders even of moderate length, he reported to Marcellus. It did not seem a matter to be despised. But since the place, being more closely guarded for the very reason mentioned, could not be approached, they cast about for an opportunity. And this was offered by a deserter, reporting that the feast of Diana was being observed for three days, and that, since other things were lacking during the siege, it was with wine that the banquets were more lavishly provided, this being furnished to the entire populace by Epicydes and distributed among the tribes by leading citizens. On learning of this, Marcellus conferred with a few tribunes of the soldiers, and after these had chosen centurions and soldiers able to dare and do a thing of such importance, and after ladders had been secretly made ready, he ordered the signal to be given to the others to eat early and then rest. In the night, he said, they must go on a raid. Then, when it seemed to be late enough for those who had begun their feast during the day to be sated, he thought, with their wine and now to be falling asleep, he ordered the soldiers of one maniple to carry the ladders. And about a thousand armed men were led in a thin column to the place in silence. When the first men without noise and confusion had made their way to the top of the wall, the others followed one after another, since the boldness of those ahead of them gave courage even to the wavering. The thousand armed men had already taken a part of the wall, when the rest of the forces were brought up, and on more ladders they were making their way to the top of the wall, a signal having been given from the Hexapylon. To that point they had advanced without encountering a soul, since many of the enemy, after feasting in the towers, either had been put to sleep by their wine or, while half-intoxicated, were still drinking. A few of them, however, they surprised and slew in their beds. Near the Hexapylon there is a postern. This they had begun to break open with great force, and from the wall the signal had been given by a trumpet, as agreed; and now the fighting was from every side, no longer by stealth, but with open violence. For they had reached Epipolae, a well-guarded region, and the enemy had rather to be terrified than deceived, as they were in fact terrified. For as soon as they heard the notes of the trumpet and the shouting of the men holding the walls and a part of the city, the guards, thinking the whole city was occupied, fled, some of them along the wall; others leaped from the wall or were pushed over by the panic-stricken crowd. A large part of the people, however, were unaware of the great danger; for all were heavy with wine and sleep, and in a city of immense size knowledge concerning its quarters failed to reach the whole. At daybreak Marcellus burst open the Hexapylon, and entering the city with his entire force awakened everybody and set them to arming themselves and bringing aid, if possible, to a city now all but captured. Epicydes came out from the Island, which they themselves call Nasos, with a quickly moving column, not doubting that he would drive out a few men who, owing to the carelessness of the guards had got over the wall. When men met him in alarm, he would say that they were adding to the confusion and bringing exaggerated and unduly alarming news. On discovering that in and near Epipolae armed men were everywhere, he merely challenged the enemy by a few missiles and then marched his column back into Achradina. He feared, not so much the attack of the enemy and their great numbers, as that some treachery within the city might have opportunity to break out, and he might find the gates of Achradina and the Island closed during the disturbance. Marcellus, on entering the walls and from the higher ground viewing one of the most beautiful of all cities in that age lying before his eyes, is said to have wept, partly for joy over his great achievement, partly for the ancient glory of the city. The sinking of the fleets of the Athenians and the destruction of two mighty armies along with two very distinguished generals came to his mind, and so many wars waged with so great a risk against the Carthaginians; tyrants and kings, so many and so wealthy, above all Hiero, a king vividly remembered and also, above all that his own merit and success had given him, conspicuous for his favours to the Roman people. Since all that came to mind and the thought suggested itself that now in the course of an hour everything there would be in flames and reduced to ashes, before advancing his standards into Achradina, he sent forward the Syracusans who had been within the Roman lines, as has been said before, in order to entice the enemy by mild words to surrender the city. Holding the gates and walls of Achradina were chiefly deserters, who had no hope of pardon if terms were made. They did not allow the men either to approach the walls or to speak to any one. And so Marcellus, now that this attempt was fruitless, ordered the standards to be carried back to Euryalus. This is a hill in the most distant part of the city, facing away from the sea, and commanding the road which leads to the country and the interior of the island, very conveniently placed for receiving supplies. In command of this citadel was Philodemus the Argive, posted there by Epicydes. Sosis, one of the slayers of the tyrant, was sent to him by Marcellus, and after being balked and put off by the delivery of a long speech, he reported to Marcellus that Philodemus had taken time to consider. Philodemus was postponing from day to day, waiting for Hippocrates and Himilco to move up their camp and legions, and not doubting that, if he should get them into the citadel, the Roman army, shut up within the city walls, could be destroyed. Consequently Marcellus, seeing that Euryalus could neither be won by surrender nor by assault, pitched his camp between Neapolis and Tycha, these being the names of quarters of the city, virtually cities in themselves. For he feared that, if he should enter thickly settled parts, the soldiers in their eagerness for booty could not be restrained from scattering. To this camp came legates from Tycha and Neapolis with fillets and woollen bands, praying that they be spared bloodshed and fires. Marcellus held a council in regard to their prayers —such they were rather than demands —and with the approval of all gave an order to the soldiers that no one should injure a free person; everything else would be spoil. The camp was enclosed by bricks from house-walls to serve as a wall of defence. At those camp gates which opened toward the streets outposts and detachments were stationed by Marcellus, that no attack upon the camp might occur while the soldiers were dispersed. Then at a given signal the soldiers scattered. And although doors were forced and everywhere were the sounds of panic and uproar, they nevertheless refrained from bloodshed. To plundering there was no limit until they had carried away all the possessions accumulated in a long-continued prosperity. Meanwhile even Philodemus, having no hope of assistance and receiving assurance that he might return unharmed to Epicydes, led his garrison out and surrendered the hill to the Romans. While the attention of all was diverted in the direction of the