Attic Nights

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1.21.1
The positive assertion of Julius Hyginus that he had read a manuscript of Virgil from the poet's own household, in which there was written et ora tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror and not the usual reading, sensu torquebit amaro.
1.21.2
NEARLY everyone reads these lines from the Georgics of Virgi in this way: At sapor indicium faciet manifestus et ora Tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro. Hyginus, however, on my word no obscure grammarian, in the Commentaries which he wrote on Virgil, declares and insists that it was not this that Virgil left, but what he himself found in a copy which had come from the home and family of the poet: et ora Tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror, and this reading has commended itself, not to Hyginus alone, but also to some other learned men, because it seems absurd to say the taste will distort with its bitter sensation. Since, they say, taste itself is a sensation, it cannot have another sensation in itself, but it is exactly as if one should say, 'the sensation will distort with a bitter sensation.' Moreover, when I had read Hyginus' note to Favorinus, and the strangeness and harshness of the phrase sensu torquebit amaro at once had displeased him, he said with a laugh: I am ready to swear by Jupiter and the stone, which is considered the most sacred of oaths, that Virgil never wrote that, but I believe that Hyginus is right. For Virgil was not the first to coin that word arbitrarily, but he found it in the poems of Lucretius and made use of it, not disdaining to follow the authority of a poet who excelled in talent and power of expression. The passage, from the fourth book of Lucretius, reads as follows: dilutaque contra Cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror. And in fact we see that Virgil imitated, not only single words of Lucretius, but often almost whole lines and passages.
1.22.1
Whether it is correct Latin for counsel for the defence to say superesse se, that he is appearing for those whom he is defending; and the proper meaning of superesse.
1.22.2
AN incorrect and improper meaning of a word has been established by long usage, in that we use the expression hic illi superest when we wish to say that anyone appears as another's advocate and pleads his cause. And this is not merely the language of the streets and of the common people, but is used in the forum, the comitium and the courts. Those, however, who have spoken language undefiled have for the most part used superesse in the sense of to overflow, be superfluous, or exceed the required amount. Thus Marcus Varro, in the satire entitled You know not what evening may bring, uses superfuisse in the sense of having exceeded the amount proper for the occasion. These are his words: Not everything should be read at a dinner party, but preferably such works as are at the same time improving and diverting, so that this feature of the entertainment also may seem not to have been neglected, rather than overdone.
1.22.3
I remember happening to be present in the court of a praetor who was a man of learning, and that on that occasion an advocate of some repute pleaded in such fashion that he wandered from the subject and did not touch upon the point at issue. Thereupon the praetor said to the man whose case was before him: You have no counsel. And when the pleader protested, saying I am present (supersum) for the honourable gentleman, the praetor wittily retorted: You surely present too much, but you do not represent your client.
1.22.4
Marcus Cicero, too, in his book entitled On Reducing the Civil Law to a System wrote these words: Indeed Quintus Aelius Tubero did not fall short of his predecessors in knowledge of the law, in learning he even outstripped them. In this passage superfuit seems to mean he went beyond, surpassed and excelled his predecessors in his learning, which, however, was excessive and overabundant ; for Tubero was thoroughly versed in Stoic dialectics. Cicero's use of the word in the second book of the Republic also deserves attention. This is the passage in question: I should not object, Laelius, if I did not think that these friends wished, and if I myself did not desire, that you should take some part in this discussion of ours, especially since you yourself said yesterday that you would give us even more than enough (te superfuturum). But that indeed is impossible: we all ask you not to give us less than enough (ne desis).
1.22.5
Now Julius Paulus, the most learned man within my recollection, used to say witll keenness and understanding that superesse and its Greek equivalent had more than one meaning: for he declared that the Greeks used perisso/n both ways, either of what was superfluous and unnecessary or of what was too abundant, overflowing and excessive; that in the same way our earlier writers also employed superesse sometimes of what was superfluous, idle and not wholly necessary, a sense which we have just cited from Varro, and sometimes, as in Cicero, of that which indeed surpassed other things in copiousness and plentifulness, yet was immoderate and too extensive, and gushed forth more abundantly than was sufficient. Therefore one who says superesse se with reference to a man whom he is defending tries to convey none of these meanings, but uses superesse in a sense that is unknown and not in use. And he will not be able to appeal even to the authority of Virgil, who in his Georgics wrote as follows: I will be first to bear, so but my life still last (supersit), Home to my native land . . . For in this place Virgil seems to have used that word somewhat irregularly in giving supersit the sense of be present for a longer or more extended period, but on the contrary his use of the word in the following line is more nearly the accepted one: They cut him tender grass, Give corn and much fresh water, that his strength Be more than equal to (superesse) the pleasing toil. for here superesse means to be more than equal to the task and not to be crushed by it.
1.22.6
I also used to raise the question whether the ancients used superesse in the sense of to be left and be lacking for the completion of an act. For to express that idea Sallust says, not superesse, but superare. These are his words in the Jugurtha: This man was in the habit of exercising a command independently of the king, and of attending to all business which had been left undone (superaverant) by Jugurtha when he was weary or engaged in more important affairs. But we find in the third book of Ennius' Annals: Then he declares one task's left over (super esse) for him, that is, is left and remains undone; but there superesse must be divided and read as if it were not one part of speech, but two, as in fact it is. Cicero, however, in his second Oration against Antony expresses what is left by restare, not by superesse.
1.22.7
Besides these uses we find superesse with the meaning survive. For it is so employed in the book of letters of Marcus Cicero to Lucius Plancus, as well as in a letter of Marcus Asinius Pollio to Cicero, as follows: For I wish neither to fail the commonwealth nor to survive it (superesse), meaning that if the commonwealth should be destroyed and perish, he does not wish to live. Again in the Asinaria of Plautus that same force is still more evident in these, the first verses of that comedy: As you would hope to have your only son Survive (superesse) you and be ever sound and hale.
1.22.8
Thus we have to avoid, not merely an improper use of the word, but also the evil omene, in case an older man, acting as advocate for a youth, should say that he survives him.
1.23.1
Who Papirius Praetextatus was; the reason for that surname; and the whole of the entertaining story about that same Papirius.
1.23.2
THE story of Papirius Praetextatus was told and committed to writing in the speech which Marcus Cato made To the soldiers against Galba, with great charm, brilliance and elegance of diction. I should have included Cato's own words in this very commentary, if I had had access to the book at the time when I dictated this extract. But if you would like to hear the bare tale, without the noble and dignified language, the incident was about as follows: It was formerly the custom at Rome for senators to enter the House with their sons under age. In those days, when a matter of considerable importance had been discussed and was postponed to the following day, it was voted that no one should mention the subject of the debate until the matter was decided. The mother of the young Papirius, who had been in the House with his father, asked her son what the Fathers had taken up in the senate. The boy replied that it was a secret and that he could not tell. The woman became all the more eager to hear about it; the secrecy of the matter and the boy's silence piqued her curiosity; she therefore questioned him more pressingly and urgently. Then the boy, because of his mother's insistence, resorted to a witty and amusing falsehood. He said that the senate had discussed the question whether it seemed more expedient, and to the advantage of the State, for one man to have two wives or one woman to have two husbands. On hearing this, she is panic-stricken, rushes excitedly from the house, and carries the news to the other matrons. Next day a crowd of matrons came to the senate, imploring with tears and entreaties that one woman might have two husbands rather than one man two wives. The senators, as they entered the House, were wondering at this strange madness of the women and the meaning of such a demand, when young Papirius, stepping forward to the middle of the House, told in detail what his mother had insisted on hearing, what he himself had said to her, in fact, the whole story exactly as it had happened. The senate paid homage to the boy's cleverness and loyalty, but voted that thereafter boys should not enter the House with their fathers, save only this Papirius; and the boy was henceforth honoured with the surname Praetextatus, because of his discretion in keeping silent and in speaking, while he was still young enough to wear the purple-bordered gown.
1.24.1
Three epitaphs of three early poets, Naevius, Plautus and Pacuvius, composed by themselves and inscribed upon their tombs.
1.24.2
THERE are three epitaphs of famous poets, Gnaeus Naevius, Plautus and Marcus Pacuvius, composed by themselves and left to be inscribed upon their tombs, which I have thought ought to be included among these notes, because of their distinction and charm.
1.24.3
The epitaph of Naevius, although full of Campanian arrogance, might have been regarded as a just estimate, if he had not written it himself:
1.24.4
If that immortals might for mortals weep,
1.24.5
Then would divine Camenae weep for Naevius.
1.24.6
For after he to Orcus as treasure was consigned,
1.24.7
The Romans straight forgot to speak the Latin tongue.
1.24.8
We should be inclined to doubt whether the epitaph of Plautus was really by his own hand, if it had not been quoted by Marcus Varro in the first book of his work On Poets: Since Plautus has met death, Comedy mourns, Deserted is the stage; then Laughter, Sport and Wit, And Music's countless numbers all together wept.
1.24.9
Pacuvius' epitaph is the most modest and simple, worthy of his dignity and good taste: Young man, although you haste, this little stone Entreats thee to regard it, then to read its tale. Here lie the bones of Marcus, hight Pacuvius. Of this I would not have you unaware. Good-bye.
1.25.1
Marcus Varro's definition of the word indutiae ; to which is added a somewhat careful investigation of the derivation of that word.
1.25.2
MARCUS VARRO, in that book of his Antiquities of Man which treats Of War and Peace, defines indutiae (a truce) in two ways. A truce, he says, is peace for a few days in camp; and again in another place, A truce is a holiday in war. But each of these definitions seems to be wittily and happily concise rather than clear or satisfactory. For a truce is not a peace—since war continues, although fighting ceases—nor is it restricted to a camp or to a few days only. For what are we to say if a truce is made for some months, and the troops withdraw from camp into the towns? Have we not then also a truce? Again, if a truce is to be defined as only lasting for a few days, what are we to say of the fact, recorded by Quadrigarius in the first book of his Annals, that Gaius Pontius the Samnite asked the Roman dictator for a truce of six hours? The definition a holiday in war, too, is rather happy than clear or precise.
1.25.3
Now the Greeks, more significantly and more pointedly, have called such an agreement to cease from fighting e)kexeiri/a, or a staying of hands, substituting for one letter of harsher sound a smoother one. For since there is no fighting at such a time and their hands are withheld, they called it e)kexeiri/a. But it surely was not Varro's task to define a truce too scrupulously, and to observe all the laws and canons of definition; for he thought it sufficient to give an explanation of the kind which the Greeks call tu/poi (typical ) and u(pografai/ (outline ), rather than o(rismoi/ (exact definition ).
1.25.4
I have for a long time been inquiring into the derivation of indutiae, but of the many explanations which I have either heard or read this which I am going to mention seems most reasonable. I believe that indutiae is made up of inde uti iam (that from then on ). The stipulation of a truce is to this effect, that there shall be no fighting and no trouble up to a fixed time, but that after that time all the laws of war shall again be in force. Therefore, since a definite date is set and an agreement is made that before that date there shall be no fighting but when that time comes, that from then on, fighting shall be resumed: by uniting (as it were) and combining those words which I have mentioned the term indutiae is formed.