uproar of a city in part captured, Bomilcar, favoured by such a night that on account of a violent storm the Roman fleet could not ride at anchor in open water, came out of the harbour of Syracuse with thirty-five ships, and with no enemy to prevent, put to sea, leaving fifty-five ships to Epicydes and the Syracusans. And after informing the Carthaginians how critical was the situation at Syracuse, he returned after a few days with a hundred ships. He was presented with many gifts, it is reported, by Epicydes out of the royal treasures of Hiero. Marcellus, after getting possession of Euryalus and garrisoning it, was relieved of one fear, that some troops of the enemy in the rear might be admitted to the citadel and embarrass his men, hemmed in and hampered by the walls. He thereupon laid siege to Achradina with three camps placed in suitable positions, in the hope of reducing the beleaguered to absolute want. When the outposts on both sides had been inactive for some days, suddenly the arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco had the effect that the Romans were actually besieged on all sides. For Hippocrates, after fortifying a camp by the Great Harbour and giving the signal to the forces occupying Achradina, attacked the old Roman camp, which was commanded by Crispinus, at the same time that Epicydes made a sally against Marcellus' outposts, and just when the Carthaginian fleet put in to the shore lying between the city and the Roman camp, to make it impossible for any force to be sent to the aid of Crispinus by Marcellus. However, it was more of an uproar than a battle that the enemy offered. For Crispinus not only drove Hippocrates back from his fortifications, but also pursued him as he fled in disorder, and Marcellus likewise forced Epicydes into the city. And now, even for the future, he seemed to have sufficiently insured that there should be no danger from their sudden raids. Then in addition pestilence brought to both sides a calamity which forthwith diverted the attention of the two armies from strategy. For owing to the autumn season and places naturally unhealthy, unendurable heat affected the health of nearly all the men in both camps, but much more outside the city than within. And at first they sickened and died owing to the season and their position. Later the mere care of the ill and contagion spread the disease, so that those who had fallen ill died neglected and abandoned, or else they carried off with them those who sat by them and those who nursed, having caught the same malignant disease. And so every day funerals and death were before their eyes, and wailings were heard on all sides day and night. Finally, from habituation to misery they had so lost their humane feelings that, so far from escorting the dead with tears and the wailing that was their due, they did not even carry them out and bury them; and dead bodies lay strewn about before the eyes of men awaiting a like death, and the dead seriously affected the ill, the ill the sound, not only through fear, but also by putrefaction and the pestilent odour of corpses. And some choosing to die by the sword, dashed into the outposts of the enemy single-handed. A much more violent epidemic, however, had attacked the Carthaginian camp than the Roman. For the Romans in their long blockade of Syracuse had grown more accustomed to the climate and the water. Of the enemy's army, the Sicilians scattered, each to his own neighbouring city, as soon as they saw that the disease was spreading owing to the unwholesomeness of the place, while the Carthaginians, who had no refuge anywhere, with even their generals, Hippocrates and Himilco, perished to the last man. Marcellus, as soon as the pestilence began to be so serious, had transferred his soldiers into the city, and shelter and shade had revived the invalids. Nevertheless many in the Roman army were carried off by the same pestilence. The Carthaginian land-army having been destroyed, the Sicilians who had been Hippocrates' soldiers had occupied . . ., not large towns, but defended both by situation and fortifications. One of them is three miles from Syracuse, the other fifteen miles. To these they were bringing supplies from their own communities and also summoning auxiliaries. Meanwhile Bomilcar left for Carthage a second time with his fleet, and he set forth the situation of their allies in such terms as to inspire hope, not only that effectual aid could be lent to them, but also that the Romans could be captured in the virtually captured city. He thus prevailed upon them to send with him as many transports as possible, laden with all kinds of supplies, and to enlarge his fleet. Accordingly, setting out from Carthage with a hundred and thirty warships and seven hundred transports, he had winds quite favourable for the crossing to Sicily. But the same winds did not allow him to round Pachynum. The report at first of Bomilcar's coming, and then its unexpected delay, brought rejoicing and fear by turns to Romans and Syracusans. Upon that Epicydes, fearing that, if the same winds which were then holding should continue to blow from the east for several days, the Carthaginian fleet would make for Africa again, turned over Achradina to the commanders of the mercenaries and sailed to meet Bomilcar, who was keeping his fleet in a roadstead facing Africa. He feared a naval battle, not so much because he was inferior in his forces and the number of his ships —in fact he had even more —as because the winds then blowing were more favourable to the Roman fleet than to his own. Nevertheless Epicydes gained his consent to try the fortune of a naval engagement. And Marcellus too, seeing that a Sicilian army was being brought together from the entire island and at the same time a Carthaginian fleet was approaching with unlimited supplies, and fearing that he might be hard pressed by land and sea, being shut up within the enemies' city, decided, although he was inferior in the number of his ships, to prevent Bomilcar from reaching Syracuse. The two opposing fleets lay on this side and that of the promontory of Pachynum, ready to engage as soon as calm weather should enable them to put to sea. And so, as the southeast wind, which had been blowing hard for some days, was now dropping, Bomilcar was the first to get under weigh. And at first his fleet appeared to be heading out to sea, the more readily to round the promontory. But on seeing that the Roman ships were steering towards him, Bomilcar, alarmed by something unforeseen, made sail for open water, and after sending messengers to Heraclea to command the transports to return thence to Africa, he himself sailed along the coast of Sicily and made for Tarentum. Epicydes, suddenly bereft of a hope so high, in order not to return, only to share the siege of a city in large part captured, sailed to Agrigentum, intending to await the outcome, rather than to set anything in motion from there. When these things were reported to the camp of the Sicilians, that Epicydes had left Syracuse, that the island had been abandoned by the Carthaginians and almost handed over a second time to the Romans, after first ascertaining by conferences the wish of the besieged, they sent legates to Marcellus to make terms for the surrender of the city. It was virtually