1.25.5
But Aurelius Opilius, in the first book of his work entitled The Muses, says: It is called a truce when enemies pass back and forth from one side to another safely and without strife; from this the name seems to be formed, as if it were initiae, that is, an approach and entrance. I have not omitted this note of Aurelius, for fear that it might appear to some rival of these Nights a more elegant etymology, merely because he thought that it had escaped my notice when I was investigating the origin of the word.
1.26.1
The answer of the philosopher Taurus, when I asked him whether a wise man ever got angry.
1.26.2
I ONCE asked Taurus in his lecture-room whether a wise man got angry. For after his daily discourses he often gave everyone the opportunity of asking whatever questions he wished. On this occasion he first discussed the disease or passion of anger seriously and at length, setting forth what is to be fund in the books of the ancients and in his own commentaries; then, turning to me who had asked the question, he said: This is what I think about getting angry, but it will not be out of place for you to hear also the opinion of my master Plutarch, a man of great learning and wisdom. Plutarch, said he, once gave orders that one of his slaves, a worthless and insolent fellow, but one whose ears had been filled with the teachings and arguments of philosophy, should be stripped of his tunic for some offence or other and flogged. They had begun to beat him, and the slave kept protesting that he did not deserve the flogging; that he was guilty of no wrong, no crime. Finally, while the lashing still went on, he began to shout, no longer uttering complaints or shrieks and groans, but serious reproaches. Plutarch's conduct, he said, was unworthy of a philosopher; to be angry was shameful: his master had often descanted on the evil of anger and had even written an excellent treatise Peri\ )Aorghsi/as; it was in no way consistent with all that was written in that book that its author should fall into a fit of violent rage and punish his slave with many stripes. Then Plutarch calmly and mildly made answer: ' What makes you think, scoundrel, that I am now angry with you. Is it from my expression, my voice, my colour, or even my words, that you believe me to be in the grasp of anger? In my opinion my eyes are not fierce, my expression is not disturbed, I am neither shouting madly nor foaming at the mouth and getting red in the face; I am saying nothing to cause me shame or regret; I am not trembling at all from anger or making violent gestures. For all these actions, if you did but know it, are the usual signs of angry passions.' And with these words, turning to the man who was plying the lash, he said: 'In the meantime, while this fellow and I are arguing, do you keep at it.'
1.26.3
Now the sum and substance of Taurus' whole disquisition was this: he did not believe that a)orghsi/a or freedom from anger, and a)nalghsi/a, or lack of sensibility, were identical; but that a mind not prone to anger was one thing, a spirit a)na/lghtos and a)nai/sqhtos, that is, callous and unfeeling, quite another. For as of all the rest of the emotions which the Latin philosophers call affects or affectiones, and the Greeks pa/qh, so of the one which, when it becomes a cruel desire for vengeance, is called anger, he did not recommend as expedient a total lack, ste/rhsis as the Greeks say, but a moderate amount, which they call metrio/ths.
2.1.1
How Socrates used to train himself in physical endurance; and of the temperate habits of that philosopher.
2.1.2
Among voluntary tasks and exercises for strengthening his body for any chance demands upon its endurance we are told that Socrates habitually practised this one: he would stand, so the story goes, in one fixed position, all day and all night, from early dawn until the next sunrise, open-eyed, motionless, in his very tracks and with face and eyes riveted to the same spot in deep meditation, as if his mind and soul had been, as it were, withdrawn from his body. When Favorinus in his discussion of the man's fortitude and his many other virtues had reached this point, he said: He often stood from sun to sun, more rigid than the tree trunks.
2.1.3
His temperance also is said to have been so great, that he lived almost the whole period of his life with health unimpaired. Even amid the havoc of that plague which, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, devastated Athens with a deadly species of disease, by temperate and abstemious habits he is said to have avoided the ill-effects of indulgence and retained his physical vigour so completely, that he was not at all affected by the calamity common to all.
2.2.1
What rules of courtesy should be observed by fathers and sons in taking their places at able, keeping their seats, and similar matters at home and elsewhere, when the sons are magistrates and the fathers private citizens; and a discourse of the philosopher Taurus on this subject, with an illustration taken from Roman history.
2.2.2
THE governor of the province of Crete, a man of senatorial rank, had come to Athens for the purpose of visiting and becoming acquainted with the philosopher Taurus, and in company with this same governor was his father. Taurus, having just dismissed his pupils, was sitting before the door of his room, and we stood by his side conversing with him. In came the governor of the province and with him his father. Taurus arose quietly, and after salutations had been exchanged, sat down again. Presently the single chair that was at hand was brought and placed near them, while others were being fetched. Taurus invited the governor's father to be seated; to which he replied: Rather let this man take the seat, since he is a magistrate of the Roman people. Without prejudicing the case, said Taurus, do you meanwhile sit down, while we look into the matter and inquire whether it is more proper for you, who are the father, to sit, or your son, who is a magistrate. And when the father had seated himself, and another chair had been placed near by for his son also, Taurus discussed the question with what, by the gods! was a most excellent valuation of honours and duties.
2.2.3
The substance of the discussions was this: In public places, functions and acts the rights of fathers, compared with tile authority of sons who are magistrates, give way somewhat and are eclipsed; but when they are sitting together unofficially in the intimacy of home life, or walking about, or even reclining at a dinner-party of intimate friends, then the official distinctions between a son who is a magistrate and a father who is a private citizen are at an end, while those that are natural and inherent come into play. Now, your visit to me, said he, our present conversation, and this discussion of duties are private actions. Therefore enjoy the same priority of honours at my house which it is proper for you to enjoy in your own home as the older man.