agreed that all that had anywhere belonged to the kings should belong to the Romans, that everything else should be secured to the Sicilians along with freedom and their own laws. Accordingly the legates summoned to a conference the men to whom power had been entrusted by Epicydes, and said that they had been sent by the army of the Sicilians at the same time to Marcellus and to them, in order that all, the besieged and those who had been outside of the operations, might share the same lot and neither party make any special terms for itself. And then, being admitted by them, that they might speak with their relatives and guest-friends, they explained the terms which they had already settled with Marcellus, and by holding out assurances of safety prevailed upon them to join with themselves in an attack upon Epicydes' prefects, Polyclitus and Philistion and an Epicydes surnamed Sindon. After slaying them and calling the populace to an assembly, they complained of privation and other things at which among themselves they had been in the habit of murmuring in secret. And they said that, although so many hardships were a burden to them, they ought not to blame fortune, because it was in their own power to say how long they would endure them. The Romans, they said, had had as their ground for besieging Syracuse their love, not hatred, of the Syracusans. For on learning that the power had been seized by Hippocrates and Epicydes, minions of Hannibal and later of Hieronymus, it was then that they had made war and had begun to besiege the city, in order to capture, not the city itself, but its cruel tyrants. But now that Hippocrates had perished, that Epicydes had been cut off from Syracuse and his prefects slain, now that the Carthaginians had everywhere been driven by land and sea from their occupation of Sicily, what reason remained for the Romans not to wish Syracuse to be preserved, just as if Hiero himself, who was unrivalled in maintaining friendship with Rome, were still alive? Accordingly both for the city and for individuals there was no other danger than from themselves, if they should let slip the opportunity of a reconciliation with the Romans. Moreover so favourable an opportunity as there was at that moment, if it should be evident that Syracuse, once it had been freed from insolent tyrants,. . . , would never come again. The speech was heard with great and unanimous approval. It was decided, however, to elect magistrates before naming legates. Then out of the number of these magistrates' representatives were sent to Marcellus. The foremost of these said: In the beginning it was not we Syracusans who forsook your friendship, but Hieronymus, who was by no means so conscienceless toward you as toward us. And later the peace concluded on the assassination of the tyrant was broken, not by any Syracusan, but by the king's minions, Hippocrates and Epicydes, after they had subdued us, now by terrorizing, now by treason. Nor can any man say that there has ever been any time of freedom for us that was not a time of peace with you. Certain it is that now, when through the slaying of those who were holding Syracuse in subjection we have begun for the first time to be our own masters, we have come forthwith to give up our arms, to surrender ourselves, the city, the walls, to reject no lot which shall be imposed by you Romans. The glory of capturing the most notable and most beautiful of Greek cities the gods have given to you, Marcellus. All that we have ever accomplished on land and sea that is worthy of record is added to the distinction of your triumph. Would you wish men merely to believe tradition as to the greatness of the city you have captured, rather than that it be a sight even to posterity, a city which shall show to every man who comes by land or by sea, at one spot our trophies won from the Athenians and the Carthaginians, at another your trophies won from us, and that you hand over Syracuse intact to your house, to be kept under the clientship and tutelage of those who bear the name Marcellus? Let not the memory of Hieronymus have more weight with you Romans than that of Hiero. The latter was much longer your friend than the former your enemy; and you have had positive experience of the good deeds of the one, while the other's folly resulted only in his own destruction. Everything could be obtained from the Romans and was already assured. It was among the Sicilians themselves that war and danger chiefly lay. For the deserters, thinking that they would surely be handed over to the Romans, aroused the mercenary auxiliaries also to the same fear. And seizing arms they first slew the magistrates and then dispersed to massacre the Syracusans, and in anger they slew all whom chance threw in their way and carried off everything on which they could lay hands. Then, not to be without commanders, they chose six prefects, three to be in charge of Achradina and three of Nasus. When the uproar was at last stilled and they were diligently enquiring what terms had been made with the Romans, the truth began to dawn upon them, that their case was different from that of the deserters. Just at the right moment the legates returned from Marcellus, stating that the mercenaries had been aroused by an unfounded suspicion, and that the Romans had no reason for demanding their punishment. One of the three prefects of Achradina was a Spaniard, Moericus by name. To him, among the- retinue of the legates, one of the Spanish auxiliaries was sent on purpose. Finding Moericus alone, he first explained the condition in which he had left Spain, from which he had recently come. The whole of that country, he said, was held by Roman arms. If he should do something worth while, he could be a chief among his own people, whether he preferred to serve on the Roman side or to return to his native town. On the other hand, if he continued to prefer to be besieged, what hope was there for a man shut in by land and sea? Moericus was impressed by these words, and when it was decided to send legates to Marcellus, sent his brother as one of them. He was escorted separately from the rest to Marcellus by that same Spaniard, and after receiving a promise and arranging the steps to be taken, returned to Achradina. Then Moericus, to divert the attention of everybody from the suspicion of treason, said he did not approve of having legates going back and forth; that none should be admitted or sent; and that, in order to keep a closer guard, suitable positions should be divided among the prefects, so that each should be responsible for the defence of his own section. All agreed. In the assignment of sections the region extending from the Fountain of Arethusa to the entrance of the Great Harbour fell to Moericus himself. He saw to it that the Romans knew that. Accordingly Marcellus ordered a transport with armed men to be towed at night by a four-banker to Achradina, and the soldiers to be landed near the gate which is by the Fountain of Arethusa. This done at the fourth watch, and the soldiers landed there having been admitted according to agreement by Moericus through the gate, Marcellus at daybreak with all his forces assailed the walls of Achradina. The result was that not only did he turn the attention of the defenders of Achradina to himself, but from Nasus