2.2.4
These remarks and others to the same purport were made by Taurus at once seriously and pleasantly. Moreover, it has seemed not out of place to add what I have read in Claudius about the etiquette of father and son under such circumstances. I therefore quote Quadrigarius' actual words, transcribed from the sixth book of his Annals "The consuls then elected were Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus for the second time and Quintus Fabius Maximus, son of the Maximus who had been consul the year before. The father, at the time proconsul, mounted upon a horse met his son the consul, and because lie was his father, would not dismount, nor did the lictors, who knew that the two men lived in the most perfect harmony, presume to order him to do so. As the father drew near, the consul said: What next? The lictor in attendance quickly understood and ordered Maximus the proconsul to dismount. Fabius obeyed the order and warmly commended his son for asserting the authority which he had as the gift of the people."
2.3.1
For what reason our forefathers inserted the aspirate h in certain verbs and nouns.
2.3.2
THE letter h (or perhaps it should be called a breathing rather than a letter) was added by our forefathers to give strength and vigour to the pronunciation of many words, in order that they might have a fresher and livelier sound; and this they seem to have done from their devotion to the Attic language, and under its influence. It is well known that the people of Attica, contrary to the usage of the other Greek races, pronounced i(xqu/s (fish), i(/ppos (horse), and many other words besides, with a rough breathing on the first letter. In the same way our ancestors said lachrumae (tears), sepulchrum (burial-place), ahenum (of bronze), vehemens (violent), incohare (begin), helluari (gormandize), hallucinari (dream), honera (burdens), honustum (burdened). For in all these words there seems to be no reason for that letter, or breathing, except to increase the force and vigour of the sound by adding certain sinews, so to speak.
2.3.3
But apropos of the inclusion of ahenum among my examples, I recall that Fidus Optatus, a grammarian of considerable repute in Rome, showed me a remarkably old copy of the second book of the Aeneid, bought in the Sigillaria for twenty pieces of gold, which was believed to have belonged to Virgil himself. In that book, although the following two lines were written thus: Before the entrance-court, hard by the gate, With sheen of brazen (aena) arms proud Pyrrhus gleams, we observed that the letter h had been added above the line, changing aena to ahena. So too in the best manuscripts we find this verse of Virgil's written as follows: Or skims with leaves the bubbling brass's (aleni) wave.
2.4.1
The reason given by Gavius Bassus for calling a certain kind of judicial inquiry divitiatio; and the explanation that others have given of the same term.
2.4.2
WHEN inquiry is made about the choice of a prosecutor, and judgment is rendered on the question to which of two or more persons the prosecution of a defendant, or a share in the prosecution, is to be entrusted, this process and examination by jurors is called divinatio. The reason for the use of this term is a matter of frequent inquiry.
2.4.3
Gavius Bassus, in the third book of his work On the Origin of Terms, says: This kind of trial is called divinatio because the juror ought in a sense to divine what verdict it is proper for him to give. The explanation offered in these words of Gavius Bassus is far from complete, or rather, it is inadequate and meagre. But at least he seems to be trying to show that divinatio is used because in other trials it is the habit of the juror to be influenced by what he has heard and by what has been shown by evidence or by witnesses; but in this instance, when a prosecutor is to be selected, the considerations which can influence a juror are very few and slight, and therefore he must, so to speak, divine what man is the better fitted to make the accusation.
2.4.4
Thus Bassus. But some others think that the divinatio is so called because, while prosecutor and defendant are two things that are, as it were, related and connected, so that neither can exist without the other, yet in this form of trial, while there is already a defendant, there is as yet no prosecutor, and therefore the factor which is still lacking and unknown—namely, what man is to be the prosecutor—must be supplied by divination.
2.5.1
How elegantly and clearly the philosopher Favorinus described the difference between the style of Plato and that of Lysias.
2.5.2
FAVORINUS used to say of Plato and Lysias: If you take a single word from a discourse of Plato or change it, and do it with the utmost skill, you will nevertheless mar the elegance of his style; if you do the same to Lysias, you will obscure his meaning.
2.6.1
On some words which Virgil is asserted to have used carelessly and negligently; and the answer to be made to those who bring this false charge.
2.6.2
SOME grammarians of an earlier time, men by no means without learning and repute, who wrote commentaries on Virgil, and among them Annaeus Cornutus, criticize the poet's use of a word in the following verses as careless and negligent: That, her white waist with howling monsters girt, Dread Scylla knocked about (vexasse) Ulysses' ships Amid the swirling depths, and, piteous sight! The trembling sailors with her sea-dogs rent. They think, namely, that vexasse is a weak word, indicating a slight and trivial annoyance, and not adapted to such a horror as the sudden seizing and rending of human beings by a ruthless monster.
2.6.3
They also criticize another word in the following: Who has not heard Of king Eurystheus' pitiless commands And altars of Busiris, the unpraised (inlaudati)? Inlaudati, they say, is not at all a suitable world, but is quite inadequate to express abhorrence of a wretch who, because he used to sacrifice guests from all over the world, was not merely undeserving of praise, but rather deserving of the abhorrence and execration of the whole human race.
2.6.4
They have criticized still another word in the verse: Through tunic rough (squalentem) with gold the sword drank from his pierced side, on the ground that it is out of place to say auro squalentem, since the filth of squalor is quite opposed to the brilliance and splendour of gold.
2.6.5
Now as to the word vexasse, I believe the following answer may be made: vexasse is an intensive verb, and is obviously derived from ve- here, in which there is already some notion of compulsion by another; for a man who is carried is not his own master. But vexare, which is derived from vehere, unquestionably implies greater force and impulse. For vexare is properly used of one who is seized and carried away, and dragged about hither and yon; just as taxare denotes more forcible and repeated action than tangere, from which it is undoubtedly derived; and iactare a much fuller and more vigorous action than iacere, from which it comes; and quassare something severer and more violent than quatere. Therefore, merely because vexare is commonly used of the annoyance of smoke or wind or dust is no reason why the original force and meaning of the word should be lost; and that meaning was preserved by the earlier writers who, as became them, spoke correctly and clearly.
2.6.6
Marcus Cato, in the speech which he wrote On the Achaeans, has these words: And when Hannibal was rending and harrying (vexaret) the land of Italy. 'hat is to say, Cato used vexare of the effect on Italy of Hannibal's conduct, at a time when no species of disaster, cruelty or savagery could be imagined which Italy did not suffer from his hands. Marcus Tullius, in his fourth Oration against Verres, wrote: This was so pillaged and ravaged by that wretch, that it did not seem to have been laid waste (vexata) by an enemy who in the heat of war still felt some religious scruple and some respect for customary law, but by barbarous pirates.
2.6.7
But concerning inlaudatus it seems possible to give two answers. One is of this kind: There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari.) And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb: Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose. But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as freedom from all reproach makes one inculpatus (blameless). Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example: And not unwillingly they charged, and again: Not then would you divine Atrides see Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight. Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words: The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains. Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool unlovely. For just as he expressed abhorrence of the unpraised man by the denial of praise, so he abhorred the unlovable by the denial of love. Another defence of inlaudatus is this: laudare in early Latin means to name and cite. Thus in civil actions they use laudare of an authority, when he is cited. Conversely, the inlaudatus is the same as the inlaudabilis, namely, one who is worthy neither of mention nor remembrance, and is never to be named; as, for example, in days gone by the common council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention the name of the man who had burned the temple of Diana at Ephesus.
2.6.8
There remains the third criticism, his use of the expression a tunic rough with gold. But squalentem signifies a quantity or thick layer of gold, laid on so as to resemble scales. For squalere is used of the thick, rough scales (squamae) which are to be seen on the skins of fish or snakes. This is made clear both by others and indeed by this same poet in several passages; thus: A skin his covering was, plumed with brazen scales (squamis) And clasped with gold. and again: And now has he his flashing breastplate donned, Bristling with brazen scales (squamis). Accius too in the Pelopidae writes thus: This serpent's scales (squamae) rough gold and purple wrought. Thus we see that squalere was applied to whatever was overloaded and excessively crowded with anything, in order that its strange appearance might strike terror into those who looked upon it. So too on neglected and scaly bodies the deep layer of dirt was called squalor, and by long and continued use in that sense the entire word has become so corrupted, that finally squalor has come to be used of nothing but filth.
2.7.1
Of the obedience of children to their parents; and quotations on this subject from the writings of the philosophers, in which it is inquired whether all a father's commands should be obeyed.
2.7.2
IT is a frequent subject of discussion with philosophers, whether a father should always be obeyed, whatever the nature of his commands. As to this question writers On Duty, both Greeks and our own countrymen, have stated that there are three opinions to be noticed and considered, and these they have differentiated with great acuteness The first is, that all a father's commands must be obeyed; the second, that in some he is to be obeyed, in others not; the third, that it is not necessary to yield to and obey one's father in anything.
2.7.3
Since at first sight this last opinion is altogether shameful, I shall begin by stating what has been said on that point. A father's command, they say, is either right or wrong. If it is right, it is not to be obeyed because it is his order, but the thing must be done because it is right that it be done. If his command is wrong, surely that should on no account be done which ought not to be done. Thus they arrive at the conclusion that a father's command should never be obeyed. But I have neither heard that this view has met with approval —for it is a mere quibble, both silly and foolish, as I shall presently show—nor can the opinion which we stated first, that all a father's commands are to be obeyed, be regarded as true and acceptable. For what if he shall command treason to one's country, a mother's murder, or some other base or impious deed? The intermediate view, therefore, has seemed best and safest, that some commands are to be obeyed and others not. But yet they say that commands which ought not to be obeyed must nevertheless be declined gently and respectfully, without excessive aversion or bitter recrimination, and rather left undone than spurned.
2.7.4
But that conclusion from which it is inferred, as has been said above, that a father is never to be obeyed, is faulty, and may be refuted and disposed of as follows: All human actions are, as learned men have decided, either honourable or base. Whatever is inherently right or honourable, such as keeping faith, defending one's country, loving one's friend's, ought to be done whether a father commands it or not; but whatever is of the opposite nature, and is base and altogether evil, should not be done even at a father's order. Actions, however, which lie between these, and are called by the Greeks now me/sa, or neutral, and now a)dia/fora, or indifferent, such as going to war, tilling the fields, seeking office, pleading causes, marrying a wife, going when ordered, coming when called; since these and similar actions are in themselves neither honourable nor base, but are to be approved or disapproved exactly according to the manner in which we perform them: for this reason they believe that in every kind of action of this description a father should be obeyed; as for instance, if he should order his son to marry a wife or to plead for the accused. For since each of these acts, in its actual nature and of itself, is neither honourable nor base, if a father should command it, he ought to be obeyed. But if he should order his son to marry a woman of ill repute, infamous and criminal, or to speak in defence of a Catiline, a Tubulus, or a Publius Clodius, of course he ought not to be obeyed, since by the addition of a certain degree of evil these acts cease to be inherently neutral and indifferent. Hence the premise of those who say that the commands of a father are either honourable or base is incomplete, and it cannot be considered what the Greeks call sound and regular disjunctive proposition. For that disjunctive premise lacks the third member, or are neither honourable nor base. If this be added, the conclusion cannot be drawn that a father's command must never be obeyed.