also columns of armed men, leaving their posts, united in haste, to ward off the violent attack of the Romans. During this confusion light vessels, previously equipped, sailed around to Nasus and landed their troops. These made an unexpected attack upon the half-manned outposts and the open doors of the gate through which the armed men had dashed out a little while before, and with no great resistance captured Nasus, deserted by the excitement and flight of the guards. And no others showed less capacity to defend or determination to hold out than the deserters, since they did not quite trust even their own men and fled out of the midst of the conflict. Marcellus, on learning that Nasus had been captured and one section of Achradina occupied, also that Moericus with his force had joined the Romans, sounded the recall, to prevent the royal treasures, which were reported to be larger than they really were, from being plundered. The onslaught of the soldiers being checked and time and place for their flight given to the deserters who were in Achradina, the Syracusans, at last relieved of their fear, open the gates of Achradina and send representatives to Marcellus, asking nothing else than their own lives and those of their children. Marcellus, calling a council and admitting also those Syracusans who, after being driven from home during the uprisings, had been inside the Roman lines, replied that the good acts of Hiero toward the Roman people during fifty years had not been more numerous than the evil deeds done in the last few years by those who held Syracuse. But most of the misdeeds, he said, had reacted just as they should, and the men had exacted from themselves much more serious penalties for the broken treaties than the Roman people wished. For his part, he was besieging Syracuse for the third year, not that the Roman people might keep the city enslaved, but to prevent the commanders of deserters and foreigners from holding it in captivity and subjection. What the Syracusans could have done was shown by the example either of those Syracusans inside the Roman lines, or of the Spanish commander Moericus, who surrendered his post, or finally of the belated but courageous resolution of the Syracusans themselves. To his mind it was by no means a sufficient reward for all the hardships and dangers, so long endured on land and sea about the Syracusan walls, that he had been able to capture Syracuse. Thereupon the quaestor was sent from Nasus with a force to receive and guard the royal funds. The city was given over to the soldiers to plunder, guards being first assigned to the houses of the men who had been inside the Roman lines. While many shameful examples of anger and many of greed were being given, the tradition is that Archimedes, in all the uproar which the alarm of a captured city could produce in the midst of plundering soldiers dashing about, was intent upon the figures which he had traced in the dust and was slain by a soldier, not knowing who he was; that Marcellus was grieved at this, and his burial duly provided for; and that his name and memory were an honour and a protection to his relatives, search even being made for them. Such in the main was the capture of Syracuse, in which there was booty in such quantity as there would scarcely have been if Carthage, with which the conflict was on even terms, had at that time been captured. A few days before Syracuse was taken, Titus Otacilius with eighty five-bankers crossed over from Lilybaeum to Utica. And having entered the harbour before daylight, he captured cargo-ships laden with grain, and disembarking ravaged a considerable area around Utica and drove booty of every kind back to the ships. On the third day after he had left Lilybaeum he returned thither with a hundred and thirty cargo-ships laden with grain and booty, and sent the grain at once to Syracuse. Had it not arrived so opportunely, a famine equally destructive to victors and vanquished was impending. In Spain in the same summer, when for about two years nothing very notable had occurred and the war was being waged more by diplomacy than by arms, the Roman generals, on leaving their winter-quarters, united their forces. Thereupon a council was called and all were of one mind, that, since up to that time they had accomplished nothing except to hold Hasdrubal back from pushing on into Italy, it was time that their task should now be to end the war in Spain. And they believed they had sufficient reinforcements for that purpose in twenty thousand Celtiberians who had been called to arms that winter. The enemy had three armies. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, and Mago with adjoining camps were about five days' march from the Romans. Nearer was Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, a veteran commander in Spain. He had his army near a city called Amtorgis. It was he that the Roman generals wished first to overpower; and they hoped they had quite ample forces for that end. The one remaining concern was the fear that, if he was defeated, the other Hasdrubal and Mago might in alarm withdraw to pathless forests and mountains and prolong the war. They thought it best therefore to divide their forces into two armies and include the whole of Spain in their plan of operations. And they divided in such manner that Publius Cornelius should lead two-thirds of the army of Romans and allies against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Gnaeus Cornelius with one-third of the old army and the Celtiberians in addition should carry on the war with Hasdrubal Barca. Setting out together, with the Celtiberians in the van, both generals and armies pitched camp near the city of Amtorgis, in sight of the enemy, but separated by a river. There Gnaeus Scipio remained with the above-mentioned forces, while Publius Scipio set out for his previously appointed share of the war. Hasdrubal first noted that there was only a small army of Romans in the camp and that all their hope was in the Celtiberian auxiliaries. Then, as he was well acquainted with every form of treachery practised by barbarians and particularly by those tribes among which he had been campaigning for so many years, and as oral communication was easy, since both camps were full of Spaniards, by means of secret conferences he made an agreement with the chief men of the Celtiberians at a high price that they should withdraw their troops. Nor did it seem an outrageous act —for it was not urged that they should turn their arms against the Romans —and a price which would have been ample even for engaging in the war was offered them not to wage war. Again, not only peace itself, but also a return home and the advantage of seeing their families and their property were attractions to the mass of them. Accordingly their leaders were not more easily persuaded than the rank and file. At the same time they had no fear from the Romans either, if they, being so few in number, should try to hold them by force. It will always be a necessary precaution for Roman generals, and these instances must really be accounted warnings, not so to trust their foreign auxiliaries as not to have in camp more of their own strength and of forces that are absolutely their own. The Celtiberians suddenly took up their standards and departed, and when Romans asked the reason and implored them to remain, they gave no other answer than that they were called away by a war at home. Scipio, now that his allies could not be held either by entreaties or by force, saw that he could neither be a match for the enemy without them nor rejoin his brother, and that no other promising plan was available. Thereupon he decided to retire as far as possible, taking every care and being on the alert not to expose himself anywhere on level ground to the enemy, who crossed the river and kept almost at their heels as they withdrew. About the same time Publius Scipio was beset by a fear no less grave and a danger that was greater from a new enemy. There was the young Masinissa, at that time an ally of the Carthaginians, a man whom friendship with the Romans later made famous and powerful. With his Numidian cavalry he now encountered Publius Scipio on his advance, and also was continually at hand day and night, ready to attack, so that he not only captured soldiers who had wandered far from the camp in search of wood and fodder, but also rode up to the camp itself, and often dashing into the midst of the outposts threw everything into great confusion. By night also there was often alarm at the gates and on the earthwork owing to a sudden attack, nor was any place or time free from fear and anxiety for the Romans, and they were confined within their earthwork, unable to obtain anything. It was almost a regular blockade, and this would evidently be stricter if Indibilis, who was reported as approaching with seven thousand five hundred Suessetani, should join the Carthaginians. Consequently Scipio, though a general marked by caution and foresight, being forced by his straits, adopted the rash plan of going by night to meet Indibilis and giving battle wherever he should encounter him. Therefore, leaving a moderate garrison at the camp and putting his lieutenant, Tiberius Fonteius, in command of it, he set out at midnight, and on meeting the enemy engaged them. It was a battle of columns rather than lines; yet, so far as could be in an engagement without order, the Roman had the advantage. But the Numidian cavalry, whose notice the general had thought he had escaped, by outflanking them inspired great alarm, and in addition, when they had entered a fresh battle with the Numidians, a third enemy also arrived, the Carthaginian generals, who from the rear overtook them when already engaged. And the Romans found themselves between two battles, uncertain against which enemy and in which direction they should choose to break through in a mass. As the general was fighting and exhorting, and exposing himself where there was most to be done, his right side was pierced by a lance. And those of the enemy who in a wedge had made an attack upon the men pressing close about the general, on seeing the dying Scipio slipping from his horse, dashed everywhere along the line, wild with delight, shouting and announcing that the Roman commander had fallen. The broadcasting of that announcement far and wide made the enemy as good as victors beyond a doubt and the Romans as good as vanquished. Flight directly from the battle-line began, once they had lost their general. But while, so far as bursting through the Numidians and the light-armed auxiliaries as well was concerned, flight was not difficult, yet it was hardly possible for them to escape such numbers of horsemen and infantry who by their speed kept up with the horses. And almost more were slain in flight than in battle, nor would anyone have survived but for the coming on of night, as the day was now rapidly drawing to a close. Then the Carthaginian generals directly after the battle, making no indifferent use of their success, barely allowed their soldiers necessary rest, and rushed their column with all speed in the direction of Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, with the certain hope that, when they should unite with him, the war could be finished. Upon their arrival there was great congratulation between the armies and generals rejoicing in the recent victory, since so great a general and his entire army had been destroyed, and they were looking for just such another victory as beyond question. As for the Romans, not yet indeed had a report of the great disaster reached them, but there was a gloomy silence and an unexpressed foreboding, such as is usually the forecast of impending misfortune when men already have presentiments. The general himself, in addition to the knowledge that he had been deserted by his allies and that the enemy's forces had been so greatly increased, was more inclined by logical inference to suspect that a disaster had occurred than to entertain any good hope. For how, he thought, could Hasdrubal and Mago, unless they had quite finished their own war, have been able to bring up their army without an engagement? And how had his brother failed to confront them or to follow in their rear, so that, if unable to prevent the generals and armies of the enemy from uniting, he might himself at least combine his forces with those of his brother? Troubled by these anxieties, he believed that the one safe course at present was to retreat as faraway as possible. Then in one night, while the enemy were unaware of it and hence made no move, he marched a considerable distance. In the morning the enemy, on discovering that they had gone, sent the Numidians in advance and began to follow them in a column at its utmost speed. Before night the Numidians had overtaken them, and charging now in the rear, now on the flanks, compelled them to halt and defend their column. Scipio kept encouraging them to fight and advance at the same time, so far, that is, as they could do so with safety, before the infantry forces should overtake them. But while he now urged his column forward, now ordered it to halt, for a long time little progress was being made and night was now at hand. Scipio therefore recalled his men from battle, concentrated them and led them up a hill that was not indeed quite safe, especially for a terrified column, but still was higher than the country around it. There the infantry, surrounding the baggage and cavalry placed in the centre, at first kept off the charges of the Numidians without difficulty. Then, when three generals arrived in full force with three regular armies, and it was evident that they would be unable by arms to defend an unfortified position, the general began to cast about and consider whether he could in some way surround it with an earthwork.. But the hill was so bare and rocky that neither could thickets be found for the cutting of stakes nor ground such that they could get turf or carry a trench in it or any other earthwork. And yet no spot was naturally so elevated or rugged as to make approach or ascent difficult for the enemy. Everywhere the ground rose at a gentle slope. However, in order to interpose some semblance of an earthwork, they laid up, as it were, to the usual height all around them, pack-saddles still tied to their loads, while, wherever the pack-saddles failed to make a barricade, they piled on top lighter baggage of every kind. The Carthaginian armies, on arriving, very easily marched in column up the hill; but the strange appearance of the defences at first checked