2.8.1
The unfairness of Plutarch's criticism of Epicurus' knowledge of the syllogism.
2.8.2
PLUTARCH, in the second book of his essay On Homer, asserts that Epicurus made use of an incomplete, perverted and faulty syllogism, and he quotes Epicurus' own words: Death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved is without perception, and what is without perception is nothing to us. Now Epicurus, says Plutarch, "omitted what he ought to have stated as his major premise, that death is a dissolution of body and soul, and then, to prove something else, he goes on to use the very premise that he had omitted, as if it had been stated and conceded. But this syllogism," says Plutarch, cannot advance, unless that premise be first presented.
2.8.3
What Plutarch wrote as to the form and sequence of a syllogism is true enough; for if you wish to argue and reason according to the teaching of the schools, you ought to say: Death is the dissolution of soul and body; but what is dissolved is without perception; and what is without perception is nothing to us. But we cannot suppose that Epicurus, being the man he was, omitted that part of the syllogism through ignorance, or that it was his intention to state a syllogism complete in all its members and limitations, as is done in the schools of the logicians; but since the separation of body and soul by death is self-evident, he of course did not think it necessary to call attention to what was perfectly obvious to everyone. For the same reason, too, he put the conclusion of the syllogism, not at the end, but at the beginning; for who does not see that this also was not due to inadvertence?
2.8.4
In Plato too you will often find syllogisms in which the order prescribed in the schools is disregarded and inverted, with a kind of lofty disdain of criticism.
2.9.1
How the same Plutarch, with obvious captiousness, criticized the use of a word by Epicurus.
2.9.2
IN the same book, Plutarch also finds fault a second time with Epicurus for using an inappropriate word and giving it an incorrect meaning. Now Epicurus wrote as follows: The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of everything that pains. Plutarch declares that he ought not to have said of everything that pains, but of everything that is painful ; for it is the removal of pain, he explains, that should be indicated, not of that which causes pain.
2.9.3
In bringing this charge against Epicurus Plutarch is word-chasing with excessive minuteness and almost with frigidity; for far from hunting up such verbal meticulousness and such refinements of diction, Epicurus hunts them down.
2.10.1
The meaning of favisae Capitolinae; and what Marcus Varro replied to Servius Sulpicius, who asked him about that term.
2.10.2
SERVIUS SULPICIUS, an authority on civil law and a man well versed in letters, wrote to Marcus Varro and asked him to explain the meaning of a term which was used in the records of the censors; the term in question was favisae Capitolinae. Varro wrote in reply that he recalled that Quintus Catulus, when in charge of the restoration of the Capitol, had said that it had been his desire to lower the area Capitolina, in order that the ascent to the temple might have more steps and that the podium might be higher, to correspond with the elevation and size of the pediment ; but that he had been unable to carry out his plan because the favisae had prevented. These, he said, were certain underground chambers and cisterns in the area, in which it was the custom to store ancient statues that had fallen from the temple, and some other consecrated objects from among the votive offerings. And then Varro goes on to say in the same letter, that he had never found any explanation of the term favisae in literature, but that Quintus Valerius Soranus used to assert that what we called by their Greek name thesauri (treasuries) the early Latins termed favisae, their reason being that there was deposited in them, not uncoined copper and silver, but stamped and minted money. His theory therefore was, he said, that the second letter had dropped out of the word flavisae, and that certain chambers and pits, which the attendants of the Capitol used for the preservation of old and sacred objects, were called favisae.
2.11.1
Numerous important details about Sicinius Dentatus, the distinguished warrior.
2.11.2
WE read in the annals that Lucius Sicinius Dentatus, who was tribune of the commons in the consulship of Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius, was a warrior of incredible energy; that he won a name for his exceeding great valour, and was called the Roman Achilles. It is said that he fought with the enemy in one hundred and twenty battles, and had not a scar on his back, but forty-five in front; that golden crowns were given him eight times, the siege crown once, mural crowns three times, and civic crowns fourteen times; that eighty-three neck-chains were awarded him, more than one hundred and sixty armlets, and eighteen spears; he was presented besides with twenty-five decorations ; he had a number of spoils of war, many of which were won in single combat; he took part with his generals in nine triumphal processions.
2.12.1
A law of Solon, the result of careful thought and consideration, which at first sight seems unfair and unjust, but on close examination is found to be altogether helpful and salutary.
2.12.2
AMONG those very early laws of Solon which were inscribed upon wooden tablets at Athens, and which, promulgated by him, the Athenians ratified by penalties and oaths, to ensure their permanence, Aristotle says that there was one to this effect: If because of strife and disagreement civil dissension shall ensue and a division of the people into two parties, and if for that reason each side, led by their angry feelings, shall take up arms and fight, then if anyone at that time, and in such a condition of civil discord, shall not ally himself with one or the other faction, but by himself and apart shall hold aloof from the common calamity of the State, let hint be deprived of his home, his country, and all his property, and be an exile and an outlaw.
2.12.3
When I read this law of Solon, who was a man of extraordinary wisdom, I was at first filled with something like great amazement, and I asked myself why it was that those who had held themselves aloof from dissension and civil strife were thought to be deserving of punishment. Then those who had profoundly and thoroughly studied the purpose and meaning of the law declared that it was designed, not to increase, but to terminate, dissension. And that is exactly so. For if all good men, who have been unequal to checking the dissension at the outset, do not abandon the aroused and frenzied people, but divide and ally themselves with one or the other faction, then the result will be, that when they have become members of the two opposing parties, and, being men of more than ordinary influence, have begun to guide and direct those parties, harmony can best be restored and established through the efforts of such men, controlling and soothing as they will the members of their respective factions, and desiring to reconcile rather than destroy their opponents.
2.12.4
The philosopher Favorinus thought that this same course ought to be adopted also with brothers, or with friends, who are at odds; that is, that those who are neutral and kindly disposed towards both parties, if they have had little influence in bringing about a reconciliation because they have not made their friendly feelings evident, should then take sides, some one and some the other, and through this manifestation of devotion pave the way for restoring harmony. But as it is, said he, most of the friends of both parties make a merit of abandoning the two disputants, leaving them to the tender mercies of ill-disposed or greedy advisers, who, animated by hatred or by avarice, add fuel to their strife and inflame their passions.
2.13.1
That the early writers used liberi in the plural number even of a single son or daughter.
2.13.2
The early orators and writers of history or of poetry called even one son or daughter liberi, using the plural. And I have not only noticed this usage at various times in the works of several other of the older writers, but I just now ran across it in the fifth book of Sempronius Asellio's History. This Asellio was military tribune under Publius Scipio Africanus at Numantia and wrote a detailed account of the events in whose action he himself took part.
2.13.3
His words about Tiberius Gracchus, tribune of the commons, at the time when he was killed on the Capitol, are as follows: For whenever Gracchus left home, he was never accompanied by less than three or four thousand men. And farther on he wrote thus of the same Gracchus: He began to beg that they would at least defend him and his children (liberi); and then he ordered that the one male child which he had at that time should be brought out, and almost in tears commended him to the protection of the people.
2.14.1
That Marcus Cato, in the speech entitled Against the Exile Tiberius, says stitisses vadimonium with an i, and not stetisses; and the explanation of that word.
2.14.2
IN an old copy of the speech of Marcus Cato, which is entitled ,Against the Exile Tiberius, we find the following words: What if with veiled head you had kept your recognizance? Cato indeed wrote stitisses, correctly; but revisers have boldly and falsely written an e and put stelisses in all the editions, on the ground that stitisses is an unmeaning and worthless reading. Nay, it is rather they themselves that are ignorant and worthless, in not knowing that Cato wrote stitisses because sisteretur is used of recognizance, not staretur.
2.15.1
To what extent in ancient days it was to old age in particular that high honours were paid; and why it was that later those same honours were extended to husbands and fathers; and in that connection some provisions of the seventh section of the Julian law.
2.15.2
AMONG the earliest Romans, as a rule, neither birth nor wealth was more highly honoured than age, but older men were reverenced by their juniors almost like gods and like their own parents, and everywhere and in every kind of honour they were regarded as first and of prior right. From a dinner-party, too, older men were escorted home by younger men, as we read in the records of the past, a custom which, as tradition has it, the Romans took over from the Lacedaemonians, by whom, in accordance with the laws of Lycurgus, greater honour on all occasions was paid to greater age.
2.15.3
But after it came to be realised that progeny were a necessity for the State, and there was occasion to add to the productivity of the people by premiums and other inducements, then in certain respects greater deference was shown to men who had a wife, and to those who had children, than to older men who had neither wives nor children. Thus in chapter seven of the Julian law priority in assuming the emblems of power is given, not to the elder of the consuls, but to him who either has more children tinder his control than his colleague, or has lost them in war. But if both have an equal number of children, the one who has a wife, or is eligible for marriage, is preferred. If, however, both are married and are fathers of the same number of children, then the standard of honour of early times is restored, and the elder is first to assume the rods. But when both consuls are without wives and have the same number of sons, or are husbands but have no children, there is no provision in that law as to age. However, I hear that it was usual for those who had legal priority to yield the rods for the first month to colleagues who were either considerably older than they, or of much higher rank, or who were entering upon a second consulship.
2.16.1
Sulpicius Apollinaris' criticism of Caesellius Vindex for his explanation of a passage in Virgil.
2.16.2
VIRGIL has the following lines in the sixth book: Yon princeling, thou beholdest leaning there Upon a bloodless lance, shall next emerge Into the realms of day. He is the first Of half-Italian strain, thy last-born heir, To thine old age by fair Lavinia given, Called Silvius, a royal Alban name (Of sylvan birth and sylvan nurture he), A king himself and sire of kings to come, By whom our race in Alba Longa reign.
2.16.3
It appeared to Caesellius that there was utter inconsistency between thy last-born heir and To thine old age by fair Lavinia given, Of sylvan birth. For if, as is shown by the testimony of almost all the annals, this Silvius was born after the death of Aeneas, and for that reason was given the forename Postumus, with what propriety does Virgil add: To thine old age by fair Lavinia given, Of sylvan birth? For these words would seem to imply that while Aeneas was still living, but was already an old man, a son Silvius was born to him and was reared. Therefore Caesellius, in his Notes on Early Readings, expressed the opinion that the meaning of the words was as follows: Postuma proles, said he, does not mean a child born after the death of his father, but the one who was born last; this applies to Silvius, who was born late and after the usual time, when Aeneas was already an old man. But Caesellius names no adequate authority for this version, while that Silvius was born, as I have said, after Aeneas' death, has ample testimony.
2.16.4
Therefore Sulpicius Apollinaris, among other criticisms of Caesellius, notes this statement of his as an error, and says that the cause of the error is the phrase quem tibi longaevo. Longaevo, he says, does not mean 'when old,' for that is contrary to historical truth, but rather ' admitted into a life that is now long and unending, and made immortal.' For Anchises, who says this to his son, knew that after Aeneas had ended his life among men he would be immortal and a local deity, and enjoy a long and everlasting existence. Thus Apollinaris, ingeniously enough. But yet a long life is one thing, and an unending life another, and the gods are not called of great age, but immortal.