them in a certain amazement, while their commanders kept shouting from all sides, asking why they stood still and did not pull apart and scatter that pretence, hardly strong enough to delay women or children. The enemy, they said, was held captive, lurking behind his baggage. Such were the scornful taunts of the commanders. But it was not easy to leap over or clear away the baggage in front of them, nor to cut apart the mass of pack-saddles, buried under the added loads. But after they had cleared away the baggage in front of them with hooked poles and made a way for the armed men, and the same thing was being done in different places, the camp had by this time been captured from all sides. Everywhere there was slaughter of the few by the many, of the panic-stricken by the victorious. A large part of the soldiers, however, after fleeing into the neighbouring forest, made their escape to Publius Scipio's camp, of which Tiberius Fonteius, his lieutenant, was commander. As for Gnaeus Scipio, some relate that he was slain on the hill in the first onset of the enemy, others that with a few men he made his escape to a tower near the camp; that fire was lighted around this, and so, by burning the doors which they had been unable to force in any way, they captured the tower and all were slain in it along with the commander himself. In the eighth year after his arrival in Spain Gnaeus Scipio was killed, on the twenty-ninth day after the death of his brother. Grief for their deaths was not greater in Rome than throughout Spain; in fact among the citizens the destruction of armies and the loss of a province and the national disaster claimed a part in their sorrow, while all Spain mourned for the generals themselves and missed them, Gnaeus more than Publius, because he had been longer in command and had earlier won their favour, and had given for the first time an example of Roman justice and self-control. While it seemed that the armies had been wiped out and all Spain lost, a single man repaired their shattered fortunes. In the army was Lucius Marcius, son of Septimus, a Roman knight, an active young man of much more spirit and talent than was to be expected in the station in which he had been born. In addition to his high promise he had had the training of Gnaeus Scipio, in which during so many years he had mastered all the arts of the soldier. This man had made an army that was not to be despised out of soldiers gathered up from the flight and in part withdrawn from garrison towns, and he had united it with that of Tiberius Fonteius, the lieutenant of Publius Scipio. But so preeminent was a mere Roman knight in his personal influence with the soldiers and in the respect they paid him that, after they had fortified a camp on this side of the Hiberus and decided that a commander of the army should be chosen in an election by the soldiers, relieving each other as sentries on the wall and in outpost duty until all had cast their votes, they unanimously conferred the high command upon Lucius Marcius. He then spent the whole time —and it was very short —in fortifying the camp and bringing up supplies. And the soldiers carried out all his commands, not only with energy, but also in no dejected spirit. But when the news came that Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, on his way to wipe out the last remains of the war, had crossed the Hiberus and was approaching, and the soldiers saw the signal for battle raised by a new general, they remembered what commanders they had had a short time before, and upon what generals and forces they had usually relied as they went into battle. Suddenly they all were weeping and dashing their heads against obstacles; and some raised their hands to heaven, blaming the gods, others lying on the ground invoked their respective generals by name. And the wailing could not be stilled, although the centurions tried to arouse the men of their maniples and Marcius himself to calm them and upbraided them for having given themselves up to womanish and useless weeping, instead of whetting their courage to defend themselves and with them the state, and begged them not to let their commanders lie unavenged, when suddenly —for the enemy were now near the earthwork —a shout and the sound of trumpets were heard. Upon that, their grief instantly changing to anger, they scatter to arms, and as if fired by frenzy, to the different gates, and dash into the enemy coming on carelessly and in disorder. At once the unexpected act inspired alarm among the Carthaginians, and they wondered whence so many enemies had suddenly appeared after the army had been almost wiped out, whence came such boldness and self-confidence so great in men beaten and put to flight, what commander had arisen after the two Scipios had been slain, who was in command of the camp, who had given the signal for battle. In the face of all that —so many things so unexpected —they at first retreated, completely at a loss and dumbfounded; then beaten back by the strength of the attack they took to flight. And there would have been either a terrible slaughter of the fleeing or a reckless and dangerous attack on the part of the pursuers, had not Marcius promptly given the signal for the recall and kept back his own excited line, facing his men in the front line and laying hold of some with his own hands. He then led them back to camp still thirsting for slaughter and bloodshed. The Carthaginians were at first forced away in confusion from the enemies' earthwork; then, when they saw that no one was pursuing, they thought they had halted for fear, and with fresh contempt and at a slow pace they retired to their camp. There was just as much carelessness in guarding the camp. For, although the enemy was near, still they kept reflecting that it was only a remnant of the two armies wiped out a few days before. Since for this reason every precaution had been omitted on the enemy's side, Marcius, informed of the facts, turned his attention to a plan at first sight reckless rather than bold, actually to attack the camp of the enemy, in the belief that it was easier to storm the camp of Hasdrubal alone than to defend his own, if the three armies and three generals should again unite. At the same time he thought that, if his efforts should prove successful, he would relieve his critical situation or, even if defeated, by venturing to attack he would at least take away their contempt for himself. But for fear an unexpected action, and alarm in the night and a plan no longer in keeping with his present situation, might bring confusion, he thought he must address his soldiers and encourage them, called an assembly and spoke as follows: "Either my devotion to our commanders, living and dead, or the present situation of us all, soldiers, can convince any one that this high command, though a great honour as your tribute, is yet in fact a burden to me and an anxious care. For at a time when, if fear did not paralyse grief, I should scarcely have such self-control as would enable me to find some comfort for distress of mind, I am compelled —a most difficult thing in sorrow —alone to plan for all of you. And even when I must consider how I may be able to save these remnants of two armies for our country, I may not turn my thoughts away from unremitting grief. For