2.17.1
Marcus Cicero's observations on the nature of certain prepositions; to which is added a discussion of the particular matter which Cicero had observed.
2.17.2
AFTER careful observation Marcus Tullius noted that the prepositions in and con, when prefixed to nouns and verbs, are lengthened and prolonged when they are followed by the initial letters of sapiens and felix; but that in all other instances they are pronounced short.
2.17.3
Cicero's words are: Indeed, what can be more elegant than this, which does not come about from a natural law, but in accordance with a kind of usage? we pronounce the first vowel in indoctus short, in insanus long; in immanis short, in infelix long; in brief, in compound words in which the first letters are those which begin sapiens and felix the prefix is pronounced long, in all others short; thus we have conposuit but cōnsuevit, cŏncrepuit but cōnficit. Consult the rules of grammar and they will censure your usage; refer the matter to your ears and they will approve. Ask why it is so; they will say that it pleases them. And language ought to gratify the pleasure of the ear.
2.17.4
In these words of which Cicero spoke it is clear that the principle is one of euphony, but what are we to say of the preposition pro? For although it is often shortened or lengthened, yet it does not conform to this rule of Marcus Tullius. For it is not always lengthened when it is followed by the first letter of the word fecit, which Cicero says has the effect of lengthening the prepositions in and con. For we pronounce prŏficisci, prŏfugere, prŏfundere, prŏfannu and prŏfestumn with the first vowel short, but prōferre, prōfligare and prōficere with that syllable long. Why is it then that this letter, which, according to Cicero's observation, has the effect of lengthening, does not have the same effect by reason of rule or of euphony in all words of the same kind, but lengthens the vowel in one word and shortens it in another.
2.17.5
Nor, as a matter of fact, is the particle con lengthened only when followed by that letter which Cicero mentioned: for both Cato and Sallust say faenoribus copertus est. Moreover cōligatus and cōnexus are pronounced long.
2.17.6
But after all, in these cases which I have cited one can see that this particle is lengthened because the letter n is dropped; for the loss of a letter is compensated by the lengthening of the syllable. This principle is observed also in the word cōgo; and it is no contradiction that we pronounce cŏegi short; for this form cannot be derived from cōgo without violation of the principle of analogy.
2.18.1
That Phaedo the Socratic was a slave; and that several others also were of that condition.
2.18.2
PHAEDO of Elis belonged to that famous Socratic band and was on terms of close intimacy with Socrates and Plato. His name was given by Plato to that inspired dialogue of his on the immortality of the soul. This Phaedo, though a slave, was of noble person and intellect, and according to some writers, in his boyhood was driven to prostitution by his master, who was a pander. We are told that Cebes the Socratic, at Socrates' earnest request, bought Phaedo and gave him the opportunity of studying philosophy. And he afterwards became a distinguished philosopher, whose very tasteful discourses on Socrates are in circulation.
2.18.3
There were not a few other slaves too who afterwards became famous philosophers, among them that Menippus whose works Marcus Varro emulated in those satires which others call Cynic, but he himself, Menippean.
2.18.4
Besides these, Pompylus, the slave of the Peripatetic Theophrastus, and the slave of the Stoic Zeno who was called Persaeus, and the slave of Epicurus whose name was Mys, were philosophers of repute.
2.18.5
Diogenes the Cynic also served as a slave, but he was a freeborn man, who was sold into slavery. When Xeniades of Corinth wished to buy him and asked whether he knew any trade, Diogenes replied: I know how to govern free men. Then Xeniades, in admiration of his answer, bought him, set him free, and entrusting to him his own children, said: Take my children to govern.
2.18.6
But as to the well-known philosopher Epictetus, the fact that he too was a slave is too fresh in our memory to need to be committed to writing, as if it had been forgotten.
2.19.1
On the nature of the verb rescire; and its true and distinctive meaning.
2.19.2
I HAVE observed that the verb rescire has a peculiar force, which is not in accord with the general meaning of other words compounded with that same preposition; for we do not use rescire in the same way that we do rescribere (write in reply), relegere (reread), restituere (restore), . . . and substituere (put in the place of); but rescire is properly said of one who learns of something that is hidden, or unlooked for and unexpected.
2.19.3
But why the particle re has this special force in this one word alone, I for my part am still inquiring. For I have never yet found that rescivi or rescire was used by those who were careful in their diction, otherwise than of things which were purposely concealed, or happened contrary to anticipation and expectation; although scire itself is used of everything alike, whether favourable or unfavourable, unexpected or expected. Thus Naevius in the Triphallus wrote: If ever I discover (rescivero) that my son Has borrowed money for a love affair, Straightway I'll put you where you'll spit no more. Claudius Quadrigarius in the first book of his Annals says: When the Lucanians discovered (resciverunt ) that they had been deceived and tricked. And again in the same book Quadrigarius uses that word of something sad and unexpected: When this became known to the relatives (rescierunt provinqui) of the hostages, who, as I have pointed out above, had been delivered to Pontius, their parents and relatives rushed into the street with hair in disarray. Marcus Cato writes in the fourth book of the Origins: Then next day the dictator orders the master of the horse to be summoned: I will send you, if you wish, with the cavalry.' It is too late,' said the master of the horse, 'they have found it out already (rescicere).'
2.20.1
That for what we commonly call virvaria the earlier writers did not use that term; and what Publius Scipio used for this word in his speech to the people, and afterwards Marcus Varro in his work On Farming.

Perseus Latin. CTS URN phi1254.phi001.perseus-eng1. Via the Perseus Digital Library / Open Greek and Latin TEI corpora. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. Source.