a bitter memory is present with me, and both Scipios trouble me all day and all night with anxiety and loss of sleep, and often arouse me from slumber, bidding me not to allow either themselves or their soldiers, your comrades, undefeated in this land for eight years, or the state, to go unavenged. And they command me to follow their teachings and their methods, and, just as while they lived not a man was more obedient to their orders than I, so after their death to hold that to be the best course which in each case I am confident they would have done. As for you, soldiers, I would have you also honour them, not with lamentations and tears as though dead. They live and work by the glory of their achievements. But whenever you shall remember them, just as if you saw them encouraging you and giving the signal, —in that spirit would I have you go into battle. It was surely no other image which presented itself yesterday to your eyes and minds and brought about that notable battle, by which you gave the enemy proof that the Roman name has not been extinguished with the Scipios, and that the people whose might and courage were not overwhelmed by the disaster at Cannae will surely survive any cruelty of Fortune. At present, because you have of your own accord shown such daring, I should like to find how much you have when your general gives the command. For yesterday, when I sounded the recall, as you in disorder were pursuing the routed enemy, it was not my wish to crush your boldness, but to reserve it for higher fame and a more favourable situation, that later, being well prepared and armed, you might be able, as opportunity offered, to attack the unprepared and unarmed, and even the sleeping. And not haphazard or at random do I cherish a hope of this opportunity, soldiers, but from the actual situation. You too, if someone should ask how you, a few men, have defended your camp against many, the vanquished against the victors, would surely give no other answer than that, fearing just that, you had kept everything in a state of defence and also had been in readiness yourselves and inline. And the fact is this: men are least protected against the thing which success leads them not to fear, since what one has made light of remains unguarded and uncovered. There is nothing in the world which the enemy now fear less than that we, who have ourselves just been beset and attacked, may venture to attack their camp. Let us dare what it is incredible that we should dare; for the very reason that it appears most difficult it will be easier. In the third watch of the night I shall lead you in a silent column. I am assured that there is no relieving of sentries, no regular outposts. The sound of a shout at the gate and a first assault will at once capture the camp. Then, among men dazed with sleep and alarmed at the unexpected uproar and surprised unarmed in their beds, let there be the slaughter from which you were recalled yesterday under protest. I know it seems a bold plan. But in dangerous and desperate situations the bravest decisions are always the safest. For if at the opportune moment, whose advantage swiftly passes, one hesitates even a little, it is vain for one to look later for the neglected opportunity. One army is near, two not far away. If we attack now there is no little hope, and already you have tried your strength and theirs. If we put off the day and owing to the report of yesterday's sally come to be no longer despised, there is danger that all the generals and all the forces may combine. Shall we then withstand the enemy's three generals, three armies, which Gnaeus Scipio with his army still undiminished did not withstand? Just as through dividing their forces our generals perished, so the enemy, if divided and in different places, can be overpowered. There is no other way of conducting the war. Therefore let us wait for nothing beyond the favourable moment to-night. Go with the kind aid of the gods, put yourselves in condition, that, sound and strong, you may burst into the camp of the enemy with the same spirit with which you defended yours. With joy they heard of the new plan from their new commander, and the bolder it was the more it pleased them. The rest of the day was spent in putting their arms in order and themselves in condition; and the larger part of the night was given to rest. At the fourth watch they started. Beyond the nearest camp and at a distance of six miles from it were other forces of the Carthaginians. Between them there was a deep valley, densely wooded. About the middle of this wood a Roman cohort and cavalry were concealed after the Punic method. The road being thus cut off at the half-way, the rest of the forces were led in a silent column to the nearest enemy. And as there was no outpost before the gates nor sentinels on the earthwork, and no one anywhere opposed them, they made their way into the camp as if it were their own. Then the trumpets sound and a shout is raised. Some slay the enemy half-asleep, some throw firebrands on the dry, thatched huts, some seize the gates, to block escape. As for the enemy, fire, shouting and slaughter, all at once, make them virtually senseless and do not allow them to hear any orders or to look out for themselves. Unharmed they encounter bodies of armed men. Some rush to the gates, others, since the roads are blocked, leap over the earthwork. And everyone who escaped fled at once in the direction of the other camp; whereupon they were surrounded by the cohort and cavalry dashing out of their hiding place and were slain to the last man. Yet, even if a man had escaped from that slaughter, so swiftly did the Romans hasten from the captured nearer camp to the other camp that news of the disaster could not anticipate them. But there, the farther it was from their enemy, and since some had scattered just before daylight to bring in fodder and firewood and booty, the more neglect and disorder did they find everywhere; only stacked arms at the outposts, the soldiers unarmed, either sitting and lying on the ground or strolling outside the wall and the gates. Against these men, so care-free and regardless of order, the Romans, who were still fired by their recent battle and made confident by victory, went into battle. And so no resistance whatever could be offered at the gates. Inside the gates there was a rush from every part of the camp at the first shouting and commotion, and a fierce battle began. It would have lasted long too, had not the sight of the Romans' bloody shields given the Carthaginians evidence of the other disaster and consequently inspired alarm. This terror made them all take to flight, and pouring out wherever a way could be found —except those overtaken by the sword —they lost possession of the camp. Thus in a night and a day two camps of the enemy were taken by assault under the command of Lucius Marcius. That about thirty-seven thousand of the enemy were slain is the statement of Claudius, who translated Acilius' annals out of Greek into the Latin language; that about one thousand eight hundred and thirty were captured and a vast amount of booty taken. And in this he says that there was a silver shield weighing a hundred and thirty-seven pounds, bearing the likeness of Hasdrubal Barca. Valerius of Antium relates that one camp was captured, that of Mago, and seven thousand of the enemy slain; that in a second battle they sallied out and fought with Hasdrubal; that ten thousand were slain, four thousand three hundred and thirty captured. Piso states that five thousand men were slain from an ambush, while Mago was pursuing in disorder our retreating men. In all of them great is the name of Marcius the general. And to his real fame they add even marvels: that as he was speaking a flame burst from his head without his knowledge, causing great alarm among the soldiers who stood around him. They say that as a memorial of his victory over the Carthaginians, down to the burning of the Capitol there was in the temple a shield called the Marcian, bearing a likeness of Hasdrubal. —Thereafter the situation in Spain was quiet for a long time, since both sides, after receiving and inflicting such losses upon each other, hesitated to risk a decisive engagement. While these things were being done in Spain, it is true that Marcellus, after the capture of Syracuse, had settled matters in general in Sicily with such conscientiousness and honesty that he added not only to his own fame, but also to the dignity of the Roman people. But as regards the adornments of the city, the statues and paintings which Syracuse possessed in abundance, he carried them away to Rome. They were spoils of the enemy, to be sure, and acquired by right of war. Yet from that came the very beginning of enthusiasm for Greek works of art and consequently of this general licence to despoil all kinds of buildings, sacred and profane, a licence which finally turned against Roman gods, and first of all against the very temple which was magnificently adorned by Marcellus. For temples dedicated by Marcus Marcellus near the Porta Capena used to be visited by foreigners on account of their remarkable adornments of that kind; but of these a very small part is still to be seen. Embassies from nearly all the states in Sicily kept coming to him. As their pleas were different, so was their status. Those who before the capture of Syracuse either had not rebelled or had returned to friendly relations were admitted and honoured as faithful allies. Those whom fear had led to surrender after the capture of Syracuse, as vanquished received terms from the victor. There was left to the Romans, however, no small remainder of the war around Agrigentum, namely, Epicydes and Hanno, the surviving commanders in the previous war, and a third new general sent by Hannibal in place of Hippocrates. He was of Libyphoenician race, from Hippacra, and called Muttines by his countrymen, a man of energy who under Hannibal's teaching had mastered all the arts of war. He was furnished by Epicydes and Hanno with Numidian auxiliaries, with which he so thoroughly scoured the enemy's lands and sought out allies, in order to retain their loyalty by lending aid to each man at the right moment, that in a short time he filled all Sicily with his name and was the highest hope of those supporting the Carthaginian cause. And so, after being confined until then within the walls of Agrigentum, the Carthaginian general and the Syracusan, emboldened not more by the advice of Muttines than by their confidence in him to go outside the walls, pitched their camp by the river Himera. When news of this reached Marcellus, he at once set his troops in motion and established himself at a distance of about four miles from the enemy, to wait and see what they were doing or intending. But Muttines gave no occasion or time for hesitation, or for a plan of action; for he crossed the river and attacked the outposts of the enemy, causing great alarm and confusion. The next day by an engagement almost in regular form he drove the enemy inside their fortifications. Then he was recalled by a mutiny of the Numidians breaking out in the camp, after about three hundred of them had retired to Heraclea Minoa. On leaving, to pacify and recall these men, he is said to have expressly warned the generals not to engage the enemy in his absence. At that both generals were indignant, especially Hanno, already uneasy because of the man's fame. To think that Muttines, a degenerate African, should set a limit for him, a Carthaginian commander, sent by senate and people! He prevailed upon the hesitating Epicydes to cross the river and form their battle-line. For if they should wait for Muttines and the fortune of battle should favour, the glory, he said, would unquestionably fall to Muttines. Marcellus, thinking it was a veritable outrage for him, a man who had driven Hannibal, backed by his victory at Cannae, from Nola, to yield to these enemies whom he had himself defeated on land and sea, ordered his soldiers to take up their arms in haste and the standard-bearers to set out. As he was drawing up his army, ten Numidians rode out of the enemy's ranks and at full speed up to him, reporting that their countrymen were aroused, first by the mutiny in which three hundred of their number had retired to Heraclea, and then by seeing their commander sent away just on the eve of battle by generals who belittled his reputation, and that in the fight they would remain inactive. A deceitful race kept its promise faithfully. And so the Romans' spirits rose when the message was sent swiftly through the ranks that the enemy had been deserted by his cavalry, which they had particularly dreaded; at the same time the enemy were terrified not only because they were having no help from the largest part of their forces, but also by the fear thus aroused that they might themselves be attacked by their own cavalry. Accordingly it was no great struggle; the first shout, the first onset, decided the matter. The Numidians, having remained motionless on the wings at the beginning of the battle, seeing their men retreating, shared only the flight with them for a short time. When they saw them all making for Agrigentum in a panic-stricken column, they themselves scattered in every direction to the neighbouring cities, fearing a siege. Many thousand men were slain . . . thousand captured, also eight elephants. This was Marcellus' last battle in Sicily; from it he returned as victor to Syracuse. By this time the year was nearly at an end. Accordingly the senate at Rome decreed that Publius Cornelius, the praetor, should send a letter to the consuls at Capua, saying that, while Hannibal was far away and there was no decisive action around Capua, one of them, if they thought it best, should come to Rome for the replacement of magistrates. On receiving the letter the consuls arranged between them that Claudius should conduct the elections, and Fulvius remain near Capua. For the consulship Claudius announced the election of Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus and Publius Sulpicius Galba, son of Servius, although he had previously held no curule office. As praetors the following were then elected: Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Gaius Sulpicius, Gaius Calpurnius Piso. The duties of the city praetor fell to Piso, Sicily to Sulpicius, Apulia to Cethegus, Sardinia to Lentulus. As for the consuls, their military authority was continued for one year.

Perseus Latin. CTS URN phi0914.phi00125.perseus-eng1. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. Source.